The Representation of God in First Corinthians 8-10: Understanding Paul in the Context of Wisdom, Philo, and Josephus by Rogers, Trent A.
Cedarville University
DigitalCommons@Cedarville
Faculty Dissertations
2015
The Representation of God in First Corinthians
8-10: Understanding Paul in the Context of
Wisdom, Philo, and Josephus
Trent A. Rogers
Cedarville University, trentrogers@cedarville.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.cedarville.edu/faculty_dissertations
Part of the Biblical Studies Commons, and the Religious Thought, Theology and Philosophy of
Religion Commons
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by
DigitalCommons@Cedarville, a service of the Centennial Library. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Dissertations by an authorized
administrator of DigitalCommons@Cedarville. For more information,
please contact digitalcommons@cedarville.edu.
Recommended Citation
Rogers, Trent A., "The Representation of God in First Corinthians 8-10: Understanding Paul in the Context of Wisdom, Philo, and
Josephus" (2015). Faculty Dissertations. 120.
http://digitalcommons.cedarville.edu/faculty_dissertations/120
  
 
LOYOLA UNIVERSITY CHICAGO 
 
 
THE REPRESENTATION OF GOD IN FIRST CORINTHIANS 8-10: 
UNDERSTANDING PAUL IN THE CONTEXT OF 
WISDOM, PHILO, AND JOSEPHUS 
 
 
 
A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO 
THE FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL 
IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
 
PROGRAM IN THEOLOGY 
 
BY 
TRENT A ROGERS 
CHICAGO, IL 
MAY 2015 
 
Copyright by Trent A. Rogers, 2015 
All rights reserved. 
For Rebekah 
iii 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
CHAPTER 1: SURVEY OF THE INTERPRETATIONS OF PAUL’S COHERENCE        
     OR INCOHERENCE IN 1 CORINTHIANS 8-10                                                       1 
   Introduction 1 
   Partition Theories 3 
      Johannes Weiß 4 
      Khiok-Khng Yeo 7 
   Importance of Location  10 
      Wendell Lee Willis 11 
      Gordon D. Fee 14 
      Ben Witherington III      18 
   Rhetorical Approaches 21 
      Chiasm 21 
         Margaret M. Mitchell         21 
      Inclusio  24 
         Peter J. Tomson            24 
      Partitio 27 
         Joop Smit 27 
         John Fotopoulos 29 
         Richard Liong-Seng Phua 34 
   The Contribution of this Study 39 
 
CHAPTER 2: IDOLATRY: CONVERSATIONS AND PATTERNS 41 
   Introduction 41 
   The Complexity of Idolatry Illustrated 43 
      Joseph and Asenath 44 
      Artapanus 50 
      Conclusions 53 
   The Complexity of Idolatry Described 56 
      Sociological Issues 57 
      Issues of Community Practice and Boundaries  60 
      Theological Issues 63 
         The Connection Between the Definitions of God and Non-God 64 
         A Philosophical Approach to Defining God and Non-God 64 
         A Model Adapted for Diaspora Jewish Texts 67 
      Conclusions  68 
   The Complexity of Paul’s Representations of God and Understandings of Idolatry  
      in 1 Corinthians 8-10 69  
   Paul in Context: A Participant in Larger Discussions  70 
      Paul’s Interaction with Jewish Discussions Described 70 
      Paul’s Interaction with Jewish Discussions Illustrated 72 
      Paul’s Novelty in his Interactions with Jewish Discussions 76 
   Summary and Conclusions  78 
 
CHAPTER 3: WISDOM’S POLEMIC AGAINST FALSE RELIGION 81 
iv 
 
   Introduction 81 
   The Structure and the Argument 87 
      Wisdom 13:1-9 95 
      Wisdom 13:10-14:2 100 
      Wisdom 14:3-11 103 
      Wisdom 14:12-31 106 
      Wisdom 15:1-6 111 
      Wisdom 15:7-13 113 
      Wisdom 15:14-19 115 
   Analysis of the Argument 117 
      Exploiting Differences in Greco-Roman Religion 118 
      Moral Arguments 120 
      Satire 121 
      Obvious Deductions 121 
      Use of Scripture (Pss 113 [115], 134 [135]; Is 44; Jer 10) 122 
   Representations of God 123 
      Creator 124 
      The Existing One 125 
      Father 125 
      Eschatological Judge 128 
   Understandings of False Worship 129 
      Thinking Wrongly About God 130 
      Worship of Idols 131 
      Worship of Animals 133 
      Effects of False Worship 134 
   Conclusions 135 
 
CHAPTER 4: PHILO’S POLEMIC AGAINST FALSE RELIGION 137 
   Introduction 137 
   The Structure and the Argument 140 
      Decal. 52-65: Nature Worship 147 
      Decal. 66-76: Idolatry 153 
         Decal. 67-69 156 
         Decal. 70-75 157 
         Decal. 76 159 
      Decal. 76-80: Theriolatry 160 
      Decal. 81: Conclusion to Aberrant Worship 161 
   Analysis of the Argument 162 
      Exploiting Cracks in Greco-Roman Religion 163 
      Ridicule 164 
      Obvious Deductions 165 
      Contrasts 165 
   Representations of God 166 
      Creator 169 
      Father 171 
      King 172 
v 
 
      True Existence  173 
   Understandings of False Worship 174 
      Honoring the Creature Rather Than the Creator 175 
      Polytheism 176 
      Worship of Images 178 
      Error  181 
         Ignorance 182 
         Delusion 182 
      Internalization of Idolatry  183 
   Conclusions 187 
 
CHAPTER 5: JOSEPHUS’ POLEMIC AGAINST FALSE RELIGION 189 
   Introduction 189 
   The Structure and the Argument 194 
      C. Ap. 2.236-8 199 
      C. Ap. 2.239-41 202 
      C. Ap. 2.242-49 204 
      C. Ap. 2.250-54 207 
   Analysis of the Argument 209 
      Character Attacks 211 
      Exploiting the Cracks in Greek Religiosity 211 
      Satirical reductia ad absurdum 212 
      Greek Arbitrariness in Defining the Divine 213 
   Representations of God 214 
      Singular 214 
      Impassible 215 
      Not Like Humans 215 
      Providential 216 
   Understandings of False Worship 216 
   Conclusions 217 
 
CHAPTER 6: PAUL’S POLEMIC AGAINST FALSE RELIGION 220 
   Introduction  220 
   The Structure and the Argument 224 
      Form of First Corinthians  224 
      Occasion and Purpose of First Corinthians 226 
      Structure of First Corinthians 227 
      Structure of Chapters 8-10 232 
      1 Cor 8:1-9 236 
         vv. 1-3 237 
         vv. 4-5 240 
         v. 6 246 
         v. 7 251 
         v. 8 253 
         v. 9 256 
      1 Cor 8:10-13 257 
vi 
 
      1 Cor 9:1-27 259 
      1 Cor 10:1-13 260 
         vv. 1-5 262 
         vv. 6-10 266 
         vv. 11-13 272 
      1 Cor 10:14-22 274 
         vv. 14-17 274 
         vv. 18-22 276 
      1 Cor 10:23-30 278 
         vv. 23-24 279 
         vv. 25-26 280 
         vv. 27-30 281 
      1 Cor 10:31-11:1 282 
   Excursus: Idolatry in the Pauline Material 282 
   Analysis of the Argument 286 
      Maintenance of or Departure from Judaism 287 
      Refutation and Qualification 288 
      Moral Arguments 289 
      Use of Scripture 290 
      Appeal to Christian Practice and Experience 291 
   Representations of God 293 
      Both God and Lord 293 
      Father/Creator 294 
      Lord Jesus Christ 295 
   Understandings of False Worship 297 
   Conclusions 298 
 
CHAPTER 7: SUMMARY, SYNTHESIS, AND SIGNIFICANCE 301 
   Introduction 301 
   Summary of Preceding Chapters 302 
      Chapter 1 302 
      Chapter 2     303 
      Chapter 3      305 
      Chapter 4    306 
      Chapter 5      308 
      Chapter 6         310 
   Synthesis of Arguments by Paul, Wisdom, Philo, and Josephus 313 
      Representations of God 314 
      Defining False Worship 318 
      Understandings of Idols 323 
   Significance of This Study 325 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 328 
 
VITA 347 
  
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 1 
SURVEY OF THE INTERPRETATIONS OF PAUL’S COHERENCE OR 
INCOHERENCE IN 1 CORINTHIANS 8-10 
Introduction 
 
First Corinthians 8:1-11:1 seems to be a relatively independent unit in the letter with a 
singular topic and introduced by περὶ δὲ, but a close reading of these chapters reveals that 
Paul comes to seemingly different conclusions in chapters 8 and 10 concerning what are 
permissible associations with idol food. The predominant interpretation argues that in 
chapter 8, Paul agrees with some of the Corinthians concerning the non-reality of pagan 
idol-gods (8:4), the singular existence of God (8:6), and the indifference of idol food for 
one’s salvation (8:7-8). In principle, Paul agrees that because the pagan gods do not exist, 
the food associated with them is not corrupted by association. The believer need not 
concern himself with how the food would harm himself or offend God; it is only on 
account of another believer that one should consider abstaining from the otherwise 
morally neutral activity of eating food sacrificed to idols. Then, Paul offers himself as an 
example of not participating in a morally neutral activity (i.e. receiving financial support) 
out of a concern for other believers (8:13-9:27).  
Paul’s argument, however, becomes more negative in chapter 10 as he warns the 
Corinthians about the dangers of idolatry by retelling, among other allusions, the effects 
of the Golden Calf incident (10:1-13). The section of 1 Cor 10:14-22 seems to be in 
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contradiction with the permissiveness Paul theoretically agreed to in 1 Cor 8:4-9. In 
10:14-22, Paul commands the Corinthians to flee actual idolatry (εἰδωλολατρία; contra 
8:1 where the subject is εἰδωλόθυτα, food sacrificed to idols) on account of the 
incompatibility of the Lord’s Table and the feasts of idol-gods. The issue is still food 
associated with idol-gods, but Paul has reframed the argument in terms of actual idolatry. 
The problem of contact with food associated with idols is that the idol-gods do have a 
demonic reality. Contact with idol food implies contact with demons. Then in a seeming 
softening of his hardline stance (10:14-22) and a return to his more permissive stance in 
chapter 8, Paul concedes that food (even food associated with idols) is morally neutral 
and one should avoid it only on account of another’s conscience because God is the 
source of all food (10:23-30). 
 Paul’s conclusions seemed so contradictory that early critical scholarship 
challenged the unity of 1 Corinthians by using these chapters as their starting point. Even 
some scholars who argue for the unity of these chapters admit that initially they appear 
inconsistent. For example, Joop Smit comments, “At first sight Paul’s discourse on the 
idol offerings in 1 Cor 8:1-11:1 looks rather incoherent and confronts even the experts 
with insurmountable problems.”1 The arguments range from the idea that Paul is treating 
markedly different issues, employing sophisticated rhetoric, or quoting the Corinthians. 
Most of these explanations are not so simplistic as to assert that only one argument 
accounts for the observed incoherence of these chapters; rather, most of the proposals 
explain the coherence on the basis of multiple factors.  
                                                          
1
 Joop Smit, “About the Idol Offerings”: Rhetoric, Social Contexts and Theology of Paul’s 
Discourse in First Corinthians 8:1-11:1 (Leuven: Peeters, 2000), 149. 
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This chapter will describe and evaluate representative authors who hold to the 
following three positions: Paul’s text is not unified; unity exists if one accounts for the 
different situations or locations; and unity is shown by analyzing Paul’s sophisticated 
rhetorical structures. While most authors employ a combination of these explanations, I 
will group them according to their primary contribution toward an explanation for the 
coherence of 1 Corinthians 8-10. Several authors combine the second and third positions. 
These positions are not treated chronologically because they do not demonstrate a linear 
development. Further, the following review of scholarship is a representative sample of 
different approaches to the coherence of Paul’s argument. Because it is only 
representative, many positions are described by either the first or the most thorough 
treatment of that position. 
Partition Theories 
The (seeming) inconsistency between Paul’s conclusions in 1 Cor 8 and 1 Cor 10 is taken 
seriously by scholars especially after Johannes Weiß. Advocates of partition theories 
argue that the differences between these chapters is so severe that they must originate 
from different correspondences. They have found the contradictions in different sections 
of 1 Corinthians to be more than just apparent contradictions, and have reasoned on this 
basis that the text as we have it is really a composite of several independent treatments of 
similar topics. While the particular partition theories differ considerably, they all share 
the view that 1 Cor 8-10 contains irreconcilable propositions. John C. Hurd notes, 
“Theories for the partition of 1 Corinthians are primarily based on the separation of 10.1-
22(23) from its context. In this section, Paul’s arguments against eating idol meat appear 
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somewhat different from the arguments used by him in 8.1-13 and 10.23-11.1.”2 
Johannes Weiß expounds the earliest and most influential of these theories, and Khiok-
Khng Yeo formulates the most recent and comprehensive example of this approach. 
Johannes Weiß 
Johannes Weiß takes seriously the (seeming) contradictions in Paul’s positions 
and posits different sources to explain the difficulty.
3
 For Weiß, the irreconcilable 
difference is between the indifferent tones in chapter 8 and 10:23-11:1 and the hardline 
stance of 10:1-22. He summarizes Paul’s inconsistent responses: 
The answer is not easy, as two apparent lines of judgment seem to be underlying:  
1) In 10.1-22 Paul takes a rigorous stance as he brings up the warning example of 
the wilderness generation, which was seduced by the daughters of Moab into 
πορνεία and idolatry. He judged their behavior (10.7-8) as inclining towards real 
εἰδωλολατρία…2) Chapter 8 and 10:23-11:1, especially 10:29-30, sound 
altogether different. Here he seems to treat the whole question from the point of 
adiaphoron.
4
 
 
These differences fit into his larger scheme of dividing 1 Corinthians according to the 
tone with which Paul makes his arguments. He argues that 1 Cor 8-10 is derived from the 
intermixing of two independent letters, one written from Ephesus and one from 
                                                          
2
 John Coolidge Hurd, Jr. The Origin of 1 Corinthians (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 
1983), 131. 
3
 Johannes Weiß, Der erste Korintherbrief (Kritisch-exegetischer Kommentar über das Neue 
Testament 5; Göttingen : Dandenhoed & Ruprecht, 1910). His understanding of the incoherence of the 
argument is contained in 210-13. 
4
 Weiß, Korintherbrief, 212, “Die Antwort ist nicht leicht, da zwei verschiedene Reihen von 
Urteilen vorzuliegen scheinen: 1) In 10:1-22 nimmt P. einen rigorosen Standpunkt ein; indem er das 
warnende Beispiel der Wüstengeneration vor Augen stellt, die von den Töchtern Moabs zur πορνεία und 
zum Götzendienst verführt wurden, beurteilt er (10:7-8) ihr Verhalten als hinneigung zu wirklicher 
εἰδωλολατρία…2) Ganz anders klingt Kap. 8 und 10:23-11:1, besonders 10:29-30. hier er scheint die ganze 
Frage unter dem Gesichtspunkt des Adiaphoron.” 
5 
 
Macedonia, with the addition of redactional comments. In 1 Cor 8-10, he divides the 
three traditions as follows:  
1) 8:1-13; 9:19-23; 10:23-11:1 are part of the original letter of 1 Corinthians written 
by Paul. Paul’s stance in these chapters is less restrictive than the added material. 
2) 10:1-22 is an addition to 1 Corinthians that has been abstracted from a previous 
letter of Paul. Paul’s positions in this section are unnuanced. 
3) 9:1-18 does not fit either context; therefore, it is very likely that it is a later 
interpolation. 
 
Paul’s stance in 1 Cor 10:1-22 appears much more forceful than the more nuanced views 
in 1 Cor 8 and 10:23-11:1. Weiß thinks that in 1 Cor 10:1-22 Paul agrees with the weak, 
in line with his Jewish heritage, and prohibits any association with idols because it 
constitutes an association with demons. In 1 Cor 8 and 10:23-11:1, however, Paul shows 
no concern for the possibility of contact with demons and appears to permit some 
consumption of idol-food. Weiß reasons that these differences belie an assumption of 
authorial unity, so he concludes that the hypothesis of multiple letters is necessary for 
logical consistency. 
The benefits of this proposal are several. Paul would not be reduced to a writer 
who did not communicate his thoughts clearly to the audience. The three different 
positions are each coherent in themselves, even if they are in contradiction with adjacent 
positions originating from different sources. 1 Corinthians 10:1-22 is singled out as a 
section that does not seem to argue on the same bases. The strong reliance on the history 
of Israel and reading Christ back into the narrative is not typically the basis for an 
argument in 1 Cor. Nevertheless, the strongest argument against Weiß’ partition theory is 
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that no extant manuscripts question the unity of these chapters.
5
 Moreover, the various 
partition theories in the wake of Weiß do not agree concerning how the text should be 
divided or on the origins of the pieces.
6
 This evidence alone, however, might not be 
sufficient to dismiss partition theories.
7
 In Weiß’ proposal we must question if it offers 
much in the way of explaining the confusion in these chapters for two reasons. First, 
Weiß understands the previous position (10:1-22) and the material original to 1 Cor (8:1-
13; 9:19-23; 10:23-11:1) to be irreconcilable, but they are both from the pen of Paul, so 
Paul is still charged with inconsistency. Of course, it is possible that this difference 
represents a development in Paul’s view on the subject or he may be addressing different 
issues. Second, by ascribing the incoherence to a redactor, Weiß just pushes the problem 
back until a later stage in the text’s development. We are left with either an incompetent 
redactor who could not see the incoherence of the argument or mistaken modern readers 
who do not understand the coherence of the redactor’s argument.8 In either case, we lack 
                                                          
5
 See the critiques of Weiß in Peter D. Gooch, Dangerous Food: 1 Corinthians 8-10 in Its Context 
(Studies in Christianity and Judaism 5. Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1993), 136-9; Alex T. 
Cheung. Idol Food in Corinth: Jewish Background and Pauline Legacy (JSNTSupp 176; Sheffield: 
Sheffield Academic Press, 1999), 82-5; and the critique of partitions theories in Hurd, Origins, 131-42; 
Helmut Merklein, “Die Einheitlichkeit des ersten Korintherbriefes,” ZNW 75 (1984): 155-83.  
6Merklein (“Die Einheitlichkeit”) compares the theories by Weiss, Héring, Schmithals, Dinkler, 
Schenck, Suhl, Schenke and Fischer, and Senft. Their proposed reconstructions of the text range from 
arguing that there were two original letters to 1 Cor being comprised of nine original letters.  
7
 For example, source criticism has long held traction in the Gospel of John despite little 
manuscript evidence for it. Moreover, the source critics have not reached agreement about either the 
division of the text or the origins of the sources. A similar source critical question arises in 1 Cor 14. Some 
scholars question the authenticity of 1 Cor 14:34-36 on the basis that it contradicts previous material in 1 
Cor despite there being no manuscript evidence that it is an addition. For example, see Joseph Fitzmyer, 
S.J. First Corinthians (AB 32; New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008), 528-38. Moreover, scholars who 
employ rhetorical criticism to parse Paul’s argument have reached no more of a consensus concerning 
Paul’s quotation of the Corinthians, but this fact alone does not invalidate the methodology.  
8
 One could argue that the contradiction is due to the emendations of a scribe who was 
uncomfortable with what he read in the text, but that is not the argument Weiß is making. 
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an explanation for the existence of these ‘irreconcilable contradictions’ in the text of 1 
Cor. 
Khiok-Khng Yeo 
Khiok-Khng Yeo attempts “to analyze Paul’s rhetorical interaction with the 
Corinthians over the issues of participating in the cultic meal (1 Cor 10:1-22) and eating 
idol food (1 Cor 8:1-13, 10:23-11:1), and subsequently, to suggest potential implications 
for a cross-cultural hermeneutic.”9 Yeo thinks that literary and textual evidence 
necessitates partitioning 1 Cor into multiple original letters. He mentions four primary 
pieces of evidence. First, Paul mentions the presence of other correspondence.  Second, 
“The abrupt transitions between 1 Cor 6:12 and 13, and between 10:22 and 23 suggest 
fragments of different letters joined together.”10 Third, there is a difference between the 
knowledge of and reactions to the divisions in 1:10-14 and 11:18-19. Fourth, “there 
appears to be a discrepancy between the absolute prohibition of Paul in 1 Cor 10:1-22 
and the seemingly compromising attitude in 1 Corinthians 8 and 10:23-31 concerning 
idol worship.”11 Yeo divides the Corinthian correspondence into a series of six letters 
                                                          
9
 Khiok-Khng Yeo, Rhetorical Interaction in 1 Corinthians 8 and 10: A Formal Analysis with 
Preliminary Suggestions for a Chinese, Cross-Cultural Hermeneutic (Biblical Interpretation Series 9; 
Leidein: Brill, 1995), 1. I have not included Walter Smithals or Robert Jewett, who was Yeo’s Doktorvater, 
in this survey because many of their arguments are adopted and expanded by Yeo. 
10
 Ibid., 80. Other scholars have noted that Yeo overstates these disjunctions as the rhetoric can 
flow smoothly. See for example, John Fotopoulos, Food Offered to Idols in Roman Corinth: A Social-
Rhetorical Reconsideration of 1 Corinthians 8:1-11:1 (WUNT 2.151; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2003), 28; 
Duane F. Watson, review of Yeo, Rhetorical Interaction, RBL (2000). Although it is beyond the scope of 
this study, Fotopoulos and Watson also offer pointed critiques of Yeo’s obscure definition of the strong as 
upper-class, intellectual, ethnically Latin, urbanites, proto-gnostic, and immersed in Hellenistic Jewish 
theology. 
11
 Yeo, Rhetorical Interaction, 80. 
8 
 
which he labels A, B, C, D, E, and F.
12
 Relevant for the analysis of chs. 8-10 are Letters 
B, C, and E. 
Letter B: 9:24-10:22 (authoritative style). 
Letter C: 8:1-13, 9:19-23, 10:23-11:1 (dialogical rhetoric).  
Letter E: 1 Cor 9:1-18 (judicial defense). 
He summarizes the rhetorical differences between Letters B and C:  
In Letter B, the style is authoritative, making use of traditional, Hellenistic 
Jewish, and scriptural material, with hardly any dialogue with the audience. In 
Letter C, however, the dialogical rhetoric is obviously visible in both chapter 8 
and the end of chapter 10. Paul uses creedal and scriptural material, but he also 
interacts substantively with the audience’s material.13  
 
Yeo argues that these letters address different times, audiences, and situations.
14
 The 
issue in 1 Cor 10:1-22 is that of actual idolatry, from which Paul commands them to flee. 
The issue in 8:1-13, 9:19-23, 10:23-11:1 is not actual idolatry, so Paul tries to create a 
community dialogue in order for the strong and weak to interact over the issue of idol-
food. 
Yeo is to be commended for recognizing the difficulties in the text and not 
minimizing them. However, on the one hand he overemphasizes the differences in Paul’s 
arguments, and on the other hand he makes the burden of consistency too high. The 
“abrupt transitions” that he detects can be explained plausibly by rhetorical studies, and 
he seems to dismiss the significant rhetorical argument for coherence advanced by 
                                                          
12
 For a summary of the content, see Ibid., 81-82. 
13
 Ibid., 210. 
14
 He identifies the knowledgeable addressed in Letter C as “proto-Gnostics who are steeped in 
Hellenistic-Jewish theology, especially that of Philo and the Wisdom literature” (155). 
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Margaret Mitchell in Rhetoric of Reconciliation.
15
 He recognizes the distinction in tone 
among these passages, but it does not follow from this that a different tone necessitates a 
different letter. 
Despite the complexity of some of these partition theories, the application of their 
methodology may be to too simplistic. Instead of wrestling with the complexities of the 
argument and the situation at Corinth, they avoid the issues by subdividing the text into 
different letters.
16
 This approach tends to exaggerate the differences between sections in 
order to highlight supposed inconsistencies. The result is that the demand for 
“consistency” is probably too high and too modern.17 Additionally, the divisions are 
based on the somewhat arbitrary and subjective basis of content without corresponding 
syntactical or text critical evidence.
18
 The arbitrariness of their methodology is shown in 
the lack of agreement among the source critics as to where the texts should be divided 
and the number of sources present.
19
 Inconsistency among source critics does not in itself 
                                                          
15
 Margaret M. Mitchell, Paul and the Rhetoric of Reconciliation: An Exegetical Investigation of 
the Language and Composition of 1 Corinthians, (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 1991). 
16
 Martinus C. De Boer (“The Composition of 1 Corinthians,” NTS 40 [1994]:229-45) does not 
argue for a partition theory, but he makes a similar argument. De Boer argues that Paul penned his original 
letter, and in response to subsequent reports, he resumed his writing with different tones. Especially 
important for De Boer is the difference in tone between chs. 1-4 and ch. 5. 
17
 As noted previously, some ancient author or redactor thought that this argument flowed well 
enough. Moreover, the Church Fathers do not detect inconsistency in Paul’s argument.  
18
 It is not that arguments based on content are themselves arbitrary because it is precisely the 
incongruence of the content that alerts the reader to the possibility of different sources. The difficulty of 
arguments made on the basis of content is both in locating a contradiction and evaluating the degree of that 
contradiction. For example, several things that source critics would label as contradictions might be 
explained plausibly as coherent statements by rhetorical analysts. Moreover, one must establish if the 
contradiction rises to the level of competing programs or ideologies or if it is considerably less. Rarely do 
source critics of 1 Corinthians provide methodological controls for these arguments. 
19
 For example, the major partition theorists do not agree about even the number of sources: Weiß 
(2 revised to be 3), Schmithals (3), Yeo (6), Jewett (5). Walter Schmithals, “Die Korintherbriefe als 
Briefsammlung,” ZNW 64 (1973): 263-88. Robert Jewett, “The Redaction of 1 Corinthians and the 
10 
 
invalidate the endeavor, but it makes current proposals less convincing as even those who 
agree about the presence of sources cannot agree about the application of this 
methodology. Perhaps one of the strongest arguments against partition theories is that the 
text critical evidence does not support subdivision into multiple letters. If convincing 
arguments for coherence can be made, they should be preferred to complex theories of 
composition. Anthony Thiselton states, “such partition theories are needed only if 
exegesis fails to reveal a genuine coherence within the epistle.”20 For these reasons it is 
preferable to accept an argument for the coherence of these chapters if it can be made. 
Importance of Location 
Paul explicitly indicates that he addresses more than one location in 1 Cor 8-10. In 1 Cor 
8:10, Paul warns the Corinthians of the possible implications if they are seen dining ἐν 
εἰδωλείῳ (in an the temple of an idol). Then he takes a more permissive stance toward 
food bought ἐν μακέλλῳ (in a meat market). Further, the situation described in 10:26 
seems to be in the house of a non-believer. All interpreters recognize that different 
situations are in view, but they dispute both the specific situations and the cultic 
implications of each situation. For example, does dining ἐν εἰδωλείῳ necessarily imply 
cultic activity, or can the dining halls function like a non-cultic restaurant? Moreover, 
what setting does Paul envision in 10:1-22 where no location is specified? Willis, Fee, 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Trajectory of the Pauline School,” JAARSup 46 (1978): 398-444. Raymond F. Collins, First Corinthians 
(SP 7; Collegeville: Liturgical Press, 1999), 13, also notes that source criticism loses some credibility 
because the interpreters have made alterations to their own theories: “The fact that Weiss and Schmithals, 
two of the major proponents of the partition theory, changed their mind as to precisely how 1 Corinthians is 
to be divided up into component parts militate against the validity of the opinion that Paul’s extant ‘first 
letter to the Corinthians’ is a composite work.” 
20
 Anthony C. Thiselton, The First Epistle to the Corinthians: A Commentary on the Greek Text 
(NIGTC; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2000), 39. 
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and Witherington, make contributions to understanding the coherence of Paul’s argument 
primarily by explaining the locations and their implications. Fee and more so 
Witherington also employ rhetorical analysis in their explanations. 
Wendell Lee Willis 
Wendell Willis’ revised dissertation, Idol Meat in Corinth: The Pauline Argument 
in 1 Corinthians 8 and 10, was a major impetus in turning subsequent discussion of 1 
Corinthians 8-10 to the topic of location and the implications of dining.
21
 Willis describes 
at least three situations in which Corinthians might encounter idol-food, a term which he 
thinks refers primarily to meat: food at formal worship of a pagan deity, meals of 
fraternal organizations at the temples, and private meals at one of the dining halls 
connected to the temple.
22
 He suggests that Corinthian Christians probably did not 
consume idol-meat in order to show their superior knowledge; rather, they likely 
consumed idol-meat in order to maintain their normal social life. He argues against a 
sacramentalist interpretation of pagan meals, which he defines as the idea that “in the cult 
meal the worshippers consumed their deity who was contained (really or symbolically) in 
the sacrificial meat.”23 Willis draws five conclusions from his study of papyrological 
evidence:
24
  
(1) There is insufficient evidence for the sacramental interpretation of cult meals. 
(2) There is a good deal of evidence for a social interpretation.  
                                                          
21
 Wendell Lee Willis, Idol Meat in Corinth: The Pauline Argument in 1 Corinthians 8 and 10 
(SBLDS 68; Eugene, Oreg.: Wipf & Stock, 1985).  
22
 Ibid., 265-6. 
23
 Ibid., 18. 
24
 See his summary, Ibid., 63-4. 
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(3) These meals were normal practices.  
(4) “Because the pagan cult meals were not sacramental (a means of acquiring the 
deity and/or its special powers and traits) nor communal (an occasion of intimate 
relationship between the worshipper and the god), it is unlikely that Paul in 1 Cor 
10:14-21 is trying to warn the Corinthians against the dangers of pagan 
sacraments.”25  
(5) This meat also would be available in the market and homes.  
 
If the meals have a social function, Willis must explain the use of κοινωνία language in 1 
Cor 10, which he asserts means a covenant relationship, not between deity and 
worshipper, but between pagan idolaters and Christians.
26
 While Paul’s tone is harsh in 
10:1-22 where he forbids the idolatrous activity of participating in meals at pagan 
temples, 8:1-13, 10:23-26, and 10:27-11:1 are instances that are not occasions of worship. 
In the latter contexts, Christians must be aware of the effects of their actions on other 
believers. Willis explains the coherence of 1 Cor 8-10: 
It has already been seen that chapter 8 takes its shape because there Paul takes up 
and refutes the Corinthians’ views. But here in 10:1-13 Paul argues for his own 
reasons. The difference in style, and even emphasis, can be explained on that 
basis. Here Paul documents the danger of apostasy in Scripture and will proceed 
in 10:14-22 to warn from contemporary examples. Both are arguments of his own 
choosing.
27
  
 
For Willis, meals in dining halls of pagan temples are not necessarily religious. He argues 
“that in chapter 8 the situation is a meal held in a temple restaurant but not as an occasion 
of worship.”28 In 1 Cor 8, the believer must consider the weaker brother’s conscience. 
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 Ibid., 63. 
26
 On this point especially, see the critique by Cheung, Idol Food, 309-11. 
27
 Willis, Idol Meat, 163. Willis seems to hint that the rhetorical design of Paul’s argument has 
some bearing on the coherence. He acknowledges that Paul quotes and refutes some positions of the 
Corinthians.  
28
 Ibid., 259. He further defines the meal in ch. 8 as “non-cultic meals held in temple precincts” 
(260). 
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But in 1 Cor 10:1-22 Paul introduces the topic of meals that are cultic by intent—meals 
that he forbids outright. The remainder of 1 Cor 10, similar to 1 Cor 8, addresses 
situations which may be permissible but in which the believer must consider other 
believers. 
 Willis’ proposal has been very influential but also strongly criticized. The 
weakest, and also most crucial, element of Willis’ thesis is that meals at pagan temples 
could be almost exclusively social with little to no cultic significance. This non-religious 
“temple restaurant” view dichotomizes the social and religious in a way that would 
probably be foreign to an ancient mind. John Fotopoulos has demonstrated persuasively 
the social and religious implications of meals within the temple precincts and in the 
home.
29
 Another issue with Willis’ interpretation is his generally reductionistic 
understanding of Paul’s Jewish heritage.30 While he attempts to show the nuances of 
different dining situations in Greco-Roman sources, his understanding of the Jewish 
heritage contributing to Paul’s thought is simplistic—Jews rejected cultic associations. 
This assumption cannot be sustained without qualification, especially as evidenced in 
Hellenistic Jewish authors. For example, Artapanus describes the Jewish hero Moses as 
building pagan temples and establishing pagan gods. Lastly, because Willis wants to 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
29
 Fotopoulos, Food Offered, 158-76. Ben Witherington III (“Not So Idle Thoughts about 
EIDOLOTHUTON,” TynBul 44 [1993]: 245) comments, “Accordingly, I must reject W. Willis' 
interpretation that some of the meals in the temple precincts were basically secular in character. Even when 
a club (collegium) or society, or trade guild held a meal in the temple precincts this would have been 
preceded by a specific sacrificial event of worship as described above. So far as I can tell from the classical 
sources, while temple staff might turn extra meat over to a shop owner in the macellum, after which it could 
be sold and eaten at home, there is no evidence of temples simply keeping quantities of meat ready to hand 
in the precincts for basically secular banquets.” 
30
 See for example, Willis, Idol Meat, 222. 
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show that the pagan meal is not sacramental in nature, he must force the Christian 
eucharistic meal into this non-sacramental mold. While he argues that κοινωνία refers to 
the covenantal relationship among human participants, Paul equates the κοινωνία of the 
eucharistic meal as humans participating in the meal with the deity (1 Cor 10:16). I will 
argue, in line with the vast majority of scholars, that the κοινωνία of the eucharist 
describes a relationship between worshipper and deity and cannot be reduced to a social 
relationship among worshippers. 
Gordon D. Fee 
Gordon Fee covers the issue of idol-food in two articles and his commentary on 1 
Corinthians.
31
 He proposes that the 1 Corinthians 8, 9, and 10 are a coherent set of 
chapters addressing two dining situations: meals of pagan worship and meals in a 
person’s home. While many scholars argue that the incoherence is between 8:7-13 and 
10:14-22, Fee argues that the problem is between 8:7-13 and 10:23-11:1. Some scholars 
before Fee had argued that εἰδωλόθυτα in 8:1-13 corresponded to the marketplace food in 
10:23ff, but Fee argues that 1 Cor 8 “is dealing primarily with the eating of sacrificial 
food at the temple itself in the presence of the idol-demon.”32 “This means, further, that 
the prohibition in 10,14-22, rather than a digression, is in fact the main point, to which 
the whole argument of 8,1-10,13 has been leading. The question of marketplace food is 
then taken up after the fact as another issue altogether—although it has close ties to 
Paul’s defense in 9,19-23—and to this issue Paul gives a considerably different 
                                                          
31
 Gordon D. Fee, “II Corinthians VI.14-VII.1 and Food Offered to Idols,” NTS 23 (1977): 140-61; 
“Εἰδωλόθυτα Once Again: An Interpretation of 1 Corinthians 8-10.” Biblica 61 (1980): 172-97; The First 
Epistle to the Corinthians (NICNT; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1987). 
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 Fee, “Εἰδωλόθυτα,” 178. 
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answer.”33  In his assessment εἰδωλόθυτα does not refer to marketplace food but to the 
“eating of sacrificial food at the cultic meals in the pagan temples.”34 And eating at cultic 
meals is the overarching problem that Paul is addressing in 1 Cor 8-10. Fee attempts to 
lay out first the problem at Corinth and second Paul’s response. 
Following Hurd, Fee thinks that there were no divisions among the Corinthians on 
this issue, and the position for which the Corinthians were arguing was one that had 
already been prohibited by Paul. They seem to be arguing for the right to eat feasts at the 
pagan temples. They make four points to support their requests. First, their γνῶσις of 
monotheism implies the non-existence of pagan deities. Second, their γνῶσις of food 
implies that it is a matter of indifference before God. Third, they have an enthusiastic 
understanding of the sacraments that implies their inability to lose their salvation. Fourth, 
they resort to questioning Paul’s apostolic authority. The real issue that Paul addresses in 
1 Cor 8:1-10:22 is the Corinthians’ desire to attend temple meals.  
Paul first takes issue with the basis of Christian ethics; it is to be based on love 
not γνῶσις. Then in 8:7-13 he qualifies their use of γνῶσις: “Food as a matter of 
indifference is about what one eats; it is not true about where—first of all because of 
what it can do to a brother.”35 Chapter 9, then, is both a defense of his apostleship and an 
example of the proper use of freedom.
36
 In 1 Cor 10:1-13, Paul attacks the Corinthians’ 
                                                          
33
 Ibid., 178-9. 
34
 Fee, First Epistle, 359. 
35
 Fee, “Εἰδωλόθυτα,” 191. 
36
 The assessment of ch. 9 as an apostolic defense is criticized by, among others, Fotopoulos, Food 
Offered, 18-20. 
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false sense of security they derive from their participation in sacramental worship 
because he views them to be in real danger of falling away. Paul appeals to the history of 
Israel to warn the Corinthians of the sin of idolatry and to demonstrate that even those 
who drew assurance from “spiritual sacraments” fell under judgment. The biggest “leap” 
that Fee makes is in his assessment of 1 Cor 10:14-22: “Having warned Corinth of the 
same possibility [of coming under God’s judgment], he concludes the argument, 
‘therefore, flee εἰδωλολατρία’. And εἰδωλολατρία of course means eating at the 
temples.”37 The bases of Paul’s prohibition are his understanding of the meal as 
participating with a deity and his understanding of idolatry as the realm of the demonic.
38
 
Only having concluded his treatment of questions by the Corinthians, does Paul then 
address a related but different topic: namely, food in the marketplace. Fee reads 10:31-33 
as paralleling 9:20-23 and argues that Paul must have been known to eat marketplace 
food that had been sacrificed to idols. Some Corinthians had judged Paul on account of 
his practice (10:29), but he appeals to them to follow his example. 
Fee’s proposal that 1 Cor 8:1-10:22 treats the single issue of attending cultic 
meals at pagan temples would seem to exacerbate the problem of coherence. Fee cannot 
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 Ibid., 193. 
38
 Fee’s assessment of Paul’s contexts is somewhat limited. He cites only Old Testament texts to 
demonstrate Paul’s view of idolatry (e.g., Fee, “Εἰδωλόθυτα,” 193, n.32). The reason for Paul’s prohibition 
is “his understanding, based on the OT, of idolatry as the locus of the demonic” (Fee, “Εἰδωλόθυτα,” 193-
4). While Fee is dealing with the limited space of an article, he dismisses altogether the history of 
interpretation between the Old Testament text and Paul’s comments on it. The same oversight is repeated in 
his commentary (Frist Epistle, 462-75). Especially with the concept of idolatry as a realm of demonic 
influence, the contributions of Hellenistic Jewish authors should not be overlooked. This oversight is 
somewhat surprising since he admits that “εἰδωλόθυτα” originates from Hellenistic Judaism (e.g., First 
Epistle, 357 n.1).  Paul, while sometimes a novel interpreter of the LXX, needs to be placed within the 
traditions of biblical interpretation in which he participated. Some will also take issue with his sources of 
Pauline thought. He relies heavily on Colossians and Ephesians—two epistles whose relevance for 1 Cor 
have come into question in more recent scholarship—to assess what was Paul’s view of the demonic realm.  
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appeal to different dining situations to explain the differences in Paul’s tone in 1 Cor 8 
where the argument is made on the basis of another believer’s conscience and 1 Cor 10 
where the argument is made on the basis of committing actual idolatry. Fee’s solution is 
somewhat surprising. He argues that Paul never begins with an imperatival prohibition; 
rather, he begins with the indicative: “An imperative which precedes the indicative 
(obedience in order to be justified) is anathema to Paul; but so also is an indicative with 
no imperative.”39 There are some things that are altogether incompatible with new life in 
Christ, but Paul does not begin with outright prohibition. Paul begins by treating the 
attitude that exalts knowledge and then treats their idolatrous actions.  
It [idolatry] is incompatible with life in Christ as it is experienced at His table. But 
their abuse of ἐξουσία in this matter, based on false γνῶσις and issuing in failure 
to love, is the far greater urgency. Both their attitude and their action are 
incompatible with the Gospel; but their action has resulted from their attitude, and 
it is this matter to which Paul first addresses himself
40
 
 
 This pattern is in line with Paul’s pattern of correcting issues at a deeper level. 
 Fee’s proposal, while valuable, has a number of shortcomings. His assumption 
that εἰδωλολατρία means eating at the temples does not adequately deal with the 
complexities of the issue. If, as Fee argues, 1 Cor 8 and 10:1-22 address the same 
situation of eating at the temple before the idol-demon, how does Paul get from the 
acquiescent tone in 1 Cor 8 to equating the same action with idolatry in 1 Cor 10. The 
explanation that Paul begins with attitude and finishes with actions is inadequate because, 
although this pattern can be observed in other texts, never do the sections appear with 
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 Fee, “Εἰδωλόθυτα,” 196. 
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 Ibid., 197. 
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such different tones.
41
 Moreover, a methodological flaw in Fee’s work is not 
incorporating adequately the findings of rhetorical criticism. In light of Margaret 
Mitchell’s subsequent work, Paul and the Rhetoric of Reconciliation, Fee’s thesis on the 
function of 1 Cor 9 needs revision. Moreover, Fee does not give adequate attention to the 
different manners in which Paul argues in the sections of 1 Cor 8-10; this oversight is 
especially apparent with regard to his silence on the different representations of God 
while he gives much attention to defining other terms.  
Ben Witherington III 
Ben Witherington III, in two articles and a commentary, explains the situations at 
Corinth in a similar manner to Fee, but Witherington buttresses his argument with lexical 
and rhetorical evidence.
42
 Witherington thinks that “some of the Corinthians who claim 
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 Fee, “Εἰδωλόθυτα,” 197, offers 1 Cor 12-14 as an examples of this pattern. These chapters 
provide the closest parallel to 1 Cor 8-10 with 1 Cor 9 and 1 Cor 13 being slight digressions. I agree with 
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activity and then with the imperative of human obedience: “Eating at the idols’ table finally will be 
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experienced at His table. But their abuse of ἐξουσία in this matter, based on false γνῶσις and issuing in 
failure to love, is the far greater urgency. Both their attitude and their action are incompatible with the 
Gospel; but their action had resulted from their attitude, and it is this matter to which Paul first addresses 
himself” (197). Ben Witherington III, “Why Not Idol Meat? Is It What You Eat or Where You Eat?” Bible 
Review 10 (1994): 38-55; “Not So Idle Thoughts,” 248-50, makes the argument that because εἰδωλόθυτα 
refers only to food eaten in the temple, Paul and James (as recorded in Acts 15) are much closer to each 
other. Both James and Paul do not impose dietary restrictions on Gentile Christians (i.e. laws); rather, they 
are concerned with the location of their dining. They prohibit dining at pagan temples where the meal 
involved εἰδωλολατρία and πορνεία. In Witherington’s view, 1 Cor might represent Paul’s attempt to apply 
the prohibition of the Jerusalem Council to Corinth. For the position that Paul’s treatment in 1 Cor has 
nothing to do with the Jerusalem Council, see Manson, “Corinthian Correspondence,” 200-201; David E. 
Garland, 1 Corinthians (BECNT; Grand Rapids: Baker, 2003), 353-7. Fitzmyer (First Corinthians, 332-5) 
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to have ‘knowledge’ are rejecting Paul’s earlier prohibition of going to pagan temples” 
which they defend through their theology of the non-reality of pagan deities and the 
moral indifference of food.
43
 While Fee had argued that this group represented all the 
Corinthians, Witherington locates this group as socially enlightened males. 
Witherington’s assessment of Paul is that he is concerned with the location of eating, 
with its attendant activities, more than the food itself. He does not maintain his Jewish 
sensibilities concerning food, and in Witherington’s view has departed a great deal from 
his Jewish tradition.
44
 Witherington’s major contribution is to demonstrate that “A study 
of all the NT references to εἰδωλόθυτον reveals that this term in the early period was 
distinguishable from ἱερόθυτον (sacred food), and that it meant meat sacrificed to and 
eaten in the presence of an idol, or in the temple precincts.”45 Like Fee, Witherington 
thinks that Paul is addressing the same issue in 1 Cor 8 and 1 Cor 10, and he appeals to 
the ABA rhetorical structure , with 1 Cor 9 being a partial although related digression.
46
  
Paul follows his standard procedure of first dealing with the error’s theological 
root, the point at which it touches the heart of the gospel, and then dealing with 
the fruit of bad theology. The root of the problem is that the members of the 
gnōsis group, while having some of the right Pauline ideas, have drawn the wrong 
                                                                                                                                                                             
claims that there is no evidence that Paul knew of the decisions by the Council. Hurd, Origins, 240-64, also 
argues that the Apostolic Decree stands behind the issues at Corinth. 
43
 Ben Witherington III, Conflict and Community in Corinth: A Socio-Rhetorical Commentary on 
1 and 2 Corinthians (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1995), 186. 
44
 Ibid., 199, “Paul does not dispute that the Corinthians have the right to eat such food, so far as 
the food is concerned. Chs. 8-10 make clear how far from Judaism Paul had moved on the matter of food. 
He no longer believed that food commended one to God or offended God. He had come to the view that 
food was morally and religiously neutral.” 
45
 Witherington “Not So Idle Thoughts,” 237. 
46
 Witherington, Conflict and Community, 191. For Witherington, the issue is still eating food in a 
pagan temple: “In v. 14 Paul gives the directive that all of chs. 8-10 has been arguing for: Flee idolatry.” 
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social consequences, perhaps in an attempt to justify their continued participation 
in society.
47
  
 
This explanation is again very similar to Fee’s, but Witherington additionally argues that 
Paul is enacting the Apostolic Decree with these prohibitions. 
Witherington might be correct to see Paul’s rhetorical approach as a theological 
introduction to the topic and then an effort to deal with the actual behavior. In all of this 
discussion, Witherington does not account for the difference in tone between the two 
chapters or the identification of the activity in 1 Cor 10 as literal idolatry. His lexical 
contribution of distinguishing between εἰδωλόθυτον (a Jewish-Christian polemical term 
referring to meat eaten in the idol temple) and ἱερόθυτον (the proper term for food that 
has come from the temple, but is not eaten there) has been criticized rightfully for being 
too forced. Alex Cheung especially criticizes Witherington for insufficiently exploring 
the Jewish and early Christian evidence.
48
 Witherington does point us in the right 
direction as his socio-rhetorical argument employs rhetorical forms, lexical data, and 
historical data. Witherington, however, does not pay careful enough attention to how Paul 
makes his argument, especially with respect to his refutation of Corinthian positions, 
varied representations of God and their origins, and the differences in Paul’s tone. He 
highlights the need to explore how idol-food is defined, but he does not give 
corresponding weight to the manner in which idolatry is defined. 
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Rhetorical Approaches 
Most explanations of Paul’s argument in 1 Cor 8-10 recognize that the complexities are 
attributable to the sophisticated way that Paul makes his argument. The interpreters in 
this section, while relying on the historical evidence for varying locations, argue for the 
coherence of these chapters primarily by analyzing Paul’s arguments with the help of 
Greco-Roman rhetoric.
49
 The apparent contradictions that the modern reader recognizes 
in the text would have been understood by ancient readers to be a rhetorical device of the 
author. Margaret Mitchell’s argument is based on her understanding of the larger 
deliberative argument of the epistle. Peter Tomson thinks that 1 Cor 8 represents a 
rhetorical inclusio in which Paul presents a number of antitheses. Joop Smit, John 
Fotopoulos, and Richard Phua attempt to identify the positions of the Corinthians so they 
can show how Paul refutes them. 
Chiasm 
Margaret M. Mitchell 
Margaret Mitchell’s Paul and the Rhetoric of Reconciliation: An Exegetical 
Investigation of the Language and Composition of 1 Corinthians is one of the most 
influential books on 1 Cor, and probably the best defense of the compositional unity of 
the book.
50
 She argues, “1 Corinthians is a single letter of unitary composition which 
                                                          
49
 Roy E. Ciampa and Brian S. Rosner, The First Letter to the Corinthians (PNTC; Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 2010), reject the categories of Greco-Roman rhetoric as a context for understanding Paul: “Our 
contention is that rather than reading 1 Corinthians with Greco-Roman rhetorical categories in mind, it is 
better to take the Old Testament and Jewish frames of reference as the primary lens that clarifies our 
understanding of both the form and contents of the letter” (20). 
50
 Mitchell, Paul and the Rhetoric of Reconciliation. Collins (First Corinthians) takes a similar 
approach to the unity of these chapters. Because the knowledgeable and the weak have communal 
solidarity in sharing the eucharist meal, it is imperative that the knowledgeable, through their blasé attitude 
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contains a deliberative argument persuading the Christian community at Corinth to 
become reunified.”51 Mitchell reads every pericope of 1 Corinthians as supporting Paul’s 
appeal, or prothesis, in 1:10 to pursue unity and put aside factionalism. The Epistolary 
Body can be divided into four sections that prove the prothesis: 1:18-4:21 censure of 
factionalism, 5:1-11:1 integrity of Corinthian community against outside defilement, 
11:2-14:40 manifestations of Corinthian factionalism when coming together, 15:1-57 
resurrection and the final goal. She further subdivides 1 Cor 5-10 into Paul’s treatment of 
the issues of πορνεία (5:1-7:40) and εἰδωλολατρία (8:1—11:1). There are a number of 
factors that argue for the unity of these subsections: corresponding exhortations (6:18; 
10:14), Paul’s repeated appeal to his own example, and the interlinking themes of 
idolatry and sexual immorality. In light of her overriding thesis, it is not altogether 
surprising that she argues that Paul’s primary concern in 1 Cor 8-10 is for the unity of the 
Corinthian Christian community in the face of challenges from outside the community:  
The variability and awkwardness of terminology in this section demonstrates that 
the issue upon which Paul is to give advice is at heart a definitional one: who is an 
idolater? But Paul’s own larger consideration is how the Christian community can 
retain its internal unity when faced with pressures from the outside culture which 
pull the community apart.
52
  
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
toward idols, not lead the weak into actual idolatry. They must flee idolatry as a community. “Paul’s use of 
the A-B-A' chiastic pattern of exposition is one in which the A' element is generally more pointed than the 
A element. This is the case with regard to the relationship between chs. 8 and 10. Chapter 8 argues more 
generally, ch. 10 more specifically. It is unnecessary to consider 8:1-13; 10:23-33 as relating to one 
situation, eating food that had previously been offered to idols, and 10:14-22 as relating to another kind of 
situation, actual participation in idolatrous worship, since 10:14-22 gets to the heart of the issue by warning 
the Christians of Corinth to avoid idolatry” (376). Collins, drawing heavily on Mitchell’s work, makes his 
argument by appealing both to rhetorical structure and the different dining situations. 
51
 Mitchell, Rhetoric, 1. 
52
 Ibid., 237. 
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She appeals to Paul’s ABA pattern in which he attempts both to permit the eating of idol 
food and to prohibit idolatry. Paul’s argument in 1 Cor 8 is that food offers no advantage, 
so the Christian must seek the community advantage, a topos common in political 
deliberative rhetoric.
53
 Chapter 9 is an exemplary argument wherein Paul properly uses 
his freedom for the common good.
54
 A corresponding negative example is given in 10:1-
13 as Paul reminds them that God will bring destruction to the community for disloyalty. 
In 10:14-22, Paul addresses some of the specific practices that should be grounds for 
unity but actually divide them. Again she thinks this section is concerned with the 
definition of idolatry: “In this case his concern is still with defining what constitutes 
εἰδωλολατρία for this Christian community, which means simultaneously defining what 
are the boundaries of this social body.”55 1 Cor 10:23-11:1 makes a final appeal to 
common advantage in opposition to factionalism in which Paul is unwavering on 
idolatry, but he concedes on the acceptability of idol meat. If Paul’s approach is judged to 
be ineffective or obscure, “this is because Paul’s overriding concern here is not merely 
idol meats in themselves, but the impact of conflicts over idol meats on the concord of 
the church community.”56 
Mitchell is to be commended for her application of Greco-Roman rhetorical 
models to the text of 1 Cor to make an overarching argument for the unity of the epistle. 
While her thesis that Paul primarily addresses factionalism works well for 1 Cor 1-4, it is 
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not as fitting for the rest of the epistle.
57
 Certainly issues of community divisions underlie 
1 Cor 8-10, but a more fundamental concern is that idolatry is a sin against God that is 
incompatible with the believer’s participation with Christ. Her analysis of the Jewish 
content of Paul’s argument is also lacking. She focuses more on the form of the argument 
rather than the content and contexts from which the content is drawn. Lastly, the works of 
Smit and Fotopoulos will demonstrate the need to reevaluate the rhetorical structure of 
ch. 8 and the identification of Corinthian quotations and Pauline refutation.  
Inclusio 
Peter J. Tomson 
Peter Tomson’s primary goal in Paul and the Jewish Law: Halakha in the Letters 
of the Apostle to the Gentiles is to examine halakha in Paul’s writings, and he uses 1 
Corinthians, especially chs. 8-10, as a window into Paul’s relationship with the Law.58 He 
rejects the idea, espoused by Barrett, among others, that Paul is at his most un-Jewish 
when he deals with idol food at Corinth, and he argues that Paul was unwavering on his 
prohibition of known idol-food.
59
 “Discussion was about gentile food of unspecified 
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 See the critiques of Mitchell by Stanley E. Porter, “Understanding Pauline Studies: An 
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nature.”60 Tomson thinks that Paul had previously taught on the matter of idol food and 
responds to their questions by employing the following structure: 
(1) 8:1-13, on idol food offerings and ‘the weak’; Paul introduces the problem of 
idol food and argues that the reality of idolatry is in the consciousness of the 
delicate brother. 
(2) 9:1-27, on the principles of Paul’s apostolic behavior; Paul’s life is an example 
of self-denial for others. 
(3) 10:1-22, on the prohibition of idolatry; Paul gives theological arguments that 
are sufficient to prohibit idol food.  
(4) 10:23-11:1, on the consumption of pagan food bought at the market place or 
offered in private homes; Paul addresses the practical considerations.
61
 
 
He argues “The inclusio created by units (1) and (4), with prominent key words 
συνείδησις and εἰδωλόθυτα gives the section its coherence, leaving units (2) and (3) as a 
digression.”62 Tomson appeals to the rhetorical flow of these chapters with the alternation 
between examples and the situation at Corinth to argue that Paul makes a sophisticated 
and coherent rhetorical argument. Paul’s overall tone toward idol food is negative. 
Because the Corinthians questioned Paul’s earlier judgments on the issue, Paul has 
recourse to the concept of another believer’s συνείδησις. In 1 Cor 8, Paul argues that the 
problem of idolatry is not contained in objects; rather, it is in human beings: “The 
problem is with the delicate consciousness of the gentile neophyte, who is still under the 
influence of idolatry. In the awareness of the ‘knowing’, the ‘delicate’ represent the 
reality of idolatry in man.”63 In 10:1-22, Tomson acknowledges that Paul combines two 
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worldviews: in one worldview, the idol is nothing while in another it represents a demon. 
Even in this combination of traditions, Paul is still writing entirely as a Jew: “It follows 
that Paul, in using arguments from both cultural traditions, strikingly reflects the various 
trends in late Second Temple Judaism.”64 While Paul does combine these traditions, he 
comes to only one conclusion concerning idol food: idol food should not be eaten. 
 Tomson explains the coherence of these chapters by appealing to rhetorical and 
halakhic features.
65
 Chapters 8-10 are unified around a chiastic structure wherein the 
primary issue of idol-food is treated in the first and last elements.
66
 Chapter 8 introduces 
the subject and places idolatry in the consciousness of the delicate brother while 
affirming the non-reality of idol-gods. Tomson argues that Paul never questions if idol-
food is permissible, and he prohibits it outright in 10:1-22. Following this position, the 
final section gives advice concerning food of ambiguous origins. Tomson understands 
this to be a halakhic argument that is well aligned with Jewish prohibitions on gentile 
idol-food. 
 Tomson’s explanation has a great deal of merit. He recognizes the different 
traditions that feed into Paul’s interpretation and he appeals to the broader rhetorical 
structure to explain the unity of these chapters. Despite these strengths, Tomson’s 
greatest flaw is his attempt to read Paul almost exclusively as parallel to, or in the stream 
of, Tannaic Judaism. The comparative literature adduced by Tomson is of value, but his 
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approach is far too exclusive of other contributing streams of thought. Cheung and Phua 
have questioned if the appeal to Tannaic literature is geographically and chronologically 
appropriate.
67
 Moreover, it seems that Tomson gives little credit to the way in which 
Paul’s belief in Christ has shaped his view of acceptable interaction with idol food. His 
over-reliance on Tannaic paradigms also affects the ways in which he sees God 
represented. He primarily discusses the tradition in 1 Cor 8 (non-reality of idols) in 
contrast to the position of 1 Cor 10 (demons behind idols), but he overlooks the 
representations of God in other sections. Tomson does not account well for the location 
of Paul as an educated Jew travelling the Mediterranean or that of the Corinthian 
Christians as primarily gentiles by birth. This study suggests that more fitting 
comparisons to the positions in 1 Cor 8-10 can be found in Hellenistic Jewish and Greco-
Roman positions. 
Partitio 
Joop Smit 
Joop Smit’s book, “About the Idol Offerings”: Rhetoric, Social Contexts and 
Theology of Paul’s Discourse in First Corinthians 8:1-11:1, is a collection of essays, 
some of which have been published previously.
68
 Smit justifies the application of ancient 
rhetoric to an examination of Paul’s letters on the basis that he likely dictated them and 
expected them to be read aloud.
69
 He argues that the coherence of a passage must be 
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made on three levels: syntactic, pragmatic, and semantic. Few question the syntactic 
coherence, so Smit focuses the bulk of his explanation on the pragmatic structure. Here 
he appeals to classical rhetorical models concerning the dispositio of a speech. He argues 
that “1 Cor. 8:1-6 functions as a partitio, a division in headlines of the entire following 
discourse.”70 In this section, Paul does not advance a positive argument; rather he offers 
two antitheses that foreshadow his ultimate conclusion of the rejection of idol offerings: 
the antithesis between knowledge and love and the antithesis between many so-called 
gods and the true God.
71
 According to Smit, Paul does not quote the Corinthians in this 
section; rather the section contains only the propositiones of Paul. The argumentatio 
comes in 1 Cor 8:7-9:27 in which Paul discusses the social aspects of associations with 
idolatry. The second section of argumentatio occurs in 1 Cor 10:1-22. Here Paul 
discusses the theological aspects of participation in idol food and argues that it constitutes 
idolatry, which  he supports by appealing to the examples of Israel and the Lord’s 
Supper. 1 Cor 10:23-30, the anticipatio, preempts probable objections, and 1 Cor 10:31-
:11:1 function as the peroratio that summarizes the discourse. Smit concludes “In so 
many words he forbids them to take part in public sacrificial meals, this being 
undesirable in social respect as well as unpermitted in theological respect.”72 
Smit’s proposal is helpful in explaining how an opening rhetorical feature can 
give coherence and structure to the larger argument. He provides a positive explanation, 
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supported by classical rhetoric for how Paul’s argument is made on multiple levels. 
Nevertheless, Smit’s proposal has significant shortcomings. Against most scholars, he 
recognizes no quotations of the Corinthians in 1 Cor 8. According to Smit, Paul presents 
antitheses, but these are his own products. This study will demonstrate that there are valid 
reasons for regarding some of the clauses in 1 Cor 8 as quotations of the Corinthians, and 
Paul’s argument is not coherent without attributing some material to the Corinthians. 
Fotopoulos has described Smit’s two levels, social and theological, as “artificial and 
overly rigid.”73 It is true that these levels are probably more separable to the modern mind 
than they would have been to the Corinthians. Even if the two levels of response are 
accepted, it still does not explain the difference in tone and definition of deity between 
the chapters.
74
 Fotopoulos criticizes Smit for two further problems.
75
 First, Fotopoulos 
will extend the partitio from 8:1-6 to 8:1-9. Second, Fotopoulos will demonstrate that 
describing the weak party as a hypothetical rhetorical device destroys the force of Paul’s 
argument by removing actual divisions from the community. 
John Fotopoulos   
John Fotopoulos’ revised dissertation, Food Offered to Idols in Roman Corinth, 
takes a social-rhetorical approach to “argue that the primary focus of Paul’s instructions 
is idol-food eaten in pagan temples in and around Corinth; a behavior that Paul 
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consistently rejects.”76 He argues that diners at pagan temples seem to have believed that 
the gods participated in the meals with them, and Paul thus denounces this association as 
idolatrous. Moreover, Paul rejected these dining occasions because of the sexual 
encounters at these meals that Paul considered to be immoral behavior for Christians. In 
his social-rhetorical study, Fotopoulos attempts to paint a broader picture of what it 
meant to eat idol-food. In addition to the impressive analysis of archeological evidence, 
he also appeals to literary, papyrological, epigraphic, votary, and numismatic evidence. 
Thus, Fotopoulos expands and refines the arguments for the importance of both location 
and rhetoric. 
 The unique contribution by Fotopoulos is his detailed survey of cults and temples 
in and around Corinth. He describes the location and cult practices of Asklepios, Demeter 
and Kore, Isis and Serapis, and others. While he argues against the relevance of Demeter 
and Kore’s sanctuary, he thinks that the Asklepieon, with its dining facilities, fits Paul’s 
description of the dining and is an “extremely plausible context for 1 Cor 8:1-10:22.”77 
Contra Gooch, he argues that there is no evidence that any of the food served in the 
Asklepieion was non-sacrificial.
78
 Fotopoulos’ chapter 6, which discusses the setting and 
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activities of dining situations, is extremely helpful for understanding the situations to 
which Paul might be responding. Fotopoulos suggests that opportunities to dine at the 
Asklepieion could arise in the context of a thanksgiving meal (when a friend or relative 
was healed) or for private use (birthdays, wedding, funerals, or at the invitation of a 
patron).
 79
 In addition to these meals at temples, sacrificial food would be very common 
in the dining situation of a private home. Even the home setting would have libations to 
the gods, and “the food could have been sacrificed at home or at a temple by the host 
before being served at home.”80 He concludes that “The avoidance of sacrificial food 
altogether would be extremely difficult.”81 Paul’s two issues with the meals seem to be 
the prevalent sexual immorality and the partnership with the idol-gods. He argues, 
“Κοινωνία at Greco-Roman formal meals fostered a relationship between the host, fellow 
diners and the deities invoked at the meal.”82 
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 Having established the probable social-historical settings in which Corinthian 
Christians might encounter idol-food, Fotopoulos turns his analysis to Paul’s argument in 
1 Cor 8-10. He argues that the Apostolic Decree has nothing to do with the situation at 
Corinth and that there were actual parties of the Strong and Weak at Corinth. He thinks 
that some Corinthian quotations must be embedded in the text to make sense of the 
argument; the following he argues are quotations of the Corinthians’ positions: 8:1b-c, 
8:4b-c, 8:5a, 8:6, 8:8, 10:23a, 10:23c.
83
 He thinks it is likely that Paul previously 
addressed the topic of idol-food, but the Corinthian Christians reverted to their normative 
Gentile practice of consuming idol-food.
84
 Following Mitchell, he interprets 1 Cor 8-10 
in line with the larger deliberative argument of the epistle that urges unity. He agrees with 
Joop Smit that 1 Cor 8 is a rhetorical partitio, but Fotopoulos argues that the partitio 
includes 1 Cor 8:1-9 instead of Smit’s 8:1-6. In 1 Cor 8:1-9, Paul quotes and refutes the 
Strong’s propositions. Fotopoulos sees the most significant seeming-inconsistency 
between the prohibition of eating food in pagan temples and tables (1 Cor 8:9-13; 10:14-
22) and the permission of eating food in pagan homes (1 Cor 10:27-30). He assigns the 
inconsistency to Paul’s quotation of the Corinthians and his correction. “Cult meal 
participation is clearly ruled out by Paul in 1 Cor 10:1-22. Paul’s conclusion for eating in 
pagan temple (1 Cor8:1-10:22) is complete prohibition: “For Paul, there is a common 
κοινωνία with pagan gods (who are actually demons) in cultic meals which is analogous 
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to the κοινωνία with Christ in the Lord’s Supper (10:14-22). Participation in cultic meals 
is κοινωνία with demons constituting idolatry which is prohibited.”85 Paul, however, 
accommodates the Strong’s insistence on freedom in 10:25-11:1 and permits dining at 
formal house meals provided that they abstained from sexual immorality and the origins 
of the food were not explicitly stated to be from idol sacrifices. 
 There is much to be commended in Fotopoulos’ study. His analysis of the 
archeological evidence solves some of the major questions surrounding the plausible 
contexts of idol-food at Corinth. He has demonstrated that the most plausible cult temple 
for dining was the Asklepieion; moreover, he has proven that the all food served at the 
Asklepieion would have been dedicated to the idol-gods. In contrast to Phua, he has taken 
seriously the Greco-Roman background of the Corinthian Christians and has 
demonstrated the likelihood of them reverting to normative Greco-Roman associations 
with idol-gods. I am largely in agreement with Fotopoulos’ assessment of the rhetorical 
partitio and his identification of Corinthian quotations. My criticism of Fotopoulos is 
threefold. First, despite Fotopoulos’ impressive grasp of the archeological evidence, he 
does not demonstrate a corresponding familiarity with textual sources, especially those of 
Hellenistic Jewish authors. It is shocking that neither Philo nor Josephus’ arguments 
against idolatry fit into his analysis at all, not even in a single citation. In passing over 
Hellenistic Jewish authors, Fotopoulos has overlooked perhaps the most significant 
context of his “social-rhetorical” analysis, the comparable rhetorical denunciations of 
idolatry in other Hellenistic Jewish authors. Second, Fotopoulos recognizes that the issue 
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centers on theological knowledge. The Strong justify their actions on the basis of their 
knowledge of the uniqueness of God and the corresponding non-existence of idols. Paul 
counters this theological knowledge with the correction that the idol-gods really have 
existence as demons. Fotopoulos recognizes the central role of theology, but he never 
deals with the different ways that the groups define God. Moreover, he does not seem to 
notice how Paul subtly shifts his own representations of God in order to fit his argument. 
Third, his explanation fails to deal with the issue of the severity of Paul’s tone in 1 Cor 
10 compared with his argument on the basis of συνείδησις in 1 Cor 8. In 1 Cor 8 Paul 
does not prohibit eating at the pagan temples on the basis of committing actual idolatry 
while in 1 Cor 10 his tone is more severe and consumption of idol food is understood to 
be idolatrous, incompatible with the eucharist, and participation with demons. My 
assessment is that Fotopoulos’ argument for a rhetorical partitio is largely correct, but it 
offers an incomplete explanation that fails to deal with the issue of what is considered 
idolatrous and how God is represented. 
Richard Liong-Seng Phua 
Richard Liong-Seng Phua’s dissertation written under the supervision of John 
Barclay, Idolatry and Authority: A Study of 1 Corinthians 8.1-11.1 in Light of the Jewish 
Diaspora, merits special attention because, like my approach, he argues for the need to 
reexamine the manner in which Paul defines idolatry in light of Diaspora Judaism.
86
 As 
his title suggests, Phua attempts to locate the different positions at Corinth within the 
various Diaspora Jewish views on what it means to commit idolatry. He states,  
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The purpose of my book is to examine the issue of idolatry and authority in 1 
Corinthians 8-10 by looking at the Jewish Diaspora communities and establishing 
parallels to the behavior of the parties in these chapters. And in the process, I 
hope to show that the parties are all ‘Jewish’ in varying ways but differ in their 
practices.
87
  
 
His main task is to reevaluate how the parties have been identified and offer new insights 
informed by the context of Diaspora Judaism. He argues, against those such as Smit, 
Hurd, and Gooch who think the “weak” are hypothetical, that there are three parties 
involved in this argument, all of which have different theological  and ethical 
conclusions. Drawing on the work of Halbertal and Margalit, Phua demonstrates the 
multi-faceted approach to idolatry in Diaspora Judaism.
88
 What one Diaspora Jewish 
author defined as idolatrous another author would permit. This assessment of Diaspora 
Jewish positions on idolatry enables him to counter the widespread assumption that only 
gentiles would be open to idolatrous associations.  
Phua does not label his approach as a rhetorical partitio, nor does he appeal to 
rhetorical models to explain what Paul is doing. Nevertheless, Phua’s argument—that 
Paul quotes the strong and then refutes their positions—is a very similar argument to 
Smit and Fotopoulos even though Phua’s work lacks the rhetorical underpinnings. Phua 
attempts to reconstruct the argument of the strong by extracting Paul’s quotations of 
them. The apparent discrepancies of a surface level reading of the text can be attributed to 
Paul and the Corinthian strong operating from different definitions of what constitutes 
idolatry—each of these three positions (the strong, the weak, and Paul) can be found in 
                                                          
87
 Ibid., 27. 
88
 Moshe Halbertal and Avishai Margalit, Idolatry (trans. Naomi Goldblum; Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1992). 
36 
 
other Diaspora Jewish authors. From their strict monotheism, the belief in the non-reality 
of idol-gods, and their freedom in Christ, the “strong” adopt the practice of eating idol 
meat in the temple because they view it as harmless.
89
 Prior to their conversion, the 
“weak” also participated in pagan cultic feasts, but after their conversion they took a 
more stringent stance and rejected any association with idol-meat. While Paul is informed 
by Diaspora Jewish rejections of idolatry, his reasons for abhorring idolatry are different. 
He rejects the strong’s assertion that the idols are nothing, but he does not condemn their 
behavior simply on the grounds of the Law. He has two concerns concerning the behavior 
of the strong. First, he thinks the idolatrous behavior of the strong will cause the weak to 
fall into actual idolatry. Second, he thinks the idolatrous behavior of the strong will cause 
them to incur the judgment of God. In 1 Cor 9 especially, Paul claims that he, as the 
founder of the church at Corinth, has the right to define what is idolatrous.  
Phua is to be commended for his assessment of Diaspora Jewish positions 
concerning idolatry, and he offers a multifaceted approach to idolatry that allows the 
diverse positions to speak. This is a very welcome correction to most discussions of 
Diaspora Judaism that condense the position of Jews into a simple maxim: “Jews reject 
idolatry.” By offering a more varied definition of what constitutes idolatry for Jews, he 
helpfully questions the assumption that positions on idolatry can be easily divided along 
ethnic lines. While Phua surveys much of Hellenistic Judaism on the topic of idolatry, my 
approach will be to analyze individual arguments in greater detail to make comparisons 
to Paul. For example, Phua draws on a number of Philo’s treatises to extract Philo’s 
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conception of idolatry, but I will focus on how Philo makes an extended argument—on 
both ethical and theological grounds—against the practice of idolatry in De decalogo. My 
contribution to the interpretation differs in scope from Phua’s. He is concerned primarily 
to provide a plausible identification of the parties involved in 1 Cor 8-10. The analysis of 
the argument itself is only a means to achieve this identification. My work, however 
attempts to analyze Paul’s argument especially in light of his Hellenistic Jewish contexts; 
both his argument and its contexts are important. It is not so much Phua’s assessment of 
Diaspora Jewish positions with which I take issue; rather, the problems arise when he 
attempts to apply these positions to the situation at Corinth. First, the most controversial 
of his claims is that all three parties are Jewish. This assertion stands in contrast to the 
vast majority of Pauline scholars who argue on both historical and literary grounds that 
the Corinthian Christians were gentiles. Phua demonstrates that the various Corinthian 
positions on idolatry and arguments concerning acceptable interaction can be found in 
Diaspora Jewish positions. From this possibility, Phua leaps to probability, and the rest of 
his work is given to showing how this explanation is plausible and in his assessment 
probable.
90
 In line with almost every Pauline scholar, I will demonstrate that the most 
likely reconstruction of the situation at Corinth is that the Corinthian Christians were 
primarily gentiles and where they seem to have Jewish thought-processes these are likely 
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attributable to Paul’s teaching when he founded the church. Second, perhaps out of his 
overarching desire to demonstrate the Jewish context of this argument, he neglects 
discussion of the Greco-Roman context. Even if one accepts Phua’s unlikely argument 
for an exclusively Jewish discussion, one still must reckon with the gentile context of 
worship at Corinth. What exactly was the action with which Paul takes issue? It should 
not just be assumed that this is, in every case, eating idol-meat in the temples. Third, his 
work suffers from an insufficient, possibly even non-existent, methodology for 
identifying the quotations of the “strong.” As I will demonstrate in subsequent chapters, 
this methodological insufficiency causes him to mislabel some of the positions in 1 Cor. 
He does not interact with comparative rhetorical models from ancient authors and he 
overlooks the works of modern scholars who examine Paul’s argument on the basis of 
rhetoric. He would be especially aided by interaction with Smit and Fotopoulos who 
present a stronger methodology for identifying quotations and demonstrating Pauline 
refutation.
91
 Fourth, Phua does not take seriously the difference in tone between chapters 
8 and 10. He argues that Paul is treating the same situation (eating idol meat in the 
temple) with the same conclusion (do not participate!) in both chapters. In 1 Cor 8 he 
treats it from the stance of communal love, and in 1 Cor 10 he treats it from a warning of 
falling into actual idolatry. Again this does not account for the inconsistency of tone 
noted by the vast majority of scholars. How can Paul acquiesce to the strong’s position of 
idol-food being unharmful for the strong person in 1 Cor 8 to the argument in 1 Cor 10 
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that it would bring the strong under God’s judgment? Phua argues Paul is just treating the 
issue from different angles, but this approach too easily passes over the differences of the 
chapters. Fifth, my primary complaint with his presentation of Diaspora Jewish positions 
is that he does not show how one author could simultaneously hold to different 
definitions of idolatry and different representations of God. Paul’s argumentation rests on 
his ability to hold in balance different Diaspora Jewish arguments concerning what is 
idolatrous. Sixth, another issue with his generally helpful assessment of Diaspora Jewish 
definitions of idolatry is that he gives little attention to the manner in which God is 
represented and its role in defining the severity of idolatry.  
The Contribution of this Study 
My review of past research has highlighted several areas that require reconsideration. 
Much attention has rightly been focused on the possible locations for interacting with 
idol-food. These analyses have adduced a combination of lexical, literary, archeological, 
and papyrological evidence. To my mind, they have adequately explained the various 
options for interacting with idol food in Roman Corinth. These previous studies 
contribute greatly to an understanding of the social situation in Roman Corinth, what 
many call a socio-rhetorical study. But these studies have failed to describe the way that 
Paul makes his argument, especially the manner in which he represents God and the 
conclusions that can be drawn from it. The argument of this project is that the evaluation 
of Paul’s coherence in 1 Cor 8-10 can be helped by examining the different ways in 
which God is represented. In 1 Cor 8, the manner of God’s representation is dictated by 
the shared confession to which at least some of the Corinthians appeal. The Corinthians 
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likely received this theological proposition from Paul, so it is not surprising that he 
affirms it here. Nevertheless, he qualifies the ethical conclusions that can be drawn from 
this theological proposition. Paul employs a different representation of God with an 
attendant shift in the definition of idolatry as he appeals to the history of Israel and the 
eucharist. Finally, Paul addresses the issue of marketplace food with yet another 
representation of God. It will be argued that Paul selects Jewish traditions (of 
representing God and defining idolatry) in order to bolster his prohibition on idol food 
and permission of marketplace food. While the traditions are primarily located in 
Hellensitic Judaism, they are filtered through Paul’s christological lens. Paul’s 
understanding of idolatry is affected by his belief in Christ’s immanent presence in the 
community with the implication that associations with other objects of worship are 
prohibited. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
IDOLATRY: CONVERSATIONS AND PATTERNS 
Introduction 
Chapter 1 surveyed the different explanations for the coherence of Paul’s argument in 1 
Corinthians 8 and 10, and it noted the problem that scholars are attempting to explain. 
The apparent problem with Paul’s logic is that he first argues that the non-reality of idols 
(8:4) implies that eating idol-food is not an intrinsically improper action (8:13). Then in 1 
Cor 10, Paul warns the Corinthians against committing idolatry (10:7, 14) because eating 
idol-food implies association with demons (10:20) and arouses the jealousy of the Lord 
(10:22); thus, Paul may imply that eating idol food is an intrinsically improper action. At 
the heart of the dispute between Paul and the Corinthians is what it means to commit 
idolatry, and they seem to come to different conclusions concerning what are permissible 
and what are idolatrous associations that a Christian may have with pagan cult-images 
and cults.
1
 While it is clear that Paul and the Corinthians are negotiating the definition of 
idolatry, modern scholars have tended to focus the bulk of their explanations for the 
coherence on other issues (e.g., sources, location, and rhetoric). Perhaps because texts 
like Isaiah 40-44 are so often taken to be representative of all Jewish thought, many 
assume that all Jews, including Paul, would deny the existence of other deities and avoid 
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any association with these non-gods. It is thus assumed that Paul would prohibit outright 
any association between the Christian and an idol-god, but the concept of idolatry in 
Paul’s Jewish background was more fluid and nuanced than a simple unqualified 
rejection of associating with idols. The diversity of understandings concerning idolatry in 
Hellenistic Jewish thought and the general assumptions by modern readers of its 
uniformity point to the need to reevaluate our rigid definitions of idolatry and their 
implications for how we read these authors’ arguments.2 
This chapter will be an initial exploration of the varied spectrum of 
understandings of idolatry held by Jewish authors and begin to propose some methods for 
analyzing their approaches. Although scholars continue to debate the relationship of Paul 
to Judaism after his vision of the risen Lord, everyone agrees that Paul was raised a 
Hellenistic Jew. No one seriously questions the probability that he was a Jew, reared and 
educated in Tarsus, and probably also received some formal instruction in Judaism at 
Jerusalem. Thus, Paul’s primary theological understandings are drawn from his Jewish 
heritage, but this Jewish heritage is broad, varied, Hellenistic, and understood through 
Paul’s christological lens.3 When Paul makes arguments concerning idolatry, he is 
                                                          
2
 In addition to the typical monolithic understanding of idolatry in scholarship, exclusive 
monotheism is often assumed to be the unquestioned norm of post-exilic Jewish belief. Michael Mach 
(“Concepts of Jewish Monotheism During the Hellenistic Period,” in The Jewish Roots of Christological 
Monotheism: Papers from the St. Andrews Conference on the Historical Origins of the Worship of Jesus 
[ed. Carey C. Newman, James R. Davila, Gladys S. Lewis; Leiden: Brill, 1999], 21-42), however, 
demonstrates the breadth of Jewish understanding of God’s oneness. For example, it will be shown below 
that Joseph and Asenath adamantly opposes association with pagan deities that the author thinks to be non-
living and unreal, but the text does not project an exclusive monotheism in which God exists in an 
unpopulated heavenly realm. Rather, Asenath interacts with a heavenly visitor who has some capacity to 
affect the physical realm.  
3
 I will use “Hellenistic Judaism” as a term descriptive of Jewish thought practiced within the 
larger Greco-Roman culture. I do not intend to contrast Hellenistic Judaism to Palestinian Judaism; rather, 
“Hellenistic Judaism” is descriptive of all Judaisms under Greco-Roman rule. When a distinction between 
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drawing upon and inserting himself into discussions that were already occurring in 
Hellenistic Jewish communities. Thus, Hellenistic Jewish authors will provide helpful 
comparisons and contexts to Paul’s arguments concerning idols. 
To illustrate the differences in response and manner of argumentation among 
Hellenistic Jews, this chapter will briefly describe the approaches taken by two 
Alexandrian Jewish texts: Artapanus Fragment 3 and Joseph and Asenath. Having noted 
the complex responses to idolatry, I will then suggest some ways of moving the 
discussion forward. I will suggest that examining the premises of an author’s argument 
provides a valuable lens from which to understand the argument as a whole. Specifically, 
looking at the manner in which an author represents God helps to understand the way that 
the author thinks about idolatry and its consequences. Then, I will note the various 
representations of God that Paul employs in 1 Cor 8-10 and the consequences that these 
variations have for his argument. I will conclude by suggesting that a profitable 
examination of Paul’s argument concerning idolatry is to compare his argumentation with 
other arguments made by Hellenistic Jews concerning idolatry. 
The Complexity of Idolatry Illustrated 
It would seem plausible that texts written by Jews living in the same cultural location 
would hold similar views concerning what constituted idolatry and what were the 
acceptable associations with idols. These Jewish authors, however, come to sometimes 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Palestinian Judaism and Judaism of other locations is fitting, I will use the terms “Palestinian Judaism” and 
“Diaspora Judaism.” Using “Hellenistic Judaism” broadly avoids questions concerning if Josephus is 
properly situated in Diaspora or Palestinian Judaism. Moreover, by using “Hellenistic” broadly to describe 
Greco-Roman culture, I avoid an artificial bifurcation of culture under Greek rule and under Roman rule, a 
distinction that is not easily made in either Corinth or Alexandria. See the treatment of the term “Hellenistic 
Judaism” by Shaye J. D. Cohen, From the Maccabees to the Mishnah (LEC; Philadelphia: Westminster 
Press, 1987), 35-7.  
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very different conclusions to these basic questions of belief and practice. Analyzing the 
approaches to idols taken by Joseph and Asenath and Artapanus Fragment 3 will 
illustrate how Jewish responses to and interactions with pagan religiosity were both 
complex and varied. Despite the similarities of these texts arising in the same general 
cultural environment and being in the stream of Jewish panegyrical writings, they come 
remarkably different conclusions concerning the ways in the which the pious should 
interact with idols. 
Joseph and Asenath 
The novelistic expansion of the biblical narrative, Joseph and Asenath, describes 
the conversion of Asenath, her marriage to Joseph, and her integration in the Jewish 
community.
4
 The text was most likely written in Alexandria between 100 B.C.E. and 100 
C.E.
5
 In many ways, Joseph and Asenath’s approach to idolatry represents what many 
readers assume to be the universal Jewish position as the author goes to great lengths to 
explain Asenath’s complete rejection of her idolatrous past. Because Joseph’s narrative 
                                                          
4
 The textual history of Joseph and Asenath is disputed. In agreement with the growing scholarly 
consensus, I favor the longer recension edited by Burchard (“Joseph and Asenath” in OTP; “Ein vorläufiger 
griechiser Text von Joseph und Asenath,” DBAT 14 [1979]: 2-53). For a defense of the shorter recension, 
see Ross S. Kraemer, When Asenath met Joseph: A Late Antique Tale of the Biblical Patriarch and His 
Egyptian Wife, Reconsidered (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 50-88; Angela Standhartinger, 
Das Frauenbild im Judentum der hellenistischen Zeit: Ein Beitrag anhand von ‘Joseph & Asenath’ 
(Leiden: Brill, 1995), 50-51, 219-55. It should also be noted that I favor the growing consensus of Jewish 
authorship, especially because the issue of exogamy was much more a Jewish than early Christian problem; 
see John J Collins, "Joseph and Aseneth, Jewish or Christian?"  JSP 14 (2005): 97-112. 
5
 Because Joseph and Asenath uses the story of Joseph in Egypt to treat the issues of idolatry and 
endogamy, the Egyptian provenance is almost certain. Moreover, the author chooses Asenath as the female 
convert instead of another character such as Ruth. See Christoph Burchard, Untersuchungen zu Joseph und 
Aseneth (Tübingen: Siebeck, 1965), 140-2. There is also a focus on Egyptian gods. John Barclay (Jews in 
the Mediterranean Diaspora: From Alexander to Trajan (323 BCE-117CE) [Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 
1996], 204, 447) and John Collins (Between Athens and Jerusalem: Jewish Identity in the Hellenistic 
Diaspora [2d. ed. Biblical Resource Series; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2000], 105-6) give the broad time 
frame of composition from 100 B.C.E. to 100 C.E. 
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antedates the Mosaic Law, the author does not explain Joseph’s actions in light of the 
Law; rather, piety is defined by distinguishing Jewish from Egyptian practice, especially 
in terms of worship and diet.
6
  
While Joseph and Asenath draws on themes from the whole Book of Genesis, it 
primarily elaborates on one verse: “And Pharao called Ioseph’s name Psonthomphanech, 
and he gave him Asenneth daughter of Petephres, priest of Heliopolis, as a wife for him” 
(Gen 41:45 NETS; cf. Gen 41:50; 46:20). The book contains two distinct sections. 
Chapters 1-21 focus on Asenath’s conversion, and chapters 22-29 focus on the jealousy 
and conspiracy of Pharaoh’s son against Asenath. The author describes Asenath as a 
beautiful virgin who arrogantly rejects every suitor, including Pharaoh’s son. Instead of 
marriage, she chooses to surround herself with her idols in an ornate multi-chambered 
complex in her father’s house. Asenath furiously refuses Pentephres’ plan for her to 
marry Joseph, but at Joseph’s physical appearance and presence, Asenath falls in love. 
Then it is Asenath who is scorned as Joseph refuses her kiss of greeting because piety 
prohibits him from touching lips that bless idols and eat idol food. Instead Joseph prays 
for her conversion. Following Joseph’s prayer, Asenath is confused and broken. She 
repents of her idolatry by destroying all her idols, fasting for a week, and praying to be 
accepted by God. An angel appears to her on the eighth day and declares her to be 
                                                          
6
 For Joseph and Asenath, piety seems to involve 4 aspects: keeping away from idols, endogamy, 
not repaying evil for evil, and observing the Jewish diet. Collins (Between Athens and Jerusalem, 243) 
comments, “It is not clear that observance of the Jewish Law is required. In practice, the Law is reducible 
to monotheism, rejection of idolatry, chastity before marriage, and avoidance of social or sexual intimacy 
with ‘aliens’—that is, people who worship other gods …  In short, true religion is equated with worship of 
the living God and avoidance of idols.”  
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accepted by God. She undergoes a mystical conversion experience and is transformed 
into a beautiful bride for Joseph, whom she marries as Pharaoh officiates the wedding. 
In the second section, the narrative resumes eight years later when Pharaoh’s son 
again becomes infatuated with Asenath. His attempts to persuade Simeon and Levi to 
conspire against Joseph are unsuccessful, but Dan, Gad, Naphtali, and Asher agree to 
betray Joseph. They ambush Asenath’s caravan, and Pharaoh’s son with fifty horsemen 
pursue Asenath and Benjamin. Benjamin kills each of them with a single stone apiece, 
and the sons of Leah overcome the rest of the troops. In a second effort, Dan, Gad, 
Naphtali, and Asher attempt to ambush Asenath, but she prays and their swords are 
turned to ash. She forgives them for their conspiracy. Pharaoh and his son die, and Joseph 
rules over Egypt for 48 years, after which he restores the throne to another of Pharaoh’s 
sons.  
 It is primarily in the first section (chs. 1-21) that the author deals with the issue of 
idolatry, and this section has a more antagonistic tone with the author despising and 
mocking the pagan gods.
7
 In the first section, the author seems to be attempting to answer 
                                                          
7
 Scholars dispute the stance that Joseph and Asenath takes toward Greco-Roman culture. John 
Barclay and John Collins are representative of the divergent views. While Collins notes that Pharaoh and 
Pentephres are treated by the author with some esteem, Barclay thinks them to be incidental to the story 
(Jews in the Mediterranean Diaspora, 210). Collins (Between Athens and Jerusalem, 108, 230-32) also 
notes that Pharaoh’s son schemes not just against Jews but also against Pharaoh. Collins emphasizes the 
rejoicing of Pentephres and Pharaoh at the marriage of Joseph and Asenath and concludes, “In view of this 
happy conclusion, it makes little sense to speak of ‘cultural antagonism’ in Joseph and Aseanth … The 
only consistent antagonism in Joseph and Asenath is directed toward idolatry” (Between Athens and 
Jerusalem, 238). Barclay’s take on the text is quite different: “The encounter of Joseph and Asenath, and 
the issue of the kiss, bring to the surface the sense of cultural antagonism which is the predominant tone of 
this document. When one considers the numerous frictionless ways in which this marriage could have been 
portrayed, the humiliating experience which Asenath is made to undergo indicates just how strongly the 
author wishes to communicate this message” (Jews in the Mediterranean Diaspora, 211). The different 
interpretations of the book by Barclay and Collins probably stem from the sections that they emphasize. 
Barclay emphasizes the first section (chs. 1-21) with Asenath’s repudiation of idols and humiliating 
conversion; whereas, Collins emphasizes the second section (chs. 22-29) in which the pious Jews are 
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the question “How could Joseph, a model of Jewish piety, marry a foreigner, the daughter 
of an idolatrous priest?”  In answering this question, the book seems to have two major 
purposes: to increase the standing of Gentile converts and to encourage Jews to take pride 
in their cultural heritage.
8
 
In general, Joseph and Asenath’s depiction of idols is in line with the prophetic 
caricatures that make a complete identification between the idol and the idol-god itself 
and therefore describe the gods as inactive and dead.
9
 Asenath’s chamber is filled with 
countless idols of the Egyptians, and the author repeatedly criticizes the idols for both 
                                                                                                                                                                             
attacked by both Pharaoh’s son and impious Jews. For a nuanced view similar to Collins’, see Erich S. 
Gruen, Heritage and Hellenism: The Reinvention of Jewish Tradition (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1998), 95-99. 
8
 Barclay thinks that Joseph and Asenath is likely about the conditions for proselytism, and not a 
missionary text because so much biblical knowledge is presupposed (Jews in the Mediterranean Diaspora, 
215; cf. Randall D. Chestnutt, "The Social Setting and Purpose of Joseph and Aseneth," JSP 2 [1988]: 21-
48.). Collins similarly thinks it is written to encourage Jews and also to encourage proselytes (Between 
Athens and Jerusalem, 238). In contrast, George W. E. Nickelsburg, “Stories of Biblical and Early Post-
Biblical Times” in Jewish Writings of the Second Temple Period: Apocrypha, Pseudepigrapha, Qumran 
Sectarian Writings, Philo, Josephus [ed. Michael E. Stone; CRINT 2.2; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1984], 65-
71) thinks there is a strong possibility that the work was directed toward Gentiles. He thinks the book’s 
syncretism, especially the Greek form of writing and telling from Asenath’s point of view, indicates an 
intended Gentile audience; thus, Joseph and Asenath becomes instruction for proselytes: “The author has 
recounted a proselyte’s progress from the viewpoint of the proselyte … Its kerygmatic content is simple. 
Eternal life and immortality are to be found in God of Israel alone, whose worship excludes idolatry” (70). 
Joseph C. O'Neill (“What is Joseph and Aseneth All About?” Henoch 16 [1994]: 189-98) takes an approach 
radically opposed to those who think the text is about proselytism or a missionary effort. He argues that 
Asenath is Jewish on account of extra-biblical stories of her being descended from Dinah, Pentephres’ 
description of her relation to Joseph, Joseph’s prayer for her, the description of her as an orphan returning 
to God, the symbolism of her meal to the Passover meal, and her name City of Refuge meaning New 
Jerusalem. O’Neill concludes, “I have been arguing that Joseph and Asenath is about apostate Israel that is 
won back to God the Father by Joseph who stands for the Messiah, the Son of God, who is bridegroom to 
Israel, his bride, and who bestows the Holy Spirit on her” (197). 
9
 There is one section that seems to acknowledge that there is a reality behind the idols. Asenath 
appeals to God for aid because “the wild old lion persecutes me, because he is (the) father of the gods of 
the Egyptians, and his children are the gods of the idol maniacs. And I have come to hate them because 
they are the lion’s children, and have thrown all of them from me and destroyed them” (Jos. Asen. 12:9 
[Burchard, OTP]). The lion represents a power that oppresses God’s people, and some later texts describe 
the persecuting lion as the devil (e.g., 1 Pet 5:8). Even though Asenath has destroyed the physical 
representations of the gods, there is a devilish reality behind the idols that continues to oppose her. This 
dissociation of the idol and the god is restricted to this section of the text. 
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their number and inactivity. Asenath describes the idols, “Behold now, all the gods whom 
I once used to worship in ignorance: I have now recognized that they were dumb and 
dead idols and I have caused them to be trampled underfoot by men, and the thieves 
snatched those that were of silver and gold.”10 The idol-gods are proven to be non-real 
because there are no repercussions for destroying them. Their inactivity is contrasted to 
the activity of God as Creator. The author assumes that by describing the non-reality of 
the idol-gods that he has made a convincing case for abandoning their worship. 
According to Joseph and Asenath, idolatry is an external act of worshipping idol-gods, 
but it is also an issue of the worshipper’s heart. The effects of idolatry are visible both in 
the internal misery of the idolater’s heart and the idolater’s outward appearance that pales 
in comparison to the pious (e.g., Jos. Asen. 6:1-8; 7:4; 14:9; 18:7-11; 20:7). While she is 
still idolatrous, Asenath’s attitude is arrogant and unkind (2:1; cf. 8:8-9). The author also 
understands idolaters to be in a defiled state because of their improper worship (11:16-17; 
12:5). Asenath’s conversion involves new life (15:3-6) that is manifested physically in a 
beautiful appearance (18:7-11). 
At the heart of this narrative is also the acceptable association that a pious Jew 
can have with a non-Jewish idolater. Initially, Asenath refuses to meet Joseph, but the 
sight of Joseph changes her heart. The story takes an ironic turn when it is Joseph who 
refuses to dine with the Egyptians (7:1-2) and refuses to be in Asenath’s presence (7:3-4). 
This refusal to associate with idol-worshippers leads to an explanation by Joseph and a 
prayer for Asenath’s conversion: 
                                                          
10
 (Jos. Asen. 13:11 [Burchard, OTP]); cf. 8:5. 
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It is not fitting for a man who worships God, who will bless with his mouth the 
living God and eat blessed bread of life and drink a blessed cup of immortality 
and anoint himself with blessed ointment of incorruptibility to kiss a strange 
woman who will bless with her mouth dead and dumb idols and eat from the table 
of strangulation and drink from their libation a cup of insidiousness and anoint 
herself with the oil of destruction.
11
 
 
What Joseph describes is a complete break with those who participate in the worship of 
idols. Because there is a fundamental incompatibility between the “blessed cup of 
immortality” and the “cup of insidiousness,” there is a fundamental incompatibility 
between the pious and the idol-worshiper. The author uses Joseph’s actions to explain 
that the pious Jew carefully separates himself from the impious pagan. Joseph can work 
for an idolater (Pharaoh) and enter the house of an idolater (Pentephres), but he refuses to 
dine with either of them. In order for Joseph to be able to have fellowship with and marry 
Asenath, she must be “reborn” in a process of conversion. This conversion involves both 
a rejection of the idols and an acknowledgment of the true Creator God. She fasts and 
mourns in sackcloth and ashes. She breaks all her idols to pieces and throws them out the 
window. Her complete break with her idolatrous past is evidenced by her refusal even to 
let her own dogs eat the sacrificial food. Rather she gives the food to other dogs.  
Central to Asenath’s acceptance by God is a mysterious visit by a heavenly 
messenger who declares to her, “Behold, from today, you will be renewed and formed 
anew and made alive again, and you will eat the blessed bread of life, and drink the 
blessed cup of immortality, and anoint yourself with the blessed ointment of 
incorruptibility.”12 Asenath then undergoes a mysterious process of renewal that 
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 Jos. Asen. 8:5-6 (Burchard, OTP); cf. 7:5-6. 
12
 Ibid., 15:5. 
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demonstrates her acceptance by God. Only then is she able to approach Joseph. Her 
complete conversion and new life is evidenced by the fact that Joseph does not recognize 
her. She describes herself, “‘I am your maidservant Asenath, and all the idols I have 
thrown away from me and they were destroyed. And a man came from heaven today, and 
gave me bread of life and I ate, and a cup of blessing and I drank.”13 There is no 
continuity with her idolatrous past, not even her physical appearance. 
The author of Joseph and Asenath takes a hardline stance against idols and 
idolaters. For the author, the idol-gods are dead, incapable of acting and speaking, and 
thus they can be destroyed without consequence. Joseph is a model of piety because he 
carefully avoids close contact, especially dining, with idolaters. In order to pursue piety, 
Asenath must completely reject her idolatrous practices and receive new life from God. 
Only then is it acceptable for Joseph to associate with her, dine with her, and marry her. 
On the one hand Joseph is fully integrated into the pagan political environment, but on 
the other hand, he remains entirely separate as a faithful Jew; thus, he provides a model 
of the possibility of cultural and religious preservation while living among pagans. In this 
way, Joseph and Asenath represents a common theme in Hellenistic Jewish documents—
neither complete rejection nor complete acceptance of Hellenistic culture. 
Artapanus 
Whereas the position of Joseph and Asenath towards idols was one of strong 
dissociation, Artapanus—written in the same cultural environment—permits a much 
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 Ibid., 19:5. 
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greater degree of interaction with idols.
14
 While Joseph and Asenath elaborates on a 
biblical narrative in order to explain a seeming incongruity (Joseph is pious even though 
he marries a non-Jew), Artapanus elaborates on and significantly expands the biblical 
narratives in order to describe more fully the contributions to Egyptian culture made by 
Jewish heroes, Abraham, Joseph, and Moses. Of the three extant fragments from 
Artapanus, Fragment 3, which describes the activity of Moses, is by far the longest. 
In Fragment 1, Artapanus explains that the Jews are named after Abraham. In 
contrast to other Hellenistic Jewish authors who praise Abraham as a model of rejecting 
pagan astral worship in order to worship God (e.g., Philo, Abr. 69-77; Jub. 12:60), 
Artapanus says that Abraham taught astrology to the Egyptians. Fragment 2 reworks 
portions of Genesis to explain how Joseph benefitted the Egyptians. In contrast to the 
biblical narrative that describes Joseph being sold into slavery (Gen 37:12-36), Artapanus 
describes Joseph as the one who arranges to be transferred to Egypt. Artapanus passes 
over the narrative of Joseph in prison (Gen 39:1-41:36) and describes Joseph’s activity as 
the administrator of Egypt. His major contributions were dividing the land by 
establishing boundaries, discovering measurements, and irrigating the land. Not only 
does Joseph allot land to the priests, he also establishes two Egyptian temples. In 
Fragment 3, Artapanus describes that Moses was the teacher of Orpheus, inventor of 
boats and tools, and a philosopher. Like Joseph, he is responsible for establishing districts 
in Egypt. Although Moses supported Cenephres, the king, Cenephres became jealous and 
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 The fragments of Artapanus were preserved by Alexander Polyhistor and subsequently by 
Eusebius in his Praeparatio evangelica. Because he discusses the activity of three Jewish heroes in Egypt, 
the Egyptian provenance is unquestioned. His work can be dated 250-100 B.C.E. (Barclay, Jews in the 
Mediterranean Diaspora, 127, 446) 
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attempted to dispose of Moses by sending him on an impossible mission against the 
Ethiopians, but Moses was victorious by using his military brilliance. Moses overcomes a 
second conspiracy by Cenephres when Moses kills a would-be assassin through his 
superior physical ability. Moses persuades Raguel not to invade Egypt, but then Moses is 
commanded by God to free the Jews from Egypt. The king imprisons Moses, but the 
prison is miraculously opened. When the king mocks Moses’ God, he falls down as dead 
but is revived by Moses. Moses performs the plagues in order to convince the king to free 
the Jews. After the release of the Jews, the king regrets allowing the Jews to leave, and he 
pursues them only to be destroyed in the sea.  
The fragments of Artapanus display both syncretism with Egyptian culture and a 
particular interest in praising Jewish heroes. On the one hand Artapanus describes each of 
these heroes establishing pagan forms of worship. But on the other hand, these Jewish 
heroes never engage in pagan worship, and they are distinct from the Egyptians on 
account of their creative brilliance. Many of the great things for which Egypt was renown 
are attributable to these brilliant Jews. The most shocking example of syncretism in the 
text is the description of the good things Moses gave to the Egyptians: 
As a grown man he bestowed many useful benefits on mankind, for he invented 
boats and devices for stone construction and the Egyptian arms and the 
implements for drawing water and for warfare, and philosophy. Further he 
divided the state into 36 nomes and appointed for each of the nomes the god to be 
worshipped, and for the priests the sacred letters, and that they should be cats and 
dogs and ibises. He also allotted a choice area to the priests.
15
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 Artapanus 27.4 (Collins, OTP). Artapanus seems to have a positive view of Egypt. He is even 
willing to attribute the annual flooding of the Nile River, an event on which Egyptian agriculture was 
dependent, to Moses (27:28). 
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Artapanus is unique among the Jewish apologists in that his syncretism goes so far as to 
suggest that Moses was responsible for Egyptian idol worship and theriolatry. Artapanus 
interprets Moses’ establishment of these areas to be a beneficial way of maintaining 
social structure.
16
 Even more, Moses makes the ibis a sacred animal.
17
 Artapanus writes 
to boost Jewish pride in the achievements of their ancestors, and he has no problem 
glorifying Moses’ role by attributing to him the establishment of Egyptian worship.  
Despite these tales in which Moses is described as founding Egyptian idol 
worship and theriolatry, Artapanus still wants to make theological and social distinctions. 
He demonstrates that the God of the Jews is most powerful, and God cares specifically 
for the Jews. Pharaoh mocks God’s activity, but when Moses whispers God’s name in 
Pharaoh’s ear, Pharaoh falls down speechless (3.27.24). God is active in speaking to 
Moses and bringing plagues on the Egyptians; whereas, Artapanus never indicates that 
the Egyptian gods have any real vitality or ability to act. Artapanus carefully 
distinguishes between Jews and Egyptians in that God’s consistent care is for the Jews 
and he delivers them from their Egyptian oppressors.  
Conclusions 
Even though they both come from Alexandrian Judaism, Artapanus and Joseph 
and Asenath represent very different responses to pagan religion and social interaction. 
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 Barclay argues that there could be a an apologetic tone to this section that combats the critiques 
of Manetho, “Where Manetho described Moses as instigating the invasion of Egypt, terrorizing the land, 
persecuting the priests and destroying the animal cults (Josephus, C Ap 1.237-50), Artapanus paints a figure 
who strengthens the ruling regime, donates land to the priests and founds animal cults, becoming 
universally loved in the process (27.4-6).” 
17
 This act is strongly contrasted by Wisdom and De decalogo that both criticize sharply the idea 
of venerating animals as the lowest form of false worship. 
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Both texts describe the actions of historical examples of piety in order to explain the 
present situation of their communities. The past is described in order to make sense of the 
present, and these authors deal especially with how to define acceptable associations with 
idols and idolaters. Both texts acknowledge some form of unavoidable contact with 
people who worship idols, but Joseph and Asenath emphasizes the great lengths that 
Joseph takes in order to maintain distinction from his idolatrous neighbors. Joseph will 
not even eat with idolatrous people, but Moses, as recorded by Artapanus, feels free to 
establish Egyptian gods in order to promote social order. From a theological point of 
view, the texts share a great deal although Joseph and Asenath is far more antagonistic in 
its description of Egyptian gods. Both texts agree that God has a special relationship with 
the Jewish people, and God is active in speaking to and delivering his people. Neither 
text gives any indication that the Egyptian gods are real or have the ability to act. Joseph 
and Asenath repeatedly ridicules the deadness of the gods; whereas, Artapanus’ approach 
is to treat them as inconsequential (they can be invented and established for social 
convenience) in contrast to God who kills those who mock God and overthrows the 
oppressors of God’s people. While Joseph and Asenath and Artapanus share a literary 
location and theology, they come to remarkably different conclusions concerning the 
acceptable interactions that a pious person can have with idols. 
Through the lens of the text that the author projects, we get a glimpse into the 
world behind the text. Both authors of these texts are attempting to instruct their 
audiences about proper and improper associations with idols and idolaters by retelling 
stories in the Jewish tradition. Both authors seem to think that the idol-gods are non-
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existent and that there is only one true God who intervenes on behalf of faithful Jews. 
Despite this shared theology, the authors differ in the implications that this theology has 
for daily life in Alexandria. Artapanus seems to reason that the non-reality of the gods 
makes them a non-threat to the Jew, and a faithful Jew is free to interact with them, even 
to the point of establishing their worship. On the other end of the spectrum, Joseph and 
Asenath instructs its audience that the faithful Jew and convert to Judaism must break off 
nearly all associations with idolaters. The circumstances of living under a larger culture 
might force the audience to have some associations (e.g. Joseph works for Pharaoh and 
enters the house of Pentephres), but the faithful Jew takes seriously this contact and 
attempts to avoid close association and dining with non-Jews. The different approaches 
by these authors have a great impact on the practice of the Alexandrian Jewish 
community(ies). For example, if a Jewish metalworker read Artapanus, he might be 
undisturbed by attending a guild meal at a pagan temple (or even crafting a cult-image), 
but if this same metalworker read Joseph and Asenath, the meal would be prohibited 
outright (Joseph refuses to dine with non-Jews, and Asenath refuses to let even her dogs 
eat the food associated with idol gods). Especially when it comes to Jewish attitudes 
toward non-Jewish gods, there is a great deal of debate among Jews as to what are proper 
and improper associations. Neither Joseph and Asenath’s outright denunciation of 
idolatry nor Artapanus’ nuanced acceptance are representative of all Hellensitic Judaism. 
Rather, they are positions that the authors have taken in an ongoing discussion among 
Jews living in a Hellenistic environment. Most Hellenistic Jews promote a position 
somewhere in between these two.  
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The Complexity of Idolatry Described 
The brief analysis of the different approaches to idolatry taken by Joseph and Asenath 
and Artapanus illustrates that the issue of idolatry is complex and irreducible simply to 
theological differences. The complexity and importance of the issue is the reason that 
Jewish authors write extensively on this topic. There was a diverse group of terms used to 
describe interactions with gods through an image.
18
 And some have argued that the 
fluidity and ambiguity of these terms was one of the primary reasons for disagreements 
concerning acceptable associations.
19
 While it is necessary to analyze the use of the terms 
themselves, this analysis must be conducted in the broader analysis of an author’s 
argument. Because these are shifting terms, the value of lexical studies apart from close 
analysis of their context is very limited. In some cases the authors are attempting to 
define terms, but most often the definition of terms is taken for granted. Joseph and 
Asenath, for example, makes no attempt to define the terms used to describe Asenath’s 
images; rather, the terms are assumed, and the text focuses on describing the permissible 
associations with the images.  
Another interpretive challenge for the modern reader is conceptualizing the first 
century Sitz im Leben. Often when the modern reader thinks about idolatry, the first 
concept is abstract and metaphorical—idolatry is excessive devotion to or passion about 
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something or someone. For the first century reader, however, the first concept of idolatry 
was the concrete reality of worshipping a deity by using an image of the diety.
20
 Early 
Christian and Jewish authors can use the concept of idolatry metaphorically (e.g., Eph 
5:5; Col 5:5), but the primary referent is to the concrete reality. For the first century 
audience, idol-worship was an assumed aspect of Greco-Roman culture. Discussions—
represented by the different positions taken by these texts—concerning the non-existence 
of idol-gods were theological, but these discussions had implications that affected their 
daily lives. Because the issue of idolatry had broad implications for how Jews and early 
Christians interacted in the larger Greco-Roman culture, the discussion below will 
highlight some of the sociological, practical, and theological issues involved in 
discussions of idolatry. 
Sociological Issues 
The whole fabric of Greco-Roman culture was interwoven with idol-worship, and 
Jewish and Christian authors were attempting to explain how the pious could navigate the 
culture and remain faithful to God. Paul’s correspondence indicates the pervasiveness of 
idolatry in Roman Corinth because he must address the issues of idolatry at the pagan 
temple, in the home, at the meat market, and possibly at social dining halls. While 
Hellenistic Jewish and Christian communities agreed that idolatry was to be rejected, 
they still had to define what it meant to be idolatrous and map the ethical parameters of 
living with and among idols. Christopher Rowland describes Paul’s task in 1 Cor 8-10, 
“In these chapters, Paul maps out for his readers and hearers a dialectical space in which 
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through an image of the deity. 
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two poles (namely fleeing idolatry and living in a world riddled with idols) are located.”21  
The specific issues at Corinth will be explained in the exegesis of 1 Corinthians 8-10, but 
I will here make an initial exploration into the social issues involved when Jews and 
Christians interacted with idols and idolaters. Taking Philo as representative of some of 
the struggles of Jews interacting in the Hellenistic world, we begin to get a picture of 
challenges of social interaction.
22
  
The fact that Philo wrestles with questions of idolatry in several texts shows that it 
is both an important and challenging issue for the Jewish community in Alexandria.
23
 
Philo’s Jewish heroes are interpreted at some points in terms of the faithfulness of their 
response to idolatrous activity. For example, Abraham is the model of abandoning 
polytheism in order to worship the true God (Philo, Somn. 1; 160-2; Virt. 219).
24
 Moses is 
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 Philo is not unique in this emphasis as almost every Jewish text from Alexandria wrestles with 
the issue of idolatry (and associations with idolaters) in some form. 
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 See, David T. Runia, “Worshipping the Visible Gods: Conflict and Accommodation in 
Hellenism, Hellenistic Judaism and Early Christianity” in Empsychoi Logoi—Religious Innovations in 
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the ideal legislator who prohibits false worship (Decal. 50-80; Mos. 2.159-73; 2.270-4). 
And Phinehas becomes the model of virtue by purging the community from idolatrous 
contamination (Mos. 1.301-4; Spec. 1.56-7).
25
 That Philo specifically confronts Greco-
Roman idolatry and Egyptian theriolatry indicates that these were relevant issues for his 
Alexandrian community and issues that often caused tension in the community. Philo, as 
a wealthy, educated, and politically-involved Jew, also struggled with idolatry in the 
forms of wealth (Leg. 1.25) and striving for glory (Leg. 1.28). Karl-Gustav Sandelin 
describes the challenges that Philo of Alexandria faced as he attempted to live in the 
Greco-Roman Egypt while remaining a faithful Jew: 
An Alexandrian Jew also witnessed pagan religious rites if he was present at 
sportive contests or performances at the theatre, occasions not unfamiliar to Philo 
(Agr. 110-123, Ebr. 177, Prob. 26, 141; Prov. 2, 5). Also attendance at club 
meetings and banquets, mentioned by Philo in Ebr. 20-23 and Leg. 3, 155-59, 
may have confronted Jews with pagan rituals (cf. Flacc. 4, 136).
26
     
 
Sandelin mentions a number of issues in Philo’s context that raised questions about 
idolatry: wealth, attendance at sporting events and the theater, club meetings, gymnasium 
education, Greek citizenship, political office, and family relationships with non-Jews.
27
 
The only things we can say about Philo are those that are indicated by his writings, but 
the fact that he repeatedly confronts idolatry in its numerous forms indicates that Philo 
viewed idolatry as a real threat to his own devotion and the religious devotion of the 
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Alexandrian Jewish community. The threat of idolatry for the Alexandrian Jewish 
community was unavoidable because they existed as a minority sub-culture within the 
larger Greco-Roman society.  
Issues of Community Practice and Boundaries 
Many modern discussions of inter-religious disputes focus on detecting different 
theological positions espoused by each conflicting group. Religious conflict, however, is 
too complex and multi-faceted to be reduced exclusively to theology.
28
 It is insufficient to 
describe Jewish worship only in terms of its monotheistic belief because there were non-
Jewish monotheistic groups. Moreover, this would reduce Jewish worship to a set of 
beliefs. John Barclay highlights this problem: 
To define Jewish religious distinction simply as adherence to ‘monotheism’ seems 
inadequate on a number of grounds. The term ‘monotheism’ places the emphasis 
on a concept—the belief that there is one, and only one, being rightly called 
‘God’—and obscures the significance of cultic practice in defining acceptable or 
unacceptable religion … Jewish distinction thus has to be defined more precisely, 
and in negative terms, as the rejection of alien, pluralist and iconic cult.
29
 
 
Barclay correctly argues that while theology is important, Jewish worship must also be 
defined by both practice and its contrast to Greco-Roman religion. As a minority sub-
culture, Hellenistic Jews were forced to tolerate some association with idols.
30
 But 
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Hellenistic Jews also labored to draw clear boundary lines for acceptable practice and 
association. The boundary lines are essential to community identity and practice because 
boundary lines create the space for community identity. That is, one way of defining who 
is “in” a community is to define who is “out” of a community. 
While discussions about idolatry for the modern reader are primarily theological, 
for first century authors and audiences they were first of all practical. Questions about 
idolatry were questions of what a person could and could not do. Definite community 
boundaries preserve sub-groups from assimilating entirely into the larger culture.
31
 Two 
of the most prominent practices that distinguished Jews from their Greco-Roman 
neighbors were circumcision and rejection of the gods. While circumcision was clearly 
defined (one either was or was not circumcised), rejection of gods and idols existed on a 
spectrum of practice, ranging from complete separation to participation in cultic meals 
while acknowledging the gods’ non-existence. There was much variation in defining 
what constituted idolatry and apostasy because these terms are labels given to those 
“outside” a community by those who are still “inside” a community. Thus, the label of 
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being “idolatrous” or committing “apostasy” was a matter of perspective, not objective 
fact.
32
  
In order to bolster their definitions of community boundaries and idolatry, Jewish 
authors drew on the events of the past. Frequently Jewish authors retell events from 
Jewish history, not simply for the sake of memory, but in order to clarify the present. For 
example, the story of Asenath’s conversion in Joseph and Asenath is an explanation of 
how first century Jews could associate with Greeks and still remain within the bounds of 
being considered faithful to Judaism. The authors of these texts are attempting to define 
acceptable actions as they address real problems in their communities. 
 The stories of Artapanus and Joseph and Asenath have illustrated that 
communities drew different lines concerning acceptable and unacceptable associations. 
Jews almost unanimously agreed that they should not worship pagan gods, but there was 
vagueness in how this was to be applied in practice. Peder Borgen further complicates the 
issue by noting, “In everyday life, the negative attitude of refusal [of associating with 
idols in a particular way] led to the question of ‘how far’, meaning ‘where is the 
boundary line to be drawn?’”33 These questions indicate the tension of attempting to 
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avoid idolatry while at the same time attempting to flourish in a Greco-Roman culture 
that necessitated some contact with idols.
34
 The danger, however, was that in attempting 
to flourish, the Jew could over-assimilate into Hellenistic culture to the degree that his 
own community would consider him to be apostate.
35
 Arguments concerning idolatry, 
while they were made on theological premises, were arguments about practice. They 
defined the limits of acceptable practice and the limits of community; and thereby, they 
were definitions of what it meant to be a practicing member of a community. 
Theological Issues 
The preceding discussion has shown that the issue of idolatry is complex and 
cannot be reduced simply to theological differences among groups, but idolatry should 
not be examined to the exclusion of theology. Idolatry is an issue of what one believes 
about God, gods, and other things claimed by some to have divine status.
36
 Other 
issues—such as where to draw the boundaries of acceptable practice—are implications of 
a community’s theology.   
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The Connection Between The Definitions of God and Non-God  
One approach to understanding what is non-god is to clarify the nature of God; 
that is, the category of non-god or idol is dependent on the how the category of God is 
defined. Stuart Weeks surveys the trends and developments of the concepts of God and 
idolatry in the Hebrew Bible and concludes that Jewish authors progressively make God 
unique by redefining the category of God: 
At the risk of over-simplifying, one might say that Yahweh becomes the only god, 
because the definition of ‘god’ is altered to fit only Yahweh; other deities, insofar 
as they are to be considered at all, qualify as only šēdîm, ‘demons’, the term used 
for some of them already in Deut. 32.17 and Ps. 106.37.
37
 
 
Whether or not one accepts Week’s description of the progressive definition of deity in 
the Hebrew Bible as accurate, he does helpfully point to a manner of understanding 
idolatry and God. An author’s understanding of what is non-god depends on what the 
author believes to be God, so that when an author labels something as non-god, he is 
necessarily comparing the non-god to his (often implicit) definition of God. 
A Philosophical Approach to Defining God and Non-God  
 Moshe Halbertal and Avishai Margalit, in Idolatry, bring some clarity to the 
relationship between the manner in which an author represents God and the manner in 
which the author understands idolatry.
38
 In attempting to clarify the agreement and 
disagreement among Jewish authors concerning idolatry, Halbertal and Margalit provide 
a valuable interpretive model for how to understand the variation in the argumentation. 
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They examine the issue of idolatry from the standpoint of how the author represents God: 
“Different concepts of God create, when reversed, different concepts of idolatry.”39 They 
look at several models of God and idolatry, of which the most relevant for our analysis of 
Jewish and early Christian texts are the representations of God in anthropomorphic terms 
and the subsequent rejection of these anthropomorphic terms. 
In traditions that represent God in anthropomorphic terms (e.g., husband, father, 
king), idolatry is understood to be a sin committed in an interpersonal relationship; 
idolatry is adultery, disobedience, and disloyalty. They summarize the biblical 
understanding of idolatry,  
According to the anthropomorphic concept of God, which is characteristic of 
biblical faith, idolatry is a sin within a system of interpersonal relationships, a sin 
analogous to those people commit with respect to other people, such as betrayal 
and disloyalty.
40
  
 
In these metaphors, God is understood to be a personal God with a special relationship to 
a chosen people. He is a jealous and avenging God, and the danger of idolatry is arousing 
his jealous anger. 
In traditions that represent God philosophically, the goal is to purify conceptions 
of God from anthropomorphism, and idolatry is understood to be error or ignorance. To 
understand the concept of idolatry as error, Halbertal and Margalit draw on the work of 
Maimonides (a 12
th
 century Jewish philosopher) who internalized the concept of idolatry. 
They argue that the concept of idolatry is internalized both socially and mentally. The 
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social internalization of idolatry refers to the transfer of idolatry from a sin committed by 
other nations to a sin of which Israel is primarily guilty. “This social internalization 
within the community is made possible by the mental internalization whose essence is the 
shift from external worship to internal belief.”41 Using Maimonides as the model of 
philosophical Judaism, they note, “According to Maimonides the great error is 
anthropomorphism, which is manifested in two ways: perceiving God as a body and 
attributing to God emotions and a psychic life.”42 The philosophical system of 
Maimonides is not of great relevance for understanding Paul’s thought world, but the 
understandings of idolatry as error and God as very different than humans has precedence 
in Jewish thought especially from authors such as Philo and Wisdom. 
Halbertal and Margalit helpfully point to a way forward in how to analyze 
understandings of idolatry. They describe the variation in defining idolatry in the Jewish 
tradition and they show the relationship between an author’s understanding of God and 
the understanding of idolatry. The nature of their work as a philosophical overview with 
an extensive scope, however, proves to be too reductionistic. Authors are confined into 
particular systems of thought; whereas, many authors employ multiple representations of 
God. Philo, for example, is adamantly opposed to anthropomorphic representations of 
God, but he maintains the biblical imagery of God as Father and King. Paul can talk 
about God’s oneness, but later he can describe other divine beings opposed to God. 
Halbertal and Margalit also do not adequately account for the significant concept of God 
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as Creator, which does not fit neatly into any one of their categories. While their study 
provides a valuable analytical model, they create too perfect disjunctions among the 
various representations of God. 
A Model Adapted for Diaspora Jewish Texts 
Richard Liong-Seng Phua, in Idolatry and Authority, attempts to clarify Halbertal 
and Margalit’s model and apply it to Diaspora Jewish and Pauline texts. Phua 
summarizes his reading of Halbertal and Margalit: “The above analysis enables us to see 
idolatry in two broad categories, namely, the worship of other gods or alien cult, and 
misrepresenting, or dishonoring God (Yahweh). These two can take place simultaneously 
or independently.”43 Phua subdivides the first category (worshipping other gods) into (1) 
unfaithfulness in the metaphor of the marriage relationship, and (2) disregarding ancestral 
customs. Phua subdivides the second category (misrepresenting/dishonoring God) into 
(1) the wrong kind of worship either in action or intention, (2) confusing God with nature 
or other gods/demons, and (3) failure to recognize the uniqueness of God. Phua then uses 
these classifications of idolatry as a critical tool for evaluating different views of idolatry 
at Corinth. 
A few of the methodological problems with Phua’s approach were noted in 
Chapter 1 and will not be repeated here. An additional fault of Phua’s work is the 
somewhat rigid way in which he fits authors into models of representation. The greatest 
weakness in the application of this categorization is that Phua fails to analyze these 
authors at the level of their arguments. He picks representations of God from a corpus of 
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an author in order to establish patterns, but he fails to analyze closely how these 
representations of God are woven into an argument. In this classification, Phua has lost 
sight of the real achievement of Halbertal and Margalit—noticing the interplay between 
an author’s understanding of God and an author’s understanding of idolatry.  
Conclusions 
What this section has noted is the broad ramifications that discussions concerning 
idolatry had for the Jewish and early-Christian audiences. While the question of what is 
considered to be idolatrous is not exclusively a theological issue, it also cannot be 
answered to the exclusion of theology. Theological decisions about permissible and 
impermissible associations and actions were eminently practical for these audiences. 
They were decisions about how Jewish and early-Christian subgroups could participate in 
a larger culture that was interwoven with idols. Thus, these authors are attempting to 
establish or reinforce boundaries for their communities. And the viability and 
continuance of the communities were dependent both upon inter-communal conformity 
of belief and practice and the distinction of the community’s belief and practice from the 
culture around them. What is remarkable is that authors from very similar theological 
traditions represent God in different (perhaps incompatible?) ways in order to define 
idolatry and thus the boundaries of their communities. These complex configurations of 
what are permissible and impermissible actions are often made by appealing to different 
strands of representing God in the Jewish Scriptures. 
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The Complexity of Paul’s Representations of God and Understandings of Idolatry in 
1 Corinthians 8-10 
Having noted that questions concerning idolatry were inseparable from social, practical, 
and theological discussions, we can turn to the complexity of the situation at Corinth. 
Scholars typically note the apparent discrepancies in the ethical conclusions in 1 Cor 8-10 
and still attempt to explain the coherence of the conclusions. This study will look at the 
issue of coherence from the other end of the argument; this study will examine the 
presuppositions of the arguments instead of the conclusions. Specifically, I am interested 
in examining the ways in which Paul represents God and the implications that these 
representations have for Paul’s arguments and conclusions. This perspective—that is, 
analyzing the argumentative presuppositions and process—has been largely overlooked 
by scholars, but it opens a window into understanding the ethical conclusions at which 
Paul arrives. Perhaps the diversity of Paul’s conclusions is intentional as he incorporates 
the breadth of Jewish understandings of who God is and what idolatry is in order to craft 
coherent arguments that are persuasive to the Corinthian audience. 
Paul begins chapter 8 with the affirmation that God alone is God and any other 
so-called deities have no real existence. After an appeal to Paul’s own example in chapter 
9, he appeals to the example of the Israelites in the wilderness. In the example from 
Israel, God is described anthropomorphically as kingly liberator who is displeased (10:5) 
with his subjects and punishes their rebellion (10:8). Paul describes this deity as Christ 
whom the Corinthians should not test (10:9), and they should remember his faithfulness 
despite their temptation to faithlessness (10:12-13). In 1 Cor 10:14-22, Christ is a 
70 
 
personal being with whom the Corinthians participate when they take the “cup of the 
Lord.” The Corinthians are in danger of provoking Christ to jealousy by their 
participation with the “cup of demons.” First Corinthians 10:23-30 relies on the 
representation of God as the sole Creator. God alone is Creator with the implications that 
there are no other deities and any good (including food) comes ultimately from him. This 
overview of Paul’s argument notes the variety of ways in which God is represented and 
idolatry is understood. These initial observations indicate that Paul is drawing on a 
variety of images from Judaism and inserting himself into larger conversations. 
Paul in Context: A Participant in Larger Discussions 
This project locates Paul as an author who is interacting with larger conversations 
occurring in Hellenistic Judaism. Its methodology is to compare Paul to similar 
arguments—not narrative texts such as Artapanus’ Fragments or Joseph and Asenath—
made by Hellenistic Jews, concerning idolatry in order to understand how Paul is crafting 
his argument in relationship with his tradition. Therefore, it is necessary to show that Paul 
is aware of and participating in these larger conversations. 
Paul’s Interaction with Jewish Discussions Described 
That Paul was influenced by both Judaism and Hellenism is evident in something 
as basic as citing the Jewish Scriptures in Greek. It is incorrect, however, to think of 
Paul’s interactions with the Corinthians as a conflict between two definable and entirely 
separable systems of thought, with Paul representing Judaism and the Corinthians 
representing Hellenism. Jason von Ehrenkrook explains the problem of assuming 
Judaism and Hellenism to be two definable and non-interacting systems of thought: 
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Hellenism was not a clearly defined, tangible, monolithic culture that Judaism 
could either accept or reject, as if Judaism were a “cultural vacuum” that could 
potentially be filled; rather, there were many Hellenisms, so to speak, numerous 
and variegated regional expression of hybrid cultures. Similarly, the notion of 
Judaism as a bounded ideological movement obscures “the ongoing messy 
negotiations that constitute culture."
44
 
 
Paul, like other Hellenistic Jewish authors, was attempting to define the boundaries of 
acceptable interactions that a Christian (or Jew) could have with Hellenism without 
becoming assimilated into Hellenism to the point of overly-compromising religious 
distinctives.
45
  
That Paul quotes the Jewish Scriptures also indicates that he is positioning himself 
as an interpreter of and contributor to larger arguments. Karl-Gustav Sandelin’s comment 
concerning the relationship of Paul and Philo undoubtedly is representative of the 
relationship between Paul and the larger Hellenistic Jewish traditions: “In his way of 
handling what he sees as idolatry Paul no doubt is a heir of the same Jewish tradition 
which Philo represents.”46 Hellenistic Judaism—coming both from the Diaspora and 
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 Jason von Ehrenkrook, Sculpting Idolatry in Flavian Rome: (An)Iconic Rhetoric in the Writings 
of Flavius Josephus (SBLEJL 33; Atlanta, Society of Biblical Literature, 2011), 37-38.  
45
 As was mentioned earlier, the point at which one has overly-compromised the distinctives and 
become apostate is subjective label. Moreover, an individual labeled as an “apostate” by a community 
might not consider himself to be an apostate.  
46
 Karl-Gustav Sandelin, “Philo and Paul on Alien Religion: A Comparison,” in Lux Humana, Lux 
Aeterna: Essays on Biblical and Related Themes in Honour of Lars Aejmelaeus (ed. Antti Mustakallio; 
Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2005), 242; cf. Sandelin, Attraction and Danger of Alien Religion: 
Studies in Early Judaism and Christianity (WUNT 290; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2012), 199. Niels 
Hyldahl (“Paul and Hellenistic Judaism in Corinth,” in The New Testament and Hellenistic Judaism [ed. 
Peder Borgen and Søren Giversen; Peabody, Mass.: Hendrickson, 1997], 204-16) probably overstates the 
comparisons between the Corinthian Christians and Hellenistic Judaism, especially in the form of Philo of 
Alexandria. “These features are admittedly few, and they do not allow the exegete to determine, with any 
reasonable certainty, the details of the philosophy of Apollos. However, they do make it clear enough that 
his philosophy was most likely akin to the philosophy of Philo of Alexandria … With Apollos a genuine 
piece of Hellenistic philosophy made its way from Alexandria (cf. Acts 18:24) to Corinth and entered 
successfully the scene of Paul’s Christian community there” (214…215). Hyldahl thinks that Apollos’ 
influence—and by implication the direct influence of thinkers like Philo—is especially prominent in the 
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Palestine—is a fitting comparison to Paul because it represents a group of diverse 
interpretations of Jewish theology and practice both in opposition to and in acceptance of 
aspects of Greco-Roman culture. Both Pauline Christianity and Hellenistic Judaism bear 
the stamp of Hellenism(s) while they also resist complete conformity. 
Paul’s Interaction with Jewish Discussions Illustrated 
While it is certainly true that Paul is a pivotal and at times novel thinker, he does 
not address the problem of idolatry apart from the preconceptions of his Jewish tradition. 
Paul is thinking as a Jew through the lens of his experience of the risen Christ. Paul 
explicitly quotes his Jewish background, an act in itself that indicates he is taking a 
certain position within the stream of Jewish interpretations concerning idolatry, even if he 
may wish to create a slightly new position in light of his experience of the risen Lord. 
Because Paul is crafting an argument as a participant in larger conversations occurring in 
Hellenistic Judaism, it is valuable to compare and contrast his argument in 1 Cor 8-10 to 
other contemporaneous Hellenistic Jewish arguments. In subsequent chapters—3, 4, and 
5—I will examine the works of The Book of Wisdom, Philo’s De decalogo, and 
Josephus’ Contra Apionem. Using these authors’ polemics against idolatry as 
representative examples, we can then examine the places where Paul intersects with their 
arguments, deviates from them, or selectively appropriates them. Because the ultimate 
goal of this project is to gain a better understanding of Paul’s argument in the context of 
his Jewish tradition, I do not describe at length narrative texts in which idolatry is 
                                                                                                                                                                             
references to γνῶσις in 1 Corinthians 8. While I certainly agree with Hyldal that comparison to other 
Hellenistic Jewish authors helps in understanding Paul’s thought, it is better to place Paul as a participant in 
larger conversations occurring in Hellenistic Judaism than to make him a respondent to a particular 
example of Hellenistic Judaism in the form of Philo of Alexandria.   
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discussed (E.g., Maccabean Literature, Joseph and Asenath, and Liber antiquitatum 
biblicarum). Texts such as these will be referred to in the analysis of 1 Cor 8-10 in terms 
of their theological and ethical content, but they are not as useful for understanding how 
Paul’s rhetoric works. 
In order to demonstrate Paul’s interaction with these larger conversations 
occurring in Hellenistic Judaism, I will briefly describe the commonly recognized 
interaction between the Wisdom of Solomon and Rom 1:18-32. The majority of scholars 
note the strong similarities between the arguments of Rom 1:18-31 and Wis 13-15.
47
 
They do not agree, however, concerning the type of relationship between these texts. 
Scholars have proposed relationships between the two texts ranging from direct literary 
dependence to dependence on a shared tradition.
48
 The nature of this relationship is 
complicated by the debate concerning the date of Wisdom. My intent is not to prove or 
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 This point has become so accepted in scholarship that offering an exhaustive list of references 
would prove unhelpful. Only the most significant, recent studies are referenced. Alexander J. Lucas, 
“Romans 1:18–2:11 and the Substructure of Psalm 106(105): Evocations of the  Calf?” Ph.D. diss., Loyola 
University Chicago, 2012; Jonathan A. Linebaugh, “God, Grace, and Righteousness: Wisdom of Solomon 
and Paul’s Letter to the Romans in Conversation” (Ph.D. diss. University of Durham, 2011); Douglas A. 
Campbell, The Deliverance of God: An Apocalyptic Rereading of Justification in Paul (Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 2009), esp. 360-62; Joseph R. Dodson, The ‘Powers’ of Personification: Rhetorical Purpose in 
the Book of Wisdom and the Letter to the Romans (BZNW 161; Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2008). For the 
lexical similarities, see Timo Laato, Paul and Judaism: An Anthropological Approach (trans. T. McElwain; 
South Florida Studies in the History of Judaism 115; Atlanta: Scholar’s Press, 1995), 94-5; Campbell, 
Deliverance of God, 361-2. For influence of the Wisdom of Solomon on 1 Corinthians, see Von Rodrigo J. 
Morales, “The Spirit, the Righteous Sufferer, and the Mysteries of God: Echoes of Wisdom in 1 
Corinthians?” BZ 54 (2010): 54-72; Matthias Konradt, “Die korinthische Weisheit und das Wort vom 
Kreuz: Erwägungen zur korinthischen Problemkonstellation und paulinischen Intention in 1 Kor 1-4,” ZNW 
94 (2003): 181-214. Morales argues that Paul is directly dependent on Wisdom especially in formulating 
his pneumatology. 
48
 Lucas, “Romans 1:18–2:11 and the Substructure of Psalm 106(105),” 15-20. See also Beverly 
Roberts Gaventa, “The Rhetoric of Death in the Wisdom of Solomon and the Letters of Paul,” The 
Listening Heart (1987): 127-45. 
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disprove a particular relationship between Paul and Wisdom. It is sufficient for my 
argument that Wisdom and Paul are shown to be participating in the same conversations. 
A thorough comparison between Wisdom and Romans would take this study off 
course, but it is necessary to recognize that Wisdom and Paul are both interjecting 
themselves into pre-existing conversations in order to offer instruction for their particular 
communities. What is clear in Rom 1:18-32 is that Paul is relying on and adapting an 
argument from his Jewish tradition. Thomas H. Tobin summarizes Paul’s technique: 
In presenting this description, Paul quite clearly used standard Hellenistic Jewish 
apologetic motifs against Gentile religiosity and conduct, and his Roman 
Christian audience naturally would have understood it in this way, at least at first. 
… Because his description basically followed the pattern of traditional Hellenistic 
Jewish apologetic against Gentile religion and morality, his Roman Christian 
audience would have easily understood it and agreed with it. In this sense, Rom 
1:18-32 is not so much an argument as an exposition of viewpoints he and the 
Roman Christians shared. On the surface at least, there was nothing controversial 
about it.
49
 
Tobin goes on to explain that although Paul largely repeats this traditional argument, he 
modifies it for his own context and argument. Most notably, Paul omits the word 
“Gentiles” as a specifying term in his description of the people against whom God’s 
wrath is directed. Moreover, Paul emphasizes that God’s wrath is directed against all 
unrighteousness. The implication of these two modifications (the omission of “Gentiles” 
and inclusion of “all”) is that God’s wrath is directed also against unrighteous Jews. 
                                                          
49
 Thomas H. Tobin, S.J. Paul’s Rhetoric in Its Contexts: The Argument of Romans (Peabody: 
Hendrickson, 2004), 109-10. Tobin (Paul’s Rhetoric, 109 n. 10, 11, 12.) expertly references Hellenistic 
Jewish arguments that are similar to Romans. Campbell (Deliverance of God, 362) emphasizes Paul’s 
disagreement with the theological program of Wisdom.  
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 Perhaps the best illustration of the relationship between the texts occurs in the 
way that Paul and Wisdom make their argument against pagan religiosity.
50
 The 
similarities in the overall structure of the arguments indicate at least a shared 
conversation—if not dependence or a shared source. Both texts attack pagan religiosity 
on the grounds that natural theology makes pagans culpable for not worshipping God, but 
the appeal to natural theology is not unique to Romans and Wisdom (cf. Philo, Decal. 58-
63).  The sequence of the arguments’ progression of natural theology, sexual immorality, 
equating idolatry to sexual immorality, and a vice list does appear to be unique to these 
texts.
51
 A brief look at these themes will demonstrate the similarities between Romans 
and Wisdom that suggest a connection of some kind. While the differences between the 
texts are numerous, this analysis focuses on their similarities. 
 Wisdom begins its critique of pagan religiosity with a natural theology that asserts 
the culpability of humanity for not understanding God’s nature by examining the natural 
world (Wis 13:1-9). Romans’ point is slightly different—humans recognized God but 
rejected God—but it too begins its critique by appealing to natural theology (Rom 1:18-
21). Both texts mention the foolishness of idolatry (Wis 13:10-14:2; Rom 1:22), and then 
describe how false belief caused humans to engage in sexual immorality (Wis 14:12, 24; 
Rom 1:24-27).  Then a vice list follows (Wis 14:25-26; Rom1:28-30). From here, the 
texts proceed in different directions. Wisdom continues with the second half of its 
                                                          
50
 For critiques similar to Wisdom’s, see Let. Arist. 128-71; Sib. Or. 3:8-45; T. Naph. 3.3-5; Philo, 
Decal 52-81; Spec. 1.13-31; Josephus, C. Ap. 2.236-54. The structure is shared only by Wisdom and 
Romans. 
51
 On this point, I am indebted to Campbell, Deliverance of God, 360; cf. Brendan Byrne, S. J. 
“Romans” (SP 6; Collegeville, Minn.: Liturgical Press, 1996), 64-5. 
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chiastic structure, and Romans turns its attention to condemnation of all humans, 
especially those who judge others. While an argument can be made for literary 
dependence, I am only suggesting that the similarities in argument structure suggest that 
Paul is aware of this conversation. Moreover, Paul inserts himself into the debate and 
puts it to his own ends. Brendan Byrne comments on Paul’s relationship especially to 
Wisdom, “These parallels show that in 1:18-32 Paul argues out of a defined tradition in 
Hellenistic Judaism. Within the framework of the intra-Jewish dialogue that he is 
conducting at this point and for his own rhetorical purposes, he is beguiling the implied 
reader with a conventional polemic against the Gentile world and its idolatry.”52 Whether 
or not this “defined tradition in Hellenistic Judaism” is the Wisdom of Solomon, a group 
of texts, the teaching of a school, etc., is not significant. The significance of Roman’s 
argument compared to Wisdom’s argument is that their similarities are too strong to 
suggest that they are not at least branches of the same tree. 
Paul’s Novelty in his Interactions with Jewish Discussions 
The danger in reading Paul alongside or in the context of other authors is that one 
could interpret Paul simply as a reservoir of preexisting streams of interpretation. While 
the present study is built upon the assertion that Paul is a participant in larger 
conversations, Paul is certainly a novel thinker who moves the discussion in new 
directions in light of both his christological lens and the Corinthian situations. What 
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 Byrne, Romans, 65; cf. Alec J. Lucas, “Reorienting the Structural Paradigm and Social 
Significance of Romans 1:18-32” JBL 131 (2012): 121-41; "Unearthing an Intra-Jewish Interpretive 
Debate? Romans 1:18-2:4; Wisdom of Solomon 11-19; and Psalms 105(104)-107(106)," Annali di Storia 
dell'Esegesi 27 (2010): 69-91; “Distinct Portraits and the Parallel Development of the Knowledge of God in 
Romans 1:18-32 and Wisdom of Solomon,” in Christian Body, Christian Self: Concepts of Early Christian 
Personhood (ed. Clare K. Rothschild and Trevor W. Thompson; WUNT 284; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 
2011), 61-82. 
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makes Paul different is the centrality of Christ, the claims made about Christ, and the 
effects that these claims have on the manner in which he understands idolatry. Paul views 
the issue of idol-food through a christological lens by which he understands the divine 
Lord to be present among the Corinthian Christians. Standard Jewish assertions of God’s 
oneness are modified to include the unique role of the “one Lord, Jesus Christ” (1 Cor 
8:6), and the ethical implications of a Christian’s associations with idols must be 
examined in light of Christ’s death on another’s behalf (1 Cor 8:11). Causing another 
believer to stumble by means of one’s associations with idols is equivalent to offending 
Christ himself (1 Cor 8:12). Paul understands Christ to have an active presence when the 
believers celebrate the eucharist (11:29-32), and this presence has implications for how a 
Christian should relate both to the divine Lord and a fellow Christian. Christians should 
be careful lest their associations with idolatry provoke the Lord to jealousy (1 Cor 10:22) 
because there is a fundamental incompatibility between participating in the Lord’s Table 
and the feasts of idols (1 Cor 10:21). The shared meal and ritual of the Lord’s Table also 
implies obligations in this inter-communal relationship (1 Cor 10:16-18). The active 
presence of Christ in establishing inter-communal bonds, judging improper action, and 
being jealous of idols governs the way in which Paul understands idolatry. This 
christological lens preserves God’s transcendent unassailability, and it also preserves the 
divine Lord’s immanent presence.  
Another aspect of Paul’s argument that is different from those in Wisdom, De 
decalogo, and Contra Apionem is that Paul addresses a very specific situation and in 
doing so quotes the positions taken by his audience. First Corinthians describes an 
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ongoing conversation in which Paul attempts to clarify his position against the Corinthian 
objections to his previous instruction. In addition to the unique situation of the ongoing 
argument, Paul also addresses an audience with a background in Gentile religiosity. The 
importance of the audience’s background cannot be overstated because it affects the 
primary categories with which the audience interprets Paul’s comments. For example, 
prior to their recognition of Jesus as the messiah, the categories by which the Corinthian 
Christians probably understood the divine were in terms of a competitive pluralism of 
deities occupying the divine realm. Their beliefs in the Jewish God and Jesus as Lord 
were not simply theological shifts; these beliefs carried many implications for the 
conduct of daily life. The prevalence of cults in Roman Corinth meant that Corinthian 
Christians would have to reevaluate their professional, social, and familial interactions. 
Paul’s arguments—like those by Wisdom, Philo, and Josephus—were not theological 
questions distanced from daily practice. Rather, questions about idolatry were imminently 
practical; they were questions about one could and could not do.  
Summary and Conclusions 
This chapter began by noting the complexity of defining what it means to be idolatrous. 
At the heart of the issue are community boundaries and self-definition of faithful 
participation in the community at the exclusion of thoughts and acts considered to be 
idolatrous. As Jews, and later Christians, participated in the larger Greco-Roman world, 
they were forced to define what acts were permissible and what acts constituted apostasy. 
Joseph and Asenath and Artapanus illustrate the remarkably different approaches of two, 
roughly contemporaneous Alexandrian Jews. They represent nearly opposite ends of the 
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spectrum as Artapanus describes Moses as fully integrated into Egyptian life to the point 
that he can establish Egyptian cults for social expediency and still remain within the 
bounds of what the author considers to be faithful Judaism. In contrast, Joseph and 
Asenath describes Joseph’s faithfulness to God in terms of separating himself from dining 
and associating with Egyptians. He navigates the larger Egyptian culture by taking care to 
remain distinctly Jewish.  
These authors, like other Jewish and Christian authors who discuss idolatry, were 
not engaging in theological conversations removed from everyday practice; rather, they 
were answering for their communities the questions of acceptable participation of a Jew 
or Christian in a larger Gentile context. Because idols and cult association were woven 
into the fabric of Greco-Roman culture, discussions about idolatry for the first century 
audiences involved social issues of how to participate in this culture and the boundaries 
of a particular community. Driving these social and community distinctions are the 
theological convictions of Jews and Christians. Drawing on the work of Halbertal & 
Margalit and Richard Phua, I suggested that a way forward in understanding authors’ 
arguments about idolatry is to examine the manner in which they represent God. 
By briefly looking at Paul’s argument in 1 Cor 8-10, it was noted that his 
(seemingly) inconsistent ethical conclusions correspond to different theological 
representations of who God is. My contribution to understanding the argument of 1 
Corinthians 8-10 will be to analyze the issue of idolatry from the standpoint of Paul’s 
representation of God in order to examine the impact that this stance has on his argument. 
This approach will compare the way that Paul argues to other Hellenistic Jews in order to 
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clarify the position that Paul takes concerning the acceptable interactions with Greco-
Roman cults, gods, and cult-images. Paul is a participant in these broader conversations 
by his appropriation of previous arguments and his novel shaping of the tradition in light 
of his experience of the risen Lord. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
WISDOM’S POLEMIC AGAINST FALSE RELIGION 
 
Introduction 
The previous chapters have demonstrated both the complexity of how Jewish authors 
understood idolatry and that this complexity has been largely overlooked in the analysis 1 
Cor 8-10. When Paul argues that Christian associations with idols are either permissible 
or prohibited, he is participating in larger discussions of how Hellenistic Jews understood 
idolatry and represented the nature of God. Other Jews living in the Hellenistic world 
were similarly attempting to convince their communities concerning the acceptable 
boundaries for their communities. In order to understand Paul better, he must be read 
within the context of these larger arguments. Understanding the ways in which Paul’s 
argument is similar to and different from other Hellenistic Jewish arguments significantly 
helps to explain Paul’s argument. It was proposed that analyzing the manner in which 
Hellenistic Jewish authors represent God, especially in extended polemics, is a valuable 
lens for understanding their critiques of pagan worship, idol-gods, and idols. 
One of the most well-known, Hellenistic Jewish critiques of idolatry comes from 
the Wisdom of Solomon.
1
 Little is known about the author or the author’s context. Due to 
the differences among sections of the book, some scholars think that Wisdom was 
                                                          
1
 This assessment and citations of the Greek text are taken from Joseph Ziegler, Sapienta 
Salomonis (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1980). Translations, unless otherwise noted, are the 
author’s. When Wisdom interacts with the Jewish Scriptures, the author is using the Greek version, the 
Septuagint. 
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composed over time by a school. Most argue for Alexandrian provenance on the basis of 
Wisdom’s critique of (Egyptian) theriolatry, the exodus theme, and Wisdom’s affinities 
to Philo of Alexandria.
2
 The most probable time period of composition is in the early to 
mid-first century CE, but a date from 100 BCE to 40 C.E. is possible.
3
 Wisdom’s 
euhemeristic explanation of idolatry in terms of a desire to worship a distant ruler (14:16-
20) is most probably explained by early emperor worship. Moreover, the author seems to 
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 For arguments for Alexandrian provenance, see Marie-Françoise Baslez, “The Author of 
Wisdom and the Cultured Environment of Alexandria,” in The Book of Wisdom in Modern Research: 
Studies on Tradition, Redaction, and Theology (ed. Angelo Passaro and Giuseppe Bellia; New York: 
Walter de Gruyter, 2005), 31-52; Addison G. Wright, “Wisdom,” in NJBC, 510-11; John J. Collins, 
Between Athens and Jerusalem: Jewish Identity in the Hellenistic Diaspora (2d. ed. Biblical Resource 
Series; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2000), 195; John M. G. Barclay, Jews in the Mediterranean Diaspora: 
From Alexander to Trajan (323 BCE-117CE) (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1996), 451-2; Michael Kolarcik, 
“The Book of Wisdom: Introduction, Commentary, and Reflections,” in NIB (ed. Leander E Keck; vol. 5; 
Nashville: Abingdon, 1997), 438-9; contra Dieter Georgi, Weisheit Salomos (JSHRZ 3.4; Güterloh: Mohn, 
1980), 396. For a discussion of the Alexandrian setting as a context of the idol-polemic, see Manfred Görg, 
“Die Religionskritik in Weish 13,1f: Beobachtungen zur Entstehung der Sapientia-Salomonis im 
späthellinistischen Alexandria,” in Lehrerin der Gerechtigkeit: Studien zum Buch der Weisheit (ed. Helmut 
Engel, S.J.; EThS 19; Leipzig: Benno, 1991), 13-25. Wisdom shares a number of features with Philo’s 
Decal. They structure their idol polemics similarly and tend to avoid overt references to Jewish history 
while being written from a position of strong devotion to the promotion of Judaism. Both are law oriented 
in their piety, but they promote the law of nature that is accessible to all humans. See Collins, From Athens, 
200; David Winston, The Wisdom of Solomon: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary (AB 
43; New York: Doubleday, 1979), 59-63; Chrysostome Larcher, Études sur le Livre de la Sagesse (EBib; 
Paris: J. Gabalda, 1969) 151-78; Maurice Gilbert, S.J., La critique des dieux dans le Livre de la Sagesse (Sg 
13-15) (AnBib 53; Rome: Biblical Institute Press, 1973), 258-263; “Sagesse de Salomon (ou Livre de la 
Sagesse),” in DBSup (vol. 11, 1996), 97. 
3
 See Barclay, Jews in the Mediterranean Diaspora, 451. James C. VanderKam (An Introduction 
to Early Judaism [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2001], 124-5) thinks that it was written in the early first 
century of the Common Era. Chrysostome Larcher (Le Livre de la Sagesse ou la Sagesse de Salomon [3 
vols.; EBib; Paris: J. Gabalda, 1983-5], 141-61) assesses the date to be late first century B.C.E.  Winston 
(Wisdom, 20-25) argues for a date during the reign of Caligula (37-41 CE); cf. Leo G. Perdue, “Rhetoric 
and the Art of Persuasion in the Wisdom of Solomon,” in Christianity and Hellenistic Judaism: Social and 
Literary Contexts for the New Testament (eds. Stanley E. Porter and Andrew W. Pitts; Texts and Editions 
for New Testament Study 10; Leiden: Brill, 2013), 358-60. Samuel Cheon (The Exodus Story in the 
Wisdom of Solomon: A Study in Biblical Interpretation [JSPSup 23; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 
1997], esp. 151) agrees with Winston’s assessment of the date. Through a social-scientific study of the text, 
he concludes that the text has several functions in the wake of Alexandrian riots in 38 C.E.: (1) identifying 
the audience as the righteous innocents (2) identifying the audience’s enemies as the persecutors under 
God’s judgment (3) identifying present history positively thus giving the audience hope (4) counteracting 
the anti-Semitic prejudice of the Gentiles. 
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be responding to a desperate situation in his community in which the hope of immortality 
and the eschatological judgment of the wicked become especially significant. This 
desperate situation is most likely a description of the pogroms in the wake of Flaccus’ 
pronouncements. These factors make the most likely date sometime around 40 C.E. 
The assessment of Wisdom’s purpose and tone has a great impact on how the 
book is interpreted. Especially when it comes to the idol polemic, it is necessary to 
discern whether Wisdom is antagonistic toward Greco-Roman culture and thus attacks it 
or Wisdom thinks Judaism and Hellenism to be fundamentally compatible and thus 
criticizes only certain aspects of Greco-Roman culture. The different outlooks can be 
represented by the approaches taken by John Barclay and John Collins. John Barclay, in 
Jews in the Mediterranean Diaspora, analyzes documents from the Jewish Diaspora and 
labels them according to their convergence or antagonism with Greco-Roman culture. 
While he admits that Wisdom is a challenging document to assess, he interprets “Wisdom 
as an educated and deeply Hellenized exercise in cultural aggression.”4 Barclay does 
admit that the central section of the book has a more positive outlook concerning the 
compatibility of Jewish and Greco-Roman cultures, but he argues, “The potential of a 
more integrated cultural vision suggested by the ‘Book of Wisdom’ (6.12-9.18) is never 
                                                          
4
 Barclay, Jews in the Mediterranean Diaspora, 184. Barclay’s analysis relies most heavily on chs. 
11-19 in which God’s people are contrasted with those who are foolish and ungodly. The last section of the 
book (chs. 11-19) parallels the opening of the book (1:1-6:11) with the emphasis on opposition and 
enemies. The transitional chapter 10 describes wisdom’s role in rescuing God’s people from enemies. The 
retelling of the exodus story portrays God’s people as persecuted by their enemies and delivered by God. 
Thus the book begins and ends with the portrayal of God’s people being under the attack of enemies. 
Winston (Wisdom, 63-4) generally agrees with Barclay that Wisdom is antagonistic to Greek culture. He 
thinks it is written to other Jews in order to encourage pride in the Jewish life. 
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fulfilled.”5 Barclay concludes that Wisdom’s antagonistic critique provides hope and 
encouragement to Jews that their enemies will be punished and they will be vindicated. 
Collins responds to Barclay’s assessment and claims that “Despite the polemical 
cast of chapters 11-19, the dominant tone of the Wisdom of Solomon is one of 
convergence with Greek culture, typified by the portrayal of wisdom in Greek 
philosophical terms in the middle section of the book.”6 He notes that Wisdom’s critique 
of popular Greco-Roman religion parallels the critiques that philosophical Greeks, 
especially Stoic and Cynic philosophers, were already making. While he admits that the 
tone of chs. 13-15 is polemical, the polemic is not directed against the Alexandrian Greek 
audience; rather, it is a polemic that Wisdom attempts to make with Alexandrian Greeks 
against the Egyptians: 
It is clear, then, that the critique of idolatry in Wis. Sol. does not represent an 
unqualified opposition to the Gentile world. Rather, the author was attempting to 
make common cause with enlightened Greeks who would share his contempt for 
popular superstition, and especially the crass forms of idolatry practiced in 
Egypt.
7
 
                                                          
5
 Barclay, Jews in the Mediterranean Diaspora, 190. Alec J. Lucas (“Distinct Portraits and 
Parallel Development of the Knowledge of God in Romans 1:18-32 and Wisdom of Solomon 13-15,” in 
Christian Body, Christian Self: Concepts of Early Personhood [ed. Claire K. Rothschild and Trevor W. 
Thompson; WUNT 284; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2011], 61-82) argues that even this section that is 
typically interpreted as more universalistic may have an implicit particularism when read in light of the idol 
polemic that follows: “…Wis 13-15 depicts the knowledge of God as something not even nature 
worshippers achieved, much less idolaters and theriolaters. This difference, in turn, I argued, provides a 
neglected window into the tension between universalism and particularism in Wisdom, one that reveals 
implicit particularism in the epistemological anthropology of Wis 7-9, chapters typically regarded as 
belonging to the most universal portion of the book” (82). 
6
 Collins, From Athens, 202. 
7
 John J. Collins, Jewish Wisdom in the Hellenistic Age (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 
1997), 212-3. See his critique of Barclay’s assessment of the idol polemic, Collins, “Natural Theology and 
Biblical Tradition: The Case of Hellenistic Judaism,” CBQ 60 (1998): 8-10. 
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Collins also compares Wisdom’s approach to Philo’s and notes the strong similarities. 
Even Barclay admits that Philo is an example of cultural convergence, so Collins thinks it 
is inconsistent for him to conclude that Wisdom’s very similar argument is an example of 
cultural aggression. According to Collins, Wisdom and Philo both believe that Jewish 
Scriptures and Greek philosophy are compatible, and the critique of Greco-Roman 
religion must be read in light of Philo and Wisdom appealing to philosophy to 
demonstrate its agreement with the Jewish Scriptures.
8
 Further, Israel serves as the 
paradigm for righteousness, but Israel is not an exclusive paradigm as righteousness can 
be deduced partly from proper philosophical reflection on nature.
9
 
In their assessments, Collins appeals more to the material in Wisdom 1-10 and 
Barclay relies more on Wisdom 11-19.  These emphases are understandable because both 
Collins and Barclay admit that chs. 11-19, the section in which the idol polemic is 
contained, are more antagonistic. This antagonism, however, is not necessarily directed to 
all Greco-Roman culture. Collins has interpreted the idol polemic as making use of 
critiques already established by Greco-Roman authors. Their disagreement concerning 
                                                          
8
 The learnedness of the author in Wisdom is undeniable, but Barclay (Jews in the Mediterranean 
Diaspora, 184) assesses the author’s use of his learning differently: “the author of Wisdom employs his 
considerable learning not to integrate his Judaism with his environment but to construct all the more 
sophisticated an attack upon it!” 
9
 Collins appeals in part to Wisdom’s practice of not offering the specific names of the characters 
in Israel’s history. Barclay (Jews in the Mediterranean Diaspora, 190) responds, “The anonymity of the 
characters is not designed to establish a broad typology capable of including the righteous of all nations. It 
is a stylistic and rhetorical device, in the Alexandrian tradition of literary allusion; the biblically informed 
audience will know well enough to whom ‘God’s people’ refers.” In addition to Barclay’s critique, there 
may be an aspect of “insider knowledge” that forms a bond between the author and audience against those 
on the outside who would not be able to recognize all the allusions. 
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the purpose of Wisdom is based, in part, on their analyses of the function of the idol 
polemic. Collins interprets the idol polemic as an argument made with educated Jews and 
Greeks against popular Egyptian religion. Barclay interprets the idol polemic as an 
argument made with educated Jews against popular Greek and Egyptian religion.  
The assessment of Wisdom’s genre also affects the way in which the sections are 
understood. The most convincing argument is that Wisdom is written in the form of logos 
protreptikos, a genre that Winston defines as “a highly charged plea designed to persuade 
a large audience to succumb to the charms of the philosophical life”10 Even though 
Wisdom does not employ many imperatives directly aimed at the audience, Wisdom is 
still attempting to make a persuasive argument for a particular course of action. Part of 
pursuing wisdom is forsaking the foolish and false worship practices that characterize the 
enemies of God’s people. The author retells Jewish history in terms of God’s provision 
for God’s people and God’s judgment on their enemies, and the author wants the 
audience to identify themselves as God’s people as they pursue wisdom and forsake folly. 
Thus, the most likely audience is Jewish. The anonymous references to Jewish historical 
figures bolster the “insider appeal” because the work is intelligible to those who are 
familiar with Jewish history. Although the intended audience was Jewish, the author’s 
interactions with Greco-Roman philosophy probably would have precluded widespread 
                                                          
10
 Winston, Wisdom, 18-20; cf. Friedrich Focke, Die Entstehung der Weisheit Salomos: ein 
Beitrag zur Geschichte des jüdischen hellenismus (FRLANT 5.22; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 
1913), 85; James M. Reese, Hellenistic Influence on the Book of Wisdom and Its Contents (AnBib 41; 
Rome: Biblical Institute, 1970), 117-21; Wright, “Wisdom,” 511; Perdue, “Rhetoric,” 241-71.  
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reception by most Jews; thus, the author likely writes to educated, Hellenistic Jews who 
understood themselves to be Jewish but also conversant with the Greco-Roman world.   
The analysis below will argue that Wisdom’s idol polemic, in line with other 
Jewish idol polemics, makes a persuasive—although perhaps not fair—critique of pagan 
religion in order to dissuade Jews from engaging in idolatry and give them pride in their 
ancestral beliefs.
11
 While Collins does make some helpful points concerning the 
argument of Wisdom, a better explanation is that Wisdom, especially in the idol polemic, 
adopts some Greco-Roman arguments and rhetorical devices, not to demonstrate 
convergence with Greco-Roman culture, but in order to make a sophisticated critique of 
Greco-Roman religion, Egyptian worship, and even Greco-Roman philosophy. The 
purpose of retelling the exodus is so that the author can make sense of the present 
circumstances of the Alexandrian Jewish community in the face of opposition. The 
author creates an argument that pits “us” against “them” and “our God” against “their 
gods.”  
The Structure and the Argument 
While there is some debate concerning the structure of Wisdom, I will subdivide the book 
into three sections with two additional excursus: 
1) Wisdom’s gift of immortality (1:1-6:21) 
2) Wisdom’s nature and Solomon’s pursuit of wisdom (6:22-11:1) 
                                                          
11
 Winston (Wisdom, 63) similarly describes the purpose, “The author is primarily addressing his 
fellow Jews in an effort to encourage them to take pride in their traditional faith. He seeks to convince them 
that their way of life, rooted in the worship of the One true God, is of an incomparably higher order than 
that of their pagan neighbors, whose idolatrous polytheism has sunk them into the mire of immorality. 
Moreover, he attempts to justify their present suffering through the promise of immortality as a reward for 
their steadfast perseverance in the pursuit of righteousness.” 
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3) Wisdom’s role in the Exodus (11:2-19:22) 
Excursus 1: God’s mercy (11:15-12:22)  
Excursus 2: Idolatry (13:1-15:19)
12
 
 
In the first section (Wis 1:1-6:21), the author describes the oppression of the righteous 
and their ultimate vindication by God. The author begins this section with an exhortation 
for rulers to seek the Lord (1:1-2) and concludes with an exhortation for rulers to honor 
wisdom (6:21). God’s justice will be realized fully in the future when the righteous will 
be rewarded with immortality and the wicked will be punished. Even though the 
righteous might appear to suffer harm—such as the barren (3:13-4:6) and those who die 
young (4:7-15)—God will reward them with life: “But the souls of the righteous are in 
the hands of God, and torment will not touch them in any way” (Wis 3:1). 13 In contrast, 
God will punish the ungodly—those who have despised wisdom—for mistreating the 
righteous and rebelling against God (3:10-11). There is a tension between the author’s 
particularism and universalism. On the one hand God is found by those who do not test 
God (1:2), wisdom is kind (1:6), and wisdom “hastens to make itself known to those who 
desire” (6:13).14 God and wisdom are accessible to all. But on the other hand, God’s 
                                                          
12
 See for example, Winston, Wisdom, 4; Lester L. Grabbe, Wisdom of Solomon (Sheffield: 
Sheffield Academic Press, 1997), 13-17. For an argument for a two-part structure, see Addison G. Wright, 
S.S., “The Structure of Wisdom 11-19,” CBQ 27 (1965): 28-34; “The Structure of the Book of Wisdom,” 
Biblica 48 (1967): 165-84. For the history of the debate concerning the structure, see Maurice Gilbert, “The 
Literary Structure of the Book of Wisdom: A Study of Various Views,” in The Book of Wisdom in Modern 
Research: Studies on Tradition, Redaction, and Theology (ed. Angelo Passaro and Giuseppe Bellia; 
Deuterocanonical and Cognate Literature Yearbook 2005; New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2005), 19-31. 
13
 Kolarcik (“Book of Wisdom,” 444) notes the chiastic structure of this opening section which 
centers on Wis 3:1-4:20. He further notes the structure of this central section wherein the author uses the 
parallel diptych system to heighten the contrast between the righteous and the wicked. 
14
 Φιλάνθρωπον (1:6; cf. 7:23; 12:19), along with its noun-form φιλανθρωπία, is a term with a rich 
history in Stoic and Middle Platonic philosophy. See David Winston, “Philo’s Ethical Theory,” ANRW 
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“grace and mercy are with his elect” (4:15). The author appeals to two unnamed Jews 
(Enoch and Elijah) as examples of the righteous. While the author describes the universal 
accessibility of wisdom, the section pits the elect righteous (who are exemplified by 
Jewish heroes) against the oppressive wicked. The author comforts the righteous by 
assuring them that they ultimately will be rewarded and their enemies will be punished. 
The author intends to comfort his oppressed Jewish audience by describing God’s 
eschatological vindication.  
The second section (Wis 6:22-11:1) is an extended praise of wisdom and her role 
in the lives of the righteous. The tone is different as the perspective shifts from third 
person in the first section to the first person in the second section. Although he is not 
named, Solomon is the implied speaker who embodies the righteous who seek wisdom 
                                                                                                                                                                             
2.2.1, 372-416; Peder Borgen, Philo of Alexandria: An Exegete for His Time (NovTSup 86; Leiden: Brill, 
1997), 243-260. Greek authors can use φιλανθρωπία to describe the benevolence of the gods (e.g., 
Aristophanes, Pax, 392-93; Plato, Symp., 189C; Plutarch, Mor., 758) and of the king (Plato, Leg., 713D; 
Symp. 189D) to their subjects. While φιλανθρωπία does have a universalistic tone in Greco-Roman 
philosophical writings, there are not necessarily universalistic implications with its use by Jewish authors. 
Philo, for example, thinks that the virtue of humanity is particularized most perfectly in the Mosaic Law. 
Even in the special laws that are most distinctly Jewish, humanity is enacted. The greatest virtue and goal 
of the law is piety, but one’s relationship with other humans should be characterized by humanity (e.g., 
Philo, Decal. 164; Spec. 1.128, 221, 295, 324; 2.39, 63, 79, 110; 4.97; cf. C. Ap. 2.145-6). Philo’s 
particularistic understanding of φιλανθρωπία expressed in the Mosaic Law is clearest in Virtues 51-174. 
Collins (Between Athens and Jerusalem, 202) explains this tension in Wisdom, “Wisdom is characterized 
as philanthrōpon (1:6; 7:23), a Stoic term with broad universalist implications. On the other hand, we are 
told that God hated ‘those who lived long ago in your holy land’ because of their abominable practices 
(12:3-4), and the author has nothing good to say about the Canaanites and Egyptians. The author wanted to 
affirm simultaneously a universalist doctrine of divine philanthrōpia and the biblical notion of the election 
of Israel. The two ideas are not easily compatible.” While the concept of φιλανθρωπία in the Greco-Roman 
world was generally put to universalizing ends, its adoption by Jewish authors is not unqualified. Rather, 
when an author such as Philo or Wisdom appropriates this term, it is shaped by their particularistic 
understanding of God’s relationship with a particular people. Borgen (Philo: An Exegete, 258) comments, 
“In a Jewish understanding the application of the concept of philanthropia to the particular people of God 
was central. The universalistic aspect then was understood to mean that this Jewish people of God with its 
laws and worship was the center of mankind.”  
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and serve as a counterpart to the wicked. The relationship of Solomon as a counterpart to 
the wicked can be seen in their reflections on mortality. In the first part of the book, the 
wicked reason that their mortality renders wise living unprofitable (2:1-24); in contrast, 
the reality of mortality makes Solomon desire wisdom even more (7:1-22). Solomon 
describes at length the nature of wisdom (7:22-8:1) with an emphasis on wisdom’s 
agency in creation and establishing the cosmic order. Two repeated themes are that 
wisdom is a gift from God (e.g., 8:21; 9:6, 17), and wisdom draws the righteous into a 
relationship with God: “generation by generation she (i.e. wisdom) enters into holy souls 
makes them friends of God, and prophets” (Wis 7:27; cf. 7:14). Solomon concludes his 
prayer for wisdom with a thematic statement that will be explained in the rest of the 
book: “And thus the paths of those on earth were set right and the humans were taught 
what pleases you, and by wisdom they were saved” (Wis 9:18). Having stated that 
wisdom saves the righteous, the author then demonstrates how wisdom rescued 
significant figures in Jewish history.
15
 The climax of this demonstration is the description 
of how wisdom rescued a holy people, understood to be the Israelites, from their 
oppressors, the Egyptians (Wis 10:15-21). This climax draws together the central themes 
of the first two sections and paves the way for the third section that describes God’s 
provision for the Israelites in the wilderness. 
The final section (11:2-19:22) explains that God delivers God’s people from their 
oppressors in the exodus, which is an extension of the theme introduced in Wis 10:15-
                                                          
15
 Wisdom may be understood to be an agent of God, but the author describes personified wisdom 
as the one who rescues the righteous. 
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11:1.
16
 There are several shifts in the argument from the previous sections. Whereas the 
first two sections are understood by some to represent convergence and openness to 
Hellenistic culture,
17
 the final section is much more particularistic (the righteous are 
identified as a specific nation) and antagonistic (the wicked oppressors of God’s people 
are punished as the righteous are saved). Corresponding to this definition of the righteous 
as a particular nation, the identities of the righteous and wicked in the final section are 
corporate; the righteous in the first two sections were individuals: the person who suffers 
injustice and Solomon. Another shift is that the third section focuses on God’s activity 
and wisdom moves to the background. Wisdom has done her job of making a people 
friends of God, and now the author focuses on God’s wise care. Kolarcik explains the 
connection between the final section and the previous two: “The events of the exodus, 
ranging from the plagues of Egypt to God’s providence for the Israelites in the desert, are 
presented as signs of God’s wisdom and commitment to justice.” In this section, God 
becomes the example of providential wisdom as God cares for God’s people and judges 
their enemies. Thus, God’s judgment of the wicked—described as an eschatological hope 
in the first section—demonstrates the wisdom and justice of God’s providential rule. The 
Israelites and the Egyptians embody the righteous sufferer and the wicked oppressor of 
the first section, and the recounting of God’s past judgment substantiates the 
                                                          
16
 There is some debate concerning whether the third section, often described as a midrash, begins 
at 10:1 or in ch. 11. Due the shifts in the argument beginning with ch. 11, it is best to begin the third section 
in ch. 11. See Wright, “Structure of Wisdom,” 28-30; Gilbert, “Structure of the Book,” 26-30. 
17
 E.g., Collins, Between Athens and Jerusalem, 201-2. 
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eschatological hope. The activity of judgment in the final section is primarily through 
secondary means; the cosmos acts with God in order to punish the Egyptians by means of 
their sins but this activity is still understood to be God’s doing (11:13): “the cosmos is the 
defender of the righteous…For creation, serving you its maker, exerts itself to punish the 
unrighteous” (Wis 16:17…24). 
 The structure of this section (11:2-19:22) is important for understanding the 
function of the polemic against pagan worship (13:1-15:17). This section explains how 
the elements of the cosmos save God’s people (Israelites) and punish their enemies 
(Egyptians): “For through the things by which their enemies were punished, they were 
benefitted in their lack” (Wis 11:5; cf. 11:16; 12:23, 27). The author employs seven 
antitheses to demonstrate how the cosmos saves God’s people and opposes their enemies: 
 1
st
 Antithesis (11:6-14): Water from Rock vs. Nile turned to Blood 
 2
nd
 Antithesis (11:15-16:15): Provision of Quail vs. Plague of Animals 
  Excursus 1 (11:17-12:22): Divine Power and Mercy 
  Excursus 2 (13:1-15:19): On False Worship 
3
rd
 Antithesis (16:5-15): Healing of the Serpent Bites vs. Fatal Bites by Insects 
 4
th
 Antithesis (16:16-29): Manna vs. Storms 
 5
th
 Antithesis (17:1-18:4): Pillar of Fire vs. Plague of Darkness 
 6
th
 Antithesis (18:5-25): Deliverance vs. Death of the Firstborn 
 7
th
 Antithesis (19:1-12): Red Sea as Deliverance vs. Drowning
18
 
 
While the first and second sections described the activity of wisdom as a secondary 
means of God’s activity, this section describes the cosmos as a secondary means of God’s 
activity. The conclusion is significant because it indicates how Wis 11-19 is to be 
                                                          
18
 This structure of six or seven antitheses is well-recognized although there is some variation in 
the precise division of the antitheses. E.g., James M. Reese, “Plan and Structure in the Book of Wisdom,” 
CBQ 27 (1965): 398-99; Wright, “The Structure of Wisdom,” 30; Winston, Wisdom of Solomon, 10-12; 
Kolarcik, “Book of Wisdom,” 446; Gilbert, “The Literary Structure,” 30. 
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understood. The author justifies the destruction of the enemies because they were 
unrighteous and were warned (19:13-17); thus, God’s justice is upheld. The author also 
indicates that the cosmos operated in a new way to punish the ungodly (19:18-21), and 
punishing of the wicked by means of the cosmos is to be understood as God’s 
providential care for God’s people: “For in every way, you exalted and glorified your 
people and you did not neglect to help them in every time and place” (Wis 19:22). 
Despite the disagreements concerning where to divide the larger units of the text, 
scholars agree that Wisdom 13-15 is a digression from the flow of the main argument. 
Gilbert explains how the idol polemic fits into the larger argument,  
The second digression (13-15) also seems to answer a tacit question: Why does 
God use animals to punish the Egyptians? The author explains that of the three 
main types of religion practiced by the pagans of his day, worship of the world 
and its elements (13:1-9), worship of idols (13:10-15:13) and worship of living 
animals (14:14-19); this last, secular in Egypt, is the worst and most blameworthy 
deviation. So God uses what the Egyptians adore in order to punish them. Once he 
has demonstrated this, the author returns to the exodus and describes what 
happened to both parties and compares their lot.
19
 
 
The first excursus (11:15-12:22) explains God’s mercy as a preface to explaining how he 
punished the Egyptians while delivering his people. God’s punishment is perfectly just as 
he punishes them by means of the objects with which they sin (11:15-16). This theme is 
reasserted in the material intervening the first and second excursus (12:23-7). The idol 
polemic is to be understood in light of the theme of God’s just punishment. Wisdom 
expands the critique of false forms of worship to include Greco-Roman as well as 
                                                          
19
 Maurice Gilbert, “Wisdom Literature” trans. K. Smith in Jewish Writings of the Second Temple 
Period: Apocrypha, Pseudepigrapha, Qumran Sectarian Writings, Philo, Josephus (ed. Michael E. Stone; 
CRINT 2; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1984), 304.  
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Egyptian practices. Directly following the idol polemic, the author explains two things 
relevant for his explanation of the exodus: God punishes the enemies of God’s people by 
means of their objects of worship and blesses God’s people with great provisions (16:1-
4). In this three-part critique, Wisdom makes an argument of progressive levels of 
wickedness. While the author criticizes Greco-Roman forms of worship, the author more 
severely criticizes the practices that are uniquely Egyptian: nature worshippers are vain 
(μάταιοι, 13:1), idolaters are wretched (ταλαίπωροι, 13:10), and Egyptian theriolaters are 
most foolish (ἀφρονέστατοι, 15:14). Scholars have constructed various outlines of chs. 
13-15. Addison Wright’s outline helps to see the structure and progression of Wisdom’s 
argument: 
(1) Nature Worship (13:1-9) 
(2) Idolatry (13:10-15:17) 
a. Introduction (13:10) 
b. The carpenter and wooden images (13:11-14:2) 
c. Apostrophe (14:3-6) and transition (14:7-11) 
d. The origin and evils of idolatry (14:12-31) 
c
'
. Apostrophe (15:1-3) and transition (15:4-6)  
b
'
. The potter and clay images (15:7-13) 
a
'
 Conclusion (15:14-17)
20
 
 
The one emendation that I will make to Wright’s outline is to extend the excursus on 
idolatry through 15:19. I have included 15:18, 19 with the preceding section because they 
continue the condemnation of Egyptian worship begun in 15:14, and the syntactical 
marker διὰ τοῦτο in 16:1 indicates a transition that applies the preceding material to a 
                                                          
20
 Wright, “Wisdom,” 519-20; “Structure of the Book of Wisdom,” 180-81; “Numerical Patterns 
in the Book of Wisdom,” CBQ 29 (1967): 528-9. Cf. the nearly identical outline, Grabbe, Wisdom, 23. This 
division of idolatry into three groups—nature worshippers, idolaters, and animal worshippers—can be 
observed in other Hellenistic Jewish texts, especially Philo, Decal. 52-81. See Larcher, Études, 144-5, 162-
66; Le Livre, 747-8. 
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new topic.
21
 Wisdom 15:18, 19 serve as a transitional passage that resumes the second 
comparison (11:15-16:15) between the cursing of the plagues with the blessing of the 
qual. While Wisdom’s mocking critiques of idol craftsmen are modeled after the critiques 
in the Psalms and Prophetic Books, Wisdom introduces new material relevant to the 
author’s situation (e.g. nature worship, animal worship, and explanation of idolatry’s 
origins as honor for a distant ruler), and Wisdom structures the argument in a more 
symmetrical manner.  
The significance of these structures—both of the book as a whole and Wisdom 
13-15—has great significance for how the polemic against false worship is interpreted. 
The author is not simply relating arguments to his audience; the author is choosing to 
make those arguments in a particular form that he thinks reinforces his overall argument. 
It is important to interpret Wisdom 13-15 within the context of Wisdom 11-19 that 
contrasts God’s provision for God’s people with God’s punishment for their enemies, a 
punishment that God accomplishes primarily through the secondary means of the cosmos. 
The enemies of God’s people are punished by means of their sins. The retelling of God’s 
past judgment on enemies substantiates the eschatological hope (described in the first 
section) that God will deliver the author’s community from their oppressors. 
Wisdom 13:1-9 
Wisdom begins the critique of false forms of worship by condemning those who 
worship nature instead of perceiving the God who gives nature its beauty. Wisdom is not 
                                                          
21
 Wright (“Wisdom,” 519) argues that the entire polemic is formed around the inclusio of 13:10 
and 15:17 with the assertion that idols are dead things. 
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making an argument for the existence of God. God’s existence is assumed, and Wisdom 
is attempting to disprove pagan conceptions of God and thereby to prove the validity of 
Jewish understandings of God. Although Wisdom’s designation of these worshippers as 
μάταιοι may be a deliberate attempt to link them to the idol craftsmen in Isaiah (Wis 
13:1; Isa 44:9), the author of Wisdom takes the critique in a different direction than the 
prophetic critiques of the Jewish Scriptures as he makes a philosophical argument. Many 
have noted that this section is a critique of Stoic materialism that had failed to make a 
distinction between God and creation.
22
 Wisdom responds by asserting that God is the 
immaterial Existing One, ὁ ὤν.23 Platonists used this term in reference to the transcendent 
intelligible principle in contrast to Stoicism’s immanent deity. For the author of Wisdom, 
Platonism’s transcendent God combats Stoicism’s failure to distinguish God from nature. 
But Platonism too is imperfect because it would leave the author with an unknowable 
God. Wisdom, however, asserts that the Existing One is none other than the Jewish God 
(cf. Exod 3:14), who is both the Creator and personal God revealed in the Jewish 
Scriptures.
24
 Thus, Wisdom corrects the conception of God by one philosophical school 
                                                          
22
 Gilbert, La critique, 14-20; VanderKam, Introduction, 127; Winston, Wisdom, 255; Larcher, Le 
Livre, 752-4. Collins (“Natural Theology,” 7) comments, “Stoics and Platonists were in agreement that the 
order of nature required the existence of a divine mind. They disagreed as to whether the divinity was 
immanent or transcendent.” In line with the scriptural tradition and contemporary Jewish writers such as 
Philo, Wisdom presents a God who is transcendent. 
23
 The term is dependent on Exod 3:14. Winston, Wisdom, 249, notes that Philo uses ὁ ὤν and τὸ 
ὄν; whereas, Wisdom only uses ὁ ὤν. 
24
 See Gilbert, La Critique, 43; Reese, Hellenistic Influence, 53-4; cf. Grabbe, Wisdom, 36-7. For 
the author of Wisdom, the ὁ ὤν of Platonism is really the ὁ ὤν of Exod 3:14. In Jewish history, this 
description of God is his self-revelation to his chosen people, so he is to some degree knowable in a 
personal sense. The concept of God as Creator of the physical world also is a correction of the Platonic 
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(Stoicism) by means of another philosophical school (Platonism), but the author 
ultimately rejects both conceptions as insufficient. 
The significance of alluding to Exodus 3:14 in the context of Wisdom 11-19 
should not be underestimated as it ties together several themes in these chapters.
25
 
Wisdom 11-19 is concerned with the actions of God in providing for God’s people and 
judging their enemies.
26
 In Exodus 3, God promises to act for the deliverance of his 
people from their oppressors (Exod 3:7-10, 16-17, 20-22). God’s self-revelation is to a 
particular people with whom God has a personal relationship. Thus Wisdom critiques the 
(Stoic and Platonic) conceptions of God, and Wisdom asserts that The Existing One is 
knowable by means of self-revelation to a particular people. The author preemptively 
limits the degree to which one can understand God by analogy to the natural world 
because God’s revelation and care are directed to a particular people. It is precisely in 
God’s historical acts of deliverance—the narrative background for Wisdom 10-19—that 
God is known. While Wisdom acknowledges a certain level of universal accessibility to 
the knowledge of God, the truest knowledge of God comes through God’s self-revelation 
to a particular people. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
conception of God. Reese (Hellenistic Influence, 53 n.93) demonstrates that for Plato, God creates the ideas 
but not the physical world; see, Rep. 497c, Soph. 266; Tim. 30a-c. 
25
 It is characteristic for the author of Wisdom to assume that the audience will understand his 
allusions to the Septuagint. In light of the significance of Exodus 3, it is not unreasonable to argue that the 
author expects his audience to interpret his brief allusion to Exod 3:14 in the context of Exodus 3. 
26
 In Wisdom 11-19, the cosmos acts to oppose the oppressors of God’s people, and this is 
understood to be God working through secondary means to punish the oppressors. Similarly, God promises 
in Exodus 3 to punish the Egyptians, but this punishment will be carried out in part through the agency of 
Moses (Exod 3:12, 16-22).  
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In order to describe the creative role of God, the author of Wisdom describes God 
as τεχνίτης (Wis 13:2). This designation is significant because it is a Greek, not biblical, 
description of God.
27
 While the author just criticized Greek understandings of ὁ ὤν, now 
the author employs terms drawn from Greek philosophy in order to explain the 
distinction between the Creator and the created world. The identification of the ὁ ὤν as 
τεχνίτης is a remarkable qualification of Platonic understandings of God. In Wis 13:1, the 
author explains that The Existing One (ὁ ὤν), whom Platonists argued was unknowable, 
is knowable in God’s self-revelation especially through Moses (cf. Exod 3:13-17). Then 
the author further redefines The Existing One (ὁ ὤν)—whom the Platonists thought to be 
separated from the material world—to be the Architect (τεχνίτης) of the material world.28 
Thus, Wisdom labors to present a God that is both the universal Creator and concerned 
with a particular people, both the immaterial Existing One and the Creator of the material 
world, both known analogously through nature and known personally through revelation.  
The problem with nature worshippers is that they rely only on the sense of sight 
and fail to understand a deeper reality (13:7). Reese summarizes the argument, “The Sage 
is saying that philosophers who thought that they had found ‘him who is’ were mistaken 
because they were not willing to recognize the nature of God as transcendent ‘craftsman,’ 
                                                          
27
 E.g. Epictetus 1.6.7; Anaxagoras, Fragment 46a. See the treatment in Reese, Hellenistic 
Influence, 54. 
28
 See Reese, Hellenistic Influence, 53-4; Gilbert, La critique, 43.  
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unique Creator of all.”29 Wisdom agrees with the nature worshippers that nature is 
beautiful, but Wisdom asserts that nature is not the ultimate reality. 
 Wisdom’s critique is one of incomplete inference. From the beauty of nature they 
should arrive at correspondingly (ἀναλόγως, 13:5) greater God.30 Wisdom has the same 
view as Philo that nature, when properly studied through philosophy, should lead one to 
recognize the infinitely greater goodness and beauty of God. Winston notes, “The author 
appears to be saying for the beauty and power of the universe we could both readily 
deduce the existence of the Designer and First Cause of all things, and equally come to 
realize how vastly superior he is to all that he has created.”31 This method of 
argumentation departs from the scriptural pattern of idol polemics. While Deutero-Isaiah 
appealed to God as Creator to prove that he was the only God, Wisdom argues from 
creation to demonstrate that people should arrive at the knowledge of the one God, whom 
the author argues is the God who is made known in the Jewish Scriptures.
32
 Wisdom’s 
critique of these worshippers is less severe because he thinks they were simply mistaken 
in their genuine quest for God. They are ignorant (13:1), foolish (13:1), unable (13:1), 
                                                          
29
 Reese, Hellenistic Influence, 54. 
30
 For the concept of analogy in Plato, see Gilbert, La Critique, 25-30; Larcher, Le Livre, 763-7; 
Hampus Lyttkens, The Analogy Between God and the World: An Investigation of its Background and 
Interpretation of its Use by Thomas of Aquino (Uppsala: Almquist and Wiksells, 1952), 18-28. 
31
 Winston, Wisdom, 251. 
32
 Reese (Hellenistic Influence, 56-62) claims that this argument is an example of Hellenistic 
influence on the Jewish author. Grabbe, Wisdom, 36, similarly states, “The type of argumentation in 13:5 is 
Hellenistic, not biblical. It includes the common Hellenistic form of reasoning from analogy, and it argues 
that the beauty of creation requires some overseer and source of beauty behind it.”  
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astray (13:6), failing (13:9), but Wisdom does not criticize their motives even though 
their methods resulted in failure.
33
 
Wisdom 13:10-14:2 
While Wisdom 13:1-9 made a philosophical critique of those who worship nature, 
Wis 13:10-14:2 is more in line with scriptural polemics that offer a caricature of the 
manufacture of idols. Wisdom’s mocking caricature of idol-making in Wis 13:10-14:2 
parallels other Hellenistic Jewish sources and is dependent on idol polemics by the 
Propehts, especially Deutero-Isaiah.
34
 The author does not make a genuine attempt to 
represent image worship in terms that would be recognizable to those participating in 
image worship.
35
 Rather, Wisdom, like the prophetic critiques, begins with the 
                                                          
33
 Wisdom and Philo might be drawing on a similar traditional critique of nature worship. They 
both associated the πλαν-stem—that can refer both to “error” and the “celestial bodies”—with nature 
worship (Wisdom 13:6; Philo, Decal. 52). For the parallels of Wisdom and Philo’s arguments in Greek 
philosophy, see Collins, Jewish Wisdom in the Hellenistic Age, 196-209. Valentin Nikiprowetsky (De 
Decalogo: Introduction, Traduction et Notes, [Les Ouvres de Philon D’Alexandrie 23; Paris: Cerf, 1965], 
75 n.7) thinks the similarities between Philo and Wisdom’s idol polemics indicate that this scheme was 
common in Alexandrian Judaism.  
34
 Cf. Philo, Decal. 70-76; Ep Jer 8-73; Sib. Or. 8.375-399   In the Prophets, see Psalm 115:3-8; 
Isa 44:9-20; Jer 10:1-16. For an extended comparison between Isa 44 and Wis 13, see Gilbert, La Critique, 
64-75. That Wis 13:1-9 does not depend directly on a form of argumentation found in the Prophets should 
not be surprising because Wisdom is treating a problem in first-century Alexandria that was not an issue for 
Deutero-Isaiah or Jeremiah.   
35
 Winston (Wisdom, 262) comments, “It should be noted that the Egyptian view of their idols was 
considerably more sophisticated than it would appear from our author’s polemical description. A ritual 
‘opening of the mouth’ was performed on the statues while they were still in the sculptor’s workshop (the 
‘gold house’), as a result of which the work of human hands was thought to come alive. The deity was 
thought to be in the heavens, and only to take up a temporary residence in his image after the necessary rite 
had been performed”; cf. Grabbe, Wisdom, 58-9. A brief comparison between Plato and Wisdom’s use of 
ἄψυχος demonstrates how Wisdom misrepresents pagan image-worship. Wisdom argues that the idolater 
petitions the lifeless image itself: “Concerning his possessions, marriage, and children, he is not ashamed to 
call on a lifeless thing (τῷ ἀψύχῳ)” (Wis 13:17). The fact that the idol is ἄψυχος is taken by Wisdom to 
mean that there is no reality apart from the idol itself. Plato, however, talks about those who acknowledge 
the lifelessness of the idol but maintains a reality apart from the idol: “The ancient laws of all people 
concerning the gods are twofold. Some of the gods whom we honor we see clearly, but some (of the gods 
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assumption that the gods behind the idols do not exist. From the presupposition of the 
idol-god’s nonexistence, Wisdom argues that Greeks worship the statue itself.36 Based on 
this assumption, the entire section is a mocking elaboration of the opening thesis: “(they) 
designate as gods the works of human hands” (Wis 13:10).37 The author first mentions 
idols made of gold and silver, and then he shows the progressively less valuable materials 
used, stone and wood and finally clay. This progressive devolution of the quality of 
materials parallels the author’s view that idolatry itself is a progressive degradation from 
good. Verses 11-16 are a narrative of idol-making followed by Wis 13:17-14:2 that 
present six ironies of the craftsman’s devotion. 
In Wisdom 13:11-16, the woodcutter uses the choice pieces of a tree to create a 
useful vessel, and with the leftover scraps he both prepares food and finally constructs an 
idol.
38
 The non-reality of the idol-god is evidenced by the fact that the other scraps are 
readily consumed by fire—they have no existence beyond their material composition. 
Moreover, the craftsman fashions a god from a piece that is unsuitable for anything 
                                                                                                                                                                             
whom we honor) we set up statues (ἀγάλματα) as images (εἰκόνας), and when we worship these things 
even though they are lifeless (ἀψύχους) we think the living (ἔμψυχοι) gods have good-will and grace on 
account of these” (Plato, Laws, 931a, author’s translation). The author of Wisdom thinks that by proving 
that the image is lifeless, he has proven that there is no reality behind the idol. According to Plato, the view 
held by many Greeks was that the image was separable from the divine reality. 
36
 Gerhard von Rad (Wisdom in Israel [trans: James D. Martin; New York: Abingdon, 1972], 181) 
argues that the accusation that pagans worship statues “stands or falls on the assumption of the complete 
identity of deity and image.” 
37
 Gilbert (La Critique, 53-5) highlights the structural significance of 13:10 that is arranged in a 
chiasm to emphasize that the idols are made by humans. He also notes the alternation between plural and 
singular words. a: ἔργα χειρῶν ἀνθρώπων; b: χρυσὸν καὶ ἄργυρον; c: τέχνης ἐμμελέτημα; cˈ: ἀπεικάσματα 
ζῴων; b: λίθον ἄχρηστον; a: χειρὸς ἔργον ἀρχαίας.    
38
 Cf. Horace, Sat. 1.8.1; Apoc. Abr. 5; Winston, Wisdom, 260-61. 
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else.
39
 The process of constructing an idol is not portrayed as a pious undertaking; rather, 
it is the activity of leisure and idleness (13:13). The author gives several pieces of 
evidence to cause the audience to question the reality of the idol-god. There is nothing 
especially godlike about its form; it looks like either a human or an animal. The strongest 
piece of evidence against the reality of the idol-god is that the idol does not display any 
ability to act: “he [the idol craftsman] knows that it is unable to help itself, for it is an 
image and it needs to be helped” (Wis 13:16).40 The idol is not that of an agent that helps; 
rather, the only thing it can do is receive help. This is a theme to which Wisdom will 
return, and it is especially significant when read in light of Wisdom 11-19 that describes 
how God repeatedly helps God’s people. 
Wisdom then mocks the idea that an idol-craftsman would entreat as a god the 
thing that he had just formed from wood. Wisdom presents six mocking ironies in which 
he contrasts the help desired by the idol-craftsman and the ability of the idol to help: 
Request of the craftsman :: characteristic of the idol 
i) assistance with life :: lifeless (17)  
ii) health :: weak (18a) 
iii) life :: dead (18b) 
iv) aid :: inexperienced (18c) 
v) prosperous journey :: unmoving (18d) 
vi) success with hands :: no strength (19) 
 
                                                          
39
 The idol craftsman uses stones that are not suitable for building (Wis 13:10) or wood that is not 
suitable for making a vessel (13:13). εἰδὼς ὅτι ἀδυνατεῖ ἑαυτῷ βοηθῆσαι, καὶ γάρ ἐστιν εἰκὼν καὶ χρείαν 
ἔχει βοηθείας. 39 
40
 Lit. “he knows that it is unable to help itself, for it is an image and has need for help.” 
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The author highlights the foolishness of idolatry by describing how the idolater entrusts 
things of greatest value to an idol that lacks inherent value. All of the characteristics for 
idols in this section are negative and focus on the non-life of the idol: dead (νεκρός, 10, 
18); useless (ἄχρηστος 10, οὐθὲν εὔχρηστον, 13), helpless (ἀδυνατεῖ ἑαυτῷ βοηθῆσαι, 
16), lifeless (ἄψυχος, 17), weak (ἀσθενής, 17), inexperienced (ἄπειρος, 18), unable to 
walk (19, τὸ μηδὲ βάσει χρῆσθαι δυνάμενον), inactive (ἀδρανής, 19). Following these 
ironies, Wisdom offers a final, more developed irony that has a slightly different form. It 
is not certain if the idol-craftsman is still the subject or if it is the idol-worshipper in 
general. The idolater asks to be provided with a safe voyage from an idol, constructed by 
a simple woodcutter in his leisure, while the idolater rides on a ship that was planned 
wisely by a skilled shipwright.
41
 The idolater’s folly is obvious: the idol which he 
petitions is less capable of saving him than the ship itself.  
Wisdom 14:3-11 
After the extended mockery of idol-craftsmen, Wisdom addresses God. The 
apostrophe is addressed to God as Father, but it is not clear how personal this Father-
figure is. On the one hand, the description of God as the providential Father describes 
God’s universal control of the world.42 Anyone who sets sail could put his trust in God’s 
providential care. But on the other hand, God’s providential care is particularized in his 
                                                          
41
 Wright (“Wisdom,” 519) describes the superiority of the ship, “The ship has two advantages 
over the idol: it was made out of decent motives (not in idleness; cf. 13:13) and under the guidance of 
Wisdom.” 
42
 Winston, Wisdom, 266, comments, “It should be noted that as in Philo and Josephus, the term 
‘Father’ is employed by our author in a universal context.” C. Kolarcikm “Wisdom,” 553. 
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actions on behalf a particular person, Noah (Wis 14:6-7). Thus, Wisdom continues to 
affirm God’s universal accessibility and God’s particular relationship with a chosen 
people. Aside from this initial designation, there is no further title for God in the 
apostrophe.  
The verb (δια)κυβερνάω and the noun κυβερνήτης are Stoic terms that describe 
the governance of the universe.
43
 Just as the author redefined philosophical terminology 
in 13:1 in terms of the God who acts in Jewish history, so the terminology concerning 
God’s providence is redefined in terms of God’s saving activity in the history of Israel. 
Gilbert comments, “The author takes the opportunity to use Greek theses on Providence, 
but he removed the aspects that were irreconcilable with his faith and based his assertions 
on several significant events in the history of salvation: the passage of the Red Sea in the 
exodus and Noah's Ark.”44 The author focuses on God as the source of wisdom, the one 
who saves, and the one who is active in history. Just as the idol polemics in the Jewish 
Scriptures assert the characteristics of God that most contrast the caricature of idols, 
Wisdom first describes the idols’ inactivity and inability to save (13:16-14:1) and then 
describes God as the Savior (14:4). The primary contrast between God and the idols is 
that God has demonstrated his ability to save humans: “showing that you can save from 
                                                          
43
 See Gilbert, La Critique, 102-4; Winston, Wisdom, 214, 265. Winston states, “The verb 
kybernaō was employed by the Stoics to describe the guiding power of the Logos” (214). Reese 
(Hellenistic Influence, 10-11) notes that πρόνοια in addition to διακυβερνάω was a technical Stoic word to 
describe God’s providence  
44
 Author’s translation of Gilbert, La Critique, 125: “L'auteur en profite pour reprendre les thèses 
grecques sur la Providence, mais il leur enlève les aspects inconciliables avec sa foi et fonde ses 
affirmations sur quelques hauts faits de l'histoire du Salut: le passage de la Mer Rouge de l'Exode et l’arche 
de Noé.” 
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anything” (Wis 14:4). In this apostrophe, Wisdom draws on the theme of chapters 11-19: 
God delivers his people using the means of the cosmos. Here it is the sea—in the 
narratives of both Noah and Moses—by which God executes providential deliverance. 
In the transitional section (Wis 14:7-11), Wisdom declares that God hates both 
idols and the idol-craftsman.
45
 There is a contrast between wood used righteously, as in 
Noah’s obedience in building the ark, and wood used unrighteously, as in in the crafting 
of an idol (Wis 14:7-8).
46
 There is a goodness to wood because it is a part of God’s 
creation, but it is misused by humans. One use trusts in God’s providential care, and the 
other use ensnares human souls in error. The critique again is that something that was 
made, and is thus not eternal, is called a god (14:8). The argument is similar to Wisdom’s 
critique of nature worship with the underlying premise that nothing created is worthy of 
worship, but the folly of idolatry is more severe because even the creator of the idol is a 
created being. Recalling the theme of eschatological judgment in the first section, 
Wisdom declares that God will punish both the idol and the idol-craftsman (Wis 14:10-
11). Wisdom continues both to retell events of God’s deliverance from the past and to 
promise future judgment in order to assure the audience that the Jewish manner of life is 
best.   
 
                                                          
45
 For the chiastic structure of 14:8-10, see Gilbert, La Critique, 100-102. 
46
 Wisdom has a similar view of humanity. Humans were created by God and are thus part of 
God’s good creation. Through a life of righteous living they can inherit immortality, but a life of unjust 
living brings death. God’s creation is good, but God judges the use of the creation whether it be wood (used 
rightly for benefit to humanity or wrongly for the substance of idols) or humans (living righteously or 
living unrighteously). 
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Wisdom 14:12-31 
Wisdom 14:12-31 forms the center of the chiastic structure in 13:1-15:19.
47
 The 
author begins by asserting that the theological error of idolatry results in moral depravity: 
“The idea of idols was the source of sexual immorality (πορνείας), and their invention 
was the ruin of life” (Wis 14:12). There is a strong connection between sexual immorality 
and idolatry in the Jewish Scriptures, and sexual immorality is often singled out as an 
especially terrible sin, one that is characteristic of the pagans.
48
 But it would still be 
strange for Wisdom to single out this particular sin here and then group sexual 
perversions, with no special designation, among other sins in Wis 14:22-31. Moreover, 
the more common sequence of causation in Jewish literature is that sexual immorality, 
especially exogamy, leads one to false worship.
49
 While Wis 14:12 could be stating that 
                                                          
47
 There is some debate concerning whether Wis 14:11 belongs in this section or the preceding 
section. Because Wis 14:12 begins a new idea (idolatry is not from the beginning and it leads to moral 
depravity), it is best to place Wis 14:11 is the preceding section as a summary statement of that section. 
48
 See, Stephen C. Barton, “Food Rules, Sex Rules, and the Prohibition of Idolatry: What's the 
Connection?” in Idolatry: False Worship in the Bible, Early Judaism, and Christianity (London: T&T 
Clark), 141-162.   
49
 For example, the Testament of Reuben also notes the close connection between fornication and 
idolatry, and  in line with most Jewish sources, the Testament of Reuben argues that fornication leads to 
idolatry: “So then, my children, observe all the things that I commanded you, and do not sin, for the sin of 
promiscuity is the pitfall of life, separating man from God and leading toward idolatry, because it is the 
deceiver of the mind and the perceptions, and leads youths down to hell before their time” (Test. Reub. 4:6-
7 [Kee, OTP]; cf. Exod 34:15-16). Similarly, Phinehas’ zeal is celebrated because the Israelites’ lust led 
them to false worship: “And Israel stayed in Sattim, and the people were profaned by whoring 
(ἐκπορνεῦσαι) after the daughters of Moab. And they invited them to the sacrifices of their idols and the 
people ate of the sacrifices and did obeisance to their idols” (Num 25:1-2 NETS). Pseudo-Philo’s retelling 
of the Balaam narrative reinforces the sequence of sexual immorality leading to false worship: “And then 
Balaam said to him ‘Come let us plan what you should do to them. Pick out the beautiful women who are 
among us and in Midian, and station them naked and adorned with gold and precious stones before them. 
And when they see them and lie with them, they will sin against their LORD and fall into your hands; for 
otherwise you cannot fight against them’” (Ps-Philo 18:13-14 [Harrington, OTP]). The scriptural story of 
Solomon is also a graphic picture of exogamy leading to idolatry (e.g., 1 Kgs 11:1-10). In the New 
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crafting idols leads to that particularly heinous sin of sexual immorality (a point that 
would be strengthened by 14:27), it is more likely that Wisdom is drawing on the 
common Jewish metaphor for idolatry in terms of sexual immorality. More specifically in 
the prophetic literature, God is the husband to an adulterous people.
50
 Like he does in 
chapter 10, the author expects the audience to understand the subtle scriptural allusion to 
make sense of the argument. Wisdom has appropriated a scriptural metaphor used to 
describe Israel’s sin of false worship, and Wisdom has applied that concept to all 
humanity. Kolarcik correctly argues, “The author is adapting the uniquely Israelite 
understanding of fidelity to the One God for its application to all humanity in the 
explanation of the origin of idol worship.”51 This universal application of this metaphor 
to all humanity strengthens the particularistic assertion in Wis 15:4-6 that the Jews are 
not deceived by the painters. Interpreted in light of this prophetic metaphor wherein 
idolatry is spiritual adultery, Wisdom 14:12 argues that idolatry entailed the betrayal of 
God. This act of betrayal evokes the personal wrath of God described in Wis 14:14. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Testament, the most common association between idolatry and sexual immorality is for them to be in a list 
of actions characteristic of non-believers and to be avoided by believers (e.g., Acts 15:20, 29; 21:25; Rom 
2:22; Col 3:5; 1 Pet 4:3; Rev 2:20; 9:20-21). There are two passages in Revelation, however, that may 
suggest that idolatry causes a devolution into sexual immorality. Revelation’s retelling of the Balaam 
incident is similar to Pseudo-Philo’s: “But I have a few things against you: you have some there who hold 
to the teaching of Balaam, who instructed Balak to place a stumbling block before the Israelites so that they 
ate food sacrificed to idols and committed sexual immorality” (Rev 2:14; cf. Rev 2:20; author’s translation 
of NA
27
).  
50
 For example the πορν-stem, in addition to the general concept of adultery, is used by these 
Prophetic texts to describe false worship: Isa 57:1-10; Jer 2:1-37; 3:6-8; Ezek 16:15-43; Hos 1:1-2:23; 
4:11-19. 
51
 Kolarcik, “Wisdom,” 557. 
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Later in this section, the author elaborates on the moral effects of idolatry, but he 
first explains the origins and end of idols.
52
 Despite God’s good creation of the world, 
evil exists. And just as God did not create death (Wis 1:13) God did not create idols. The 
unrighteousness of humanity brought about death, and idols are the result of human 
vanity. The author assumes that truth preceded error which implies that monotheism 
preceded polytheistic idol worship. The argument for a god’s validity is made on the 
grounds not only of its origins (idols were created by humans vs. God who is The 
Existing One) but also its endurance (God will continue to exist after God destroys the 
idols).
53
 While Wisdom 11-19 primarily describes God’s punishment of the wicked by 
means of their sins, the theme of eschatological judgment is recalled (3:10-13) and now it 
is applied to the creations of the ungodly (14:9-10, 13-14). Despite the current flourishing 
of the ungodly and their ungodliness (i.e. idols), the author assures that God will one day 
judge them. 
Having established that idols were not from the beginning, the author must 
explain how they came to exist, since they clearly were not the creation of God. The 
mockery of the idol-craftsman did not explain how humanity got to the point of 
                                                          
52
 Wisdom 14:13-14 is arranged in a chiastic ABA'B' pattern: 
A: statement of idols’ beginning: “neither did they exist from the beginning” (14:13a). 
B: statement of idols’ end: “nor will they exist forever” (14:13b). 
A': means of idols’ beginning: “by the vanity of humans they entered the world” (14:14a). 
B': means of idols’ end: “and therefore a sudden end is devised for them” (14:14b). 
See, Gilbert, La Critique, 127-8. 
 
53
 Perhaps the most vivid picture of this in Jewish texts is the story of Dagon’s destruction and 
God’s endurance (1 Sam 5:1-5).  
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worshipping idols, and now the author will attempt an explanation.
54
 The author provides 
two euhemeristic explanations for the origins of idolatry: a father honoring his deceased 
child and people honoring a distant ruler. Wisdom explains how a father initiates honor 
rituals that progress into idolatry:      
For a father, troubled with untimely grief and having made an image of his child 
so quickly taken away, now honored as a god what was formerly a dead person, 
and he handed down to his dependents mysteries and initiation rites. Then the 
ungodly custom, being strengthened in time, was kept as law. (Wis14:16-17) 
 
The background for Wisdom’s euhemeristic explanation lies in the Greco-Roman 
practice of erecting statutes of deceased loved ones.
55
 And while it is improbable that a 
father would worship the image of his son, it is plausible enough for Wisdom’s argument 
that generations later might worship the image as a god. The euhemeristic explanation of 
idolatry originating from the desire to worship a monarch is more plausible, especially in 
the Egyptian context where the line between ruler and divine was blurred. Roman 
emperor worship also provides a possible backdrop for the concept of honoring a distant 
ruler. The people begin with a desire simply to honor the ruler, but the artisan deceives 
the people by forming the ruler’s image into a more beautiful form. The result of the 
artisan’s deception is that “The masses, enticed by the beauty of the workmanship, now 
regard as an object of worship the one who recently was honored as a human” (Wis 
14:20).  
                                                          
54
 Euhemerism derives its name from Euhemerus (ca. 300 B.C.E.) who argued that Uranus, Zeus, 
and Cronus were great human kings who were subsequently venerated as divine. Cf. Sib. Or. 3.110-115. 
55
 See Winston, Wisdom, 276-8; Gilbert, La critique, 140-57. 
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 After the author has explained how people arrive at the folly of idol worship, he 
lists a catalogue of sins that result from their theological error. The author attributes all of 
these sins to the single cause of idolatry: “For the worship of unspeakable idols is the 
beginning, cause, and end of every evil” (Wis 14:27). Several of these practices, such as 
the references to mystery cults, condemn distinctly Greco-Roman practices.
56
 It is 
common for Jewish authors to caricature pagans as sexually immoral while asserting that 
Jews maintain sexual purity and marital fidelity. By castigating pagan practice and 
praising Jewish practice, the vice list allows the author to reinforce the observable 
distinctions between his Jewish audience and their pagan neighbors. It is not just that the 
pagans worship falsely; their false worship results in moral depravity. And the 
description of their immorality makes the connection between these idolaters and the 
wicked oppressors in the first section of Wisdom (E.g, Wis 2:6-20; 3:1-13; 4:3-6). That 
the idolaters are identifiable with the wicked reinforces the connection in Wisdom 11-19 
between the wicked and the oppressors, who are the Egyptian idolaters.
57
 Wisdom 
continues to threaten eschatological judgment on these people (Wis 14:30-31). 
 This section is attributed special significance by the author’s placement of it in the 
center of the chiasm. There are a number of explanations that the author makes in this 
section, but its contribution to the overall argument of Wisdom 11-19 is probably the 
reason that it is central to the chiasm. Wisdom 11-19 emphasizes God’s provision for 
                                                          
56
 For the Hellenistic context of these vices, see Reese, Hellenistic Influence, 20-21; Winston, 
Wisdom, 279-80. Gilbert (La critique, 164-9) is more helpful for the Jewish and Christian parallels. 
57
 See Kolarcik, “Wisdom,” 559. 
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God’s people and God’s punishment of their enemies, and this central section of the 
chiasm highlights the distinction between God’s people and everyone else. It explains 
how all the other nations forsook God and devolved into idolatry. The difference in 
theology between God’s people and their enemies results in radically different ethical 
practices because idolatry is the cause of every evil. Finally, Wisdom emphasizes the 
distinction between God’s people and the eschatological judgment of these idolaters 
(14:13-14, 30-31). This distinction between God’s people and their enemies is heightened 
by the transitional passages before and after this section that emphasize God’s displeasure 
with and eschatological judgment on the idolaters (14:8-11) and God’s special 
relationship to those who are not idolaters (15:1-6).    
Wisdom 15:1-6 
These verses comprise the second apostrophe to God. The most notable shift in 
this section is the use of first person pronouns beginning with the address as “our God” 
(Wis 15:1). The author identifies himself and his audience as the God’s people, for whom 
God cares personally.
58
 Wisdom 11-19 describes the provision of God for God’s people 
in the wilderness, and the identification of the audience with the people of God is 
strengthened by the allusion to God’s self-revelation in the wilderness (cf. Exod 34:6). 
The characteristics of God that these verses highlight differ from many idol polemics 
because this apostrophe does not reassert specific characteristics of God that contrast with 
                                                          
58
 The personal relationship between the author’s audience and God alludes to the personal 
covenantal relationship that God has with Israel, and thereby the author strengthens the identification of the 
audience as the people of God. Cf. Ezek 11:20; 34:30-31.  
112 
 
 
 
the absence of those characteristics in idols (e.g., God’s salvific providence in Wis 14:3 
in contrast to the inability of idols to act in Wis 13:16-19).
59
 In 15:1, Wisdom describes 
God as kind (χρηστός), true (ἀληθής), patient (μακρόθυμος), and merciful in managing 
all things (ἐλέει διοικῶν τὰ πάντα). These attributes are not contrasted with the idols; 
rather, they allude to the presentation of God’s character in the aftermath of the Golden 
Calf episode: compassionate (οἰκτίρμων), merciful (ἐλεήμων), patient (μακρόθυμος), 
exceedingly merciful (πολυέλεος), and truthful (ἀληθινός) (cf. Exod 34:6).60 The allusion 
to Exodus 34 has strong particularizing implications. God’s self-revelation in Exodus 34 
is directed toward Moses and the Israelites for whom God declares his steadfast love. 
Exodus 34 emphasizes the knowledge of God that the Israelites have on account of God’s  
Law (34:1, 4, 11-28), self-description (34:6-7), and saving actions on their behalf (34:10-
16). And each of these ways of knowing the true God is directed toward a particular 
people with whom God has made a covenant. Exodus 34 is entirely antagonistic toward 
non-Israelites as they are commanded to observe extreme separation from the native 
inhabitants of the land.  
Wisdom 15:2 seems somewhat out of place because the subject shifts from God to 
first person plural pronouns. The change in subject is probably due to Wisdom 15:2 
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 Kolarcik (“Wisdom,” 561) sees the primary contrast being between God’s relationship with his 
people and the idolaters’ relationship with their idols: “The bond between the righteous and God is 
highlighted and intensified by the contrast to the relationship between idolaters and their lifeless idols (vv. 
4-6). The God of the righteous is full of power and mercy (v. 1); the many gods of the idolatrous are 
powerless (13:17-19).” 
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 Wisdom’s reliance on Exodus 34 in this section is well-recognized; see Larcher, La Livre, 847-
8; Winston, Wisdom, 281. 
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alluding to Exodus 34:9 in which Moses asks God to take away Israel’s sins and be with 
his people.
61
 Alec Lucas explains the function of Wisdom 15:2ff in the context of Exodus 
34: 
The confident declaration in Wis 15:2 that “we will not sin” and the subsequent 
denial of complicity in contemporary idolatry suggests that the author of Wisdom 
regarded Moses’ prayer as having been answered. Israel’s “stiff-necked” nature, 
her “sin” and “lawlessness,” had been removed.62 
 
Following the pronouncement of God’s judgment on idolaters (14:30-31), Wisdom 
asserts that God is also merciful (15:1) and that God’s people are not to be grouped with 
the pagan idolaters (15:2-6). Wisdom states both that God’s people are not deceived by 
idols (15:2, 4-6) and that God would forgive them if they were deceived (15:1-2).   
 In contrast to the close relationship that God has with God’s people, the idolaters 
offer devotion to an object that cannot reciprocate. The idolaters “desire the non-
breathing form of a dead image” (Wis 15:5). Wisdom returns to the theme of the wicked 
being punished by the things they desire, and claims that those who set their hope on 
these foolish things are worthy of that vain hope (15:6) 
Wisdom 15:7-13 
Wisdom’s mockery of the potter parallels the critiques Wisdom leveled against 
the woodcutter, but the author is more severe in his critique of the potter because the 
potter has evil motives (15:12). The non-reality of these idols is shown by both their 
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 Gilbert, La Critique, 181-2; Winston, Wisdom, 281; Lucas, “Distinct Portraits,” 70. 
62
 Lucas, “Distinct Portraits,” 70; cf. Kolarcik, “Wisdom,” 562-3. Judith 8:18 confidently makes 
this same boast: For never in our generation, nor in these present days, has there been any tribe or family or 
people or town of ours that worships gods made with hands, as was done in days gone by” (NRSV). 
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substance and their maker. Like the woodcutter, the potter begins with one substance that 
he forms for different uses. The potter makes vessels for clean use and vessels for 
unclean use from the same lump of clay. He forms vessels for common use, and then, “In 
ill-will, he forms a non-god from the same clay, he who shortly before came from the 
earth and shortly after will return to the earth from which he was taken, when the loan of 
his life is demanded back” (Wis 15:8). The idol is crafted from a common substance and 
by a common agent, an agent so incapable of imparting life that even his own life is on 
loan from another. Even the potter himself was recently formed from the clay. He has a 
borrowed soul and attempts to create life even though he has no life in himself.
63
 The 
result of his effort is that the idols are twice removed from divinity. 
 While Wisdom has hinted that idols were created as a delusion, in this section, the 
author describes the intentionality on the part of the craftsman to deceive the 
worshippers. Because he does not know the true God, the potter pursues money by any 
means, and he crafts idols for profit. Wisdom places greater blame on the craftsman than 
the masses because the craftsman knows that the idols are not gods. The craftsman’s 
motives and pursuit of material pleasures (Wis 15:10-13) recall the attitude of the wicked 
(Wis 2:6-20). While Wisdom has predicted the eschatological judgment of idolaters, the 
punishment described in Wis 15:10-11 is according to the theme of Wisdom 11-19: “one 
is punished by means of the very things by which one sins” (Wis 11:16). The potter seeks 
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 There are references to humans have a borrowed life in Greek (Plato, Tim. 42E), Roman 
(Lucretius 3.971),  Jewish (Philo, Abr. 257; Her. 104; Spec. 1.295; Josephus, B.J. 3.374), and early 
Christian texts (Luke 12:20). 
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after material gain at the cost of knowing God, and the result is internal misery. The irony 
is that the patter’s hope is placed in clay and as a result “His heart is ashes. His hope is 
more worthless than earth. And his life is of less value than clay” (Wis 15:10). 
Wisdom 15:14-19 
At this point, Wisdom explicitly identifies the false worshippers as the oppressors 
of God’s people, an identification at which Wisdom has been hinting. Although the 
author never uses the proper name (Wis 16:4; cf. 11:5; 12:20; 16:8; 18:1), “the enemies 
of God’s people” (Wis 15:14) are the Egyptians, who are especially noted for theriolatry 
(Wis 15:18-16:4). Additionally, Kolarcik comments “Other designations for the 
Egyptians link the oppressors of Israel to the wicked in the first part of the book 
(‘wicked,’ 12:10-11; ‘ungodly,’ 16:16; ‘unjust,’ 12:23; ‘foolish,’ 15:14; 19:3).”64 Thus, 
both the wicked in the first section and the oppressors of God’s people in the third section 
are ways of describing the Egyptians. In the chiastic structure of Wisdom 13-15, 
Egyptian theriolatry is paralleled to philosophical nature worship. Nature worshippers are 
described as “vain” (μάταιοι, 13:1) compared the theriolaters as “most foolish” 
(ἀφρονέστατοι, 15:14). The structure heightens the folly of the theriolaters because they 
worship the worst kind of animals in contrast to philosophical nature worshippers who at 
least deified the beautiful and useful aspects of creation. 
This final section summarizes some of Wisdom’s critiques of idols, and directs 
the critiques specifically at the Egyptians. Wisdom alleges that these Egyptian oppressors 
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 Kolarcik, “Wisdom,” 569. 
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are foolish and miserable, but the cause of this misery is not what the reader might 
expect. Reading the exodus narrative, Wisdom’s readers might expect the Egyptians to be 
miserable as a result of God’s direct actions against them in the plagues and drowning in 
the Red Sea. Wisdom, however, states that they are miserable because of their incorrect 
theology. The oppressors of God’s people are foolish and miserable “for all the idols of 
nations they accounted gods” (15:15). Wisdom again alleges that non-Jews make a 
complete identification between the idol and the god. The non-reality of the divinity 
behind the idols is evidenced in the fact of their inactivity and their origins in human 
craftsmanship.
65
 These critiques seem to be modeled after Psalm 113:11-15 (LXX; 115:4-
7).
66
 They are merely material and have no life with which to activate their body parts. 
Wisdom explains their non-reality in the fact of humans’ inability to give life. Humans 
are even better than their idols because humans are at least made by God who has the 
ability to impart life and the soul: “For a human made them, and one who borrowed his 
spirit formed them; for no human is able to form a god like himself. But being mortal, he 
makes a dead thing with his lawless hands, for he is better than the things he worships 
because he had life but those things never did” (Wis 15:16-17 NRSV). 
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 Larcher, Le Livre, 879-80, argues that the author criticizes both Greek and Egyptian gods at this 
point for their anthropomorphic character. 
66
 While the two texts show some variation, both Ps 113 (115) and Wis 15 contain the following 
descriptions: idols of the nations (113:12; 15:15); made by humans (113:12; 15:16); eyes incapable of sight 
(113:13; 15:15); ears incapable of hearing (113:14; 15:15); noses incapable of smelling (113:14; 15:15); 
hands incapable of feeling (113:15; 15:15); feet incapable of walking (113:15; 15:15). Wisdom has omitted 
the elements of mouths (113:13) and throats (113:15) and switched the order of ears and noses. 
Additionally, Wisdom makes the concept of human construction an explanation for their inability rather 
than a characteristic of the idols. The dependence of Wis 15:15-16 on Ps 113 is strengthened by the shared 
theme of the exodus from Egypt. Psalm 113 begins “At Israel’s exodus from Egypt, of Iakob’s house from 
a barbarian people, Judea became his holy precinct, Israel his seat of authority” (113:1-2 NETS). 
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In Wis 15:18, 19, the author criticizes a specifically Egyptian practice, theriolatry. 
Wisdom’s preceding critique of idols in terms of their inactivity and human origins 
would not disqualify animals from being suitable objects of worship, but in Wis 13:1-9, 
the author made the distinction between God and everything God created. For the author, 
only God is worthy of worship. While the nature worshippers at least deified magnificent 
things, the Egyptians deify animals; moreover, they deify the worst kinds of animals.
67
 
The theme of theriolatry, specifically being punished by the animals that one worships, 
caused the initial excursus (12:27), and now the author returns to the same theme: 
“Therefore, they were punished rightfully through similar creatures and were tormented 
through hordes of beasts” (16:1). Having completed the excursus on idolatry, the author 
resumes his explanation of how God delivered God’s people while punishing their 
enemies by the same means. 
Analysis of the Argument 
The textual analysis above has noted some ways in which the author crafts his polemic 
against false forms of worship. While the author is making an argument for the Jewish 
understanding of God, he accomplishes this by drawing on and correcting Greco-Roman 
arguments. For the author, the most significant source of theological knowledge is the 
Jewish Scriptures, but his interpretation of the Scriptures is shaped by his understanding 
of Greek philosophy and his own situation in Alexandria. The author does not engage in a 
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 It seems to be a common Hellenistic Jewish criticism that Egyptians worship the worst kinds of 
animals (cf. Philo, Decal. 78; Cont. 8; Josephus, C. Ap. 2.6). Wisdom’s reference to the Egyptian 
theriolaters as most foolish (ἀφρονέστατοι) and the animals they worship as foolish (ἄνοια) might be a 
deliberate attempt to connect the condemnation of idolatry in Ps 113 to the theme of Egyptian theriolatry: 
“May those who make them [idols] become like them, and all who trust in them” (Ps 113:16 NETS). 
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systematic rebuttal of Greco-Roman theologies; rather, he exploits internal differences, 
makes moral arguments, satirizes, relies on deductions, and alludes to Scripture.   
Exploiting Differences in Greco-Roman Religion 
Wisdom’s idol polemic is different from the polemics in Psalms and Prophets, 
texts on which Wisdom draws, because Wisdom expands the polemic by incorporating 
philosophical critiques of Greco-Roman forms of worship. Because Greco-Roman 
religiosity was not a single unified system of beliefs, intramural critiques existed among 
different groups of Greeks and Romans.  Some of these intramural critiques were socially 
stratified critiques made by the educated against the masses, and some critiques were 
among philosophical schools. In both cases, the author of Wisdom is able to assume a 
countering position that already existed within Greco-Roman thought although the author 
carefully modifies it in light of his Jewish tradition. This technique is demonstrated most 
clearly in the critique of nature worshippers and the critique of Egyptian theriolatry. 
As the argument was described above, the author of Wisdom aligns himself with 
the Middle Platonic idea of a transcendent God against Stoicism’s immanent God (e.g., 
13:1, 7-9). But even though Wisdom can borrow an argument from one philosophical 
school, Wisdom does not endorse this philosophy altogether. Wisdom accepts 
Platonism’s transcendent God, but Wisdom identifies the unknown Existing One of 
Platonism as the God of the Jews, who reveals himself at Sinai. Moreover, this 
transcendent Existing One is understood to be the craftsman who forms the material 
world. Thus the author corrects Stoicism by means of Middle Platonism and then corrects 
Middle Platonism by means of Judaism. The author similarly exploits the existing divides 
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in pagan religiosity when he criticizes the foolishness of Egyptian theriolatry. The author 
doubtlessly expects no resistance from his Jewish audience in the condemnation of this 
Egyptian practice. Instead countering theriolatry by means of a logical rebuttal, the author 
is able to insert himself into a divide among pagans, align himself with Greek criticisms 
of Egyptians, and dismiss theriolatry with little effort. 
That the author employs existing arguments does not imply that the author lacks 
creativity or insight; rather, the use of existing critiques enables the author to make a 
stronger argument. If (as I have argued above) the author writes primarily to an educated, 
Hellenistic Jewish audience, his appeals to Greco-Roman philosophy and upper-class 
criticisms would function to bolster the audience’s pride in their Jewish faith that was 
conversant with but superior to the best Greco-Roman thought. In order to appeal to an 
audience that probably had some familiarity with Greco-Roman philosophy (perhaps 
through a gymnasium education), the author demonstrates both his own facility with 
philosophy and Judaism’s superiority over Greco-Roman philosophical understandings of 
God. This technique allows the author to buttress his argument with the best of Greco-
Roman philosophy in order to demonstrate that wisdom—even in the incomplete form 
understood by Greco-Roman philosophers—points to the Jewish manner of worship, 
although it does so insufficiently. The author bolsters the audience’s pride in Judaism by 
demonstrating that the best Greco-Roman philosophy points to Jewish belief and practice. 
And the author attempts to persuade the audience to pursue Jewish belief and practice by 
demonstrating the incompleteness of Greco-Roman philosophy and the moral 
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consequences of its practice. The author references Greco-Roman beliefs in order to 
make a more sophisticated rebuttal and to demonstrate the superiority of Judaism. 
Moral Arguments 
Although the author does not dwell on his view of Jewish morality, the underlying 
assumption is that the Jewish way of life is characterized by moral integrity, and this 
morality flows from their proper understanding of God. The contrast to Jewish morality is 
pagan immorality that flows from their improper understanding of God (esp. Wis 14:12-
14, 21-22). Many of Wisdom’s examples of pagan immorality are standard Jewish 
accusations against pagans (e.g., murder, adultery, debauchery, and homosexuality), and 
the author likely thinks he will receive no objection from the audience. Some of his 
examples of pagan immorality, however, are more specific to Greco-Roman cultic 
practices (e.g., secret mysteries, frenzied revels).
68
 Wisdom has incorporated stock 
Jewish critiques of pagans and supported them with some specific examples of pagan 
excess in order to persuade the audience of the dangerous moral result of false worship. 
The author paints an obviously slanted picture of pagan immorality and altogether omits 
any example of pagan morality. The author and his audience were part of the same 
minority group that struggled to maintain their community boundaries within the broader 
Greco-Roman world. Establishing a set of moral values characteristic of the minority 
group is an effective boundary marker only if they are not characteristic of the larger 
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 The accusations of murder (14:23, 24, 25) and sexual immorality (14:12, 24, 26) are especially 
pronounced. The accusation of homosexuality is debatable. Wisdom 14:26 lists several results of idolatry 
among which is γενέσεως ἐναλλαγή. While Winston (Wisdom, 280) notes that we would expect γένους 
ἐναλλαγή instead of γενέσεως, the best translation is probably “interchange of sexes.” Cf. Test. Nephtali 
3:4; Rom 1:26. 
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culture. The author argues that Judaism is distinctly superior both in its theology and 
morality, an assertion which his audience likely received wholeheartedly. 
Satire 
Wisdom’s critiques are most persuasive when the author elaborates on long-
standing Jewish caricatures of pagan worship. The author mocks pagans as worshipping 
precious metals, stone, wood, and clay. This satirical critique is undergirded by an 
assumption that the author assumes the audience will share: pagans believe that their 
gods are the idols, not that they are represented by the idols. By never stating this 
premise, the author avoids inviting the readers to question the logic of the argument, and 
the reader is easily caught up in the humorous caricature of the opponents. This 
disingenuous representation of pagan worship allows the author to describe the idol-gods 
repeatedly as “dead” and “manmade.” These satirical flurries also permit the author to 
pass over more difficult questions, such as the question of the seeming superior power of 
the pagan gods in light of the dominance of Greco-Roman culture over Jewish culture. 
These selective and well-crafted satires demonstrate the ridiculousness of the pagan 
worship as the author has represented it. 
Obvious Deductions 
In the idol polemic, the author rarely offers detailed logical arguments. The reader 
must fill in the logical steps to arrive at Wisdom’ conclusions. For example, the polemic 
closes with an explanation of why idols are dead. Wisdom argues that humans receive 
their spirits from God and are not capable of creating inspirited life. They are necessarily 
better than any of their creations because they have a spirit that their creations lack (Wis 
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15:16-17). The vagueness of this argument has the benefit that the author’s premises are 
hard to challenge because the audience must infer them. The statements about idols being 
dead and humans being better than idols are conclusions of arguments that the author 
states without detailing the logic.
69
 The reader is shamed into compliance with the author 
because the author compares those who do not follow his logic to infants (15:14). 
Similarly, Wisdom describes those who worship nature as incapable in their reasoning 
(13:1-2). Anyone who would disagree with the author is readily dismissed as being 
foolish and without thought. 
Use of Scripture (Pss 113 [115], 134 [135]; Is 44; Jer 10) 
This section is limited to discussing briefly the manner in which Wisdom employs 
the Scriptures to argue against idolatry. Wisdom makes use of the Scriptures in several 
ways: direct reference, allusion, and type of argumentation. Wisdom directly references 
Exodus 3 and 34 (Wis 13:1; 15:1), and in both occurrences Wisdom is attempting clarify 
who God is. Implicit in this manner of argumentation is that the Jewish Scriptures, not 
philosophy or human reason, is accepted as the authoritative guide to belief. Wisdom also 
alludes to the history of Israel in order to demonstrate God’s character through a 
description of God’s interactions with humanity. The primary theme of Wisdom 11-19 is 
that God acts, through the secondary means of the cosmos, to deliver God’s people and 
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 The whole argument is built upon a reassertion of who God is. God is True Existence and has 
the ability to create inspirited life; humans are the creations of God; therefore, humans are inspirited. From 
this theology, the author can make claims about the natures of humans and idols. Humans, as creations, 
cannot create inspirited life; idols are the creations of humans; therefore, idols do not have life.  From the 
conclusions of these arguments, the author can compare idols and humans. Death is better than life; humans 
are alive, and idols are dead; therefore, humans are better than idols.  
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punish their enemies. In order to demonstrate this point within the idol polemic, Wisdom 
alludes to the stories of Moses (Wis 14:3) and Noah (Wis 14:6). The author resumes this 
explanation, following the excursus on idolatry, by explaining the irony of Egyptian 
theriolatry—the Egyptians are punished by the animals that they worship in contrast to 
the Israelites whom God feeds by means of animals (16:1-3). Wisdom also borrows the 
form of critique from the scriptural text. The reworking of idol polemics is evident in 
Wisdom 13:10-16 and 15:7-9 which seem to be an elaboration of themes in Ps 113:11-15, 
Isa 44:9-20 and Jer 10:1-16. Wisdom heightens and extends the satire by giving more 
detail to the process of crafting the idols. 
Representations of God 
There are some considerable differences between the representation of God in Wisdom’s 
polemic against false worship and the polemics in the Prophets. These differences are 
largely attributable to the different audiences and locations of the authors. Most notably, 
the author of Wisdom interprets the scriptural views of God through his philosophical 
understanding. The author neither attacks polytheism nor emphasizes God’s oneness.  
Instead, the author presents a God who is both the universal Creator, perceivable by 
observing nature, and covenantal Father, known by God’s self-revelation in the Law. 
Thus Wisdom presents God in both universal and particular terms, but the universal terms 
(e.g., Creator and The Existing One) and redefined by the author’s interpretation of the 
Jewish Scriptures.  
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Creator 
A consistent aspect of the Jewish definition of God is that God is Creator, so it is 
not surprising that Wisdom’s representation of God assumes God’s role as Creator.70 Just 
as some knowledge about wisdom can be obtained apart from direct revelation, some 
knowledge about God is obtainable apart from special revelation. Thus, even pagans can 
infer some things about God by observing nature. Wisdom, like Philo, expects some 
humans to apply reason and philosophy to the natural world in order to infer something 
about the analogous nature of God.
71
 From the beauty of nature, humans should be able 
to understand that the Creator is infinitely more beautiful. 
God’s identity as Creator provides the essential distinction between worshipping 
God and worshipping anything else. The category of God is defined so that anything not 
the Creator is disqualified from being God. God is the self-existent Creator in contrast to 
nature that is contingent on God. Only God is The Existing One. Moreover, God is 
Creator in distinction from idols that are the creations of humans. Wisdom does describe 
God as Creator with the anthropomorphic representation of a Craftsman (13:1), but this 
image is intended to describe the distinction between God and everything else.
72
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 The affirmation of God as Creator does not necessarily mean that God does not use secondary 
means to create. Wisdom can be described as an agent that God uses in order to create (Wis 7:22, 25-26; 
8:1; esp. 9:2; cf. 1:14). Moreover, God’s role as the Creator explains why the cosmos punishes the 
oppressors of God’s people in Wis 11-19. 
71
 See Collins, “Natural Theology and Biblical Tradition: The Case of Hellenistic Judaism,” 1-15. 
72
 The term τεχνίτης is used both in reference to God as the Craftsman of the World (13:1) and 
humans as the craftsmen of idols (14:18). Wisdom probably intends to contrast the creative abilities of the 
idol-maker to God’s magnificent works in creation. The idea of God as Craftsman may also have been a 
way for Wisdom to draw on Greco-Roman philosophy. See Reese, Hellenistic Influence, 54; Winston, 
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The Existing One 
In the polemic against false worship, the author’s first description of God is drawn 
from Greek philosophy. God is The Existing One, ὁ ὤν. The author uses this description 
to make a distinction between the self-existence of The Existing One and the contingent 
existence of everything else.
73
 As I have commented, Wisdom is employing a Middle 
Platonic term in order to critique a Stoic idea, but ultimately the author wants to argue 
that the meaning of God as ὁ ὤν is understood properly by the Jewish Scriptures. The 
author appeals to the description of God as ὁ ὤν in the Septuagint’s translation of Exodus 
3 in order to describe The Existing One as a God who is personally connected to a 
particular people. God is the self-existing Creator, but the context of Exodus 3 qualifies 
this God to be the Jewish God who enters into special relationship with a particular 
people. 
Father 
The tendency of Wisdom to present God in both universalistic and particularistic 
terms is especially evident in the description of God as Father. Wisdom borrows the 
anthropomorphic imagery of God as Father from the Jewish Scriptures but not without 
modification.
74
 In Wis 14:2, the author describes the actions of wisdom, being manifested 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Wisdom, 249-50. The author also describes wisdom as a craftsman of the world (7:21) and of a ship (8:6), 
but a different word is used (τεχνῖτις). 
73
 This is an essential distinction that the author uses to contrast God’s creation to the creations of 
idol craftsmen. Idol craftsmen are incapable of imparting life because they are not self-existing; they have a 
borrowed spirit (e.g., Wis 15:8). 
74
 The imagery of God as Father in the Jewish Scriptures is complex and can make reference to 
God as Creator and God as the Redeemer (or Maker of his people) in the exodus. Isaiah 45, directly 
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through the skillfulness of the shipwright in the act of crafting a vessel. There is nothing 
to suggest that this shipwright is Jewish, and wisdom seems to be universally accessible. 
While wisdom built the ship, the author argues that God directs it: “But your providence, 
Father, steers it” (Wis 14:3). As wisdom is accessible to the (pagan or Jewish alike) 
shipwright, it seems that God’s paternal providence is exercised in an equally universal 
manner. Kolarcik comments, “Philo and Josephus employ the metaphor of father for God 
in a universal manner, as does the author of Wisdom.”75 Wisdom’s description of God as 
Father, however, is more nuanced than Kolarcik indicates. Although the author parallels 
the actions of God to the non-particularistic agency of wisdom, the author addresses God 
personally. Moreover the examples of God’s providence are in terms of God’s provision 
for Moses (Wis 14:3) and Noah (Wis 14:6). The particularistic nuances of God as 
providential Father agree with the manner in which God is depicted in Wis 11-19, a 
section in which God’s providence is exercised by the cosmos punishing the enemies of 
God’s people. Moreover, the author can group himself with the righteous who call on 
God as their Father (Wis 2:16). 
                                                                                                                                                                             
following the idol polemic on which Wisdom draws, exemplifies this complexity. On the one hand, there 
are strong references to God’s special care for his people (45:3, 4, 11, 15, 17), even when it manifests itself 
by raising up Cyrus to punish God’s people (45:1, 13). On the other hand, there are references to God’s 
universal work as Creator (45:5-8, 12, 18). Among these particularistic and universalistic conceptions of 
God, is the description of God as Father: “It is like the one who says to his father, ‘What will you beget?’ 
and to his mother, ‘With what are you in labor?’ Because thus says the Lord God, the Holy One of Israel, 
the one who has made the things that are coming: Ask me about my sons and about my daughters, and 
command me concerning the works of my hands.” (Isa 45:10-12 NETS). God is the Potter of all things but 
especially of God’s people Israel. His Fatherhood has a special focus on Israel, but he is also the Creator 
(and in that sense Maker and Father) of all things (cf. Exod 4:22; Deut 32:6, 18; Isa 1:2; 64:7; Jer 38:9 
[31:9]; Hos 11:1; Mal 2:10). God’s Fatherhood most often refers to his care for Israel, and even when God 
is Father in terms of creating everything, Israel is still the focus as God’s unique son.   
75
 Kolarcik, “Wisdom,” 553. 
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When multiple gods are introduced to compete with the Jewish God for authority, 
Wisdom, in line with the scriptural tradition, appeals to the activity of the deities in 
history to demonstrate their reality or non-reality. Wisdom accomplishes this by making 
subtle references to God’s activity within the idol polemic and by framing the idol 
polemic within the exodus story. Wisdom’s references to God’s salvation of Noah and 
the Israelites in the Red Sea passage are situated in the apostrophe to God wherein the 
author reasserts the character of God in contrast to idols. Whereas the idols are unable to 
save a well-designed ship on a common voyage, God saved a “plank” through a 
catastrophic flood. The activity of God in history frames the discussion of idols because 
the surrounding chapters describe how he accomplished the exodus from Egypt.
76
  
Related to the idea of God as personal Father is the theme of God’s special care 
for God’s people.77 In some instances, the Fatherhood of God is implied by the 
designation “your people” because God’s people are described as God’s children (e.g., 
Wis 9:7; 12:19; 18:13). God’s people are also identified more specifically as the 
righteous (Wis 2:13, 18; 5:5; 18:7), not idolaters (Wis 15:14-15), and God’s people in 
every case are understood to be Israel (Wis 9:7, 12; 12:19; 16:2, 3, 5, 20; 18:3, 13; 19:2, 
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 A critical reader might notice that Wisdom’s examples of God’s activity come from distant 
history, and more recently it does not seem that God has delivered Israel from her enemies. Wisdom does 
not address this issue, but Wisdom’s description of God’s involvement in the world does not stop with his 
activity in Israel’s history because Wisdom envisions a more fundamental and universal activity for God, 
creation. Not only is this a standard Jewish method of argumentation, it also allows the author to argue 
from a philosophical standpoint because deduction of God’s being from nature is accessible to all humans. 
77
 God’s care for God’s people is not to be understood at the exclusion of God’s care for all people 
(e.g. Wis 12:13, 20-21). When the oppressors of God’s people repeatedly and unrepentantly sin, God 
judges their actions against God’s people.  
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5, 22). Within the idol polemic, God’s special relationship with God’s people is alluded 
to in 15:1 which calls God “our God” and alludes to the renewal of the covenant in 
Exodus 34. The conclusion of Wisdom is important for understanding God’s relationship 
with humanity: “For in every way, you exalted and glorified your people and you did not 
neglect to help them in every time and place” (Wis 19:22). Thus, Wisdom describes God 
as the transcendent Creator and also the one who cares especially for his people.  
Eschatological Judge 
On the one hand, the unrighteous are presently punished by means of their own 
sins and by the cosmos, and on the other hand, the author holds out the threat (which is 
the hope of the author and audience) that God will one day punish the wicked oppressors, 
who are idolaters. In the idol polemic, the author states that God will punish idols and 
idol-craftsmen: “For equally hated by God are the ungodly person and his ungodliness, 
and the thing made will be punished with the one doing it” (Wis 14:9-10; cf. 14:11, 14, 
30-31). In the first section, God’s eschatological judgment embodied the righteous’ hope 
of justice (e.g., Wis 3:10; 4:16-5:14).
78
 The function of God’s eschatological judgment in 
the idol polemic is to dissuade the audience from engaging in idolatry by promising that 
idolatry incurs the wrath of God. 
 
 
 
                                                          
78
 Wisdom preempts any questioning of God’s justice because Wisdom asserts that God gave 
people a chance to repent (Wis 11:9-14; 12:3-18, 20-21; 19:1-5, 13). 
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Understandings of False Worship 
Collins states that for Wisdom, “The basic sin is idolatry, which is denounced repeatedly 
throughout the book.”79 While Wisdom does argue that the fundamental sin is 
abandoning God in false worship, false worship is not reducible to idolatry. Even within 
the idol polemic of Wisdom 13-15, the author describes the differences in the manner and 
motives of different types of false worship. The nature worshipper is guilty of error and 
ignorance (13:1), but this person has made a genuine attempt to seek God (13:6). The 
idolater is miserable (13:10) and deceived by idols (14:11, 21; 15:4), and their sin is one 
of both cognitive error and action. Wisdom accredits no goodwill to the idol craftsmen 
(14:8-10); rather, they are portrayed as intentionally deceiving the masses (15:9). “This 
person [idol craftsmen] knows more than all others that he sins” (Wis 15:13). Thus, 
Wisdom hints at an understanding of false worship as a willful act by some (idol 
craftsmen and some idolaters) and an unintentional act by others (nature worshippers and 
some idolaters). 
Various actions are included under Wisdom’s condemnation of false worship. At 
its core, false worship is a combination of cognitive error about who God is and incorrect 
action (both in devotion to things that are not God and in not devoting oneself to the 
worship of God). Nature worshippers have an incorrect understanding of God. While they 
do not necessarily express that in improper action, they do not worship properly by 
practicing Jewish forms of worship. The author defines the false worship of idolaters as 
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 Collins, From Athens, 199. 
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errant thought expressed in improper action: idolaters “thought wrongly about God by 
devoting themselves to idols” (14:30). Pagans err not only in worshipping falsely but also 
in thinking falsely about God and gods. 
A common explanation of false worship in the Jewish Scriptures is that it is the 
forsaking of ancestral customs. This understanding of false worship, however, is absent 
from Wisdom, which signals a difference in the way that Wisdom presents false worship. 
When a scriptural author warns his audience not to forsake ancestral custom, he 
understands idolatry to be a sin into which Israel can fall. Similarly, in some prophetic 
texts (e.g. Jeremiah), idolatry is described as a characteristic of Israel. In other prophetic 
texts (e.g. Deutero-Isaiah), idolatry is a sin that characterizes pagans. The author of 
Wisdom draws stark contrasts between God’s people and their oppressors, and idolatry is 
uniquely a characteristic of their oppressors. Wisdom acknowledges that there might be a 
chance that Jews could stray into false worship, but even then God would forgive them 
(Wis 15:1-3).  The general presentation of false worship in Wisdom is that it is a sin of 
which the pagans are guilty. 
Thinking Wrongly About God 
Wisdom presents false worship as incorrect thinking about God. This is evident 
both in explicit texts (e.g., Wis 13:2, 10; 15:15) and the mockery with which Wisdom 
treats the process of making idols—it is a foolish endeavor. Associated with incorrect 
thinking about God are misplaced trust (14:29), misdirected prayer (13:17-14:1), frenzied 
cultic activity (14:22-23, 28-29), and improper worship (14:18, 20, 27).  For the author of 
Wisdom, improper worship does not necessarily have to express itself in pagan ritual. 
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Nature worshippers do not seem to participate in any particular cultic acts; nevertheless, 
the author considers them to worship falsely because they think wrongly about God. The 
author describes their thinking as ignorant of God (13:1), failure of perception (13:1, 4-
5), and error about the knowledge of God (14:22). These descriptions of pagan ignorance 
contrast with the God’s people who think rightly about God and are not deceived by 
pagans (15:2-4). The allusions in Wis 15:1-2 to the covenant and Mosaic Law imply that 
proper Jewish understanding of God comes from God’s self-revelation in the Law. While 
pagans should be capable of inferring something about God by observing nature (Wis 
13:1-5), the author thinks that the truest knowledge of God is available to Jews in the 
form of the Mosaic Law.  
Worship of Idols 
Idolatry was both the most prevalent and most obvious example of false worship 
in the author’s context. Cult temples and idols were visible daily to the Alexandrian 
Jewish community. The worship of a deity through idols was also the most common and 
characteristic form of non-Jewish worship in the Greco-Roman world. Moreover, the 
rejection of images in worship, while not exclusively a Jewish concept, was especially 
noted by pagans as a characteristic of Jewish worship. In contrast to philosophical nature 
worship, idolatry had been discussed by Jews for centuries and was prohibited in the 
Law. 
Idols are defined in contrast to God who is Creator. From God’s role as Creator, 
Wisdom asserts God’s salvific providence, pre-existence of the physical world, and 
ability to act in history. Corresponding to each of these traits of God, the idols are 
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demonstrated to be non-gods. The fundamental difference between God and everything 
else is that he is the Existing One who creates everything else. God is Creator, but idols 
are created. Unlike nature and humans that are created directly by God, idols are twice 
removed from God. Even the description of an object as being made with human hands 
may have become a term to describe idols.
80
 The non-reality of idol-gods is shown by the 
fact that they are created by those who cannot impart the spirit to them. Thus, idols are 
dead. Addison Wright attributes significance to the definition of idols as dead because he 
argues that the entire polemic is formed around the inclusio of 13:10 and 15:17 with the 
assertion that idols are dead things.
81
 God’s salvific providence is contrasted to both the 
idols’ inability to save and the special care that the idolater must take in order to ensure 
the safety of his idol. God’s pre-existence stands in stark contrast to the euhemeristic 
explanations of the origins of idolatry. God’s activity in the history of Israel is contrasted 
with the inability of idols even to perform actions on their own behalf: they cannot 
exercise even the most basic sensory abilities. 
The most succinct expression of the author’s criticism of idols occurs in his first 
description of idols and idolaters:  “Wretched, with their hopes set on dead things, are 
those who designate as gods the works of human hands. These things are skillfully 
crafted gold and silver, representations of animals, or useless stone, the work of an 
                                                          
80
 See Ernest G. Clarke, The Wisdom of Solomon (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), 
93-4; Gilbert, La Critique, 81-3. 
81
 Wright, “Wisdom,” 519.Wolfgang M. W. Roth (“For Life, He Appeals to Death (Wis 13:18): A 
Study of Old Testament Idol Parodies,” CBQ 37 [1975]: 21-47, esp. 45-7) argues that the primary contrast 
in Jewish idol parodies is between the dead idols and life-giving God. 
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ancient hand” (Wis 13:10). The author critiques the idols in terms of their activity, 
makers, material, and form. The most biting parts of Wisdom’s polemic against idols are 
the satirical comments about the “deadness” of idols that are like a corpse in that they 
have body parts but they are unable to use them (Wis 13:16-19; 14:29). As discussed 
above, the author thinks idols to be unworthy of worship because they are the creation by 
humans who do not have the ability to create inspirited life. Idols are made from precious 
and common materials, but nothing merely material is worthy of worship. Moreover, the 
form into which craftsmen shape this material is unbefitting deity; they are shaped into 
the form of animals and other humans. 
Worship of Animals 
The inclusion of theriolatry in the author’s critique of false worship allows the 
author to resume the main argument of Wisdom 11-19 and draw on the situation of his 
own community. This especially Egyptian practice is important for the author’s own 
context and to demonstrate how God had delivered God’s people from the hand of the 
Egyptian gods in the past. The importance of discussing theriolatry for the flow of the 
argument is that it resumes the author’s theme of how God uses the cosmos to provide for 
God’s people and punish their enemies (Wis 11:5; 16:17, 24; 19:6). In Wis 16:1, the 
author reminds his audience that people are punished by the things by which they sin, a 
theme that also appears directly before the excursus on false worship (Wis 12:27; 
cf.11:16). Moreover, the author reinforces the distinction between God’s people, for 
whom God provides, and the enemies of God’s people, whom God punishes. The 
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Egyptian oppressors were punished by means of animals, but instead (ἀντί) of 
punishment by animals, God’s people received the animals as food (Wis 16:1-4).  
Effects of False Worship 
The effects of idolatry are realized both externally and internally. Internally, the 
idolater is miserable with useless hope, but the idolater is also threatened with divine 
judgment. The consequences of idolatry are realized internally, and the author argues that 
idolaters are punished by the things that they worship. They are punished because they 
have hoped in false things, and as a result, their hopes are futile (Wis 15:6). Idolatry has 
further internal consequences in that idolatry results in immoral actions, actions that the 
author thinks result in misery (Wis 14:22-29). The idolaters are frenzied, disordered, and 
confused. The author makes an implicit argument that the Jewish mode of living, even in 
its strictness, produces a happier existence than pagan excesses.   
In addition to the internal torment of the idolater’s soul, Wisdom also assures the 
audience of God’s future judgment on the idolaters, a judgment that is seen historically in 
God’s punishment of the Egyptians in the exodus. Wisdom 11-19 describes how God 
punishes the oppressors of God’s people, who are identifiable as idolaters, through the 
secondary means of the cosmos.
82
 In the polemic against false worship, Wisdom 
mentions that God will punish idolaters, even if their present punishment is to lead a 
miserable life. Wisdom 14:8-10 states that both idols and idolaters are hated and cursed 
by God, and then the author promises that they will be punished: “and the thing made 
                                                          
82
 The identification of idolaters as the wicked oppressors is strengthened by the description of 
them as wretched (ταλαίπωρος; Wis 3:11; 13:10; cf. 15:14) with vain hope (Wis 3:11; 13:10). 
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will be punished with the one doing it. Therefore divine judgment (ἐπισκοπή) will come 
upon the idols of the nations…” (14:10-11a; cf. 14:30-31). While the main point of the 
excursus on false worship is not to promise God’s eschatological punishment on the 
idolaters, the author uses eschatological punishment as another assurance that the Jewish 
way of life and worship is proper. Even though the author’s community presently suffers 
at the hands of wicked idolaters, God will punish the wicked idolaters and reward the 
righteous Jew. 
Conclusions 
In Wisdom 13-15, the exhortation to avoid false worship and pursue piety through the 
Mosaic Law is largely implied by describing the foolishness of pagan expressions of 
worship. The author describes the internal misery of idolaters, mocks the foolish manner 
in which they craft gods, and promises God’s future punishment on their actions. On the 
other hand, the author reaffirms the close relationship between God and God’s people; 
they are not deceived by false forms of worship, but even if they were, God would 
forgive them. The text seems to be written to Jews, and the author assumes that this 
people no longer commits idolatry (15:2). The author attempts to show the benefits of the 
proper conception and worship of God in contrast to the disastrous results of all forms of 
pagan worship. The author thinks the contrast between Jewish Law-observance and 
pagan cultic worship sufficiently proves the superiority of Jewish belief and practice. 
Wisdom’s critique of idolatry is very much in line with scriptural idol polemics in 
their mocking caricatures of the process of making a god. Because they deny any reality 
of the deity behind the idol, they both begin with the complete identification of the god 
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and the idol. Wisdom also speaks of false worship in terms of error and departure from 
the proper worship of God. While wisdom shares these features with the Jewish 
Scriptures, Wisdom mostly removes idolatry from the context of interpersonal 
relationship because idolatry is something that characterizes the pagans.  
While Wisdom is dependent upon and in agreement with rejections of idolatry in 
the Jewish Scriptures, Wisdom expands the discussion of false worship to include issues 
relevant to the Alexandrian context, nature worship and theriolatry. In the discussion of 
nature worship, the author demonstrates that he is conversant in Greek philosophy by 
rejecting and qualifying different Greek philosophical positions. Wisdom also introduces 
euhemeristic explanations for the origins of idolatry that caricature common Greco-
Roman practices. Following the explanation of the invention of idolatry, Wisdom 
explains that the introduction of idolatry also introduced every evil into the world 
(14:27). The counterpart to the evil effects of idolatry is Jewish piety in the observance of 
the Law. Wisdom 13-15, read in the context of the Book as a whole, argues that idolatry 
is a foolish pagan invention with disastrous effects including the sure punishment of God. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
PHILO’S POLEMIC AGAINST FALSE RELIGION 
 
Introduction 
Philo of Alexandria was a highly educated Jew who lived from about 20 B.C.E. to 50 
C.E. In addition to his literary output, he also represented the Alexandrian Jews 
politically in the delegation to Gaius Caligula (38 C.E.) in response to the disturbances in 
Alexandria. Within this societal upheaval, Philo remained deeply committed to the 
Jewish community, Jewish way of life, and Jewish Scriptures. Philo was an extremely 
well-educated and Hellenized Jew who interpreted the LXX in light of his philosophical 
education. On the one hand Philo was staunchly committed to Jewish belief and practice 
(e.g., he thought apostates should be executed), and on the other hand, Philo was 
remarkably convergent with Hellenistic culture (e.g., he received a gymnasium education 
and wrote in Greek). Philo’s writings display the dual commitments in Philo’s own life 
between being a pious Jew and being conversant with Hellenistic culture, and they bear 
the stamps both of his Jewish commitment and Hellenistic education.  
His writings are generally divided into the Allegorical Treatises and the treatises 
concerning the Exposition of the Law. Because idolatry was a significant boundary 
marker that differentiated Jew from Gentile, Philo mentions idolatry in many of his 
treatises, and the most extended critique of Gentile idolatry comes in De decalogo. De 
decalogo belongs to the Exposition of the Law in which Philo offers a commentary and 
138 
 
explanation of the LXX.
1
 There is general agreement among scholars that the Exposition 
is less technical than the Allegorical Treatises and thus more accessible to a broader 
audience. Erwin R. Goodenough is an early representative of those who think Philo’s 
Exposition is directed to a Gentile audience: “The Exposition is thus more intelligible 
throughout when, in contrast with the writings designed for Jews, it is recognized to have 
been written for gentiles.”2 Elsewhere I have argued that Philo’s retelling of the narrative 
events around Sinai and his presentation of the Law in De decalogo is an attempt to make 
accessible the Law and history of a particular people to a broader Greco-Roman 
audience.
3
 This universalizing tendency in De decalogo is less evident when he pointedly 
critiques the theology and practice of all non-Jewish religion because Philo is arguing 
that Jewish practice embodies piety in contrast to the impiety of pagan practice. Proper 
belief and practice are exemplified by a particular people. But even when he critiques 
                                                          
*In order to make the references to Philo more accessible to the reader, I have employed the 
translations by F. H. Colson in the Loeb Classical Library. 
1
 Many accept the sequence of the Exposition to be Opif., Abr., (On Isaac), (On Jacob), Decal., 
Spec., Virt., Praem. See for example Peder Borgen, Philo of Alexandria: An Exegete for His Time 
(NovTSup 86; Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1997), 77. There is debate concerning the insertion of Mos. as the last of 
the biographies. In Praem. 1-3, Philo himself indicates this scheme of Moses’ work: creation of the world, 
history, and Law. 
2
 Erwin R. Goodenough, “Philo’s Exposition of the Law and his De Vita Mosis,” HThR 26 (1933): 
124; cf. Emil Schürer, The Literature of the Jewish People in the Time of Jesus (ed. Nahum Glatzer; trans. 
Peter Christie and Sophia Taylor; New York: Schocken, 1972), 338. See also, Emil Schürer, The History of 
the Jewish People in the Age of Jesus Christ (175 B.C. – A.D. 135) (trans. rev. ed. Geza Vermes, Fergus 
Millar, and Martin Goodman; Edinburgh: Clark, 1973), 3.840-1; Frederick H. Colson, De Decalogo PLCL, 
xiv; Valentin Nikiprowetzky, De Decalogo (Les Oeuvres de Philon D’Alexandri 23; Paris: Cerf, 1965), 29-
32; Peder Borgen, “Philo of Alexandria: Reviewing and Rewriting Biblical Material,” SPhilo 9 (1997): 47-
53.  
3
 Trent A. Rogers, “Philo’s Universalization of Sinai in Decal. 32-49,” SPhilo 24 (2012): 89-109. 
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pagan religiosity, there are hints of his more universal scope because he does so in a way 
that he thinks will appeal to the philosophically inclined Gentile.  
Having concluded that the treatises comprising the Exposition, and De decalogo 
in particular, are more accessible and universalizing, we must still assess Philo’s purpose 
in this genre of writing. Ellen Birnbaum argues that we should not limit Philo to a single 
purpose: “Philo may have several aims in mind here: to reclaim the alienated Jews, 
educate less knowledgeable ones, assuage non-Jews who may be hostile, and appeal to 
those who might be interested.”4 These purposes are consistent with the universalizing 
tendency observable in Philo’s writing even though Philo’s universalism is grounded in 
particularism. 
5
 Jutta Leonhardt-Balzer defines universalism and particularism in Second 
Temple Judaism: “Universalism in the context of Judaism is the idea that the Jewish 
traditions—in whichever form—are relevant for the whole world. The opposite term is 
particularism, which in the same context would mean the view that they refer to the 
Jewish nation only.” Philo believes Judaism to be the purest philosophy, and in this 
sense, it should be the universally practiced philosophy. Thus, the particular Law of the 
Jewish God is understood to be relevant and accessible to all people because it is the law 
of nature. Philo does not want to compromise his conviction that the Jewish Law and 
practice is superior to all others; rather, he intends to show the superiority of the Jewish 
                                                          
4
 Ellen Birnbaum, The Place of Judaism in Philo’s Thought: Israel, Jews, and Proselytes (BJS 
290/SPhMS 2; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1996), 20. 
5
 Jutta Leonhardt-Balzer (“Jewish Worship and Universal Identity in Philo of Alexandria” in 
Jewish Identity in the Greco-Roman World: Jüdische Identität in der griechisch-römischen Welt [ed. Jörg 
Frey, Daniel R. Schwartz, and Stephanie Gripentrog; AGJU 71; Leiden: E. J. Brill, 2007], 33. See also 
Birnbaum, The Place of Judaism, 1-6. 
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Law in that it is universally applicable.
6
 In this demonstration, he may hope to persuade 
sympathetic Gentiles of the respectability of the Jewish Law and perhaps persuade them 
to practice the Law. Moreover, and perhaps more importantly, this demonstration assures 
Jews of the intellectual superiority of Judaism and engenders pride in their ancestral 
religion, which provides the foundation for pious actions.
7
 
The Structure and the Argument 
The argument of Decal. should not be separated from its connection to other treatises in 
the Exposition. Philo assumes that the audience will be familiar with treatises concerning 
the patriarchs (Decal. 1), and he reads the Decalogue as heads, or summaries,  of laws 
that are explained more extensively in De specialibus legibus (Decal. 50-2; cf. Abr.1; 
Spec.1.1; Heres. 167-73). The Exposition is Philo’s explanation of the Jewish Law, and 
De decalogo deals specifically with the 10 commandments and the circumstances of their 
dictation. Philo’s treatise is well structured: 
Introduction (1) 
I. Four Questions about the Circumstances of Giving the Law (2–49) 
II. Exposition of the Ten Commandments (50–153): 
A. Explanation of the Division into Two Sets of Commandments (50–51)  
B. The First Set of Commandments (52–120) 
C. The Second Set of Commandments (121–53) 
III. Rough Synopsis of Spec. 2–4.131 
IV. Explanation for the Absence of Penalties in the Decalogue (176–78) 
 
                                                          
6
 Peder Borgen (“Philo of Alexandria,” in ABD 5.341) comments on this universalizing impulse in 
Philo: “Philo’s extreme form of particularism risked ending up in a universalism where Jewish 
distinctiveness was in danger of being lost.” It should also be noted that Philo’s universalism can be read as 
an extreme particularism in which other nations abandon their practices and observe the Jewish Law 
because it is the legal code that accords perfectly with the law of nature and reason. Cf. Mos. 2.17-20, 43-4.  
7
 While Philo’s implied audience and purpose are probably outside his Jewish community, 
apologetic works often are read by those inside the community of the author. Jews would be comforted by 
Philo’s defense of Jewish philosophical superiority and might find in De decalago an apologetic model. 
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The Introduction locates De decalogo among Philo’s other treatises, and the four 
questions preempt some of the concerns that an audience, unfamiliar with the specifics of 
the Law, might ask. In the Exposition, De decalogo follows both the description of God’s 
creation of the world and the lives of Jewish patriarchs. The narratives about the 
patriarchs are especially important for Philo’s explanation of the Decalogue because the 
patriarchs are examples of how to live in accordance with the law of nature. Philo 
understands the Decalogue to be the perfect, written manifestation of the law of nature, 
and thus the patriarchs are prototypes of the Decalogue. The universalizing implication of 
this identification of the Decalogue with the law of nature is that Mosaic Law is 
applicable to non-Jews.
8
 Philo clarifies the connection between the patriarchs and the 
written Law in his opening: “Having related in the preceding treatises the lives of those 
whom Moses judged to be men of wisdom, who are set before us in the Sacred Books as 
founders of our nation and in themselves unwritten laws, I shall now proceed in due 
course to give full descriptions of the written laws.”9 For Philo, the lives of the patriarchs, 
who precede the giving of the Law, demonstrate that the Law extends beyond 
nationalistic practice because it can be practiced in accord with nature and wisdom. Peder 
Borgen argues, “On the concrete and nationalistic level the lives of the Patriarchs were 
the lives of ‘the founders of our nation,’ i.e. of the Jewish nation. On the general level of 
                                                          
8
 J. H. A. Hart, “Philo of Alexandria,” JQR 17 (1904): 82, makes the connection between Philo 
and the Stoic natural Law: “So, then, the life according to Nature which the Stoic philosopher preached was 
after all no more than the life of the law-abiding Jew.” 
9
 Philo, Decal. 1 (PLCL, Colson). Although the audience knows who the “men of wisdom” are, 
the discrete Jewish designations never appear in Decal.: Abraham, Isaac, Jacob/Israel, and Joseph. Aaron 
also receives no mention and the priests are only mentioned twice (Decal. 71, 159). 
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law and philosophy they were archetypes and in themselves unwritten laws.”10 Although 
it is important that the Jewish people have wise ancestors, the significance of the 
patriarchs is that their wise manner of living agrees with the wisdom of the Mosaic 
Law.
11
 Moreover, the Law of Moses accords with natural law because the Law is 
received from God who is Creator.
12
 Special revelation to specific men (i.e. the Jewish 
patriarchs) excludes non-Jews, but Philo’s presentation of the Law as the same as the law 
of nature opens the possible practice of the Law to all people who live in accord with 
reason and nature.
13
 Hindy Najman summarizes, “In Philo’s view, the patriarchs 
exemplify the possibility of leading a virtuous life even if one does not have access to the 
written Law of Moses (Abr. 16).”14 Appeal to the congruence between the Mosaic Law 
and the natural law removes some of the exclusive Jewishness of the Law because it can 
be lived partially through wisdom. 
                                                          
10
 Borgen, Philo, 71. 
11
 See John W. Martens, One God, One Law: Philo of Alexandria on the Mosaic and Greco-
Roman Law (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 2003), 86-90, who correctly notes that more than just being in accordance 
with the Law of nature, these wise men become unwritten laws that are determined by the law of nature.  
12
 See Francesca Calabi, The Language and the Law of God: Interpretation and Politics in Philo 
of Alexandria (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1998), 37-8. 
13
 On the natural law being the law of reason, see Philo, Opif. 172; Prob. 47-9; Hindy Najman, 
“The Law of nature and the Authority of the Mosaic Law,” SPhilo 11 (1999): 62-3. While another Second 
Temple Jewish work, Jubilees (E.g., Jub. 6:17; 15:1; 16:28), indicates that the patriarchs had access to the 
Mosaic Law in the form of heavenly tablets and thus kept the Law through direct revelation, Philo intends 
to show that the Mosaic Law has broader accessibility and applicability. See Peder Borgen, “Philo of 
Alexandria,” in Jewish Writing of the Second Temple Period: Apocrypha, Pseudepigrapha, Qumran 
Sectarian Writings, Philo, and Josephus (ed. Michael E. Stone; CRINT sec. 2, vol. 2; Philadelphia: 
Fortress, 1984), 238, n.23; Najman, “Law of nature,” 61-2. 
14
 Hindy Najman, “A Written Copy of the Law of nature: An Unthinkable Paradox,” SPhilo 15 
(2003): 60. 
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 Philo then answers four questions that a reader might have concerning the law: (1) 
Why was the Law given the in the desert? (2) Why was the number of laws ten? (3) What 
is the nature of the voice? (4) Why was the singular “you” used? These are not technical 
questions that an educated Jew might ask; rather, they are questions that arise from a 
person who was familiar with Judaism but not formally instructed in the Law.
15
 The 
answer to each of these questions reinforces the truthfulness and piety of the Mosaic 
Law.  
 In De decalogo 44-49, Philo describes the manner in which the Law was given. 
Philo highlights the cosmic elements of the giving of the Law to show its divine delivery 
and reception. Philo spends the most time in his Sinai account describing the anomalous 
voice that he takes to be God speaking to the souls of rational humans (again, not 
exclusively Jews).  In this retelling of the Law’s dictation, Philo mutes and downplays 
especially Jewish elements while at the same time highlighting cosmic elements. Philo’s 
emphasis on the universal aspects of the giving of the Law coincides with his description 
of the Law as relevant, applicable, and perhaps even accessible to pagans.  “He presents 
the Law as proved true by nature and philosophy and shown to be unique by its divine 
and miraculous origins, but to universalize the Law Philo must hurdle the particularizing 
                                                          
15
 Maren R. Niehoff (Jewish Exegesis and Homeric Scholarship in Alexandria [New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2011], 184) notes that De decalogo fits the more accessible tone of the 
Exposition with its general introductory questions. The overall tone suggests “Philo’s audience in the 
Exposition indeed seems to be more interested in the overall values and customs of Judaism rather than in 
intricate questions” (174-5). These observations lead Niehoff to conclude that a non-Jewish audience for 
the Exposition is more likely. 
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aspects of the Sinai narrative and transform Sinai into a truly universalizing event.”16 
Philo is so intent on presenting the exceptionalness of the Jewish Law that he presents it 
in a way that is universally applicable.  
 In Decal. 50, Philo begins to describe the Law itself. He already made the 
distinction between the Decalogue (the heads or summaries of the laws that were given 
directly by God) and the special laws (the ones that elaborate on the Decalogue and were 
given through Moses) (Decal. 19-20). Now Philo divides the Decalogue into two tables 
with the first set, comprised of commands relating primarily to God, and the second set 
comprised of commands relating to humans’ obligations to other humans. His 
explanation is that piety is the basis for morality. (Decal. 121).
17
 These five begin with 
                                                          
16
 Rogers, “Philo’s Universalization,” 109. Hindy Najman (Seconding Sinai: The Development of 
Mosaic Discourse in Second Temple Judaism [JSJSup 77; Leiden:  Brill, 2003], 105) similarly notes, “Only 
through the unique Sinai event does it become possible for the written Law of a particular nation to serve as 
the perfect copy of the unwritten law of nature.” 
17
 Philo can show the similarity of Greek laws and the Jewish Law while maintaining the 
superiority of the Jewish Law by explaining how the Jewish Law is the best promotion of the polis. While 
the first table more specifically relates to the Jewish God, the second table can be interpreted in congruence 
with Greek laws for the promotion of society and humanity. See especially, Rogers, “Universalization of 
Sinai,” 93, from which much of the following note is adapted. The first tablet accords with the law of 
nature and proper philosophy, and the second tablet prevents the destruction of the polis. (6) Adultery is the 
greatest crime against the polis because it is founded in pleasure [Decal. 121], corrupts another’s soul 
[§§123-4], destroys three families [§§125-7], and it leaves the children despised by both families [§§130-
1]. (7) Murder is an offense against another person with a soul and robs the temple of God [§§132-4]. (8) 
The thief is an enemy of the polis (πόλεως ἐχθρόϛ), and if the thief were strong enough, he would destroy 
the whole polis as his desire is only checked by his weakness [§§135-7]. (9) False witness destroys the 
legal system of the polis [§§138-41]. (10) All interstate wars spring from desire which is one of the four 
Stoic passions [§§142-53]. Thus, the Laws are cast in terms of philosophy and the polis, not in terms of 
covenant faithfulness and ethnic identity.  Jutta Leonhardt, Jewish Worship in Philo of Alexandria (TSAJ 
84; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2001), 286-92, compares Philo’s works to Plato’s Laws and argues “Philo 
describes the Torah as a Jewish constitution in the Hellenistic sense. This brings him close to the Greek 
descriptions of constitutions, and especially Plato’s Nomoi, in which the philosopher attempts to design the 
ideal constitution by comparing the best aspects of a number of Greek states” (286). Moreover, Philo 
appeals to his audience through language appropriate to the contemporary Greco-Roman context. On the 
desert as a place of cleansing (Decal. 12-13), Maren Niehoff, Philo on Jewish Identity and Culture 
(Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2001), 256, notes, “By thus associating Mosaic Law with health Philo has 
inscribed it into Nature and suggested its objective value.” Niehoff explains that this way of presenting the 
Mosaic Law in terms health reflects a contemporary trend in Greco-Roman culture in which ethics was 
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God’s governance of the world and conclude with reverence for parents who mimic 
God’s creative activity (Decal. 51). The First Commandment (Decal. 52-65, 155) rejects 
nature worship and polytheism on account of God being utterly distinct from nature and 
being uniquely One. The Second Commandment (Decal. 66-81, 156) demonstrates the 
absurdity of worshipping both inanimate objects and irrational animals. The Third 
Commandment (Decal. 82-95, 157) explains that perjury is calling on God to witness a 
lie, which implies that the perjurer does not believe that God exists. The Fourth 
Commandment (Decal. 92-105, 158-64) grounds the Sabbath rest in the activity of God 
in creation and explains the Sabbath as a day on which the entire Jewish nation studies 
philosophy and pursues virtue. The Fifth Commandment (Decal. 106-120, 165-7) 
describes how parents mimic God’s creative actions and commands children to repay 
kindness to their parents. Philo interprets the Sixth Commandment (Decal. 122-31, 168-
9) as the worst offense against a fellow human because it has pleasure as its source, 
corrupts another’s soul, destroys families and even states, and is cruel toward children. 
The Seventh Commandment (Decal. 132-4, 170) prohibits murder as sacrilegious 
because it is an offense against one who possesses a soul and is near to God. The Eighth 
Commandment (Decal. 145-7, 171) forbids stealing because it leads to the usurpation of 
states if the thieves gain sufficient power. The Ninth Command (Decal. 138-41, 172) 
forbids false testimony because it corrupts truth, conceals facts, and corrupts the legal 
system. Philo interprets the Tenth Commandment (Decal. 142-53, 173-4) in Stoic terms 
                                                                                                                                                                             
understood as treatment and a cure. In Spec. Philo explains how the Law is the best remedy both for mental 
and physical ailment. For example, indigestion is cured through the prohibition on gluttony (Spec. 4.100). 
For an explanation of the special Laws as Greek virtues, see Naomi G. Cohen, “The Greek Virtues and the 
Mosaic Laws in Philo: An Elucidation of De Specialibus Legibus IV 133-135,” SPhilo 5 (1993): 9-23. 
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as a prohibition on desire. Covetousness is founded in desire, the deadliest of the four 
passions, and can be checked only by philosophical reasoning. 
 Having completed his treatment of the Decalogue, Philo summarizes the laws and 
explains how the Decalogue relates to the special laws, and thus also how De decalogo 
relates to De specialibus legibus. The Ten Commandments are summaries or heads on 
which the special laws elaborate. For example, the Fourth Commandment involves 
numerous areas in the special laws: purification rituals, feasts, year of rest for the land, 
and the year of Jubilee (Decal. 158-64). The Ten Commandments are summaries of the 
laws, and they are also distinct in that there are no punishments prescribed for 
disobedience. Philo explains the absence of penalties on the grounds that God is the 
source of good, and God leaves punishment to a subordinate, justice.  
 With this overview of Philo’s presentation of the Law, we now turn to a more 
detailed analysis of Philo’s polemic against false religion contained in his explanation of 
Commandments One and Two. While Wisdom’s polemic against false religion was a 
very carefully constructed chiasm, De decalogo 52-81 derives its structure primarily by 
explaining the Ten Commandments successively. De decalogo treats nature worship, 
idolatry, and theriolatry in the same sequence that Wisdom did, but the reasoning for the 
sequence is different. Even though Wisdom 13-15 was an excursus, the author still 
attempted to tie it into the flow of the argument in Wisdom as a whole, and in Wisdom 
11-19 the main point is to demonstrate that God provides for God’s people while 
punishing their enemies. Philo does not make the explanation of the Commandments to 
be an example of a larger argument. Rather, Philo is working progressively through the 
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text in the LXX.  As he explains each commandment, he catalogues the list of pagan 
errors combated by the Commandment. 
Decal. 52-65: Nature Worship 
While the larger structure of De decalogo is clear, the substructure within each of 
the Commandments is sometimes elusive. The First Commandment establishes that God 
is the supreme, unique King, and everything else is categorically inferior to God. When 
Philo examines how pagans abuse this proper understanding of God, he dwells primarily 
on pagans who worship the natural world (Decal. 52-64). Philo lists errors while also 
interjecting a proper understanding of who God is.
18
 While the structure and progression 
of Philo’s argument is not as clear or precise as Wisdom’s, it is nevertheless discernible. 
1) Manifestations of Error: Deifying the Material World (Decal. 52-8) 
 A Deification of the four elements (Decal. 53)  
B Deification of the sun, moon, planets, and fixed stars (Decal. 53) 
C Deification of heavens (Decal. 53) 
D Deification of whole cosmos and misunderstanding                                 
God’s providence (Decal. 53)  
A' Pantheon as the four elements (Decal. 54)
19
  
  B' Pantheon as the sun, moon, planets, and fixed stars (Decal. 54-5)
20
 
   C' “Pantheon” as the heavens (Decal. 56-7)21 
D' Moses instructs not to deify the cosmos and about God’s 
providence (Decal. 58)
22
 
                                                          
18
 Philo introduces the different manifestations of theological error with a particle (or combination 
of particles) and the nominative, masculine, plural article. The particle indicates transition to another error, 
and the article is used substantively to indicate a group of people.  
19
 Philo identifies the deities in the following way: earth (Kore, Demeter, or Pluto), sea (Poseidon 
and subordinates), air (Hera), and fire (Hephaestus). 
20
 Philo identifies the deities in the following way: sun (Apollo) moon (Artemis) planets 
(Aphrodite and Hermes) stars (names by the mythmakers). 
21
 Philo identifies the sons of Zeus, the Dioscuri, as the heavens. 
22
 While D' is not perfectly parallel because it does not involve the Greek pantheon, it belongs in 
the chiastic structure because it contains a reference to the cosmos and God’s providence. 
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2) Further Manifestations of error (Decal. 59-63) 
 Thinking material things to be the primal God (Decal. 59-61)  
 Giving no honor to God (Decal. 62) 
 Blaspheming God (Decal. 63) 
3) Exhortation not to worship the material world but to honor the Creator (Decal. 64-5)
23
 
 
It seems that Philo wants to address a specific set of errors, so he groups them 
systematically in the first section and then lists a number of other errors in the second 
section. The structure of the first section indicates that Philo’s primary argument is to 
combat the deification of the cosmos—an error he probably identifies as Stoicism. In 
subsection D, Philo uses several descriptions of God’s providential activity and none of 
them is an especially Jewish description of God. But in D', Philo clarifies that the 
providential God is to be identified as the Jewish God. The fundamental distinction is that 
the pious (Jew) “should not suppose any of the parts of the universe to be the omnipotent 
God.”24 Section 3 is a summary exhortation that reinforces the distinction between God 
and everything else that exists. Philo emphasizes God’s uniqueness as the providential 
Creator by reaffirming it at key structural points of the argument. 
Philo does not cite the LXX. Rather, he assumes that his audience has familiarity 
and he begins the explanation with the problem: “A great delusion (πλάνος) has taken 
hold of the larger part of mankind…”25 Philo is commenting on Exodus 20:1 in the LXX: 
                                                          
23
 De decalogo 64-5 comprises a third section that is distinguishable from first two as it is a 
summary exhortation that addresses the errors in both of the first two sections. 
24
 Philo, Decal. 58 (Colson, PLCL). 
25
 Philo, Decal. 52 (Colson, PLCL). The first part of Decal. 52 belongs to the general introduction 
of the Commandments. It explains how each of the two tables is to be categorized. The first table relates 
primarily to piety and the second table to virtue: “The transcendent source of all that exists is God as piety 
is the source of the virtues, and it is very necessary that these two should be first discussed.” (Philo, Decal. 
52 [Colson, PLCL]) 
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“You shall not have other gods besides me” (Exod 20:3, author’s translation)26 The first 
commandment should create in humans a proper conception of who God is, but human 
beings have gone astray in their understanding by worshipping nature as if it were God.  
There may be a play on words as Philo describes nature worship as a delusion (πλάνος), 
and they worship among other things “the other planets and the non-wandering stars” 
(τοὺς ἄλλους πλανήτας καὶ ἀπλανεῖς ἀστέρας; Decal. 52). The repetition of the πλαν-
stem, while appropriately describing the celestial bodies as those that appear to move and 
those that appear fixed, may also be used to heighten the irony. The play on words is 
more explicit in De specialibus legibus where Philo rejects the worship of celestial bodies 
by explaining Deut 4:19: 
“Do not when thou seest the sun and the moon and the stars and all the ordered 
host of heaven go astray (πλανηθείς) and worship them.” Well indeed and aptly 
does he call the acceptance of the heavenly bodies as gods a going astray 
(πλάνον) or wandering. For those who see the sun … have wandered infinitely far 
(ἐπλανήθησαν πλάνον) in supposing that they alone are gods. But if they had been 
at pains to walk in that road where there is no straying (ἀπλανοῦς), they would at 
one have perceived that just as sense is the servitor of mind, so too all the beings 
perceived by sense are the ministers of Him who is perceived by the mind.
27
 
 
Philo reads the LXX closely and highlights aspects that strengthen the irony of the 
pagans’ folly. Pagans go astray theologically by following celestial bodies that do not go 
astray. Philo is not bothered by the fact that Deut 4:15-20 seems to elaborate primarily on 
the Second Commandment while he applies it to the First. 
                                                          
26
 Philo omits the particularizing elements of describing God in terms of God’s activity with Israel, 
especially Exod 20:2. 
27
Philo, Spec. 1.15-17 (Colson, PLCL). 
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Philo describes four different manifestations of the error of not distinguishing 
properly God from the material world: those who deify the four elements; those who 
deify the celestial bodies, those who deify the heavens, and those who deify the cosmos. 
Philo objects to the deification of these beings because it undermines the worship that is 
due to God alone. Philo describes God with especially Greek terms that emphasize both 
that God is Creator and that God continues to control the world providentially. Each of 
the manifestations of error can be described as worship of the Greek pantheon. Those 
who worship the four elements give them the names of the gods of the Greek pantheon: 
Kore or Demeter or Pluto (earth), Poseidon (sea), Hera (air), and Hephaestus (fire).
28
 
Similarly, the celestial bodies have counterparts in the pantheon, and the heavens refer to 
the sons of Zeus, the Dioscuri. Moses, however, commands the pious to distinguish 
between God and everything else: “he should not suppose any of the parts of the universe 
to be the omnipotent God.”29 For Philo, the fundamental ontological distinction is 
between God and everything else, and he expresses this idea through the metaphor of 
God as Father. The Father is distinct from all His children, everything that is created. God 
                                                          
28
 Cf. Philo, Spec. 1.12-20; Contempl. 3. In making this argument Philo seems to acknowledge that 
pagan worship of the gods of the pantheon can be dissociated from idols. He seems to acknowledge that a 
pagan could worship at a temple of Poseidon before his cult image and believe that the reality of the god’s 
power was in his governance of the sea, not in his physical presence in the cult image. This recognition of a 
reality beyond the physical cult image is not a thought that Philo repeats when he wants to criticize the non-
reality of idols on the basis of their merely physical existence. 
29
 Philo, Decal. 58 (Colson, PLCL); Nikiprowetzky, De Decalogo, 70 n.1, provides the following 
references where Philo makes a similar point: Ebr. 43; Spec. 1.13; Conf. 170-6; Fug. 212; Mos. 1.113, 2.37; 
Somn. 1.15; Flacc. 123; QG 3.34. In Spec. 1.20, Philo emphasizes that God has priority over nature in 
terms of time and causation: “And if anyone renders the worship due to the Eternal, the Creator, to a 
created being and one later in time, he must stand recorded as infatuated and guilty of impiety in the 
highest degree.” (Colson, PLCL). See also Philo, Mig. 179. 
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can be distinguished from nature in terms of both time and God’s activity. God existed 
before nature and he continues to guide it providentially. 
The next classification of nature worshippers are those who think nature to be the 
primal God, and Philo criticizes them for relying exclusively on their physical senses.
30
 
They rely on inferior means (physical senses) and thus they come to inferior conclusions 
(deifying those things that are perceived physically). In contrast, the Law speaks to the 
superior faculty (the mind) and thus it describes the Supreme Being (cf. Spec. 1.16-20). 
Similar to Wisdom 13:1-9, this critique is probably aimed at the Stoics.
31
 Collins 
comments on Decal. 52-54, “Here, Philo is taking issue with Stoicism, but he could find 
support for his position in the Platonic tradition, which affirmed the role of the Demiurge 
and the priority of the soul.”32 Again Philo responds to this error by reasserting a proper 
conception of God. Also paralleling Wisdom, Philo describes God as the Truly Existent 
One (ὁ ὤν ὂντως; 59), which contrasts God’s self-existence with the contingent existence 
of everything else God created. God is both eternal (in contrast to the nature that came 
into being) and the providential Charioteer who steers all creation safely (in contrast to 
nature that is acted upon). Philo compares nature worshippers to those who honor a 
                                                          
30
 Cf. Spec. 17-20. Philo juxtaposes two conceptions of God in Decal. 59. The pagans regard 
nature as the primal God, who is the Existent one that they do not know. In making this comparison, Philo 
abuts the term πρῶτος θεός to ὁ ὤν ὄντως, a term which  Philo interprets in light of his Jewish tradition and 
Middle Platonism. Nikiprowetzky, De Decalogo, 71 n.3, comments on whom Philo addresses in Decal. 59, 
“According to Philo, this formula refers to the Chaldeans and the Stoics (cf. Migr. 179; Virt. 212), or the 
Epicureans (cf. Somn. II, 283)” (author’s translation). 
31
 Cf. Alan Mendelson, Philo’s Jewish Identity (BJS 161 ; Atlanta: Scholar’s Press, 1988), 35; 
Karl-Gustav Sandelin, “The Danger of Idolatry According to Philo of Alexandria,” Temenos 27 (1991): 
132-33. 
32
 John J. Collins, “Natural Theology and Biblical Tradition: The Case of Hellenistic Judaism,” 
CBQ 60 (1998): 7-8. 
152 
 
King’s servants instead of the King. The result is not that the servants are honored; rather, 
the result is that the King is dishonored (61).  
While the similarly structured and argued critique by the Book of Wisdom 
presented the nature worshippers with generally good motives, Philo criticizes them more 
severely. These people honor everything except the God who really deserves the honor, 
and they do so intentionally (Decal. 62-3). Some of these people attempt both to 
blaspheme God and harm the pious (i.e. Jews).
33
 
Philo concludes his critique of nature worshippers exhorting the audience to reject 
false conceptions of God and pursue correct thinking in the Law:  
Let us then reject all such imposture and refrain from worshipping those who by 
nature are our brothers, even though they have been given a substance purer and 
more immortal than ours, for created things, in so far as they are created, are our 
brothers, since they have all one Father, the Maker of the universe.
34
  
 
Philo again reasserts God’s character; God is eternal and he is the cause of everything. 
Philo continues the metaphor of God’s Fatherhood , which distinguishes God from 
everything else that is dependent on God. All created things, even if they appear more 
splendid than humans, are in the class of beings that are contingent; thus, all created 
                                                          
33
  Philo inserts an apologetic for Jews “who hold that silence is best for the time being to avoid 
giving provocation” (Decal. 63 [Colson, PLCL]). This probably references Jewish actions in the 
Alexandrian riots, and Philo is attempting to defend Jewish practice and theology by demonstrating that 
pagan misperception of God leads to murderous actions against humans.  
34
 Philo, Decal. 64 (Colson, PLCL). In Contempl. 7, Philo makes a similar argument concerning 
idols. Their substance disqualifies them from being an object meriting worship. The “brothers” of the idols 
are crafted into various shapes to be used in daily activities. The fact that the same substance of which the 
god is crafted is also used to make common tools demonstrates that there is nothing special about the 
substance. Philo argues that for something to be truly worthy of worship it needs to be unique and 
incomparable. 
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things are the brothers of humans. Philo concludes this section by exhorting the audience 
to take seriously the first commandment by forsaking these ideas and honoring God. 
35
 
Decal. 66-76: Idolatry 
Philo then proceeds to explain the second commandment, which he again does not 
quote:  
You shall not make for yourself an idol or the likeness of anything whatever 
things are in heaven above, whatever things are in the earth below, or whatever 
things are in the waters under the earth. You shall not worship them or serve 
them, for I am the Lord your God, a jealous God who repays the sins of fathers 
upon children to the third and fourth generation to those who hate me and shows 
mercy to thousands, for those who love me and keep my ordinances.
36
 
 
In his explanation of the second commandment, Philo structures it in two main sections 
dealing with idolatry and theriolatry: 
1) Introduction to Idolatry: Idolaters are guiltier than nature worshippers (66). 
A) Idolaters are blind (67-69). 
B) Idol craftsmen are more worthy of honor than idols (70-72). 
C) Idolaters are foolish (72-75). 
Exhortation: One with a soul should not worship something without a soul (76a). 
2) Introduction to Theriolatry: Egyptians are guiltier than other nations (76b) 
 A) Egyptians deify domesticated animals (76c-77). 
 B) Egyptians deify savage wild animals (78-79). 
 C) Egyptians are miserable and are mocked by outsiders (80). 
Conclusion: The goal of the Second Commandment is knowledge of God (81). 
 
There is not a clear progression of the argument. Rather, Philo seems to combine several 
critiques of idolatry that culminate in his conclusion. Philo explains the second 
                                                          
35
 Philo’s comment concerning polytheism seems somewhat misplaced: “let the idea that gods are 
many never even reach the ears of the men whose rule of life is to seek for truth in purity and guilelessness” 
(Philo, Decal. 65 [Colson, PLCL]). Syntactically this phrase goes with the section concerning nature 
worship, but polytheism has not been the major criticism of nature worshippers.  
36
 Exodus 20:4-6, author’s translation of the LXX. Philo does quote the commandment in Spec. 
I.22. In Spec. I.25, Philo quotes from Leviticus 19:4. 
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commandment primarily as a prohibition of making physical idols.
37
 He begins his 
critique with a theme that recurs in his treatments of idols: artists deceive the masses by 
making beautiful idols (66). Philo has a general mistrust of artists who use precious 
materials in order to trick people into assigning divinity to an image. In De specialibus 
legibus, Philo elaborates on the manner in which the artisans deceive the masses. Similar 
to the nature worshippers whose reliance on physical senses made them unable to 
perceive God, the idol craftsmen make use of the limitations of physical senses to deceive 
the masses. In De specialibus legibus, Philo describes how the myth-makers and the 
craftsmen cooperate: 
And to promote the seductiveness they have fitted the falsehood into melody, 
metre and rhythm, thinking to cajole their audience thereby. Further, too, they 
have brought in sculpture and painting to co-operate in the deception, in order that 
with the colours and shapes and artistic qualities wrought by their fine 
workmanship they may enthrall the spectators and so beguile the two leading 
senses, sight and hearing—sight through lifeless shapes of beauty, hearing 
through the charm of poetry and music—and thus make the soul unsteady and 
unsettled and seize it for their prey.
38
 
                                                          
37
 W. Barnes Tatum (“The LXX Version of the Second Commandment (Ex. 20, 3-6 = Deut. 5,7-
10): A Polemic Against Idols, Images,” (JSJ 17.2 [1986], 189) clarifies Philo’s interpretation of the Second 
Commandment: “Philo’s understanding of the Second Commandment, therefore, approximates that of the 
LXX although he does not use the vocabulary of the LXX. He interprets the Second Commandment in a 
polemically anti-idolic and not in an anti-iconic manner.” Previously, Barnes explained how Josephus (Ant. 
3.91) and Philo (Decal. 51) redefined the scope of the Second Commandment from its form in the LXX, 
which is similar to that in the MT: “They consider as the First Commandment: the prohibition against 
having ‘other gods’ beside God. They view the Second Commandment as consisting of the second and 
third prohibitions: the one against making ‘a sculpted image’ (MT) or ‘an idol’ (LXX), and the other 
against worshipping ‘them’” (188). Thus, Philo is following the LXX when he interprets the Second 
Commandment as a prohibition of idolatry and not just iconic representations. 
38
 Philo, Spec. I.28-9 (Colson, PLCL). 
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Philo repeatedly criticizes the motives of craftsmen as they intentionally deceive the 
masses for their own profit. They deceive people by using desirable materials, cast in 
beautiful form, and established by elaborate rituals (Spec. I.21).
39
 
Philo, like the prophetic critiques of the LXX, begins with the assumption that the 
gods behind the idols are non-existent. From the presupposition of the idol-god’s 
nonexistence, Philo argues that Greeks worship the statue itself. Philo does not make a 
genuine attempt to represent pagan image worship on its own terms; rather, as an outside 
observer of their rituals, he makes a one-to-one equivalence between the idol and the 
god.
40
 Philo repeatedly claims that the craftsmen make the gods themselves. Philo 
explains his understanding of idols as merely material in De specialibus legibus when he 
talks about greed as an idol:  
It is these that he calls “idols,” like to shadows and phantoms, with nothing firm 
or strong to which they can cling. They are borne along like a restless wind, 
subject to every kind of change and alteration ... And indeed when they are 
present, the apparition is like idols or images seen through mirrors, deceiving and 
bewitching the sense and seeming to subsist when they have no abiding 
substance.
41
  
                                                          
39
 Philo links the Second Commandment to greed because the idol craftsmen use gold and silver to 
make their images. The idolaters associate gold with blessing and happiness. The result is that they pay 
homage to anyone that possesses gold. Philo then critiques the Roman patronage system that is built on 
greed: “All the needy who are possessed by that grievous malady, the desire for money, though they have 
no wealth of their own on which they bestow worship as its due, pay awe-struck homage to that of their 
neighbors, and come at early dawn to the houses of those who have abundance of it as though they were the 
grandest temples, there to make their prayers and beg from blessing from the masters as though they were 
gods” (Spec. I.24 [Colson, PLCL]). Philo might just be arguing that idolaters associate wealth with blessing 
because their idols—which they also associate with blessing—are made from gold. But his argument might 
also be that the idolaters associate the golden idols with blessing, and since there is no reality behind the 
idol, they learn to associate gold with blessing 
40
 Cf. Spec. 1.21: “There are some who put gold and silver in the hands of sculptors as though they 
were competent to fashion gods” (Colson, PLCL). Philo does not discuss, for example, how the Ark of the 
Covenant could be constructed by human hands, but it does not locate God as being physical or unmoving. 
41
 Philo, Spec. I.26 (Colson, PLCL). 
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Philo is attempting to explain how greed can be understood as an idol. His explanation is 
that greed is a non-reality that moves around like the wind. Similarly, idols are non-
realities because they are reducible to their merely material composition. Philo argues 
that they are phantoms and shadows because there is nothing beyond the material 
substance of which the idols are made. In reality, most Greeks probably viewed images as 
representations of or the local presence of the deity. This satirical critique is undergirded 
by a caricature of pagan religion that the author assumes the audience (both sympathizers 
and especially Jews) will share: pagans believe that their gods are the idols, not that they 
are represented by the idols. Philo states his premise: “they think to be gods the images 
and paintings made by their own craftsmanship”(τὰ δ’ ὑπ’ δημιουργηθέντα πλάσματα καὶ 
ζωγραφήματα θεοὺς ἐνόμισαν, 70; cf. 7, 156; Spec. I.21). This disingenuous 
representation of pagan worship allows Philo to describe the idol-gods repeatedly as 
“dead” and “manmade.” These satirical flurries also permit the author to pass over more 
difficult questions, such as the question of the seemingly superior power of the pagan 
gods in light of the dominance of Greco-Roman culture over Jewish culture. These 
selective and well-crafted satires demonstrate the ridiculousness of the pagan worship as 
Philo has portrayed it.  
Decal. 67-69 
Philo criticizes both idolaters and idol craftsmen in this section. The error of the 
idol craftsmen is greater than that of nature worshippers. Philo seems to think that 
worshipping God’s creation is closer to true piety than worshipping material parts of 
creation (stone, silver, gold, and wood) that have been refashioned by humans. While 
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Wisdom 14:12-31 demonstrates the terrible effects of idolatry by describing the external 
immoral actions that result from idolatry, Philo appeals to the internal misery of the 
individual’s soul. By deceiving the masses, the artists have harmed the souls of people: 
“For these idolaters cut away the most excellent support of the soul, the rightful 
conception of the Ever-living God.”42 Idolaters then wander through life directionless, 
like unstable boats. Idolaters are more miserable even than those who suffer from 
physical blindness because idolaters have deliberately destroyed the “eye of the soul.”43 
God’s judgment awaits them, and they are presently reduced to being more foolish than 
infants.
44
 Philo states that even an infant can understand that a craftsman is greater than 
the craft he produces because the craftsman precedes it and is the cause of the craft (69). 
The craftsman has priority of time and honor over his craft.
45
 
Decal. 70-75 
Philo continues this theme of comparing the idol to the idol craftsman, and he 
argues that both the craftsman and the craftsman’s tools—things which no pagan would 
                                                          
42
 Philo, Decal. 67 (Colson, PLCL); cf. Spec. 1.36, 313. Philo likely agrees with Wisdom that 
idolatry results in the immoral actions characteristic of the pagans. He certainly believes that proper 
worship of God brings about righteous living: piety leads to virtuous living (Decal. 52) 
43
 Philo describes both idolaters and nature worshippers as intentionally misrepresenting God. He 
uses the same term to describe them: ἑκών (63, 68); cf. Contempl. 10. 
44
 Philo says that idolaters will encounter κόλασις (69). LSJ, “κόλασις,” lists the concrete 
definition as “checking the growth of trees” which can then refer to more general “correction” or 
“chastisement.” While this word, along with its cognate verb (κολάζω), is not the most common word used 
in the LXX to reference God’s punishment, in early Christian (e.g., Matt 25:46; 2 Pet 2:9; 1 John 4:18) and 
first centuries C.E. and B.C.E. Jewish literature (e.g., 2 Macc 4:38), it specifically references God’s 
punishment of human activity. Philo’s use of this term elsewhere (e.g., Spec. 1.55; 2.196; Fug. 65; Flacc. 
96) seems to indicate that κόλασις refers to God’s divine judgment. Contextual support for this 
interpretation can be found in the adverb δικαίως, a term commonly associated with the fairness of God’s 
judgment.  
45
 Cf. Spec. 1.20. 
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think of worshipping—are more worthy of worship than the idol. The logic of Philo’s 
argument becomes apparent in Decal. 76. The idol craftsman, being given a soul by God, 
is superior to an idol that lacks a soul. The irony of this inversion of honor is that the 
craftsmen age and become poverty-stricken; whereas, the idols become more adorned 
with expensive ornaments. The most ridiculous act is that some idol craftsmen worship 
their own creations as gods: “for it is known that some of the image-makers pray and 
sacrifice to their own works though it would be far better to worship each of their 
hands.”46 Like the Wisdom of Solomon, Philo is drawing on the satire of idol makers 
made by the Prophets. Even the craftsman’s tools—which are presumably also creations 
of the craftsman—are superior to his product. The implicit argument is that the tools at 
least have some benefit in that they are useful for shaping materials, but the idols offer no 
benefit at all to humans. The argument that the craftsman’s hands and tools are more 
worthy of worship only works if one accepts the complete equivalence of the god with 
the idol. Thus, the idol craftsman creates his god.  
 The comparison of the idol craftsman to his idol reaches its most satirical point 
when Philo asks if the craftsman would desire to be like his god. One’s goal should be to 
become similar to his god, and the coherence of one’s religious beliefs is evidenced in 
one’s desire to be like his god. For idolaters this would constitute a downgrade as they 
would become blind, deaf, non-aspirating, non-smelling, non-tasting, mute, and inactive. 
They would become like their gods that sit in temples and enjoy the sacrifices but are 
incapable of doing anything. Philo predicts that pagans would wholeheartedly reject this 
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 Philo, Decal. 72, author’s translation. 
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idea. And the pagans’ response to Philo’s proposal is “the strongest proof of the wide 
extent of impiety shown by men who acknowledge gods of such nature that they would 
abominate the idea of resembling them.”47 Philo begins with the premise that worshippers 
should want to be like the god that they worship. In a reductio ad absurdum, he 
demonstrates the foolishness of pagan worship by explaining the results of this premise in 
their religious system. 
 Philo again makes a complete equivalence between the idol and the god. Implicit 
in his argument is that the anthropomorphism of the idol demonstrates its non-reality. The 
idolater prays to the god as if it can do something more than a human, but the idol is a 
less capable replica of a human because it is in human form but cannot act. There is no 
reality beyond the physical location of the idol. Even though it possesses hands like a 
human, it has been created by one who is unable to impart life. The logic runs: pagan 
gods are manmade; humans do not have the ability to create life; therefore, the pagan 
gods are lifeless. 
Decal. 76 
 The comparison between the idol craftsman and idol reaches its conclusion with 
Philo’s exhortation: “Let no one, then, who has a soul worship a soulless thing.”48 Only 
God, as True Existence, has the ability to impart a soul to something else. Humans, as the 
direct creations of God, have received a soul. But idols, as the creations of humans, lack a 
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 Philo, Decal. 75 (Colson, PLCL); cf. Ps 115:5-8; Isa 44:9-20. 
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 Philo, Decal. 76 (Colson, PLCL). In the beginning of the treatise (Decal. 7-8), Philo contrasts 
idols and the true God. The primary difference is that idols are all “soulless/lifeless” (ἀψύχοι) in contrast to 
“the true, really existent God” (τὸ ὂντα ὂντως ἀληθῆ θεὸν).  
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soul. The critique of idols and thus pagan gods is that they are the creations of human 
hands. 
Decal. 76-80: Theriolatry 
Egyptians are as guilty as the Greeks in terms of their idolatrous behavior, but the 
Egyptians also engage in theriolatry.
49
 Philo thinks that the Egyptians are unique in their 
reverence for animals. The Egyptians worship bulls, oxen, rams, and goats, and like the 
Greek mythmakers, they invent tales for each of the animals. While these animals at least 
offer some value to humans, the Egyptians take their aberrant worship further and 
worship animals that are not only useless but actually harmful.
50
 They choose the two 
fiercest creatures on land and water, the lion and the crocodile (Decal. 70). The Egyptians 
also worship a host of other animals, most of which are unclean according to the Mosaic 
Law.  
Philo does not attempt to prove why animal worship is improper. For him, the 
category of “irrational animals” (ζῷα ἄλογα) is one that is not worthy of worship. While 
idols were criticized for being the products of human craftsmen, animals at least are the 
direct creations of God. Nevertheless, animals lack souls. He expects that his audience 
will readily condemn this Egyptian practice (80). Philo, thus, concludes his polemic of 
aberrant worship with the example that will be most persuasive to his audience of Greek-
speaking Alexandrians. He anticipates that the audience will side with his ridicule of the 
Egyptians. This ridicule serves two purposes for Philo. First, it distinguishes Jews from 
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 For Philo’s further critiques of Egyptian theriolatry, see Spec. 1.79, 2.146; Mos. 1.23; Contempl. 
8-9; Legat. 139, 163. 
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 Cf. Philo, Contempl. 7-8. 
161 
 
the common Egyptians, a distinction that had profound implications for the legal standing 
of Jews in Alexandria. Philo calls attention to a well-recognized difference between the 
Jews and Egyptians. This difference highlights the difference between Jews and 
Egyptians and similarity between aniconic Jewish and philosophical Greek reverence for 
God. Second, it allows Philo a way to exploit distinctions in the varied pagan religious 
systems. Even the first two groups in Philo’s polemic, nature worshippers and idolaters, 
would ridicule the Egyptians.  
Decal. 81: Conclusion to Aberrant Worship 
Philo’s comments in Decal. 81 probably serve primarily as a summary of the 
second commandment, but they draw on arguments from both the first two 
commandments. Moses’ intent was to lead humans to worship the God who is. Moses’ 
goal in directing people to worship God is not to benefit God because God is sufficient in 
himself; rather, instructing people to worship God benefits humans. Whereas idolatry 
removed the best support of the soul (τὸ κάλλιστον ἒρεισμα τῆς ψυχῆς, 67), rightful 
worship of God is the best end (τὸ ἂριστον τέλος, 81). Whereas idolatry resulted in 
misery, rightful worship of God results in being showered with blessings by God. Philo 
also returns to his thesis that one should arrive at the correct conception of God—which 
is recorded perfectly in the Mosaic Law—through proper reflection on nature.51 One 
should follow nature (ἕπομαι τῇ φύσει). 
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 Philo makes explicit in Spec. 1.32-50 that philosophically contemplating nature should lead one 
to perceive and seek after God. Moses is the example of the philosopher who was taught about God by 
nature (Spec.1.41, 49-50): “That means I bid you come and contemplate the universe and its contents, a 
spectacle apprehended not by the eye of the body but by the unsleeping eyes of the mind” (Philo, Spec. 
1.49 [Colson, PLCL]). Colson (PLCL vol. VII, 127 n. b) interprets this statement to mean “the 
contemplation must be philosophical, ‘looking through nature to nature’s God.’” Philo regards Platonic 
philosophy as most closely attaining this contemplation of God (Spec. 1.47-8). The idea that one can 
162 
 
Philo concludes his treatment of aberrant worship by using a technique common 
to Jewish idol polemics; he reasserts the character of God. Philo’s conclusion asserts that 
God is the Really Existent One (ὁ ὂντως ὤν), and this phrase summarizes some of the 
critiques of each improper form of worship. Whereas nature worshippers (i.e. Stoics) 
failed to distinguish between God and nature, Philo employs the Middle Platonic 
vocabulary to present a God who is transcendent over nature. Whereas idol-gods were the 
creations of humans and lacked a soul, God is self-existent. Whereas the animals 
worshipped by Egyptians caused only harm for humans, God is the source of good gifts 
in the world.  
Analysis of the Argument 
Philo’s manner of argumentation can be distinguished from Wisdom’s at the outset 
because of differences in genre. While Wisdom uses Jewish Scripture to illustrate the 
activity of wisdom, Philo’s whole approach is to explain the Jewish Scriptures. The idol 
polemic is an attempt to explain the superiority of the Mosaic Law by demonstrating the 
absurdity of false forms of worship. The argumentative implication for this approach is 
that Philo does not typically employ Scripture to prove his point; rather, he begins with 
Scripture, makes an explanation, and supports his explanation by other means such as 
Jewish practice, philosophy, and logical argumentation. For example, Philo begins De 
specialibus legibus with an explanation of the practice of circumcision. He demonstrates 
                                                                                                                                                                             
deduce God from nature accords with Philo’s overall treatment of the Law in Decal. He intends to show 
that the natural law is identical to the Mosaic Law. See Rogers, “Philo’s Universalization,” 91-5; 
Nikiprowetzky, De Decalogo, 133; cf. Martens, One God, 127; Hart, “Philo,” 82; Najman, “Written Copy,” 
59. André Myre, S. J., “La Loi et Le Pentateuque,” ScEs 25 (1973): 209-225, esp. 219-220, does not equate 
the two laws. While he argues for a strong connection between the two laws, he accords the Mosaic Law 
with a lesser status than the natural law. 
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the validity of the practice by normalizing it as a practice of many cultures (Spec. 1.2-3). 
Philo also appeals to contemporary medicine: prevention of disease (Spec. 1.4), 
promotion of cleanliness (Spec. 1.5), and the fertility (Spec. 1.7). Moreover, he observes 
that circumcision promotes the high moral value and piety that characterizes Jewish men 
(Spec. 1.6). To these explanations, Philo adds two allegorical proofs: the removal of 
pleasure (Spec. 1.8-9) and deceit (Spec. 1.10). Philo’s explanation of circumcision 
represents his method of explaining the Law because he begins with Scripture and makes 
his explanation by drawing on things like the experience of other nations, Jewish 
practice, medicine, and philosophy. 
Exploiting Cracks in Greco-Roman Religion 
Like other Jewish authors, Philo does not attempt a frontal attack against all non-
Jewish worship. Rather, Philo inserts himself into debates already occurring among 
different streams of thought in Greco-Roman religion. He is least condemning of Greco-
Roman philosophy that errs by deifying nature. He probably wants the audience to view 
him as philosophically astute, and he probably writes to persuade an upper-class, 
educated audience that would recognize and accept his arguments. When he critiques 
nature worshippers (Stoics), he takes the stance of another philosophical system (Middle 
Platonism). Thus he borrows existing arguments for God’s transcendence, but he 
modifies them in light of his Jewish faith. For example, he borrows Platonism’s idea of 
True Existence (τὸ ὂντως ὤν), but he nuances Platonism’s unknowable God to be the 
Jewish God who is known through the Mosaic Law and law of nature. He continues his 
self-identification as a philosopher into his critique of idol worship. Greco-Roman 
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philosophical critiques of anthropomorphic idol worship already existed. Philo borrows 
this line of critique, and he modifies it by incorporating mocking satire, a common theme 
in the idol polemics in his Jewish tradition.
52
 But when Philo comes to the discussion of 
Egyptian worship, he expects his audience to agree wholeheartedly with his criticism. He 
notes that any outsider would rightly look scornfully on the Egyptian practices (80). 
Ridicule 
Philo is most persuasive when he mocks other forms of worship. He does make 
logical arguments that explain why idolatry is foolish. For example, he argues that 
humans have a soul, but they worship objects that are soulless. But his more powerful 
arguments are those that rely on satire. The longest of these satirical flurries occurs in 
Decal. 74-5 in which Philo mocks the idols as having qualities that no human would 
reasonably want to possess. Their physical reality is nothing more than the material of 
which they are made, and they are incapable of performing even basic functions like 
sight. Similarly, he mocks the Egyptian manner of choosing which animals should be 
honored as gods. He caricatures them as finding the most harmful of animals to be their 
gods (78). Philo is not attempting to offer a genuine representation of these forms of 
worship. He offers a caricature (e.g., Greek idols are gods; Egyptians searched for the 
least worthy animal) from which he can ridicule them persuasively.  
 
 
                                                          
52
 While Jewish authors typically deny the reality of idol-gods and thus prohibit their worship, the 
Greco-Roman authors who criticized idolatry, frequently concluded with civic custom and expedience 
necessitated their ongoing worship. E.g. Dio Chrysostom, Dei cog. 48-60; Cicero, Nat. d. II.70, 71; Varro 
in Augustine, Civ. IV.27, 31; VI.10. 
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Obvious Deductions 
Philo is prone to making deductions, the logic of which is difficult to refute. The 
problem is that he begins with premises that are not really representative of the positions 
he is combating. Two examples relying on the same premise demonstrate this technique. 
Philo begins by making a complete identification between the pagan god and the cult 
statue. He can then observe that the cult statues do not move or act, so he mocks pagan 
gods as inactive. Moreover, because he thinks that the pagan god is identical to the 
image, he can conclude that pagans make their gods. Everyone agrees that the craftsman 
is greater than the product of his craft, so it is foolish for pagans to worship their non-
gods. The deductions that Philo makes in each of these arguments are sound, but they are 
based on premises that do not accurately represent pagan positions.
53
 
Contrasts 
A technique that Philo uses throughout De decalogo to demonstrate the 
superiority of the Mosaic Law is to contrast it with pagan forms of law and religion. In 
his polemic against false worship, Philo draws contrasts between God and other objects 
of worship and between piety and false worship.  The mocking descriptions of pagan 
objects of worship have been described above, but it is important to note that the 
condemnation of a particular object of worship is frequently followed by a reassertion of 
the value of God’s nature. While Wisdom groups the reassertions of God’s nature into 
apostrophes, Philo cannot help himself and frequently interjects the proper understanding 
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 This feature of Philo’s argument reinforces that assessment of his audience to be primarily 
upper-class, educated Jews and also Gentile sympathizers. It is doubtful that anyone would read Philo’s 
exposition if they did not already have an interest in the Jewish Scriptures, and it is even more doubtful that 
his exposition would move someone from being antagonistic to the Jewish faith to being a supporter.  
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of God directly following a description of error. A corresponding set of contrasts occurs 
with Philo’s description of Jewish Law observance and pagan religion. The Mosaic Law 
is “profitable for life” (50), the “genuine philosophy” (58), provides support for the soul 
(67), and is “right instruction” (80). In contrast, other religious devotion can be described 
as a “great delusion” (52), “incapacity for instruction or indifference to learning” (59), 
and “excess of impiety” (62). 
Representations of God 
Philo thinks that the representation of God in the Jewish Scripture is consistent with the 
best philosophical understandings of deity. When one reads the Jewish Scriptures at face 
value, however, there are certain depictions of God that describe God in anthropomorphic 
terms (e.g., Father, King, and Husband), and these anthropomorphic descriptions appear 
to be inconsistent with philosophical conceptions of God. Philo does not set out to correct 
“errors” in the Scriptures. Philo likely does not think that errors exist in Moses’ writing 
and especially not in the Decalogue because it was given directly by God. Rather, the 
anthropomorphic language has a function in explaining God even if the language needs to 
be interpreted properly as describing a deeper non-anthropomorphic reality. Philo asserts 
God’s role as Creator and continues to employ anthropomorphic images drawn from the 
Jewish Scriptures, such as King, Ruler, and Father. But he transforms these images, so 
that they are no longer descriptions of interpersonal relationships; rather, they refer to 
God’s sovereign rule as the Creator and Sustainer of all things. 
Philo’s concept of God is remarkably complex and detailed. While the primary 
goal of this section is to describe the manner in which God is represented in De decalogo, 
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broadening the scope to some other texts in the Exposition—especially De opificio mundi 
and De specialibus legibus—will clarify Philo’s argument in De decalogo. Perhaps the 
clearest explanation of Philo’s conception of God comes in the conclusion to De opificio 
mundi in which he explains God’s nature and role as Creator: 
The one first learning these things—not by his hearing but rather by his 
understanding—and impressing on his soul amazing and worthwhile thoughts that 
God is and exists, the Truly Existing One is One, He made the cosmos and has 
made it one just as it was said that He made it like Himself according to its 
oneness, and He always exercises providence over His creation, will lead a 
blessed and happy life because he is shaped by thoughts of piety and holiness.
54
  
 
Philo’s concept of God is rooted in Jewish monotheism. Similar to what he argues in 
Spec. I.33-35 (cf. Wis 13:1-5), here Philo argues that God’s existence and the oneness of 
God can be perceived analogically by looking at nature. Just as the cosmos is singular, 
God is singular. The singular God is the Truly Existent One, which term is significant for 
both Platonism and his Jewish tradition. Moreover, God is Creator and continues to guide 
the world providentially. For Philo, God is unique, and nothing is comparable to God, so 
that only God belongs to the category of God.
55
 
 In De opificio mundi 172, Philo makes a fine and important distinction between 
the essence and existence of God with the phrase ἔστι καὶ ὑπάρχει θεός.56 Philo uses two 
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 Philo, Opif. 172, author’s translation. The references to God are translated with masculine 
pronouns as it is closer to Philo’s thought than feminine pronouns. While I have primarily used Colson’s 
translations to make the texts more accessible to the reader, I have translated this section because it is at the 
end of a treatise (and thus easily referenced by the reader) and to highlight specific ideas of Philo’s 
conception of God. 
55
 See Philo, Sacr. 92; cf. L.A.B. 2.86. See also Peter Frick, “Monotheism and Philosophy: Notes 
on the Concept of God in Philo and Paul (Romans 1:18-21)” in Christian Origins and Hellenistic Judaism: 
Social and Literary Contexts for the New Testament (eds. Stanley E. Porter and Andrew Pitts; Leiden: Brill, 
2012), 240-1. 
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 On this point, I am indebted to Frick, “Monotheism and Philosophy”, 241-4. 
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verbs to describe God’s existence, and their significance is more recognizable in their 
substantive forms: οὐσία and ὕπαρξις. Philo elaborates on this distinction in his 
explanation of the Second Commandment in De specialibus legibus. Philo admits of the 
difficulty of thinking about God and states that two questions must be answered: “One 
(question) is whether the Deity exists (ἔστι) … the other is what the Deity is in essence 
(κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν).”57 Thus Philo makes a fundamental distinction between the existence 
and essence of God. In order to answer the first question that concerns God’s essence, 
Philo argues analogically from nature that one should be able to perceive the Craftsman 
from the craft (Spec. I.33-35). In answer to the question about God’s essence, Philo 
admits that knowing God’s essence is beyond human capacity, even beyond Moses’ 
ability (Spec. I.40-41). Humans only have the capacity to perceive the powers of God 
(Spec. I. 45-50) because the essence of the transcendent God is only knowable by the 
purest mind (Spec. I.46). Peter Frick summarizes,  
In sum, in Philo we thus have a concept of God that has at its core a God who is 
utterly unique and transcendent, inaccessible to the human mind and cognition. 
Philosophically, Philo mediates this notion of utter transcendence via his doctrine 
of the logos and powers. Theologically, he mediates his view of absolute 
transcendence by recourse to anthropomorphic designations, the via negativa, and 
occasionally even positive descriptions.
58
 
 
When this understanding of Philo’s representation of God is applied to De decalogo, the 
anthropomorphic images make better sense. In contrast to God, Philo insists that the 
anthropomorphic form and activity (as described in myths) of the gods demonstrates that 
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 Philo, Spec. I.32 (Colson, PLCL); cf. Philo, Somn. 1.230-231. 
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 Frick, “The Concept of God,” 243; See also Frick, Divine Providence in Philo of Alexandria 
(TSAJ 77; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1999), 38-42. 
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they are not divine beings. And he is careful not to mold God into an anthropomorphic 
form that would similarly demonstrate that God is not divine. Rather, the 
anthropomorphic descriptions of God are a way for Philo to explain the transcendent God 
by means of human understanding, even if it must be recognized that they are imperfect 
descriptions of God.   
Creator 
For Philo, the concept of God as Creator is foundational to the refutation of other 
forms of worship. The tendency to reassert God’s role as the Creator in contrast to 
contingent idols is a long-standing pattern in Jewish literature. Philo also applies God’s 
role as Creator to the issue of nature worship. Philo interprets several anthropomorphic 
descriptions of God to be descriptions of God’s creative activity. For example, Philo 
interprets the First Commandment primarily as a condemnation of nature worship and the 
necessity of distinguishing between Creator and creation. The primary representation of 
God in the First Commandment is God’s role as Creator, and when Philo introduces this 
commandment, he explains God’s uniqueness as the Creator through the image of God as 
King. Philo explains that the Decalogue is divided into two tables, and the first 
commandment deals with matters “concerning the monarchy, by which the world is 
ruled.”59 And worshipping creation instead of the Creator parallels the folly of one “who 
rendered to the subordinate satraps the honours due to the Great King.”60 In addition to 
the image of God as King, Philo employs another anthropomorphic image from the 
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 Philo, Decal. 51 (author’s translation): περὶ μοναρχίας, ᾗ μοναρχεῖται ὁ κόσμος. 
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 Philo, Decal. 61 (Colson, PLCL). 
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Jewish Scriptures to explain God’s role as Creator. Philo explains the coherence of the 
first table: “The one set of enactments begins with God the Father and Maker of all, and 
ends with parents who copy His nature by begetting particular persons.”61 God is Father 
in the sense that he generates the world as the sole Creator. Thus, Philo explains God’s 
distinct role as Creator with the images of his kingly governance and paternal generation. 
Moreover, Philo’s introduction to the First Commandment condemns the deification of 
nature and those people who have forgotten that God is the Begetter of creation and the 
Ruler of the great world-city (53). Philo’s primary representation of God in the First 
Commandment is God as Creator, and Philo interprets several anthropomorphic images 
drawn from the Jewish Scriptures as descriptions of God’s role as Creator. Philo retains 
the images from the Scriptures, but he reinterprets them. 
 For Philo, the fundamental ontological distinction is between God as Creator and 
everything that God created, and the images of King and Father communicate well the 
definitive boundaries between categories of being. A father is clearly distinct from his 
children, and the king is clearly distinct from his subjects. The ontological distinction 
between God and nature is reinforced by the facts that God precedes creation and is the 
cause of creation. While creation came into existence, God has always been (Decal. 58; 
cf. Spec. 1.14; Opif. 171; Contempl. 4). In contrast to everything else that is contingent, 
God is “the Uncreated, the Eternal, the Cause of all.”62 Underlying the assertion of God’s 
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superiority to creation is the idea—made explicit in Philo’s critique of idols (Decal. 
69)—that the craftsman is superior to his product. 
Father 
The analysis above highlighted the importance of God’s role as Creator and noted 
that Philo employs images drawn from the Jewish Scriptures in order to express God’s 
creative role. Now we will examine an important scriptural image for God, God as 
Father, to see how Philo’s philosophical interpretation of the Jewish Scriptures removes 
this image from the interpersonal context. While the Scriptures do not frequently describe 
God as Father, when it does use paternal language of God it is in the context of an 
interpersonal relationship with God’s children, often identified as Israel. Sometimes 
God’s Fatherhood is implied by his relationship to Israel who is his son (e.g., Exod 
4:22; Deut 1:31; 8:5; 14:1).
63
 For example, God’s Fatherhood in the Song of Moses (Deut 
32:6) is a way to explain God’s personal care for his people. Philo employs this scriptural 
description of God, but he transforms it to align with contemporary philosophical 
conceptions of deity. Philo refers to God as ὁ πατὴρ τῶν ὅλων (Decal. 32; cf. 107, ὁ θεός 
ὁ γεννητὴς τῶν ὅλων; Ebr. 108-110), a term drawn from Middle Platonism. Father is also 
a way for Philo to describe God as Creator. He is the source of existence, and everything 
that exists is his progeny. He is the “Father, Maker of the universe” (Decal. 64; cf. 51, 
105). For Philo, the distinction between God and everything else consists in God’s self-
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existence in contrast to the contingent existence of everything else. God’s Fatherhood is 
not confined to Israel as in the Jewish Scriptures; rather, Philo describes God as Father of 
the world (134). Philo can combine the scriptural anthropomorphic images in a redefined 
way that emphasizes God’s cosmic role. Philo argues that improper worship is that which 
forgets the “the highest and most august, the Begetter, the Ruler of the great World-city, 
the Commander-in-Chief of the invincible host, the Pilot who ever steers all things in 
safety.”64 False worship is not a sin committed exclusively by Israel who forgets God’s 
special paternal care for his children; false worship is also a sin committed by all humans 
who fail to recognize God’s cosmic paternity as the Father of everything. 
King 
One of the representations of God in the scriptural description of the giving of the 
Law is that of a King. God is the King to whom Israel has obligations of loyalty and 
service. Philo actually makes the reference to God as King more explicit whereas it is 
often underlying in the Jewish Scriptures. But while Philo maintains the imagery, he also 
transforms it, so that God’s role of King has more to do with his sovereignty as Creator 
than his interpersonal relationship with Israel. Perhaps the clearest example of this occurs 
in Philo’s summary of the First Commandment. The LXX frames the Decalogue in terms 
of God’s political deliverance of an enslaved people from an oppressor: “I am the Lord 
you God, who brought you out of the land of Egypt, out of the house of slavery. You 
shall not have other gods besides me” (Exod 20:1-2 NETS). Philo acknowledges that the 
LXX represents God as King, and he maintains this imagery, but he reframes the 
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imagery, so that God’s kingship is his sovereign control of the world: “the monarchy, by 
which the world is ruled” (Decal. 52; cf. 155).65  
Philo also transforms the promises associated with keeping the law. Covenant 
loyalty, understood by the LXX as faithfulness to the Great King, entailed benefits for a 
particular people:  
You yourselves have seen what I have done to the Egyptians, and I took you up as 
though on eagles’ wings, and I brought you to myself. And now if by paying 
attention you listen to my voice and keep my covenant, you shall be for me a 
people special above all nations. For all the earth is mine. (Exod 19:4-5 NETS) 
 
Philo explains the blessings with some redefinition that universalizes the concept of 
Kingship:   
 
  But it befits the Great King that the general safety of the universe should be 
 ascribed to Him, that He should be the guardian of peace and supply richly and  
 abundantly the good things of peace, all of them to all persons in every place and  
 at every time.”66  
 
God’s Kingship is understood to be his sovereign rule of everything, not his alliance with 
a particular people. Philo preserves the image of God as King, but this language too is 
transformed so as to be grounded in God’s sovereign rule as Creator and for the benefit of 
all people.
67
 
True Existence 
While Wisdom began its polemic against nature worship by asserting that God is 
ὁ ὤν (Wis 13:1), Philo begins his polemic against idols (Decal. 59) and concludes the 
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section (Decal. 81) by asserting that God is ὁ ὂντως ὤν.68 Sandmel comments on Philo’s 
vocabulary for God, “Philo’s usual term for God as the transcendent, unknowable deity, 
is the Platonic term To On, ‘that which exists’; at times he uses another Platonic phrase, 
To ōntōs On, ‘that which existingly (that is, ‘truly’) exists.’”69 Like Wisdom, Philo 
employs this Middle Platonic term for God, but he does not do so without qualification. 
Philo believes that the unknowable Being of Platonism is the personal God who is 
revealed in the Law. An important implication of God’s identity as ὁ ὂντως ὤν is that 
God has the ability to create life with a soul. The critical distinction between humans and 
the idols they worship is their origin. God created humans, and humans have a soul, but 
humans do not have existence in themselves as God does, so they are unable to create life 
with a soul (76).  
Understandings of False Worship 
Corresponding to Philo’s redefinition of God, he redefines what it means to worship 
improperly. Because he has redefined the anthropomorphic language associated with the 
representation of God in the LXX (esp. King and Husband), definitions of false worship 
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dependent on these representations must also be adjusted (esp. disloyalty and adultery). 
Philo still has a great concern to prohibit idolatrous activity, but he redefines the language 
of what is idolatrous. One thing that stands out in Philo’s denunciation of false worship in 
De decalogo is that he does not repeat all scriptural definitions of idolatry. For example, 
denunciations of idolatry in the Jewish Scriptures often are made along the lines of 
forsaking ancestral customs, but this concept of false worship is absent in De decalogo.
70
 
We can speculate that the absence of this definition of idolatry corresponds to Philo’s 
insistence that the law of nature is the law of Moses, so that the proper practice of this 
law is accessible to non-Jews and not bound by the ancestral customs of a particular 
people or group. The following categorizations are Philo’s primary descriptions of what it 
means to worship falsely.  
Honoring the Creature Rather Than the Creator 
Although Philo can distinguish among the different manifestations of false 
worship (worship of nature, cult images, and animals), his critique of all of them is that 
they make a category mistake in what they worship. They all honor as God things that are 
not God, and worship things unworthy of worship. Philo believes these categories of 
being to be obvious because everyone should recognize that the craftsman is greater and 
more worthy of honor than the thing he produces (Decal. 69). The product is passively 
acted upon; whereas, the craftsman is the active cause. Sandelin comments,  
Philo’s understanding of idolatry as deification of created things, i.e. things which 
do not form ultimate causes, illuminates his interpretation of the commandment 
forbidding images (Ex. 20, 4. 23). The second commandment, says Philo, forbids 
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us to ‘to make gods of things which are not the cause of existence (τὰ μὴ ἄιτια)’ 
(Her. 169).
71
  
 
Philo argues that giving undue honor to nature does not really honor nature; it only 
dishonors God (Decal. 61).
72
 Again drawing on the metaphor of God as Father, Philo 
makes a distinction between God and all creation that is God’s progeny; thus, nature is 
viewed as the sibling of humanity, and it is absurd for people to worship their siblings 
(Decal. 64, 70). Philo treats Egyptian theriolatry as something that is obviously absurd. 
Their folly is demonstrated not just in that they worship the class of things not worthy of 
worship (everything created), but they worship even the lowest things of that class.
73
  
Polytheism 
Whereas the Wisdom of Solomon only critiques the particular expressions of false 
worship (e.g., the construction of manmade gods), Philo, similar to the argument 
Josephus will make, briefly critiques the idea of polytheism. After Philo has discussed the 
error of worshipping nature, he summarizes the First Command:  
Let us, then, engrave deep in our hearts this as the first and most sacred of 
commandments to acknowledge and honour one God Who is above all, and let the 
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idea that gods are many never reach the ears of the man whose rule of life is to 
seek for truth in purity and guilelessness.
74
  
 
Not only is it an error to deify that which is created, it is an error to think that multiple 
things can be described as deity because there is only one being in the category of 
Creator.
75
 Philo does not develop this idea any further. He is content to define God as the 
singular Creator, Father, and Cause. The preface to De specialibus legibus offers some 
insight into how Philo regards the relationship between polytheism and the first 
commandment: “On the special laws which fall under the two heads of the Ten 
Commandments, one of which is directed against the acknowledgment of other sovereign 
gods save the One, and the other against giving honours to the works of men’ hands.”76 In 
both De decalogo and De specialibus legibus, Philo argues that the First Commandment 
prohibits polytheism because polytheism, like nature worship, is the deification of the 
created (cf. Migr. 179; Her. 169; Virt. 212).
77
 Philo believes that false worship is not 
original, and he attributes the origins of polytheism to ignorance. Although false worship 
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is not original, humanity has devolved into an ignorance of God that Moses must correct 
(Decal. 8; Spec. 1.14-5; Ebr. 45).
78
 
Worship of Images 
Philo attacks the most prevalent and visible form of aberrant worship when he 
criticizes any worship that involves a physical image.
79
 He interprets the second 
commandment primarily to be a prohibition of worshiping idols. Philo, like the prophetic 
critiques of the Jewish Scriptures, begins with the premise that the gods behind the idols 
do not exist. From his monotheistic viewpoint, it is not possible for idol gods to have any 
real existence; rather, they are phantoms. Even the idols are interpreted by Philo to be 
phantoms because they have no existence beyond their material substance (cf. Spec. 1.26-
7). Because their idol-god does not exist, pagan worship involving images must be 
directed at the physical image itself. Thus, Philo satirizes that even pagans believe that 
their gods are the idols, not that they are represented by the idols.
80
  
Because the idol-gods do not exist and craftsmen know that they do not exist, the 
craftsmen use every deception at their disposal to convince people that the idol-gods are 
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real. Sculptors and painters (Decal. 7-8, 66, 70, esp. Spec. 1.29), craftsmen (Decal. 71), 
and mythmakers (Decal. 55; Post. 165) conspire to deceive the masses into false belief 
about the idol’s reality. Philo believes that both mythmakers and those who craft the 
physical representations are guilty of deception. In De gigantibus, Philo defends Moses 
as one who always speaks truthfully, and to demonstrate Moses’ truthfulness he explains 
Moses’ intolerance for deceitful images: 
…And therefore also he has banished from his own commonwealth 
painting and sculpture, with all their high repute and charm of artistry, 
because their crafts belie the nature of truth and work deception and 
illusions through the eyes to souls that are ready to be seduced..
81
  
In Decal. and Spec., Philo also criticizes poets because, like the artisans, they deceive the 
masses through the senses. 
For Philo, the gods are not real, but the craftsmen and mythmakers intentionally 
deceive the masses. The result is that “they think to be gods the images and paintings 
made by their own craftsmanship” (τὰ δ’ ὑπ’ δημιουργηθέντα πλάσματα καὶ 
ζωγραφήματα θεοὺς ἐνόμισαν, Decal. 70). This representation of pagan worship allows 
Philo to describe the idol-gods repeatedly as “dead” and “manmade.” These satirical 
flurries also permit Philo to pass over more difficult questions, such as the question of the 
seeming superiority of Greco-Roman gods in light of the dominance of Greco-Roman 
culture over Jewish culture or the question of how the Jewish God can have a physical 
location with the Ark of the Covenant and not be identified with it. These selective and 
well-crafted satires demonstrate the ridiculousness of the pagan worship as Philo has 
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represented it. Because he believes that the gods can be equated with their idols, Philo 
criticizes the gods primarily with descriptions of them as manmade and lifeless. 
Having made the assertion that idols are equivalent to pagan gods, Philo explains 
how the gods are manmade. The designation of pagan gods as “manmade” is so 
engrained in Philo’s thought that it has almost become title for them. The logic runs: 
pagans gods are only their material image; their material images are made by humans; 
therefore, pagan gods are manmade. Philo’s emphasis on God as “Uncreated and Eternal” 
(Decal. 60; cf. 67) might be an effort to contrast the created and dependent idols. 
Following his argument that idols are manmade, Philo can describe them as lifeless. 
Supporting the description of idols as lifeless are both a logical argument and the 
observation that they do not act as living beings. The implied logical argument runs: 
pagan gods are manmade; humans do not have the ability to create life; therefore, the 
pagan gods are lifeless. Philo offers a very pointed critique of idols in which he compares 
the nature of idol-gods to the nature of the true God. Philo’s first description of idols is 
that they are “idols of stone and wood and suchlike images, all of them lifeless things.”82 
He then proceeds to define God in terms of True Existence. In doing so, Philo makes a 
contrast between the Truly Existent One and those images that are without life. Philo’s 
most satirical argument is a reductio ad absurdum based on the equivalence of the god 
and the statue. Philo thinks that the goal of religion is to become like one’s god. This 
goal, however, is not desirable if one’s god is lifeless and inactive. Philo mocks,  
Pray you therefore that you may be made like your images and thus enjoy 
supreme happiness with eyes that see not, ears that hear not, nostrils which neither 
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breathe nor smell, mouths that never taste nor speak, hands that neither give nor 
take nor do anything at all, feet that walk not, and no activity in any parts of your 
bodies.
83
  
 
Philo expects no objection to his argument. If the idols are the gods and are made by 
humans, then they have no life because humans are incapable of creating life. Philo 
concludes his polemic against images with an exhortation, “Let no one, then, who has a 
soul worship a soulless thing, for it is utterly preposterous that the works of human nature 
should turn aside to do service to what human hands have wrought.”84  
Error 
Philo is quite in line with the Jewish Scriptures when he defines false worship in 
terms of worshipping things that are created and worshipping images of gods. Philo, 
however, expands what constitutes false worship from being primarily an external act to 
being an improper understanding. For example, Exodus 20 describes the first two 
commands in terms of exclusivity of devotion (οὐκ ἔσονταί; Exod 20:3) and external acts 
of worship (οὐ ποιήσεις σεαυτῷ εἴδωλον; Exod 20:4). The Scriptures, in this example, 
are not primarily concerned with improper thoughts about God. Sandelin comments on 
Philo’s approach, “The basic reason for creating images of gods is a blindness of the 
intellect (διάνοια). The ‘man of no discernment’ believes material things to be the causes 
of all things instead of the Existent (τὸ ὄν) whom he is unable to see.”85 For Philo, 
idolatry is not exclusively an outward act of worship; rather, it can be understood as an 
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inward misdirection of the soul. False worship is not exclusively false action because 
thinking falsely about God is also false worship. False worship as incorrect thought falls 
into two primary categories: ignorance and delusion. 
Ignorance 
In Decal. 7-9, Philo hints at an argument that he makes more clearly in other 
treatises: idolaters are ignorant of the Source of Existence. The chain of events leading to 
idolatry begins in the prideful heart that despises proper reverence for divine things; this 
results in ignorance of the divine and the invention of idol-gods. Idolaters are ignorant of 
God, and “Such persons are happily compared in the sacred Scriptures to the children of a 
harlot; for as they in their ignorance of their one natural father ascribe their paternity to 
all their mother’s lovers…”86 Philo mocks the idolaters as not perceiving things that even 
infants perceive. Even infants recognize that the craftsman is greater than his craft. 
Idolaters, however, deify those things that are twice removed from deity. They are the 
creations of created humans (69-70). The irony is that the human craftsmen who are 
created directly by God grow old, become impoverished, and die, while their creations 
gain greater honor and adornment (71). Moreover, the folly of idolatry is demonstrated in 
that an ensouled person worships a soulless thing (76). 
Delusion 
Nature worship can be described as a delusion or wandering from the truth 
(Decal. 52, 66). David Runia argues that the verb πλανάω, which the LXX uses to 
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translate נַָדח, may show the influence of Middle Platonism on the text of the LXX.87 
Regardless of the intent of the LXX, Philo is happy to adopt this terminology in order to 
make a Middle Platonic critique of Stoic materialism that failed to distinguish nature 
from the transcendent God. “When he says at De Decalogo 52 that ‘no small delusion has 
taken hold of the majority of humankind in deifying the elements’, the word planos 
naturally recalls the ‘going astray’ in the biblical text.”88 The link to a Middle Platonic 
interpretation is made more evident in Spec. 1.13-20 in which Deut 4:19 is explicitly 
quoted (Spec. 1.15). Runia notes that Philo does not avoid the description “gods”; people 
go astray when they think that these sense-perceptible celestial bodies alone are gods 
(Spec. 16). “What we must do is ‘give honour to the One who is not only God of gods 
both intelligible and sense-perceptible, but also Creator of all things’ (20).”89 
Internalization of Idolatry 
While Philo does want to promote the community practice of the Law in 
Alexandria, he also moves the Law from the context of a nation practicing the Law to the 
Law being directed at an individual soul. He notes that the Decalogue is directed to 
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individuals whose obedience is equal in worth to the obedience of an entire nation (36-
38). It is consistent with the Jewish Scriptures to argue that the Law is a means of life, but 
his explanation of the function of the Law is also made in terms of the individual’s soul: 
“Both [tablets of the Law] are excellent and profitable for life; both open out broad 
highroads leading at the end to a single goal, roads along which a soul which ever desires 
the best can travel without stumbling.”90 For the individual who wants to pursue truth and 
piety, the Law provides instruction for that individual’s soul.91 Philo’s internalization of 
the Law—made in part by noticing the anomaly of a singular “you” in the Decalogue—
has the implication of making the benefits and consequences of obedience to be realized 
in the soul of an individual; moreover, the specific sins also can be interpreted as internal 
sins against the soul.
92
 Sandelin comments on the result of internalizing idolatry, “Philo 
does not only speak of deifying things outside man. He also mentions deifying things 
connected with man himself, i.e. his senses, his mind and his body (Leg. 1.344, Ebr. 95).” 
The passions themselves become idolatrous.
93
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Corresponding to his internalization of the Law, Philo also internalizes the sin of 
idolatry.
94
 Philo’s argument throughout the Exposition of the Law is that the piety 
prescribed in the Mosaic Law can be arrived at even by non-Jews by examining nature 
and philosophy. This consistent assertion implies that gentiles are inexcusable for their 
false worship even though they did not receive the explicit prohibition of idolatry in the 
Mosaic Law. The question then might be “From where does idolatry come, and what 
causes its origin if it is not from the beginning and not from God?” Philo’s response is 
consistent with the internalization of idolatry through the Exposition: idolatry originates 
in the prideful hearts of humans. Philo begins De decalogo by answering the question of 
why Moses would choose to legislate away from the cities. His answer is fourfold: pride 
is rampant in cities, purification is necessary before receiving the laws, rules for civic life 
are necessary before civic life, and God’s miraculous provisions in the wilderness 
demonstrate that the laws are also a miraculous provision (Decal. 2-20). Under the topic 
of pride, Philo explains that pride gives rise to idolatry. The prideful heart does not give 
proper reverence to things superior to the human being with the result that “Pride also 
brings divine things into utter contempt, even though they are supposed to receive the 
highest honors.”95 The proud human has no concern for truth and he degenerates into the 
error of idolatry. There is a subtle difference here between the very similar critiques of 
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idolatry by Philo and the Book of Wisdom. While Wisdom offers an euhemeristic 
explanation of idolatry by which humans slowly descend into foolish misconception, 
Philo places the origin of idolatry in the prideful heart. Wisdom makes the argument on 
the larger scale of a people-group (especially Greeks and Egyptians) foolishly wandering 
into idolatry to the point where it is an accepted part of their culture. At least in Decal. 6-
9, Philo seems to locate the origins of idolatry in an individual’s prideful heart. Yehoshua 
Amir comments that Philo’s critique of pagan pride and ostentation in worship also 
brings him in line with other critiques of pagan religiosity, especially by Cynics.
96
 
As the origins of idolatry are in an individual’s prideful heart, so the effects of 
idolatry are in the harming of an individual’s soul. Philo describes how people have filled 
the world with contrived images for worship. The effect of idolatry is NOT primarily an 
affront against God; rather, it harms the idolater’s soul:  
These idolaters cut away the most excellent support of the soul, the rightful 
conception of the Ever-living God. Like boats without ballast they are forever 
tossed and carried about hither and thither, never able to come to harbor or to rest 
securely in the roadstead of truth, blind to the one thing worthy of contemplation, 
which alone demands keen-sighted vision.
97
  
 
By failing to look with the eye of the soul, these people have an incorrect understanding 
of who God is (68). The result is that they live a miserable life. 
Corresponding to the internalization of idolatry is the internalization of piety. 
Because God is sufficient in himself, it is improper to say that worship of God is for 
God’s benefit. Rather, proper worship has as its goal the benefit of humanity:  
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He [Moses] gave no place in His sacred code of laws to all such setting up of 
other gods, and called upon men to honor Him that truly is, not because He 
needed that honour should be paid to Him, for He that is all-sufficient to Himself 
needs nothing else, but because He wishes to lead the human race, wandering in 
pathless wilds, to the road from which none can stray, so that following nature 
they might win the best of goals, knowledge of him that truly is, Who is the 
primal and most perfect good, from Whom as from a fountain is showered the 
water of each particular good upon the world and them that dwell therein.
98
  
 
Several important points emerge in Philo’s understanding of worship. (1) God is 
sufficient (2) therefore, worship is not for him. (3) God teaches humans piety for their 
own good by means of (4) nature and (5) revelation. This argument fits into Philo’s larger 
argument in the Exposition that intends to show the plausibility and value of the Jewish 
religion to a broader Greco-Roman audience. Humans can observe the evidences of God 
in nature and in the Jewish Law, and these are established by God for the good of 
humans. 
The internalization of piety and idolatry does not mean that Philo denies the 
validity of Jewish religious activity. In fact, Philo views his internalization of piety as 
offering a surer defense of Jewish practice (cf. Decal. 97-8 concerning the Sabbath and 
the manner in which allegorical interpretation coexists with the literal). And outward 
religious apostasy is still to be punished with death (e.g., Spec. 1.54-5; 1.315-6). One of 
the consequences of internalizing idolatry is that it makes idolatry a sin for which Jews, 
including Philo, must examine their hearts.  
Conclusions 
Philo begins with an understanding of God that is dependent on his Jewish tradition as 
interpreted through Greco-Roman philosophy. Most importantly for Philo’s conception of 
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 Philo, Decal. 81 (Colson, PLCL); cf. Philo, Decal. 41. 
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God are the ideas that God is One, True-Existence, and unlike humans. Philo consistently 
reinterprets anthropomorphic language concerning God. He does retain the imagery of 
God as Father and King from the Jewish Scriptures, but he redefines both of these roles 
to refer to God’s sovereign rule and creative ability, not God’s unique relationship with a 
particular people. Corresponding to this reinterpretation of God, Philo comes to new 
conclusions concerning what is false worship. He removes idolatry, as well as piety, from 
an interpersonal relationship and describes it as error that harms a person’s soul. 
In the broader Exposition’s presentation of idolatry, Abraham serves as the 
paradigm for pagan enlightenment and Phinehas serves as the paradigm for Jewish 
religious zeal. The narrative of Abraham assures Philo that proper philosophical 
contemplation can lead a righteous soul from misguided astral worship to true piety.
99
 
Abraham demonstrates that the broader Greco-Roman audience to which the Exposition 
is directed should through proper philosophical reflection discern the correctness of the 
Jewish religion. Phinehas demonstrates that even though pagan idol-gods are non-
existent, Jews must still vigorously, and at times violently, defend their ancestral customs 
when other Jews violate them.
100
 In De decalogo, Philo ridicules the foolish practices of 
false worship among non-Jews, but he does not prescribe any action that should be taken 
against them. Their punishment is to lead miserable lives and await the judgment of God.  
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 Philo, Praem. 27, 58; Somn. 1.160-61; Virt. 212-3; Sandelin, “The Danger of Idolatry,” 110-11. 
100
 See Spec. 1.56; 1.316; Sandelin, “The Danger of Idolatry,” 112, 122-3. 
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CHAPTER 5 
JOSEPHUS’ POLEMIC AGAINST FALSE RELIGION 
Introduction 
The works of Flavius Josephus are well-recognized as vital sources of information 
concerning the interactions of Jews with their Greek and Roman neighbors. His own life, 
detailed in his somewhat self-serving autobiography, describes how he navigated the 
challenges of living as a “faithful Jew” under Roman rule.1 After the Jewish Revolt (66-
70 C.E.), an event in which he played a role on both sides, he moved to Rome and began 
writing under the patronage of the Flavian emperors. His writings evidence cultural 
awareness, political experience, learnedness, and a steadfast commitment to the Jewish 
people. Josephus produced two major historical records, Bellum judaicum and 
Antiquitates judaicae, and two shorter works, Vita and Contra Apionem. Josephus was a 
voluminous writer, and Contra Apionem stands as the last and shortest of his works. 
While all of his works show an underlying Jewish apologetic, apology is the primary 
intent in Contra Apionem, and it is an important source for understanding how Jews 
could reject Greco-Roman religion and still view themselves as good citizens under 
Roman rule.  
                                                          
1
 Josephus’ own life is a picture of the complexity of defining what it means to be a “faithful Jew.” 
While Josephus’ attempts to portray himself as both faithful to the Jewish ancestral religion and a patriot, 
many other Jews would consider him to be unfaithful both religiously and politically. See Steve Mason, 
Life of Josephus: Translation and Commentary (Vol. 9 of Flavius Josephus: Translation and Commentary; 
ed. Steve Mason; Leiden: Brill, 2001). 
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Josephus wrote over the course of several years, and it is somewhat difficult to 
date Contra Apionem precisely, but a date shortly after 94 C.E. is most likely.
2
 Although 
Josephus uses sources drawn from different types of writing, he integrates them into a 
generally coherent argument. Various proposals have been given as to the genre of the 
treatise, and it is probably best to assess the genre to be that of apologia.
3
 Barclay 
provides a helpful definition of this genre: “It seems best to define ‘apologetic’ as defense 
that is a) directly formulated against explicit accusations (legal charges and non-legal 
slurs), and b) directed toward observers (rather than ‘insiders’), at least at the level of 
rhetoric (the actual or intended audience is another matter).”4 While Barclay’s definition 
of apologia is helpful, it should also be noted that Josephus’ apologia makes both 
negative (refutation of slanders) and a positive (extolling the excellences of the slandered 
position) arguments. In C. Ap. 2.145-286, Josephus sets aside the refutation of specific 
slanders and attempts to offer a positive presentation of the Law that will persuade the 
reader concerning the benefits of the Jewish practice of the Law. He states his purpose in 
this section: 
For I did not choose to write an encomium of ourselves, but I consider this to be 
the most just form of defense against the many false accusations against us—a 
defense from the laws, in accordance with which we continue to live.
5
 
 
                                                          
2
 See John M. G. Barclay, Against Apion: Translation and Commentary (Vol. 10 of Flavius 
Josephus: Translation and Commentary; ed. Steve Mason; Leiden: Brill, 2007), XXVI-XXVIII.  
3
 Christine Gerber, Ein Bild des Judentums für Nichtjuden von Flavius Josephus: Untersuchungen 
zu seiner Schrift Contra Apionem (AGJU 40; Leiden, Brill, 1997), 78-88; Barclay, Apion, XXX-XXXVI.  
4
 Barclay, Apion, XXXV.  
5
 Josephus, C. Ap. 2.147 (Barclay, Apion, 250-251). 
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Despite the encomiastic nature of 2.145-286, Josephus puts this material to an apologetic 
use. He notes the deviation from the general thrust of the work, and he explains how it 
fits into the overall structure of the work. 
Having established the genre, it is still necessary to determine the purpose and 
intended audience of this work. The implied audience of an apologia (at the level of the 
rhetoric) is someone or some group that is outside the exchange of accusations and 
defenses. The implied audience is an observer whom the author wants to persuade to take 
the author’s side over against his critics. Thus, Josephus claims to direct his work toward 
Gentiles, not Jews, because Jews should not need to be persuaded to accept Josephus’ 
positions.
6
 The implied Gentile audience is more specifically a Roman audience. 
Josephus generally criticizes Greeks and Egyptians harshly, but he remains silent 
                                                          
6
 Contra Martin Goodman (“Josephus’ Treatise Against Apion” in Apologetics in the Roman 
Empire: Pagans, Jews, and Christians [ed. Mark Edwards, Martin Goodman, and Simon Price; Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1999], 50-51) who accepts that the declared audience is identical with the 
intended audience, so that Contra Apionem is both written for and received by a Gentile audience. Gerber 
(Ein Bild des Judentums, 90-91) argues that the intended audience was Greeks and Romans but 
acknowledges that it was likely received mostly by Jews: “It is obvious that the intended readers of 
Josephus are primarily non-Jews—Greeks and Romans—with the respect for Greek thought and Roman 
power. But, as is claimed, are Jews also envisioned as addressees? It is clear that Josephus does not apply 
directly to Jewish readers. Although apologies, in fact, were reliably handed down by the adherents of the 
apologists, but not by the targeted opponents, and it is easy to imagine that Jews read Apion to gain self-
assurance in their Judaism and to find arguments against the hostile environment” (“So ist offensichtlich, 
daß die intendierten Leser des Josephus zuallererst Nichtjuden sind, Griechen oder Römer, mit Achtung 
vor griechischer Denktradition und römischer Macht. Sind aber, wie behauptet, auch Juden und Juedinnen 
als Adressaten anvisiert? Es ist deutlich ist, dass sich Josephus nicht direkt an juedische Leser wendet. 
Zwar wurden Apologien de facto sicher von den Anhaengern der Verteidigten ueberliefert, nicht aber von 
den angesprochenen Gegnern, und es ist gut vorstellbar, daß Juden und Jüdinnen Ap lesen, um 
Selbstvergewisserung in ihrem Judentum zu gewinnen und Argumentationshilfe gegenueber einer feindlich 
eingestellen Umwelt zu finden.”). It is, however, unlikely that Greeks were the intended audience because 
they are criticized sharply.  
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concerning the Romans.
7
 Josephus also assumes that his audience is sympathetic to the 
Jewish cause, well-educated, and familiar with his previous works.  
Although the implied audience (the group to whom the work is directed at the 
level of rhetoric, not necessarily the actual audience) of Contra Apionem consists of 
educated upper-class Romans, this group is probably not the intended audience (the 
group to whom Josephus actually writes). Greeks and Egyptians, bearing the brunt of 
Josephus’ criticisms, could not be expected to receive this treatise favorably. They would 
likely be frustrated by the disingenuous representation of their beliefs and practices. 
Moreover, Josephus’ critiques of Greek gods are easily applied to the Roman gods, so it 
is also unlikely that Josephus’ work would be viewed favorably by a popular Roman 
audience. Eric Gruen also questions the probability of an educated upper-class Roman 
audience being the actual recipients (even if they are the implied audience): “How many 
Romans would take an interest in Josephus’ sniping at obscure Greek and Egyptian 
writers, quarreling about Jewish antiquity, and claiming the superiority of Judaism over 
Hellenic institutions?”8 While upper-class Romans may not have taken great interest in 
Josephus’ subject matter, they also would not have taken great offense at his criticisms 
either of Greek and Egyptian writers or popular Greek (and by implication, popular 
Roman) religion. Thus, that upper-class Romans are the implied audience makes the most 
                                                          
7
 Barclay, Apion, 362-9; see also, XVL-LI. Although Josephus does not criticize Roman belief or 
practice explicitly, I will show below that most of his criticisms of Greek religion are easily applicable to 
Roman religion. Thus, his explicit deference to the Romans veils his underlying attack on all of Greco-
Roman religion.  
8
 Eric S. Gruen, “Greek and Jews: Mutual Misperceptions in Josephus’ Contra Apionem” in 
Ancient Judaism in its Hellenistic Context (ed. Carol Bakhos; Boston: Brill, 2005), 49. 
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sense of the rhetoric. The audience for whom Josephus writes (intended audience) and the 
audience most likely to have read his work (actual audience) doubtlessly would have 
been an educated, upper-class Jewish audience (one that spoke Greek and was conversant 
in philosophy), and it is most likely that Josephus intends his work to be read by this 
educated, upper-class Jewish audience. 
If we are correct in distinguishing the implied audience (upper-class Romans) 
from the intended audience (upper-class Jews), we still must examine the purpose of this 
apologetic work. The assessment of the audience is interconnected with the assessment of 
the purpose. Coinciding with the different proposals of the audience, there are several 
proposals for the primary purpose of Contra Apionem: to defend Judaism from criticisms 
in the larger Greco-Roman environment and reestablish relations with Rome,
9
 gain 
proselytes or converts,
10
 defend Judaism and impress the audience,
11
 or a combination of 
purposes.
12
 I am unconvinced that Contra Apionem’s intended audience is Roman, so I 
                                                          
9
 Goodman, “Josephus’ Treatise,” 55-8; Per Bilde, “Contra Apionem 1.28-56: Josephus’ View of 
His Own Work in the Context of the Jewish Canon” in Josephus’ Contra Apionem: Studies in its Character 
and Context with a Latin Concordance to the Portion Missing in Greek (ed. Louis H. Feldman and John R. 
Levison; Leiden: Brill, 1996), 94-114. 
10
 Per Bilde, Flavius Josephus between Jerusalem and Rome: His Life, his Works, and their 
Importance (JSPSup 2; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1988), 117-8, 120-21; Steve Mason, “The 
Contra Apionem in Social and Literary Context: An Invitation to Judean Philosophy” in Josephus’ Contra 
Apionem, 187-288, esp. 188, 208, 222. Mason summarizes his view of Contra Apionem as a form of logos 
protreptikos: “Josephus’ Contra Apionem, [was] written for gentiles in Rome at the end of the first century. 
This document, I shall argue, is best understood as an invitation to already interested gentile readers to 
embrace Judean philosophy” (188); cf. Mason, Josephus and the New Testament (2d ed.; Peabody, Mass.: 
Hendrickson, 2003), 136-8. 
11
 John M. G. Barclay, “Josephus v. Apion: Analysis of an Argument” in Understanding 
Josephus: Seven Perspectives (ed. Steve Mason, JSPSup 32; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1998), 
194-200. 
12
 Aryeh Kasher, “Polemic and Apologetic Methods of Writing in Contra Apionem” in Jospehus’ 
Contra Apionem, 143-86, esp. 185. 
194 
 
find it unlikely that it intends to reestablish relations with Rome or gain proselytes. 
Christine Gerber proposes a more general purpose of Contra Apionem: “to convince [the 
audience] of the falsity of the slander by the goodness, as well as the superiority of 
Judaism.”13 While the implied audience consists of upper-class Romans, apologetic 
works often find their greatest readership (the actual audience) within the author’s own 
tradition. Even though an apologia is formally directed outward (the implied audience), 
Collins explains the psychological benefit of an apology for those inside the tradition: 
“Even if the apologetic had little impact on outsiders, it still reduced the dissonance for 
the Jews since it showed how their tradition could be made compatible with the 
surrounding culture.”14 As it was read by Jews, this thorough defense could have 
encouraged Jews about the respectability (indeed superiority) of their beliefs and ways of 
life; moreover, it might have been intended as a model of how to defend Judaism against 
Gentile criticisms.
15
 
The Structure and the Argument 
The outline of Josephus’ argument is important for interpreting his discussion of Greek 
religion because it occurs, not in the refutation of specific slanders, but in the context of 
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 Gerber, Ein Bild, 93: “…zu überzeugen von der Falschheit der Verleumdungen wie der Güte, ja 
Überlegenheit des Judentums.” 
14
 Collins, From Athens to Jerusalem, 16; cf. Kasher (“Polemic and Apologetic Methods,” 144) 
who summarizes the function of polemical works, “Polemics are intended, on the one hand, to strengthen 
those who hold similar opinions—i.e. to reinforce the convinced while convincing the sympathetic, the 
dubious and hesitant. On the other hand, they are also intended to change the opinions of the distant and 
opposed (or at least to cast doubt in their minds), and to arouse interest among the indifferent and the 
uninvolved, with a view to eventually convincing them as well.” 
15
 Cf. Kasher, “Polemic and Apologetic Methods,” 155-6. 
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an apologetic explanation of the Law. Barclay provides the following structure of the 
two-volume work: 
1.1-5: Introduction 
1.6-218: Part One: The Antiquity of the Judeans 
1.219-2:286 Part Two: Refutation of Slanders 
1.219-26: Introduction 
1.227-87: Manetho 
1.288-303: Chaeremon 
1.304-20: Lysimachus 
2.1-144: Apion 
2.145-286: Apollonius Molon and others 
2.287-96: Conclusion
16
 
 
The section that is most significant for presenting Josephus’ rebuke of aberrant forms of 
worship is the refutation of Apollonius Molon and others (2.145-286). The tone of this 
section can be distinguished from preceding sections because here Josephus focuses more 
on offering a positive portrayal of Judaism than refutation of criticisms, and at some 
points this section becomes an encomium of the Law and Moses. The structure of this 
section is more difficult to delineate than previous sections that proceeded more 
systematically. Barclay provides a more detailed outline: 
2.145-286: Apollonius Molon and others 
2.145-150: Introduction 
2.151-89 Moses and the structure of the constitution 
2.190-218: Summary of key laws 
2.219-35 Judean endurance for the law 
2.236-86: Judean religious difference and its rationale
17
  
                                                          
16
 Barclay, Apion, XXI. Barclay provides more detailed outlines for each of the sections, and I 
have only reproduced the most relevant subject headings. See the slightly different and more detailed 
outline in John R. Levison and J. Ross Wagner, “The Character and Context of Josephus’ Contra 
Apionem,” in Josephus’ Contra Apionem, 2-5. Bilde, Flavius Josephus, 118, offers a simple structure that 
accounts for both the different tone beginning in 2.145 and Bilde’s argument that C. Ap. has a missionary 
intent: (1) 1.1-5: Introduction (2) 1.6-2.144: Polemics and Apologetics (3) 2.145-286: Agitation or 
Missionary Activity (4) 2.287-296: Conclusion. While the simplicity and clarity of this outline is attractive, 
the sections are much more lopsided than Barclay’s, and I am unconvinced by the missionary intent. For a 
structure similar to Barclay’s with variations on some section delineations, see Gerber, Ein Bild, 67-71. 
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The subsection in which Josephus criticizes pagan religion (2.236-54) occurs in the 
explanation of Jewish religious difference (2.236-286). 
Before turning to the specific arguments made in C. Ap. 2.236-54, we will 
examine the structure of Josephus’ argument in C. Ap. 2.236-86. While Josephus does not 
explicitly state his main point at the beginning of C. Ap. 2.236-86, he primarily defends 
the Jews against the accusation that they are intolerant and anti-social: not only do Jews 
prohibit non-Jews from Jewish worship, they also refuse to worship non-Jewish gods. At 
C. Ap. 2.236, Josephus transitions to a new point. While C. Ap. 2.145-235 focused on the 
excellences of the Jewish Law and rarely named critics, C. Ap. 2.236 begins with the 
theme of accusations by people like Lysimachus and Apollonius Molon. Apollonius 
Molon, as the primary example of one who accuses Jews of being anti-social, will recur 
in this section (2.255, 258, 262, 270). Apollonius Molon and Lysimachus both criticized 
the Jews for being anti-social and even misanthropic (1.309; 2.148), and this shared 
criticism seems to be the reason that Apollonius and Lysimachus are mentioned together 
at the beginning of 2.236-86. The central criticism for which Josephus offers an apology 
in this section is stated in 2.258: “Without taking any of this into account, Molon 
Apollonius accused us of not admitting those who are in the grip of their own opinions 
about God, and of not wishing to share fellowship with those who choose to live 
according to a different way of life.”18 Josephus introduces this accusation (2.236-8) and 
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 See Barclay, Apion, XXI. 
18
 Josephus, C. Ap. 2.258 (Barclay, Apion, 315-16). While Josephus defends the Jewish practice of 
not admitting foreign worship into Jewish practice, this defense is probably a redefinition of the real issue. 
The offense by the Jews had much less to do with their refusal to admit foreign worship into their own and 
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then makes his defense against this accusation in three steps. First, he demonstrates the 
foolishness of Greco-Roman conceptions of deity (2.239-254). If the Greco-Roman 
understandings about deity are so mistaken, why would Jews even think to admit these 
conceptions into their worship? The criticism is restated in C. Ap. 2.255-58. Second, 
Josephus explains that other noteworthy nations similarly prohibit foreign religious ideas 
and people into their polity: Lacedaemonians (2.259-61), Athenians (2.262-8), Scythians 
(2.269), and Persians (2.270). Third, Josephus affirms Jewish loyalty to their Law as a 
noble virtue and the only sensible course of action (2.271-84). The Jewish Law is so 
excellent that other nations emulate it. Why then should Jews emulate foreign customs 
when foreigners acknowledge the excellence of Jewish Law and practice? 
Thus, the polemic against false religion (2.236-54) must be understood as a 
function of three greater arguments: the treatise as a whole, C. Ap. 2.145-286, and C. Ap. 
2.236-86. In C. Ap. 2.236-86, the polemic against false religion justifies the Jews’ 
tenacious guarding of their religious customs by showing the absurdity of other religious 
beliefs. This section (2.236-86) fits into C. Ap. 2.145-86 by demonstrating the virtue of 
the Jews in their practice of the Law: the Law so exceeds other legal constitutions 
(especially in its conception of God) that it would be foolish for the Jews to abandon it. In 
                                                                                                                                                                             
much more to do with their refusal to recognize pagan deities. The refusal to recognize pagan deities gives 
rise to the accusations that Jews are atheists (because they deny the existence of gods), insurrectionists 
(because they refuse to worship patron deities and thereby upset social order), and anti-social (because they 
do not participate in civil activities associated with religious rites and segregate themselves by sectarian 
worship). Barclay explains Josephus’ redefinition: “Few could complain Judeans kept their own religious 
traditions, but it could cause deep offense if they disparaged others’ customs. Refusal to participate in the 
religious rites that defined social solidarity could cause friction (e.g. in Alexandria; 2.65), raising 
suspicions that they did not support the local city or the larger Roman empire (cf. 2.73). If that is the force 
of the accusation, Josephus turns the issue of Judean non-participation in others’ rites into that of non-
admittance of others into their own. He thus makes a purportedly ‘anti-social’ and ‘irreligious’ policy look 
like quite proper defense of the truth” (Barclay, Apion, 315 n.1041). 
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the argument of Contra Apionem as a whole, the polemic against false religion is one 
defense in refuting the accusation that Jews are intolerant minsanthropes and atheists. 
The way to refute these accusations is to show the excellence of the Jewish Law and the 
virtue of Jews who practice it. 
While the bulk of this analysis will focus on the particular argument Josephus 
makes in C. Ap. 2.236-54, it is profitable first to point out the sequence of some 
arguments that Josephus makes elsewhere in C. Ap. 145-286 concerning pagan gods and 
idolatry. This section (C. Ap. 2.145-286) is devoted to a defense of the Law, which 
Josephus, like Philo, thinks promotes both piety and humanity (2.145-6). While Greeks 
attribute their laws to various gods such as Zeus and Apollo, Moses is led by God to 
provide a faithful conception of God (2.162-3). Josephus intends to prove the correctness 
of Moses’ understanding of God by examining individual laws and demonstrating that the 
wisest of the Greeks have imitated Moses’ conception of God (2.168-71).  Due to the 
overlap with Philo’s exposition of the first commandment in De decalogo, C. Ap. 180-98 
merits a closer examination. Some think it may even be possible that Josephus depends 
on Philo’s descriptions of the Law in De decalogo and De specialibus legibus.19 
Consistent with Middle Platonic conceptions of Deity, Josephus describes God as known 
by his works (2.190-2).
20
 While Josephus does not explicitly deny that God has an image, 
                                                          
19
 Barclay, Apion, 359-61. 
20
 Cf. Plato, Tim. 41-42. Barclay, Apion, 277 n. 756, comments, “Drawing on the Platonic 
tradition, Philo would speak of God’s invisibility and immateriality (e.g., Spec. 1.20); Josephus uses less 
precise terms, but makes it clear that it is both impossible  and improper to represent God visually (cf. 
2.252).” For an alternative reading based on a textual variant, see Jason von Ehrenkrook, Sculpting Idolatry 
in Flavian Rome: (An)Iconic Rhetoric in the Writings of Flavius Josephus (SBLEJL 33; Atlanta: Society of 
Biblical Literature, 2011), 72-8.  
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he interprets the first commandment to be a rejection of making or imagining the image 
of God (2.191).
21
 The LXX can refer to creation as the work of God’s hands, but 
Josephus carefully denies any anthropomorphic representation of God: “These [i.e. all 
creation] God made without hands, without effort, without needing any assistants, but 
when he willed beautiful things, they at once beautifully came to be.”22 God is 
worshipped both in cultic acts and in daily living.  In daily life, Jews worship God by 
practicing virtue (2.192). For cultic worship they have one temple for the one God 
(2.193). Underlying this statement is a subtle critique of pagan polytheism because 
pagans have many gods and even erect multiple temples for the same god. 
C. Ap. 2.236-8 
After describing the greatness of the Jewish Law and the courageous practice of 
the Law by Jews, Josephus claims that these facts have no effect on the Jews’ accusers: 
“The Lysimachuses and Molons, and other writers of that sort—fake sophists, who dupe 
the young—insult us as the most despicable human beings.”23 Josephus does not 
elaborate concerning why Jews are labeled as the vilest or most despicable humans. In 
this introduction, Josephus does not state the specific accusation leveled against the Jews, 
but the immediate and broader context clarifies that the accusation centers on Jewish 
intolerance of pagan religions. As noted above, Apollonius Molon and Lysimachus both 
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 For Josephus’ understanding of idolatry and images, see Ehrenkrook, Sculpting Idolatry. 
22
 Josephus, C. Ap. 2.192 (Barclay, Apion, 305-6). 
23
 Josephus, C. Ap. 2.236 (Barclay, Apion, 315-16). Before Josephus refutes the accusation, he 
inserts a brief ethos-argument against his accusers. The accusation that a philosopher corrupted the youth 
was a common way of describing the subversiveness and destructiveness of their teaching (e.g., Xenophon, 
Mem. 1.1; Isocrates, Antid., 15.96; Cicero, Clu. 63; Plato, Apol. 23d-25d; Crito 15; Josephus, C. Ap., 2.145, 
2.264; ). 
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criticized the Jews for being anti-social and even misanthropic (1.309; 2.148). Josephus 
cites Apollonius Molon especially as a representative of the accusation that Jews do not 
tolerate other religious beliefs or modes of life (2.258). It seems that their “vileness” is 
primarily related to their social practice of preserving Jewish distinctions. Barclay 
explains,  
Josephus keeps the charge at this point extremely general. It is only after an 
extended depiction of valueless opinions about the divine (240-54) that he will 
specify the issue of religious intolerance (2.258). In that context it will seem 
entirely reasonable for Judeans to be inhospitable to others’ opinions about 
‘God.’24   
 
Thus, Josephus builds his apology before he states the specific accusation. The accusation 
will appear absurd in light of Josephus’ preceding explanation. Why would Jews admit 
such foolish ideas about God into their worship? Their intolerance is justified, and in fact 
laudable. The polemic against pagan religion must be understood in the immediate 
apology for Jewish intolerance of pagan religion and the broader apology for the 
superiority of Jewish belief and practice.  
Josephus alleges that the critics of the Jews hurl accusations—that in this context 
are primarily the accusations of Jewish intolerance of pagan religion—at them without 
reason. He states that he would prefer not to discuss the aberrant worship practices in 
which other nations have engaged, but these critics have forced his hand in the matter 
(2.237; cf. 2.150).  Both Jewish practice and Law prevent them from criticizing other 
nation’s gods, and their philanthropy is demonstrated in their peaceable living with 
                                                          
24
 Barclay, Apion, 306 n.955. Barclay uses the term “Judeans” while I will use “Jews.” There is no 
ideal term in English because “Judean” emphasizes their geographical location but downplays religion; 
whereas, “Jew” emphasizes religion but downplays geographical location. 
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others: “It is our traditional custom to observe our own laws and to refrain from criticism 
of those aliens.”25 Moreover, the piety of the Jews generally prevents them from 
criticizing pagan religiosity: “Our legislator has expressly forbidden us to deride or 
blaspheme the gods recognized by others, out of respect for the very word ‘God.’”26 
Josephus seems to be drawing on an existing interpretation of Exodus 22:28 (22:27 
LXX). The LXX translates םיהלא as a plural: θεοὺς οὐ κακολογήσεις (Exod 22:27 LXX, 
You shall not revile the gods). Josephus reads the LXX carefully and interprets this as a 
prohibition of criticizing things reported to be divine out of respect for the concept of 
divinity. Nevertheless Josephus’ opponents have forced him into the situation in which he 
must comment on pagan deities. 
 The effects of this introductory apology are to present the Jews favorably, offer an 
apology for Jewish actions, and turn the tables on his opponents. Josephus intends to 
demonstrate that the Jews are both philanthropic and pious, and these themes shape the 
way he represents Jewish interactions with respect to pagan deities. Jews are typically 
tolerant of other people on account of Jews’ respect for God. Behind the text of Contra 
Apionem is a long history of social unrest due to Jewish insistence on purity of worship. 
In the audience’s not too distant memory are thoughts of the Jewish War with Rome, the 
pogroms in Alexandria, and their rejection of emperor worship. Josephus’ subtle counter 
to this history of unrest is to claim that Jews really desire to live peaceably with their 
neighbors. Mirroring the attitude of the Jews, Josephus intends to present himself as 
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 Ibid., 2.237; cf. Philo, Mos. 2.205; Spec. 1.53.  
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desiring not to criticize. He is not the attacker; rather, his opponents have attacked the 
Jews and forced him to make a defense, a part of which is to demonstrate the faults of his 
accusers.  
C. Ap. 2.239-41 
Throughout Contra Apionem, Josephus has attempted to present himself as a 
philosopher, and thus he can offer a sophisticated philosophical critique of more base 
forms of Greek and Egyptian thought. This approach also allows him to align himself 
with positions that already exist in the broader Greco-Roman world, so he is not forced to 
make entirely new arguments about Greek religion. Josephus’ attempt to align himself 
with philosophers is most obvious in his critique of Greek polytheism. He questions, “For 
who of those among the Greeks admired for their wisdom has not censured the most 
famous poets and the most trusted legislators for originally sowing such opinions about 
the Gods among the masses…?”27 Josephus claims that he is not the first to notice the 
absurdity of pagan worship; the wisest pagans have already criticized these institutions 
and practices.
28
 There is an underlying view that the common people are neither capable 
of nor possibly even culpable for deciding to engage in polytheistic practices. They are 
led by others. In the case of false worship, the blameworthy leaders are the poets and 
legislators.
29
 Notice also that Josephus is critiquing primarily Greek mythology, and he 
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 Josephus, C. Ap. 2.239 (Barclay, Apion, 306); cf. 2.242, 247, 255, 281. 
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 See Barclay, Apion, 307 n. 964. There was a long-standing tradition in Greek culture of 
critiquing myths about the gods. E.g., Plato, Resp. 376-392; Cicero, Nat. d. 1.39-41. 
29
 Cf. C. Ap. 2.153. In De decalogo, Philo heavily criticizes the poets, myth makes, and artists, but 
his critique of the legislators is not as explicit. Instead, when Philo speaks of legislators he typically does so 
in encomiastic terms of Moses. In Decal. 176, Philo does compare Moses to other lawgivers, but the 
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allows Roman mythology to remain relatively unscathed. This deference to the Romans 
is due doubtlessly to his implied audience and his patrons who were both Roman.  
Josephus’ criticism of the Greek gods is on the basis of their plurality, likeness to 
animal behavior, and anthropomorphic nature. Greek religion offers no objective criteria 
for determining the number of gods. The result is that “they represent them to be as 
numerous as they choose.”30 Josephus blames the idea of the plurality of the gods on the 
desires of the poets. This might be a subtle critique of pagan acceptance of foreign gods 
into their worship and Jewish resistance to that trend. The Greco-Roman frustration with 
Jewish worship was not that they worshiped God; rather, Jews—like Christians later—
were considered atheists because they only worshipped one God. Josephus makes his 
critique with the presupposition that anything in the category of God pre-exists humanity. 
The idea of creating one’s gods was a ridiculous concept for a Jew whose view of God is 
rooted in God’s role as the sole Creator.  
Pagans are not even respectful of their gods in the way that they describe them. 
Rather, they make myths about the existence of the gods, and the myths are patterned 
after the behaviors that they observe in the animal world. They describe their gods “like 
the species of animals” (ὣσπερ τῶν ζῴων τὰ γένη [C. Ap. 240]). Then Josephus addresses 
the anthropomorphic nature of the gods, especially Zeus. The ungodlike character of the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
comparison is not meant to demonstrate how the other lawgivers have led the people astray; rather, the 
comparison is to demonstrate the greatness of Moses. The theme that leaders are the ones primarily 
responsible for the idolatry practiced by the masses is a theme that runs throughout Pseudo-Philo’s Liber 
Antiquitatum Biblicarum. On this point, see Frederick T. Murphy, “Retelling the Bible: Idolatry in Pseudo-
Philo,” JBL 107 (1988): 275-87. 
30
 Josephus, C. Ap. 2.240 (Thackeray, LCL). Elsewhere Josephus argues that even philosophical 
Greeks borrowed Moses’ monotheistic understanding of God’s nature (2.168). 
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gods is demonstrated not only in their myths that are patterned after humans but also that 
their myths are patterned after the most reprehensible human behavior. For example, 
Zeus is a tyrant and a terrible Father against whom his own children rebel. 
C. Ap. 2.242-49 
Josephus reiterates that he aligns himself with the critique that pagan philosophers 
already make concerning the Greek gods (2.242) although he does not cite or name any 
of these philosophers at this point.
31
 Josephus again critiques the anthropomorphic 
descriptions of the gods in terms of their appearances (bearded, beardless), occupations 
(blacksmith, weaver, warrior, musician, archer), and interactions (wars and alliances 
among themselves) (2.242-3). The underlying critique is that the myths about pagan gods 
are crafted in the likeness of human activity, and thus they must not be divine. 
Josephus offers a more extended critique of the gods’ sexual immorality. It was 
common for Jews to criticize the sexual immorality of non-Jews, and Josephus alleges 
that these sexually immoral tendencies are mirrored by their gods. The fact that the gods 
are subject to their passions undermines any claims that they might make to being deities. 
Even their wills are subject to the passions, things outside themselves that exercise 
control over them. Moreover, the greatest of the gods, Zeus, has limited control of events, 
and even he is subject to a force greater than himself, Fate (2.245). The pagan deities not 
only have a hierarchy of control among themselves, they also are controlled by forces 
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beyond their control. In contrast, Josephus’ God is not subject to or in competition with 
any other deity, and the Jewish God is the sole director of the course of history.
32
 
Josephus attacks Zeus far more than any of the other gods, and he offers specific 
myths that describe Zeus’ sexually immoral activity (2.245-6). Josephus probably 
criticizes Zeus especially because Jews might have had some attraction to the idea of the 
supreme deity.
33
 It might be that Josephus thinks that most Jews would be unlikely to 
abandon Jewish monotheism for the ridiculous myths of polytheism, but they might be 
tempted to make an equivalence between the Jewish God and the pagan god Zeus. 
Josephus does not offer a systematic rebuttal; rather, he assumes his audience will share a 
basic understanding of what constitutes sexual immorality and that this activity of the 
gods shows their falsity: “what person of good sense would not be provoked by these [i.e. 
descriptions of the gods’ sexual immorality] both to castigate those who concocted these 
stories and to condemn those who accepted them for their utter stupidity?”34 When one 
compares the chastity and self-control (that Josephus claims is) practiced by Jews (2.199-
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 Josephus’ criticism of anthropomorphisms in the pagan deities, like Philo’s criticism, overlooks 
some of the anthropomorphic representations of God in the Jewish Scriptures. 
33
 See Barclay, Jews in the Mediterranean Diaspora, 432-3. The best-known association of Zeus 
with the God of the Jews occurs in the Letter of Aristeas. The Greek description of Jewish worship is as 
follows: “These people [i.e. Jews] worship God the overseer and creator of all, whom all men worship 
including ourselves, O King, except that we have a different name. Their name for him is Zeus and Jove. 
The primitive men, consistently with this, demonstrated that the one by whom all live and are created is the 
master and Lord of all.” (Let. Aris. 16 [Shutt, OTP]; cf. Aristobulus Fragment 4). Collins thinks that even 
though this statement is attributed to a Greek, it still represents the theology of Let. Aris. as a whole. He 
does, however, caution that this is not a complete identification, “Pseudo-Aristeas was not suggesting the 
complete equivalence of Greek and Jewish religion by any means, only that Greeks, too, had a place for the 
worship of a supreme god” (Collins, From Athens, 192). While The Letter of Aristeas does not necessarily 
demonstrate a desire on the part of the Jews to worship the non-Jewish god, Zeus, it does show a method of 
seeking common ground by identifying at least in part Zeus with God. 
34
 Josephus, C. Ap. 2.247 (Barclay, Apion, 310). Here Josephus condemns the commoners along 
with the leaders. 
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203) to the actions of the pagan gods, it is an unavoidable conclusion that even common 
Jews practice a greater degree of morality and self-control than pagan deities.
35
 What’s 
more is that even goddesses—in a culture that placed more sexual restrictions on 
women—were guilty of sexually immoral and impassioned behavior. 
Josephus, then, offers a few final criticisms in no particular order. He comments 
that they deified passions, and even more than this, they have deified the worst passions. 
They have also institutionalized these ridiculous myths by making sacrifices to the more 
esteemed gods a matter of civic importance. Lastly Josephus criticizes the idea that there 
are good and bad gods. The Greeks believe that the bad gods are to be avoided, but the 
idea of needing to avoid a deity is altogether preposterous for Josephus. The Jewish 
understanding of God is that God is the source of good (2.166), and it is also not possible 
to avoid God. 
Josephus continues his approach of refuting arguments from the past, that he 
implicitly claims to be representative, in order to show the absurdity of his opponents’ 
positions. When he refutes accusations against the Jews in Book 1, he critiques the 
arguments made by distant and obscure Greek and Egyptian historians while largely 
avoiding contemporary critiques. Similarly, when he attacks Greco-Roman religion, he 
critiques the most outrageous of the Greek myths while largely avoiding contemporary 
Roman writings about the gods. In both his refutation of slanders and critique of pagan 
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 The Jews are so concerned about sexual morality that they would execute any Jew who acted 
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deities, Josephus attacks positions that are distant from his audience. If we are correct that 
Josephus’ implied audience included Romans, it is no accident that he attacks Greek 
myths while avoiding Roman myths. Barclay calls this approach controlled antagonism 
… [When Josephus borrows the Greek historical practices of criticizing other 
Greek historians] in his attack on Greek mythology, Josephus knows that he is 
following in the steps of Greek intellectuals (especially Plato, C Ap 2.238-39, 242, 
256-7), and when one compares what other Jews have said about idolatry (e.g. 
Wisdom of Solomon) Josephus’ comments on images appear relatively mild. It is 
also noticeable that the examples Josephus chooses are generally from the old 
‘classical’ Greece rather than from contemporary life. While Josephus thus 
undercuts the cultural claims of his Hellenized contemporaries, he leaves 
undefined the targets of his attack in the present day.”36 
 
He does not provide a logical refutation of the deities; rather, the ridiculousness of their 
actions is assumed to be evident, and this absurdity is assumed to prove that they are not 
really gods. On the one hand, Josephus does not attack Roman beliefs and practices, but 
he does criticize Greek religiosity with arguments that could just as easily apply to 
popular Roman religiosity. Upper-class, philosophically-inclined Romans would 
probably agree with Josephus’ criticism of the Greek (and implicitly Roman) gods; thus, 
commonality of belief might have as much to do with class as it does with ethnicity. 
C. Ap. 2.250-54 
It must be recalled that C. Ap. 2.145-296 forms an extended defense of the Jews 
on account of the perfection of their Law. The condemnation of the lawgivers in C. Ap. 
2.239 and 2.250 forms an inclusio around Josephus’ main critique of aberrant worship. 
The relevance of false worship to Josephus’ larger defense is that legal systems, other 
than the Jewish Law, remove piety and the proper understanding of God from their laws. 
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208 
 
Josephus, like Philo, thinks that laws regulating human interactions are based on and flow 
from one’s understanding of God (C. Ap. 2.169-71, 181, 188-9). Josephus traces the 
source of the problem and its effects, and he answers the question of what causes false 
worship: “Now what is the reason for such inconsistency and error concerning the deity? 
I suppose it is because their legislators did not originally recognize the true nature of 
God, nor, when they had distinguished whatever accurate knowledge they were able to 
grasp, relate to this the rest of the structure of the constitution…”37 Legislators, with the 
obvious exception of Moses, begin with an improper understanding of God that corrupts 
the rest of their laws.  
Because the lawmakers failed in their task of legislating piety, the poets, orators, 
and artists were afforded an opportunity to deceive the masses. Josephus’ view is that 
Moses is the earliest legislator, and he is copied by others. These Greek legislators, 
however, failed to copy the best part of the Mosaic Law, those parts that relate to piety. 
That the Greek gods are later introductions betrays their true reality as human inventions. 
The Jews practice the original, correct form of legislation from which the Greeks deviate. 
The poets whimsically assimilate even foreign gods into the myths.
38
  
Similar to his predecessor Philo, Josephus argues that the fluctuations in the 
physical appearances of the gods also shows their non-reality. Some artists use the finest 
material to make cult statues, but even these materials need constant upkeep. Josephus 
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 Josephus, C. Ap. 2.250 (Barclay, Apion, 311-12). 
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 This point foreshadows Josephus’ next argument which is an apology for Jewish rejection of 
foreign gods. Barclay (Apion, 312 n.1019) comments, “The reference to admitting foreign gods, which is 
hardly relevant to 2.240-49, is introduced here to prepare the way for the central theme of 2.255-69 (e.g., 
2.257, 259, 267), the refusal of Judeans to accommodate foreign conceptions of the divine.” 
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does not explicitly identify the god with the cult image as Philo and Wisdom had done, 
but he does criticize Greeks for forming the figure (μορφή) of a god from their own 
imaginations (2.252). Moreover, as the popularity of a god increases or decreases so does 
the splendor of his temple.
39
 The alternative to this false worship is for humans to 
“preserve unchangeable their conception of God and the honor they pay him.”40 Although 
Josephus does not offer a thorough reassertion of God’s character at this point, he 
maintains that the solution to false worship is a proper conception of God. This assertion 
also segues into the next section in which Josephus will defend the Jews against the 
claims that they are antisocial and atheists because they do not accept the Greek gods. 
Barclay explains how these sections fit together: “If Judeans have their own conception 
of God (which is true and proper, 2.255) why should they admit people with opinions 
such as those described in 2.240-49? If their unwillingness to associate with others 
signals a refusal to change, what Apollonius considers a fault is in fact the Judeans’ 
greatest virtue.”41 
Analysis of the Argument 
It is well-recognized that Contra Apionem is the most structured and rhetorically 
sophisticated of Josephus’ works.42 It is his final work, and in it he attempts to 
                                                          
39
 The fact that a god’s temple is neglected is taken by Josephus to be proof that the god is unreal. 
Josephus does not address the logical problem of how to explain the destruction of the Jerusalem Temple 
either by the Babylonians or the Romans. 
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 Josephus, C. Ap. 2.254 (Barclay, Apion, 313). 
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 Barclay, Apion, 313 n. 1027. 
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 For reference to some of Josephus’ argumentative structures, see Harold W. Attridge, “Josephus 
and His Works” in Jewish Writings of the Second Temple Period: Apocrypha, Pseudepigrapha, Qumran 
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demonstrate the respectability of the Jews in comparison with other cultures, especially 
the Greeks and Egyptians. For the most part, he exempts the Romans (at least explicitly) 
from his most scathing critiques.
43
 Barclay argues that the idol polemic in particular 
demonstrates Josephus’ attitude toward the Romans,  
Most revealing is the fact that the critique of ‘Greek’ religion and mythology is 
not widened (as it could have been) to include the Romans: to say that ‘the Greeks 
and some others think it good to make statues’ (C Ap 2.74) looks like a studied 
attempt to avoid including the Romans in his critique of religious images.
44
  
 
Although Barclay correctly notes that Josephus avoids critiquing Roman religious belief 
and practice, this explicit avoidance does not mean that Josephus altogether exempts 
Roman religion from critique. As I have mentioned above, the things that Josephus 
critiques about Greek gods (e.g., plurality, humanlike activities, and immoral actions) are 
also true of the Roman gods. Thus, Contra Apionem can be read as an explicit deference 
to the Romans, but it is also a veiled critique of popular Roman religion. Josephus does, 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Sectarian Writings, Philo, Josephus (ed. Michael E. Stone; CRINT II.2; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1984), 228-
30. 
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 On Josephus’ deference to the Romans and modeling of Judaism to be in agreement with the 
Romans, Barclay (“Judaism in Roman Dress: Josephus’ Tactics in the Contra Apionem” in Internationales 
Josephus-Kolloquium Aarhus 1999 [ed. Jürgen U. Kalms; Münsteraner Judaistische Studien 6; Münster: 
LIT, 2000], 232) comments, “I think a strong case can be made that Josephus’ depiction of Judaism in C 
[i.e. Contra Apionem] has a specifically Roman character and is designed to represent Jews in terms both 
comprehensible and attractive to his Greek-reading Roman (or Romanised) audience. The Jews of 
Josephus’ C are, if you will, Judaei togati.” Barclay does not interpret Josephus’ Romanized portrayal of 
Judaism as an exclusively political move; rather, this representation likely mirrors Josephus’ own 
acculturation and reconceptualization of what Judaism meant under Roman rule. Barclay concludes, 
“While claiming to belong to an unchanging tradition—in fact, precisely in making that claim—Josephus 
has, perhaps, internalized the Roman culture he had come to appreciate, and has found in it an appropriate 
vehicle with which to express his Judaism” (245). 
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 Barclay, Jews in the Mediterranean Diaspora, 366. See also Barclay, “The Politics of 
Contempt: Judeans and Egyptians in Josephus’s Against Apion,” in Negotiating Diaspora: Jewish 
Strategies in the Roman Empire (ed. John M. G. Barclay; Library of Second Temple Studies 45; New 
York: T & T Clark, 2004), 109-127, where he argues that Josephus was appointed by the Romans to be a 
spokesman for the Jews, but he was forced to argue in terms that would compliment his Roman patrons. 
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however, argue that Greek philosophers recognized the error of popular Greek religion, 
and thus he exempts philosophically-inclined Romans from criticism. Josephus’ makes 
his arguments by attacking the accusers’ character, exploiting the variation already 
existent in Greek religion, using satire, and condemning the arbitrariness of Greek 
religion. 
Character Attacks 
Some of the liveliest rhetorical flurries in Contra Apionem are the places where 
Josephus attacks the character of his accusers (e.g., 2.2-7). This argumentative tendency 
is less prevalent in C. Ap. 2.236-54, but Josephus does introduce the section by attacking 
the character of Lysimachus, Molon, and others like them. They are fraudulent in the 
wisdom that they espouse, and they deceive the youth who are easily swayed by their 
inventions (2.236). This tactic lessens the force of the accusations by explaining the 
source of the accusations as unreliable and even deceptive. These foolish teachers are 
contrasted with the intellectuals who reject such notions of deity (2.242). 
Exploiting the Cracks in Greek Religiosity 
Josephus’ position in the larger Greco-Roman world was tenuous on all sides. 
While he very clearly identified himself as a Jew, his actions in the war with Rome 
brought his standing in the Jewish community into suspicion. And while he comfortably 
enjoyed the patronage of the Flavians, he did not adopt their religious beliefs or practices. 
On the surface, it would seem that Jewish aniconic monotheism was entirely in 
contradiction to Greco-Roman iconic polytheism, but this view underestimates the 
plurality of options in both systems of belief. Even if there were more inclusive views in 
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Judaism, Josephus’ own position was not one of them. Greco-Roman religious belief, 
moreover, was not a unitary system with standardized sacred texts. Great variation in 
belief and practice existed within Greco-Roman religious expression. Perhaps because 
Josephus’ own religious beliefs did not have sufficient cultural traction, he attempts to 
critique Greek religiosity from within the system by identifying himself as a philosopher. 
Barclay comments on this tactic, “He insinuates himself into the debates among Greeks 
and Romans, wedging open the gaps that lay between one system of religion and the 
other, and linking the Judean tradition to its ‘philosophical’ mode.”45 Josephus does not 
begin his critique of myths by advancing an argument of his own invention; rather, he 
claims to be arguing in line with Greek philosophers (2.239). He pauses briefly to restate 
that leading thinkers reject these myths (2.242). 
Satirical reductia ad absurdum 
Josephus chooses myths that are both well-known and easily critiqued. It is 
perhaps impossible to determine to what degree these myths—primarily in this case by 
Homer and Hesiod—represented the beliefs of common Greek worshippers. The fact that 
Stoics felt the need to interpret Homer allegorically probably indicates that the myths 
were accepted at face value by at least some Greeks. Josephus’ tactic is to demonstrate 
that the logical results of these myths are entirely untenable. The actions of the gods in 
the myths demonstrate that they are not gods. An unchallenged premise of Josephus’ 
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argumentation is that he begins with the Jewish God as the definition of deity. Evidence 
that the Greek gods are not gods comes from them being controlled by their passions, 
being many, bound by Fate, and similar to humans. 
Greek Arbitrariness in Defining the Divine 
Josephus criticizes the myths of the pagans because they have no standards by 
which to evaluate them other than their own whims. Without any objective standards, 
“They represent them to be as numerous as they choose…”46 Moreover, the laziness of 
the lawgivers resulted in an ever increasing number of gods:  
[The lawgivers] allowed the poets to introduce whatever Gods they wished, 
suffering all kinds of things, and the orators to give citizenship, by decree, to any 
useful foreign God. Painters, also, and sculptors enjoyed considerable license in 
this matter among the Greeks, each himself devising a particular form, one 
molding it from clay, the other painting;
47
  
 
Corresponding to the whimsical introduction of new deities is the falling out of favor 
experienced by some of the cults. The fleeting nature of the worship of certain gods 
demonstrates that they were not worthy of worship in the first place. Underlying 
Josephus’ argument is an implicit apology for the Jewish refusal to admit foreign gods 
into worship. The difference between the Jews and Greeks is that the Jews have defined 
standards of what is worthy of worship; whereas, the Greeks worship whatever deities 
suit them for a time and then they discard them when they are no longer in vogue.   
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Representations of God 
Josephus is somewhat unique among Jewish idol polemicists in that he does not 
interweave the reassertion of God’s character into his polemic against false religion. 
While Wisdom and Philo seem to model their idol polemics in part after Isaiah 44 with 
the mockery of making idols and the reassertion of God as Creator, these themes are not 
present in C. Ap. 2.236-54. This difference in argumentation is largely due to the fact that 
Contra Apionem is an apologetic work, and the polemic against Greek religion is part of 
Josephus’ apology for Jewish non-admittance of Greek gods into their worship. Josephus 
explains that the Jews are justified in not worshipping the Greek gods primarily by 
explaining the foolishness of the gods, not by extolling the character of the true God. 
Because Josephus does not explicitly describe God’s nature in C. Ap. 2.236-54, we are 
forced to discuss what is implicit in this section and what we can glean from the larger 
argument of C. Ap. 2.145-286. Because Josephus critiques the Greek gods in terms of 
how they deviate from his understanding of God, we can get a glimpse of Josephus’ 
understanding of God by looking at what God is not. If the God of the Jews is to be the 
perfect contrast to the flawed Greek gods, God must have at least the following qualities: 
singularity, lack of passion, being free of anthropomorphism, and being providential.   
Singular 
In contrast to the pagan gods who are many, a number that is growing with the 
whimsical desires of the poets, the Jewish God is One (C. Ap. 2.240). The ridiculousness 
of the interactions among the gods is probably an attempt to undermine the idea of 
polytheism itself. Philo interpreted the First Commandment to forbid polytheism 
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explicitly, and Josephus similarly asserts the unique oneness of God by means of the First 
Commandment. He especially emphasizes that God is the self-sufficient Creator (C. Ap. 
2.190-2). Jewish practice also coincides with Jewish theology: Εἷς ναὸς ἑνὸς θεοῦ (There 
is one temple for the One God. C. Ap. 2.193). Moses’ whole representation of God is tied 
to his singularity: “he represented him as single and uncreated and immutable through all 
eternity, more beautiful than any mortal form, known to us by his power, but as to what 
he is like in essence, unknown.”48 Moses’ Law is superior because he begins with the 
proper understanding of who God is, and fundamental for Jewish theology is the oneness 
of God. 
Impassible 
Josephus’ most extended critique of the Greek gods is that they are enslaved to 
their passions and as a result they engage in moral depravity. In order for God to 
transcend the immorality of the Greek gods, God’s activity must be self-controlled. 
Josephus does not explain God’s character positively perhaps because he believes the 
nature of God to be incomprehensible (C. Ap. 2.167). The idea of God having desires, 
especially desires comparable to human desires, is unbecoming of deity. By avoiding the 
scriptural descriptions of God’s emotions, Josephus presents a less personal God that fits 
well with his attempt to present Judaism as a philosophy. 
Not Like Humans 
The description of the Greek gods in terms of having emotions, struggling with 
each other, and working at specific trades makes the gods very much like humans. 
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Josephus judges anthropomorphic descriptions of the divine to be incorrect and 
irreverent. That the Greek gods can be compared to the most immoral humans shows 
their non-reality. Correspondingly, the incomparability of God to human terms evidences 
his distinction from humanity. 
Providential 
Finally, for Josephus an essential aspect of the definition of God is that God be 
self-existent and not controlled by any external forces. Even the greatest of the Greek 
gods cannot escape the control of Fate. In contrast, Josephus believes in a God who is 
both transcendent and sovereign:  
…God encompasses all things, perfect and blessed, self-sufficient and sufficing 
for all, that he is the beginning, middle, and end of all things; he is evident 
through his works and acts of grace, and more apparent than anything else, but in 
form and greatness beyond our description.
49
  
 
Josephus’ God is not controlled by any forces beyond God. God is self-sufficient and in 
control of all things in contrast to the Greek gods who are bound by external forces. 
Understandings of False Worship 
Josephus differs somewhat from Philo and Wisdom who attacked the idea of crafting 
physical statues as gods. Unlike Wisdom and Philo, Josephus does not focus his critique 
on physical images; rather, Josephus mocks the myths of the gods. Elsewhere in Contra 
Apionem, Josephus strictly forbids representing God’s form in any statue, but that is not 
his focus here.
50
 The very human behavior of the gods shows that they are not gods at all. 
                                                          
49
 Josephus, C. Ap. 2.190 (Barclay, Apion, 276-7); cf. C. Ap. 2.165-6, 179-81, 185, 245. 
50
 See, C. Ap. 2.12, 74-5, 191. John M. G. Barclay (“Snarling Sweetly: Josephus on Images and 
Idolatry,” in Idolatry: False Worship in the Bible, Early Judaism and Christianity [ed. Stephen C. Barton; 
New York: T & T Clark, 2007], 81-83) describes the problem of representing God with a physical image. 
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Josephus’ definition of false worship seems to be worship of many gods and worship of 
gods with non-divine qualities. 
For Josephus, the idea of a plurality of divine beings itself creates an 
insurmountable problem. Plurality of divine beings implies competition and ranking 
among the gods. The result is that there are greater and lesser gods, and there are 
beneficial and harmful gods. Moreover, even the greatest gods are subject to forces that 
are external to them, such as Fate and their own passions.  
Additionally, false worship is any worship of beings that possess qualities not 
becoming of divine beings. These qualities include both likenesses to animal species and 
anthropomorphisms. Perhaps the qualities that make the gods most unworthy of worship 
are those moral qualities that would be reprehensible if they were to be found in human 
beings. The way that Zeus seduces women, treats them after he impregnates them, and 
acts according to his passions demonstrates that his activity would not be desirable in any 
human being, much less a god. 
Conclusions 
The ethical conclusions that Josephus intends to make are a function of how C. Ap. 
2.236-54 fits within both C. Ap. 2.145-286 and the work as a whole. The section, C. Ap. 
2.236-54, is a negative aside directed against Greek religion in a section that is primarily 
a positive presentation of Jewish Law and life. The negative aside functions to contrast 
                                                                                                                                                                             
In contrast to Philo and Wisdom’s explanation of Greco-Roman religious belief, many Greeks likely 
distinguished the cult image from the god. The question becomes why an image cannot represent a greater 
reality (e.g., as a flag represents a country). Barclay lays out Josephus argument: “A. Images are meant to 
be similar to the reality they represent. B. Images are lifeless and therefore inferior to what they represent. 
C. But the inferior cannot be adequately similar to the superior. D. What is not wholly adequate in religion 
is wholly inadequate, indeed impious. E. Therefore: image-representation of God was rightly banned by 
Moses” (81). 
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Greek belief—especially in terms of its absurd piety and the inhumanity of the gods—
with both the piety and humanity that characterize Jewish life. Josephus attempts to align 
himself with Greek philosophers who recognize the ungodlike nature and activity of the 
gods. The effect of Josephus’ argument on the Jewish audience, who is the audience most 
likely to have read Contra Apionem, is to bolster the confidence that Jews should have in 
their Law and to comfort them concerning the compatibility of Judaism with the best 
expressions of Greco-Roman culture. It is obvious that Josephus wants to dissuade his 
upper-class Jewish audience from believing in the Greek pantheon, but he does not deal 
much with the practice of Greek religion. Belief in the pantheon was probably not a 
strong temptation to an educated Jewish audience although he does focus his critique on 
Zeus more harshly probably because the supreme God represented some temptation for 
the Jews. 
 Josephus does not make a precise logical argument for the non-reality of the 
Greek gods. Further, he does not make a persuasive argument for the correctness of 
worshipping the God of the Jews. In fact, it is unlikely that Josephus’ arguments would 
move someone from a firmly held position into agreement with Jewish practice. But this 
is not his purpose in this section. His primary purpose is to describe the absurdity of 
Greek religion as part of an apology for Jews not worshipping Greek gods. He intends to 
defend Jewish worship as honorable, and in so doing he promotes it as the wisest form of 
worship. In C. Ap. 2.236-54, Josephus castigates the ungodlike qualities of Greek gods, 
and by comparison, he shows the greater respectability of Jewish worship. Like Wisdom 
and Philo’s arguments, Josephus makes a broad appeal to reject Greek forms of worship 
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and pursue Jewish practice. He does not, in this work deal with the specifics of what that 
worship looks like. The most one could glean from this presentation is that the Greek 
gods are unworthy of worship and indeed are not really gods. 
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CHAPTER 6 
PAUL’S POLEMIC AGAINST FALSE RELIGION 
Introduction
1
 
The preceding three chapters analyzed arguments made by Hellenistic Jews about false 
religion. This detailed analysis has established an understanding of the manner in which 
educated, upper-class Jews refuted popular and philosophical Greco-Roman religious 
                                                          
*All quotations of the New Testament, unless otherwise noted, are the author’s translation of 
NA
27
: B. Aland, K. Aland, J. Karavidopoulos, C. M. Martini, and B. M. Metzger (eds), Novum 
Testamentum Graece (27
th
 ed. Stuttgart: Deutsche Bibelgesellschaft, 1993). 
1
 One of the great challenges of analyzing the argument of 1 Cor 8-10 is to present a fresh and 
original analysis of the text while remaining conversant with the abundant secondary literature. My 
approach in this project as a whole and also in this chapter is to focus on the primary sources while noting 
the contributions of other scholars primarily in the footnotes. The works that are most influential on my 
analysis are listed below. In some cases, those cited are the most significant scholarly work on a topic, 
while in other cases I have chosen them because of their fresh approach.  
Commentaries: Gordon D. Fee, The First Epistle to the Corinthians (NICNT; Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 1987); Wolfgang Schrage, Der erste Brief an die Korinther (EKK 7 vol. 2; Zürich: Benziger, 
1995); Raymond F. Collins, First Corinthians (SP 7; Collegeville: Liturgical Press, 1999); Joseph 
Fitzmyer, S.J. First Corinthians (AB 32; New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008); Roy E. Ciampa and 
Brian S. Rosner, The First Letter to the Corinthians (PNTC; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2010). 
Monographs: Margaret M. Mitchell, Paul and the Rhetoric of Reconciliation: An Exegetical 
Investigation of the Language and Composition of 1 Corinthians (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 
1991); N. T. Wright, The Climax of the Covenant: Christ and the Law in Pauline Theology (Minneapolis: 
Fortress, 1991), esp. 120-136; Joop Smit, “About the Idol Offerings”: Rhetoric, Social Contexts and 
Theology of Paul’s Discourse in First Corinthians 8:1-11:1 (Leuven: Peeters, 2000); John Fotopoulos, 
Food Offered to Idols in Roman Corinth: A Social-Rhetorical Reconsideration of 1 Corinthians 8:1-11:1 
(WUNT 2.151; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2003); Richard Liong-Seng Phua, Idolatry and Authority: A 
Study of 1 Cor 8:1-11:1 in Light of the Jewish Diaspora (JSNTSup 299; New York: T & T Clark, 2005). 
Articles: Gordon D. Fee, “II Corinthians VI.14-VII.1 and Food Offered to Idols,” NTS 23 (1977): 
140-61; “Εἰδωλόθυτα Once Again: An Interpretation of 1 Corinthians 8-10,” Biblica 61 (1980): 172-97; 
Ben Witherington III, “Not So Idle Thoughts about EIDOLOTHUTON,” TynBul 44 (1993): 248-50; “Why 
Not Idol Meat? Is It What You Eat or Where You Eat?” Bible Review 10 (1994): 38-55; Peder Borgen, 
“‘Yes,’ ‘No,’ ‘How Far?’: The Participation of Jews and Christians in Pagan Cults,” in Paul in His 
Hellenistic Context (ed. Troels Engberg-Pedersen; Fortress: Minneapolis, 1995); John Fotopoulos, 
“Arguments Concerning Food Offered to Idols: Corinthian Quotations and Pauline Refutations in a 
Rhetorical Partitio (1 Corinthians 8:1-9),” CBQ 67 (2005): 611-63; Karl-Gustav Sandelin, “Philo and Paul 
on Alien Religion: A Comparison” in Lux Humana, Lux Aeterna: Essays on Biblical and Related Themes 
in Honour of Lars Aejmelaeus (Ed. Antti Mustakallio; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 2005), 211-
46. 
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beliefs and practices. For these authors, and also for Paul, discussions concerning idolatry 
and pagan gods were discussions that were eminently practical and profoundly shaped the 
activities of their communities. Interactions with the religious practices and beliefs of the 
pagan culture were unavoidable, and Jews debated the acceptable degrees of interaction 
that one could have and still remain faithful to God. When a particular author (or 
community) designated something as idolatrous, he forbad the practice and also defined 
the faithful within the community as those who did not engage in that particular action. 
While discussions concerning interactions with other religions were practical, the 
arguments were made on theological grounds and involved a particular view of the deity. 
The manner in which an author represented God affected the manner in which idolatry 
was understood and the dangers associated with interactions with pagan gods. 
In turning to Paul’s argument in 1 Cor 8-10, we must be aware of both how Paul 
is a participant in these larger Hellenistic Jewish conversations about idolatry and how he 
turns the discussion in new directions. Christopher Rowland notes the similarity of the 
theological and practical questions faced by early Christians and Jews: “While an 
uncompromising rejection of idolatry was required, living with and around idols (the 
prepositions are important) reflected the centuries-old experience of the Jews.”2 
Rowland’s statement, however, requires some explanation. Certainly, most first-century 
Jews were monotheistic, but to say that “an uncompromising rejection of idolatry was 
                                                          
2
 Christopher Rowland, “Living with Idols: An Exercise in Biblical Theology,” in Idolatry: False 
Worship in the Bible, Early Judaism and Christianity (ed. Stephen C. Barton; T & T Clark: London, 2007), 
164. 
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required” does not mean that Jews unanimously agreed on what was idolatrous. Chapter 2 
illustrated the remarkable breadth of how Jews defined idolatry, and that definition 
depended significantly on how the author represented God. In addressing the complex 
situation at Corinth, Paul draws on various Jewish streams of interpretation concerning 
the representation of God and definition of non-gods. Some of these streams Paul views 
as complementary even while he interprets them all in light of his radical belief in the 
Lord Jesus Christ.   
Like the author of Wisdom, Philo, and Josephus, Paul was a Hellenistic Jew, and 
his arguments show his indebtedness to his Jewish heritage. The comparison of these 
authors’ arguments shows not only Paul’s connection with Hellenistic Jewish streams of 
interpretation, but even more so the comparison highlights how Paul shapes these 
traditions in radically new directions. A few differences in Paul’s writing should be 
noted. First Corinthians is different in terms of his form. Paul writes a letter of 
admonition in order to give apostolic instruction in response to specific questions from 
the audience. First Corinthians is also different in terms of the relationship between 
author and audience. Paul founded the Christian community at Corinth, so that the 
Corinthians beliefs are shaped substantially by Paul’s own instruction.3 First Corinthians 
is most notably different from other Hellenistic Jewish texts in the way that Paul argues, 
particularly in regard to his understanding of the Lord Jesus Christ. In contrast to 
Wisdom, De decalogo, and Contra Apionem, the argument in 1 Cor 8-10 is a 
                                                          
3
 I recognize that the term “Christian” is viewed as problematic by some. For the purposes of this 
study, it is a helpful description of those who believe in Jesus as the Messiah in contrast to those like 
Wisdom, Philo, and Josephus (cf. 1 Cor 1:2). 
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christological argument. Paul’s belief in the Lord Jesus Christ as the Savior and Judge of 
the Christian community created an imminent view of the deity in a way unattested in 
Hellenistic Jewish authors. 
Because Paul’s instructions are directed at a particular people in a specific setting, 
understanding some basic things about the Corinthians’ location sheds light on the 
challenges they faced. By the time that Paul writes in the mid-fifties, Greek Corinth was 
only a memory.
4
 Gaius Julius Caesar repopulated the city with freedmen, military 
veterans, and urban tradesmen. The city was now governed by Roman law, used Latin as 
its official language (even if Greek was most commonly spoken), adopted Roman 
customs, and practiced Roman religion. But the steady flow of traffic into this port city 
also meant that new customs and religions came too, and intermixing was inevitable. 
Corinth’s position as distributor of both goods and ideas may have provided strategic 
motivation for Paul to found the Christian community at Corinth.
 
 
The composition of the Christian community at Corinth seems to be primarily 
Gentile converts to faith in Christ.
5
 What is perhaps more surprising is the breadth of 
socio-economic statuses implied in Paul’s Letters to Corinth. There are believers wealthy 
                                                          
4
 See Pausanias, Descr. Graec. 2.1.2; 2.3.7. Corinth’s strategic location on the isthmus allowed it 
to control important harbors on the eastern (Cenchreae) and western (Lechaeum) coasts of Greece. Thus, 
Corinth became a significant trade city. Moreover, Corinth possessed fertile plains and a thriving pottery 
industry. Following its defeat in the Achaean War (146 B.C.E.), Corinth remained destitute for about a 
century. The major turning point came in 44 B.C.E. when Julius Caesar decreed that Corinth was to be 
refounded as a Roman colony with Roman laws. For an abbreviated history of Corinth, see Collins, First 
Corinthians, 21-4; Thiselton, First Epistle, 1-22; Jerome Murphy-O’Connor, O. P., St. Paul’s Corinth: 
Texts and Archaeology (3
rd
 ed. Rev. and Exp.; Collegeville, Minn.: Liturgical, 2002); Wayne A. Meeks, 
The First Urban Christians: The Social World of the Apostle Paul (2
nd
 ed.; New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 2003).  
5
 Contra Phua, Idolatry and Authority. 
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enough to host leisurely meals in their homes while other believers arrive later at these 
meals probably because they are either slaves or day-laborers. The disparities in socio-
economic statuses among the Corinthians probably had repercussions for how they 
understood their interactions in the church with issues such as rankings of gifts, authority 
of an apostle, the role of wisdom, unity, and (especially important for our study) 
acceptable interactions with pagan society. After Paul left Corinth, divisions arose in the 
church, and the authority of his apostleship seems to have been questioned. The 
Corinthians, at least some of them, have written to Paul to request his advice on divisive 
issues while others sent oral reports.
 
 
The Structure and the Argument 
Form of First Corinthians 
Determining the form of Paul’s writing affects how one understands the content 
and arguments contained in it. It is common to call this text “The First Epistle to the 
Corinthians” but Fitzmyer points outs that First Corinthians should not be understood as 
an epistle (a highly artistic form of writing) but rather as an occasional letter and 
substitute for Paul’s personal presence: “A letter is something non-literary, a means of 
communication between persons who are separated from each other.”6 This classification 
is correct so long as one recognizes, as Fitzmyer does, that there are sections (esp. 
chapters 13 and 15) that transcend the immediate problems in the community. Moreover, 
classifying a letter as “non-literary” does not mean that the author does not make 
                                                          
6
 Fitzmyer, First Corinthians, 54; see Collins, First Corinthians, 1-4, 6-14. 
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sophisticated arguments.
7
 Paul addresses the problems in the community, but he is 
constantly placing those problems in the grander picture of the death of Christ, nearness 
of the Parousia, and resurrection. This letter, then, is the personal address of Paul to a 
community that he founded, in response to reports and the community’s own questions, 
in order to give his apostolic instruction. But what kind of letter is it? The answer to this 
question is tied to both the structure and purpose.  
While scholars debate the specific purpose for Paul’s letter to the Corinthians, at 
least they (those who hold to the unity of the letter) can agree that First Corinthians is an 
occasional letter.
8
 Paul offers his instruction in a particular manner, so that his purpose is 
connected to both the argumentative content and the form in which it is delivered. In 
dealing with the form and purpose of First Corinthians, Margaret Mitchell’s work has 
been the most influential. She assesses the form of the letter to be deliberative rhetoric, 
intended to persuade the audience to pursue unity (1 Cor 1:10).
9 
As I will discuss below, I 
                                                          
7
 Even though First Corinthians is a letter, it was probably read to the Corinthians, and thus it was 
received as a form of speaking to the Corinthians. In this speech, Paul can employ rhetorical models to 
communicate his instruction. See Collins, First Corinthians, 17-20. 
8
 The following features of the letter help us understand the occasion of writing: 1) Reports from 
Chloe’s people (1:10-12); 2) Writings from the Corinthian Christians (7:1); 3) Reports from Stephanus, 
Fortunatus, and Achaicus (16:15-17); 4) Desire of the Corinthians for Apollos to visit (16:12); 5) Delay of 
Paul’s visit (4:21). See Fitzmyer, First Corinthians, 51-2. 
9
 Mitchell, Paul and the Rhetoric of Reconciliation; cf. Hans Dieter Betz and Margaret M. 
Mitchell, “Corinthians, First Epistle to the” in ABD, 1.1139-48. A number of scholars accept Mitchell’s 
general argument of deliberative rhetoric. For example, Collins (First Corinthians, 20) agrees that First 
Corinthians is a form of deliberative rhetoric with 1 Cor 1:10 as the thesis; and thus he assesses the 
purpose: “It is addressed to the Christians at Corinth, urging them in the name of the Lord Jesus to have no 
divisions among them. Rather they ought to be in agreement with one another.” Fitzmyer follows some of 
the structural points, but he criticizes the rigidity of forcing the whole letter into the mold of deliberative 
rhetoric. See below for his critique. 
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am unconvinced that the letter as a whole is a single exercise in deliberative rhetoric. 
Others argue that First Corinthians is a letter of admonition intended to instill proper 
action in the audience (1 Cor 4:14).
10
 The category of letter of admonition is to be 
favored because it is broad enough to include the various topics addressed but also 
narrow enough to describe the work as instructions to act in particular ways. 
Occasion and Purpose of First Corinthians 
Ciampa and Rosner consider themselves to be part of the “rough consensus [that] 
has begun to emerge in which scholars agree that the problems Paul addresses in 1 
Corinthians reflect the infiltration of Corinthian social values into the church.”11 This 
“consensus” has merit when one considers that actions such as sexual immorality, 
idolatry, striving for position, and the glorification of wisdom were viewed by Jews and 
early Christians as characteristic actions of pagans. In short Paul is urging the Corinthians 
to live in light of their new calling in Christ and not in light of their past. This mirrors 
Paul’s instructions to Gentile churches elsewhere. Especially relevant for our focus on 
chapters 8-10, is Paul’s description of the Thessalonians’ faith in Christ: “you turned to 
God from idols to serve the living and true God, and to wait for his Son (coming) from 
heaven, whom he raised from the dead, Jesus who rescues us from the coming wrath” (1 
Thess 1:9, 10). Paul goes on to describe how he instructed them to live in light of this 
                                                          
10
 E.g., Fitzmyer, First Corinthians, 55-6. 
11
 Ciampa and Rosner, First Letter, 4, see also 21. They quote several others who argue similarly. 
See also Richard B. Hays, First Corinthians (Louisville: John Knox, 1997), 71; esp. Bruce W. Winter, 
After Paul Left Corinth: The Influence of Secular Ethics and Social Change (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 
2001), 27-8; Wolfgang Schrage, Der erste Brief, 1:42; Thiselton, First Epistle, xviii;  David E. Garland, 1 
Corinthians (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2003), 13. 
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calling: “… encouraging, comforting, imploring you to walk worthily of the God who 
calls you into his kingdom and glory” (1 Thess 2:12; cf. 1 Cor 12:2). This manner of 
walking involves ongoing conformity to the calling of Christ and rejection of pagan 
practices. In a similar way, he instructs the Christians in Rome, “Do not to be conformed 
to this world [i.e. the pagan practices that are contrary to God], but be transformed by 
renewing the mind…” (Rom 12:2). Paul thinks that something radically new has 
happened when these Gentiles believed in Jesus as the Christ (“If someone is in Christ, he 
is a new creation. The old has passed away; behold, the new has come.” 2 Cor 6:17), and 
now he is instructing them about how they should live in light of this new radical life. 
The reintegration of pagan values into the lives of these converts to Christ manifests itself 
in a number of ways in the practice of Corinthian Christians: fascination with wisdom, 
social climbing, sexual immorality, legal disputes, marriage practices, idolatry, disorder, 
and prideful vaunting of one’s abilities. 
Structure of First Corinthians 
Even though scholars almost universally recognize certain thematic divisions 
within First Corinthians, there is still debate concerning how the letter fits together as a 
whole. One of the peculiar characteristics of First Corinthians is its episodic character.
12
 
                                                          
12
 The letter is so episodic that some commentaries assess the structure to be a list of thematic 
sections. For example, Collins has labeled thematically similar sections as Rhetorical Demonstrations 
although the thematic unity of his Second Rhetorical Demonstration (5:1-7:40) is difficult to discern. One 
of the disadvantages of these thematic outlines is that they do not help in seeing the overall unity of the 
letter or the way that the component sections are connected. Similarly, Schrage (Der Erste Brief, 1.90-1) 
divides the letter thematically: 1,10-4, 21 Parteien; 5,1-6,20 Konkrete Mißstände; 7,1-40 Ehe und 
Ehelosigkeit; 8,1-11,1 Götzenopferfleisch; 11,2-34 Gemeindeversammlung; 12,1-14,40 Charismen; 15,1-
58 Auferstehung; 16, 1-18 Kollekte und persönliche Mitteilungen. 
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In comparison to Paul’s other works, First Corinthians discusses a variety of practical 
topics that do not seem to be tightly intertwined around one central theme.
 13
 Paul seems 
to be treating a number of different issues. While many assessments of the structure of 
First Corinthians err on being too disconnected, Ciampa and Rosner provide a novel 
proposal. I include it not because it has gained widespread scholarly acceptance, but 
rather because it is a thoughtful attempt to connect chapters 8-10 closely to chapters 11-
14 without forcing the whole letter into a single rhetorical mold.
14
 Moreover, they 
provide a fresh perspective on the main theme of the epistle being the purity of the church 
instead of its unity (e.g., esp. Mitchell). In line with their reading of Paul in light of the 
Old Testament background, they argue that Paul opposes two practices that (both Jews 
and Christians thought) were especially characteristic of pagans: sexual immorality and 
                                                          
13
 This assessment of First Corinthian’s structure contradicts the proposal of Mitchell’s Paul and 
the Rhetoric of Reconciliation. She argues that First Corinthians is written in the form of deliberative 
rhetoric and each pericope advances Paul’s prothesis stated in 1 Cor 1:10 to put aside factionalism and 
pursue unity. Thus, every topic that Paul addresses—even though they range from incestuous relationships 
to head coverings in worship to the nature of the resurrection body—serves the overarching function of 
exhorting the Corinthian Christians to pursue unity. In the Second Section of Proof (1 Cor 5:1-11:1), 
Mitchell sees two main topics: Πορνεία and Group Solidarity (5:1-7:40) and Idol Meats, Freedom and 
Group Unity (8:1-11:1). My assessment of Mitchell’s proposal is that she makes an appropriate explanation 
of chapters 1-4, but forcing chapters 5-16 into the same mold reduces the complexity of the arguments. 
Fitzmyer (First Corinthians, 55; cf. Ciampa and Rosner, First Letter, 20) aptly evaluates Mitchell’s 
proposal that the whole letter makes the appeal for unity (in Rhetoric of Reconciliation and her ABD article 
co-authored with Hans Dieter Betz: “Corinthians, First Epistle to the”): “That is indeed the burden of 
chaps. 1-4, but it is an oversimplification of the argument of ‘the entire letter,’ and sections in the probatio, 
with their multiple and diverse topics, scarcely function as a proof of the alleged narratio. In an effort to 
show the rhetoric of the letter, a procrustean bed has been made.”  
14
 See my review of their work, Trent A. Rogers, review of Roy E. Ciampa and Brian S. Rosner, 
The First Letter to the Corinthians, TJ 34 (2013): 107-8. Following Mitchell, most scholars employ models 
of Greco-Roman rhetoric to make sense of how Paul’s larger argument is structured, but Ciampa and 
Rosner (First Letter, 20) do not follow this approach: "Our contention is that rather than reading 1 
Corinthians with Greco-Roman rhetorical categories in mind, it is better to take the Old Testament and 
Jewish frames of reference as the primary lens that clarifies our understanding of both the form and 
contents of the letter." 
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idolatry (with greed being a third vice). Ciampa and Rosner’s structure reflects their 
interpretation centering on sexual immorality and idolatry:
15
 
I. Letter Opening (1:1-9) 
II. True and False Wisdom and Corinthian Factionalism (1:10-4:17) 
A. Factions in the Community (1:10-17) 
B. Negative Treatment: “No More Boasting about Human Leaders” (1:18-
2:5) 
C. Positive Treatment: “Let Those Who Boast Boast in the Lord” (2:6-3:4) 
D. Application to the Church, Ministers, and Ministry (3:5-4:17) 
III. “Flee Sexual Immorality” and “Glorify God with your bodies” (4:18-7:40) 
A. Negative Treatment: “Flee Sexual Immorality” (and Greed) (4:18-6:20) 
B. Positive Treatment: “Glorify God with Your Bodies” (7:1-40) 
IV. “Flee Idolatry” and “Glorify God in Your Worship” (8:1-14:40) 
A. Negative Treatment: “Flee Idolatry” (Food Offered to Idols) (8:1-11:1) 
B. Positive Treatment: “Glorify God” in Your Worship (11:2-14:40) 
V. The Resurrection and Consummation (15:1-58) 
VI. Letter Closing (16:1-24) 
In summary, Paul treats four main elements: wisdom (chs. 1-4), sexuality (chs. 5-7), 
idolatry (chs. 8-14), and resurrection (ch. 15).
16
 Ciampa and Rosner should be 
commended for thinking closely about how the theme of “the infiltration of pagan 
practices into the church” affects the structure of the epistle, and their proposal helps to 
show the connectedness of themes. But they have attempted to force the letter into too 
rigid of a structure. This is most obvious in their assessment of chapter 6 within the 
broader theme of sexuality. The connection between the sections “Flee Idolatry” and 
                                                          
15
 Ibid., 24. 
16
 They also list four major themes that drive Paul’s instruction in the letter: the lordship of Christ, 
worldwide worship, the eschatological temple, and the glory of God (Ciampa and Rosner, First Letter, 33). 
It should also be noted that “Toward the end of each negative section (4:18-6:20 and 8:1-11:1) Paul 
provides both negative and positive imperatives using the same language relating to the broader theme” 
(Ibid., 23). 
230 
 
 
 
“Glorify God in Your Worship” is intriguing, but there is little indication in the text that 
they are tightly connected; moreover, 1 Cor 11:2-14:40 could hardly be characterized as a 
thoroughly positive treatment of worship.  
 Simply listing the themes does little to show the connectedness, and approaches to 
connect the themes at the level of the letter (e.g., Mitchell) or themes (e.g., Ciampa and 
Rosner) are too forced. I will not propose a novel structure, but I do want to account for 
both the unity of the letter and its episodic character. It is best to read First Corinthians as 
an occasional letter, in fact a letter of admonition, with issues being addressed on account 
of either direct questions from the Corinthians or reports about the community that 
concerned Paul. Paul uses models of Greco-Roman rhetoric, but he does so primarily at 
the level of the argument concerning each topic, not at the level of the whole letter.
17
 
Perhaps the best that we can propose is a simple broad structure connecting the issues: 
Paul first discusses the oral reports he has received and then addresses written reports. 
Attempts to discern a stronger overarching structure have proven too forced. In Chapter 
1, Paul indicates that he is addressing oral reports which seem to carry through chapter 6: 
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 In contrast, Mitchell argues that the topics are carefully selected to demonstrate the overarching 
appeal: “The present historical rhetorical study, which dovetails with some such analyses, is meant to 
provide further substantiation for the comprehensive structure of the whole letter by examining it as a 
deliberative letter. However, unlike previous analyses, this study argues that 1 Corinthians is not merely a 
list of loosely connected topics which one might conceivably grant to have been part of the same original 
letter, but indeed constitutes a thoroughgoing argument for church unity centered on the πρόθεσις in 1:10” 
(Rhetoric of Reconciliation, 187-8). For the validity of applying rhetoric to the level of individual 
arguments, see Quintilian, Inst. Or. 4.1.73-75. Although I disagree with Fotopoulos in the acceptance of 
Mitchell’s thesis for the whole epistle, he is still correct in seeing 8:1-11:1 as a distinct rhetorical unit 
(Fotopoulos, Food Offered to Idols, 197-9). Fitzmyer again offers a fitting critique: “That Paul makes use at 
time of rhetoric in his argumentation no one will deny (see Smit ‘Epideictic Rhetoric’). That this letter as a 
whole, however, follows a deliberate rhetorical pattern is highly questionable” (Fitzmyer, First 
Corinthians, 55. Citation of Joop F. M. Smit, “Epideictic rhetoric in Paul's First Letter to the Corinthians 1-
4,” Biblica 84 [2003]: 184-201).  
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“For it was reported to me about you, my brothers, by those from Chloe that...” (1 Cor 
1:11; cf. 5:1). And then he addresses written questions beginning in chapter 7: “Now 
concerning the matters about which you wrote…” (1 Cor 7:1). I will use the following 
structure: 
Introduction: 1:1-9 
 Reports about the community: 1:10-6:20 
  Wisdom and Divisions: 1:10-4:21 
  Incest: 5:1-13 
  Lawsuits: 6:1-11 
  Prostitution: 6:12-20 
 Written Questions: 7:1-14:40  
  Marital Sexuality: 7:1-16 
  [Eschatological Excursus: 7:17-24 remaining is same state] 
  Virgins: 7:25-28 
  [Eschatological Excursus: 7:29-35 living in in light of the eschaton] 
  Virgins and Widows: 7:36-40 
  Idol food 8:1-11:1  
  Public Worship 11:2-14:40  
   11:2-16 Head Coverings 
   11:17-34 Lord’s Supper 
   12:1-31 Spiritual Gifts  
   [Eschatological Excursus: 12:31-13:13 Love] 
   14:1-40 Gifts in Worship 
 Resurrection 15:1-58  
 Closing 16:1-24 
This structure accounts for the episodic character as the topics are treated because they 
appeared in either an oral report or written question. It also provides a general 
overarching structure based on two broad sections of oral reports and written reports. It is 
probable that the questions concerning food sacrificed to idols were questions about 
which the Corinthians wrote to Paul. 
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Structure of Chapters 8-10 
When we turn to the section of chapters 8-10, almost everyone recognizes that 
there is general thematic unity in dealing with food associated with idols, but there is a 
great deal of debate concerning the internal structure (or lack of structure) of this unit. 
The main issue that runs throughout chapters 8-10 is the discussion about the 
acceptability or non-acceptability of eating food that is associated with idols. If one 
accepts that there are actual groups of Corinthians disputing this issue as I do, then there 
is a disagreement between the groups for which Paul offers his instruction. Several times 
(1 Cor 8:7, 9, 10, 11, 12; cf. 9:22) Paul refers to those who do not participate in the eating 
food sacrificed to idols as weak (ἀσθενεῖς), and he uses the substantive form, “the 
Weak.”18 While he never explicitly labels the opponents of “the Weak,” “the Strong” is 
the best term primarily because it is the logical corollary to “the Weak” group. Moreover, 
there may be hints at the idea of a Strong group in Paul’s wording in 10:22 (cf. 10:13). 19 
                                                          
18
 There are some who think that the Weak group is a hypothetical group created by Paul for the 
sake of argument. They typically argue that the Corinthians as a whole desired to participate in feasts with 
food dedicated to idol-gods. But most scholars recognize this as a real group, even if they would not self-
identify themselves as Weak. I will argue that there is both a Weak and Strong group. For the sake of 
clarity I will capitalize both Strong and Weak. 
19
 While I recognize that Paul never uses the term “Strong” in 1 Corinthians 8-10, I will employ 
the term throughout this chapter. There is a group in Corinth that is arguing for the consumption of food 
sacrificed to idols. It is the group that asserts “we all have knowledge.” Because they make their argument 
on the basis of their gnosis some have labeled them as gnostics. This term, however, is to be avoided 
because it can be confused with the labels some scholars have used for the Nag Hammadi texts. Paul argues 
that the Strong are in danger of provoking Christ to jealousy, and then he asks rhetorically if the Strong are 
stronger than Christ. If this Strong group is identifiable as one of the factious groups in chapters 1-4, Paul 
may be playing on words in his satirical statement in 4:10: ἡμεῖς ἀσθενεῖς, ὑμεῖς δὲ ἰσχυροί (we [the 
apostles] are weak, but you are strong). But in 1 Cor 4 Paul is likely talking about the whole church. 
Whether or not these groups, the Weak and Strong, would self-identify by such titles is another issue 
altogether. If anything, “Weak” might be a pejorative title for those whom the Strong felt to be uneducated. 
Anders Erikkson (Traditions as Rhetorical Proof: Pauline Argumentation in 1 Corinthians [ConBNT: 
NewTestament Series 29; Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1998], 143-4; cf. Stanley Stowers, “Paul on the 
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It seems that the Strong argue from their monotheistic theology that idols are non-entities, 
and thus food associated with idols is not dangerous. Paul addresses this issue by 
interacting with their arguments.   
The presence of contradictory statements in 1 Cor 8:1-9 implies one of three 
things: an incoherent argument, a later composition from multiple arguments, or a series 
of quotations with refutations. For example, 1 Cor 8:1 states “we all have knowledge” 
and then v.7 states “but this knowledge is not held by everyone.” Apparent contradictions 
like this lead scholars to argue that Paul both quotes and refutes certain positions of the 
Corinthians in 1 Cor 8:1-9. John Fotopoulos draws on ancient rhetoric and labels this 
structure of quotation and refutation as a partitio.
20
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Use and Abuse of Reason,” in Greeks, Romans, and Christians: Essays in Honor of Abraham J. Malherbe 
(eds., David L. Balch, Everett Fergusson, and Wayne A Meeks; Minneapolis: Fortress, 1990), 276-84) 
relies on therapeutic models of Hellenistic philosophy and argues that ‘weak’ can also mean ‘sick’ where 
the remedy is philosophical instruction. Thus, the issue of food sacrificed to idols may have arisen from the 
instructive “proselytizing” efforts of the Strong: “A likely scenario is that some of the Corinthians, proud of 
their true beliefs about the divine and the power of those beliefs to desacralize the world, attempted to cure 
the moral illness of the weak by drilling into them the true belief of the sole existence of the One God” 
(Erikkson, Traditions, 144). Even if the Strong had designated a group as weak, it is unlikely that they 
would label themselves as such. Gerd Theissen (“The Strong and Weak in Corinth: A Sociological 
Analysis of a Theological Quarrel,” in The Social Setting of Pauline Christianity [Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 
1982], 121-43) argues that the Strong and Weak are divided by socio-economic status. The Strong, being 
more affluent, were accustomed to fine dining at the temple; whereas the poorer Weak rarely consumed 
meat. Although Theissen’s assessment of first-century meat consumption has been disproven, socio-
economic factors likely affect the situation, as they almost certainly do in 11:17-34 (see Justin J. Meggitt, 
“Meat Consumption and Social Conflict in Corinth,” JTS 45 (1994): 137-41). As we have seen with upper-
class Jews—exemplified in the gymnasium education of authors like Philo, Josephus, and the Wisdom of 
Solomon—social pressures combined with philosophical approaches to God could lead to different 
conclusions concerning the acceptable interactions with pagan deities.  
20
 Fotopoulos also argues that the structure of the paritio establishes the structure for the whole 
argument in 1 Cor 8-10: “His partitio also attempts to establish the general order for his ensuing 
argumentation, as a partitio can do. This ensuing argumentation consists of a narratio (statement of facts) 
in 8:10a and the probatio (proofs), which are laid out in 8:10b-11:1, roughly corresponding to the order of 
the Corinthian Strong quotations and Pauline refutations from 8:1-9” (Fotopoulos, “Arguments Concerning 
Food Offered to Idols,” 617-8).  For Fotopoulos, the following sections correspond to one another: 
8:1-3   8:10-9:27 
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 I read First Corinthians 8-10 as a self-contained argument against eating food 
sacrificed to idols in the idol’s temple. While it does involve improper worship (Ciampa 
and Rosner) and has a serious impact on communal unity (Mitchell), Paul is addressing 
the issue because it had become a problem of central importance for the Corinthians’ 
faithfulness to Christ. I agree with Fotopoulos that “Paul’s instructions in 8:1-11:1 [are] 
to be interpreted as a coherent, sustained prohibition of intentional consumption of food 
offered to idols.”21 My reconstruction of the argument accepts that 8:1-9 is a partitio and 
then Paul makes his argument against eating εἰδωλόθυτα22 in two stages: communal love 
                                                                                                                                                                             
8:4-7  10:14-22 
8:8a  10:1-13 
8:8b-9  10:23-11:1 
1 Cor 8:1-19 does introduce many of the topics that Paul will discuss in chapters 8-10, but I am 
less convinced of its role of providing the structure for the whole argument. The looseness of this 
structuring element is shown even in the fact that the sections in 10:14-22 and 10:1-13 are inverted from 
their reference in the partitio 
21
 Ibid., 611; cf. Smit, “1 Cor 8, 1-6”; “The Rhetorical Disposition of First Corinthians.” Another 
proposal for the dining situation and the coherence of Paul’s response is offered by Bruce Fisk: “Some 
activities and meals within a pagan temple are morally objectionable for Christians while others are not. 1 
Cor 8:10 describes permissible meal attendance, while 10:19-22 clearly portrays what is off limits” 
(“Eating Meat Offered to Idols: Corinthians Behavior and Pauline Response in 1 Corinthians 8-10 [A 
Response to Gordon Fee],” TJ 10 [1989]: 62). He defends this interpretation by making three points: (1) 
pagan temples had diverse functions, including non-cultic functions Fisk can label as “harmless fun and 
social convention”; (2) Paul only condemns idolatry, not idol meat; and (3) partnership with idolaters 
entails idolatry. Fisk sees the unity in the following way: “We have sought to show that both halves of 
chap. 10 have strong ties to chap. 8. 10:1-22 shares the temple setting of 8:10 while 10:23-11:1 follows 
chap. 8 in defending the moral neutrality of idol meat. Chap. 8 is the common denominator” (68). In the 
following analysis I will explain what I think is a more fitting explanation of the situation, but a comment 
on the supposed neutrality of food associated with an idol temple is warranted here. While Paul does not 
explicitly forbid the eating of food sacrificed to idols in this passage, that is one of the earliest Christian 
commands for Gentile believers (Acts 15:20, 29; 21:25). That does not prove that this is the case in 1 
Corinthians, but does make it more likely that Paul sees a problem with the consumption of food known to 
be sacrificed to idols.  
22
 Paul uses both the singular and plural forms of εἰδωλόθυτον with no discernible difference in 
meaning. I will use the plural throughout this chapter: εἰδωλόθυτα. 
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and theological fidelity.
23
 First, Paul argues on the basis of love for other believers in 
chapters 8 and 9. Paul introduces the issue, refutes some of the Strong’s positions, and 
argues that the Strong’s pseudo-right is of less importance than love for other believers. 
Chapter 9 is an argument from the greater to the lesser: if Paul is willing to sacrifice 
legitimate rights out of love for other believers, all the more the Strong should be willing 
to sacrifice their pseudo-right out of love for other believers. Second, Paul argues on the 
basis of faithfulness to Christ. Chapter 10 demonstrates the danger of the Strong’s actions 
as an affront to Christ, and warns of impending judgment. Then Paul discusses other 
situations in which the believer would encounter food associated with idols.  
In summary, Paul uniformly prohibits Christians from eating in the presence of an 
idol-god. On account of Christ’s work as Savior, Christians have obligations of love to 
other believers and of faithfulness to Christ. What has largely been overlooked is the way 
that these arguments are made on the basis on one’s understanding of God and idols and 
the varied representations of God to which Paul could appeal to make his point. It is to 
this analysis that we now turn. It cannot be overemphasized that Paul’s argument (both in 
its focus on communal love and its focus on theological fidelity) is grounded in the work 
of Christ as Savior. As I have done in previous chapters, I will first offer a thorough 
analysis of the text, and then I will attempt to synthesize some of the strands of 
                                                          
23
 Alex T. Cheung (Idol Food in Corinth: Jewish Background and Pauline Legacy [JSNTSup 176; 
Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1999], 162; cf. Schrage, Der Erste Brief, 1.66-8) also thinks Paul 
makes a two-part argument, “There is no inconsistency between 1 Corinthians 8 and 1 Cor 10:1-22. On the 
contrary, the two passages represent two stages of Paul’s argument: not only will eating idol food cause the 
weak to stumble, but it will also make the Corinthians partners with demons…Paul’s position in a nutshell 
is this: to eat idol food knowingly is to participate in idolatry; therefore, for the sake of the weak and for the 
sake of yourselves, avoid any food if, and only if, you know that it is idol food.” 
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argumentation. I will divide the text and its analysis into thematic and syntactical units 
even while recognizing that these units comprise a unified whole: (a) 8:1-9, (b) 8:10-13, 
(c) 9:1-27, (d) 10:1-13, (e) 10:14-22, (f) 10:23-30, (g) 10:31-11:1. 
1 Cor 8:1-9 
The interpretation of 1 Cor 8:1-9 is complicated by several factors, among them 
the most challenging are the identification of quotations and understanding the 
theological underpinnings of the argument. I will argue that the Strong (an actual group 
of the Corinthian Christians), appealing to the oneness and uniqueness of God, reject the 
existence of idol-gods and thereby conclude that neither eating nor abstaining from 
εἰδωλόθυτα has any bearing on their salvation. Paul refutes both their theological premise 
(by arguing that there is a reality behind the idol-gods which he will later identify as 
demons) as well as their ethical conclusion (by demonstrating that eating has caused the 
Weak to stumble and the Strong to be unfaithful to Christ). While it is difficult to discern 
precisely what the argument of the Strong is, their argument is plausibly reconstructed as 
follows:  
We all have knowledge that God is One and therefore idol-gods are not real. For 
us there is one God the Father, from whom all things exist and we exist for him. 
And there is one Lord Jesus Christ, through whom all things exist and we exist 
through him. Food is a matter of indifference that does not cause God to judge us, 
so we are neither worse nor better off if we eat or do not eat.  
 
In the following exegesis I will explain why I think certain phrases are best understood in 
Paul’s argument as quotations of the Strong.  
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vv. 1-3  
At the beginning of 1 Cor 8, Paul begins a new section of the letter with the topic 
indicator, περὶ δέ: “Now concerning food sacrificed to idols.”24 While εἰδωλόθυτα 
literally means “things sacrificed (or perhaps ceremonially dedicated) to an idol” the 
context and the fact that Paul includes the term βρῶσις in 8:4, indicates that the problem 
centers on the consumption of food sacrificed to idols. Gordon Fee and Ben 
Witherington, especially, have advanced the argument that εἰδωλόθυτα refers to food 
sacrificed in the temple and then eaten in the temple precincts.
25
 They are probably 
correct in this assessment both because every occurrence of εἰδωλόθυτα definitely or 
plausibly refers to food eaten in the temple precincts and because when the context is 
clearly different (e.g., 1 Cor 10:25-30) another word is used, ἱερόθυτον.  
Witherington points out that the term εἰδωλόθυτα is a Christian polemical word.26 
As we have seen with the Jewish idol polemics, εἴδωλον (which forms the root of 
                                                          
24
 Fotopoulos (in summary, Food Offered, 208) argues that the things offered included more than 
just meat although 1 Cor 8:13 is concerned especially with idol meat. I am persuaded by his analysis, and 
thus I translate εἰδωλόθυτον (and also the plural, εἰδωλόθυτα) as “food offered to idols.” See also, Joël 
Delobel, “Coherence and Relevance of 1 Cor 8-10” in The Corinthian Correspondence (ed. R. Bieringer; 
Leuven: University Press, 1996), 182-3. While Gordon Fee (Εἰδωλόθυτα, 180-3; First Corinthians, 358-9) 
argued that εἰδωλόθυτα referred specifically to meat eaten in the idol’s temple, Bruce Fisk (“Eating Meat 
Offered to Idols,” 55-8) argues that this focuses the term too narrowly. In my assessment, Fisk’s thesis is 
incorrect. For an explanation of the derogatory connotations of εἰδωλόθυτα for Jewish writers, see 
Fitzmyer, First Corinthians, 337-8. 
25
 Gordon D. Fee, “II Corinthians VI.14-VII.1 and Food Offered to Idols,” NTS 23 (1977): 140-61; 
“Εἰδωλόθυτα Once Again: An Interpretation of 1 Corinthians 8-10,” Biblica 61 (1980): 172-97, esp 179-87. 
See references for Witherington below. 
26
 Witherington also has argued that εἰδωλόθυτα refers to meat sacrificed and eaten in the pagan 
temple precincts in contrast to ἱερόθυτον that is sacrificed in the temple and then eaten in the home. See, 
Ben Witherington III, Conflict and Community in Corinth: A Socio-Rhetorical Commentary on 1 and 2 
Corinthians (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1995), 188-9; “Why Not Idol Meat?” 38-55; “Not So Idle Thoughts 
about EIDOLOTHUTON,” 248-50. The summary of his interpretation is as follows: “It is commonly 
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εἰδωλόθυτα) is a pejorative term that Jews and early Christians used to describe pagan 
cult statues, so εἰδωλόθυτα is not a pagan self-description. The examination of Joseph 
and Asenath in chapter 2 showed that pagan food was closely associated with idols and 
could serve as a boundary marker between faithful Jews and everyone else, including 
pagans and (those deemed to be) unfaithful Jews. While authors like Philo and Josephus 
never directly address food sacrificed to idols, they both defend Jewish dietary 
restrictions. And while Jews could allegorize the dietary laws, there is no evidence that 
Jews dismissed the literal observance of these laws. The combination of their defense of 
food laws and condemnation of idolatry makes it very likely that Philo and Josephus 
would denounce the eating of εἰδωλόθυτα as behavior unfaithful to God.27 Philo and 
                                                                                                                                                                             
assumed that εἰδωλόθυτον is a polemical term created by early Jews to refer to meat sacrificed to a pagan 
god. An exhaustive search of the data in the TLG and in the papyri casts doubts on this hypothesis. All of 
the references to εἰδωλόθυτον in the sources are found in Christian texts, with two exceptions; and both of 
these exceptions may have been influenced by Christian redaction. In any case, it appears that neither of 
these texts antedates the Corinthian correspondence. Thus, this term may have originated in early Jewish 
Christianity. A study of all the NT references to εἰδωλόθυτον reveals that this term in the early period was 
distinguishable from ἱερόθυτον (sacred food), and that it meant meat sacrificed to and eaten in the presence 
of an idol, or in the temple precincts. Numerous reference to εἰδωλόθυτον in the Greek Fathers show that 
Chrysostom and others understood this to be the meaning of the term in Acts 15 and in other contexts. 
Several possible implications of the above are: (1) the Decree in Acts 15 is about Gentiles refraining from 
meals and immorality in pagan temples, not about them keeping a modicum of Jewish, or Noachic food 
laws; (2) 1 Cor. 8-10 reflects Paul's acceptance and implementation of the Decree; (3) Galatians was 
written before the Decree and reflects the struggle that led to the Decree; (4) Paul and James were in basic 
agreement in regard to what Gentiles needed to do to maintain table fellowship with Jewish Christians—
avoid pagan feasts and immorality. Neither imposed circumcision or food laws on Gentiles. The latter was 
the position of the Judaising faction in the Jerusalem Church who were more conservative than James, 
Peter, or Paul. As C. Hill's recent 'Hellenists and Hebrews' shows, F.C. Baur's view of early Christianity is 
no longer adequate” (“Not So Idle Thoughts,” 237). Cf. Paul Douglas Gardner (The Gifts of God and the 
Authentication of the Christian: An Exegetical Study of 1 Corinthians 8-11:1 [Lanham, Md.: University 
Press of America, 1994], 15) who thinks that the term originated with the Apostolic Council. 
27
 See Cheung, Idol Food, 39-81. He summarizes his examination of Jewish texts: “In the minds of 
most Jews, idol food was so inextricably bound up with idolatry that they were instinctively repulsed by it. 
Idol food simply epitomized idol worship. It was no accident that the Jewish attitude toward idol food 
reflected in these sources was more stringent than attitudes concerning other matters which involved at 
least passive contact with idolatry” (77). 
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Josephus represent streams of Jewish interpretation with which Paul would interact as he 
gives instructions to the Corinthian Christians. 
It is unclear whether Paul introduces the Strong’s quotation with the phrase “we 
know that” or if this is part of the quotation by the Strong. This formulaic introduction 
coupled with the content that he will counter makes it likely that this is a quotation of the 
Strong, but this has little bearing on the interpretation.
28
 Thus the Strong defend their 
actions by arguing that everyone has knowledge. The knowledge to which they are 
referring is both the theological proposition (idols are not real because God is one) and 
the ethical conclusion (associations with idols are harmless): “We know that idols do not 
exist, and therefore any interaction with them is harmless.” The argument on the basis of 
shared knowledge is immediately countered by Paul in a three-part refutation: (1) 
“knowledge puffs up but love builds up” (2) “if someone thinks he knows something, he 
does not yet know as he ought to know” (3) “if someone loves God, this one is known by 
                                                          
28
 Many previous scholars read this as a quotation (e.g., Wendell Lee Willis, Idol Meat in Corinth: 
The Pauline Argument in 1 Corinthians 8 and 10 [SBLDS 68; Eugene, Oreg.: Wipf & Stock, 1985], 68; 
Gardner, Gifts, 22; Fotopoulos, Food Offered to Idols, 209). In contrast, Derek Newton (Deity and Diet: 
The Dilemma of Sacrificial Food at Corinth [JSNTSup 169. Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1987], 
289) and Smit (“1 Cor 8,1-6”) argue that 1 Cor 8:1-6 contains no quotations by the Corinthians, but rather 
is Paul’s position. The central dispute, according to Newton, is that Paul and the Corinthians have different 
understandings of εἴδωλον. Smit (“1 Cor 8,1-6,” 583) argues that Paul agrees with the Corinthians that they 
both have knowledge, and that this approach is a prudent acknowledgement of the Corinthians as equal 
partners in the discussion. But this interpretation would appear to put 1 Cor 8:1 in contradiction with 8:7. 
Smit’s explanation is that in 8:1 “Paul addresses the Corinthians who have knowledge. Besides them, or 
among them, he now distinguishes a group of believers who have not yet reached this level of knowledge” 
(“The Rhetorical Disposition,” 479). Smit’s explanation does not account for the bold claim in 8:1 that it is 
“all” who have this knowledge. From 1 Cor 8:7, it is clear that Paul recognizes not “all” have this 
knowledge. While I am unpersuaded by proposals such as Smit and Newton’s, arguing that Paul quotes the 
Corinthians still leaves us with the question of whether or not the Corinthians would recognize these 
quotations. Ciampa and Rosner (First Letter, 374) question if this is a quotation of the Strong or Paul, and 
conclude “The answer would be obvious to the Corinthians but is perhaps unattainable today, and the 
difference does not greatly affect our exegesis once we understand the ways in which Paul both agrees and 
disagrees with those to whom he is responding.” 
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him.”29 Paul’s focus on love probably looks forward to his quotation of Deut 6:4 in 1 Cor 
8:6. Paul uses the same verb for love: ἀγαπάω. The Shema in Deut 6:4 (LXX) is followed 
by the command to love God in 6:5: καὶ ἀγαπήσεις κύριον τὸν θεόν σου. Paul’s point is 
likely that any appeal to the knowledge about God must be understood in light of the 
command to love God. This sets the context of 1 Cor 8-10 to be about God’s people 
commanded to love both God and God’s people.30 Those who know and love God are 
distinct from everyone else, not only in their actions, but also because they are known by 
God. 
vv. 4-5  
Similar to the introduction of the topic in 1 Cor 8:1, the restatement of that topic 
begins with Περὶ … οἴδαμεν ὅτι: “we know that an idol is nothing in the world and that 
there is no God except One.” As in 8:1, this again is probably a statement by the Strong. 
The Strong’s argument involves a positive (there is no God except One) and negative 
assertion (an idol is nothing). At first glance, the logic of the argument is not entirely 
clear. How does the assertion that “an idol is nothing” relate to (or is proved by) the 
assertion that God is one? It would seem that God’s oneness directly relates to the 
plurality of the gods but not necessarily the “nothingness” of the idol. The argument is 
based on the close association between the idol and the god. Erikkson summarizes the 
Strong’s argument: 
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 The movement of the Christian from worshipping non-gods to worshipping God is described by 
Paul as knowing and being known by God (Gal 4:8-9).  
30
 See Ciampa and Rosner, First Letter, 378-9. 
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Major premise  There is only One God, 8:4c 
Minor premise The pagan gods are not real gods, 8:4b 
Conclusion  Therefore, eating idol sacrifices is allowed.
31
 
 
Erikkson’s summary of the argument is correct, but note that the “Minor premise” is 
inferred because 1 Cor 8:4b claims that idols, not pagan gods, are not real or “nothing.” 
The Strong’s argument is based in part on Paul’s theological instruction, but they have 
quite clearly come to different conclusions concerning the acceptability of certain actions. 
Before we analyze the Strong’s conclusion and Paul’s response, we need to understand 
how they are making their argument and the streams of interpretation that feed into it. 
 Foundational to most Hellenistic Jewish and Christian thinking about God was the 
belief that God is one, but this theological proposition resulted in numerous positions 
concerning pagan gods, non-gods, or idols.
32
 What does it mean for an idol to be 
“nothing”? In one sense, Jews and Christians criticized idols because they are 
“something.” At the very least (and in fact, at the very most) pagan idols are material 
objects. But there is only one true God, so these gods must be nothing. Christopher 
Wright explains how the Jewish view of the existence or non-existence of the gods is 
made on the basis of a point of reference:  
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 Eriksson, Traditions, 154; Cf. Fee, “Εἰδωλόθυτα,” 181; Witherington (Conflict and Community, 
186) summarizes similarly, “Only God is God and food is morally neutral. Therefore, eating in temples 
dedicated to so-called gods is harmless.” 
32
 Phua is correct that God’s oneness was a basic Jewish confession, and it was significant for 
Hellenistic Jewish authors. He cites the following (Idolatry and Authority, 131 n. 33): “Ant. 3.91; Spec. 
Leg. 1.30; Op. Mund. 170-2; Conf. Ling. 170-71 and Leg. All. 3.48, 126.”  P. M. Casey (“Monotheism, 
Worship and Christological Development in the Pauline Churches,” in The Jewish Roots of Christological 
Monotheism: Papers from the St. Andrews Conference on the Historical Origins of the Worship of Jesus 
[ed. Carey C. Newman, James R. Davila, and Gladys S. Lewis; Leiden: Brill, 1999], 221-2) notes that the 
Strong are using a strand of interpretation within Jewish monotheism to justify their actions.  
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So, coming back to the question, are the gods something or nothing? If asked in 
relation to YHWH, the answer has to be nothing. Nothing whatsoever compares 
with YHWH, or stands in the same category as he does … But if the question is 
asked in relation to those who worship the other gods—whether the nations who 
claim them as their own national deities or even in relation to the temptation that 
Israel faced to “go after” them—then the answer can certainly be something. The 
gods of the nations, with their names, statues, myths and cults, clearly do have an 
existence in the life, culture and history of those who treat them as their gods … 
They are nothing in relation to YHWH; they are something in relation to their 
worshippers.
33
  
 
Jews and Christians recognized both that pagans worshipped non-real gods and that these 
gods really existed in the minds and cultic worship of the pagans.  
The singular existence of God is shown to be true by comparison to the 
“nothingness” of idols: οὐδὲν εἴδωλον ἐν κόσμῳ (1 Cor 8:4). One Jewish interpretation of 
idolatry (See my discussion of De decalogo and the Wisdom of Solomon) argued that 
pagan idols are the pagan gods, and because the gods do not exist, the idols are nothing 
real. The idol, and thus the god, is merely the material of which it is composed (and is 
more useful for lighting a fire than it is for worshipping). Paul, Philo, and the author of 
Wisdom drew heavily on the Psalms and Prophets (especially texts like Isaiah 40-44; Jer 
10; Psalms 77, 105, and 115) in order to criticize pagans as worshipping idols 
themselves. These texts equate the god and the idol. Some have criticized Jews and early 
Christians as approaching pagan idols with a naïve understanding because even pagans 
would recognize that idols were the work of human hands (and certain craftsman were 
even very well-respected). The Jewish and I think the Pauline understanding of gods and 
                                                          
33
 Christopher J. H. Wright, The Mission of God: Unlocking the Bible’s Grand Narrative 
(Downers Grove, Ill.: IVP Academic, 2006), 139. See also Fitzmyer, First Corinthians, 342. 
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idols, however, was not based on naiveté, but rather was a criticism founded in the way 
that pagan’s themselves understood their idols. Several Septuagintal texts make a clear 
distinction between the image and the god, which indicates that at least some Jews 
understood the distinction. Clearest is the statement attributed to Gideon’s father, “And 
Joash said to the men who were standing against him [i.e. Gideon], ‘Are you acting as 
judges on behalf of Baal? Or are you saving him? ... If he is god, he himself will judge 
him [i.e. Gideon] because he tore down his altar’” (Judges 6:31 LXX; see also 3 
Kingdoms 18:27). The author indicates that there is a distinction between the god and the 
image/idol because the god should defend his image. Even the context of Isaiah 44 
(which was foundational for Paul, Philo, and Wisdom) recognizes the distinction between 
the image and the god.
34
 If Jews and Christians really do understand that the pagans do 
not equate their gods with the images of their gods, then why do they claim that the gods 
are not real because they are merely material? The Jewish, and thus Christian, critique 
rests on the belief that both the idols (see De decalogo and the Wisdom of Solomon) and 
the gods (see Contra Apionem) are the creations of the human imagination. Christopher 
Wright summarizes this critique well: 
The Israelites, fully aware of what idols were supposed to signify among those 
who bowed down before them, nevertheless castigated them as “the work of 
                                                          
34
 The distinction between gods and their images is clearer in the Masoretic text of Isaiah 46:1 
than it is in the Septuagint. The Septuagint reads: “Baal has fallen, and Dagon is broken; their carvings (τὰ 
γλυπτὰ αὐτῶν) have become for beasts and cattle (i.e. they must be carried by cattle because the gods are 
not able to carry their images). You carry them bound as a burden for the weary one…” (Isa 46:1 LXX). 
The Masoretic text reads, “Bel bows down and Nebo bends down; their idols have become for beasts and 
cattle; these things are carried as burdens on weary animals” (Isaiah 46:1 MT). In the Masoretic text, there 
is almost the sense that the gods are crouching down to steady their idols that are being carried by oxen. 
But the Septuagint describes the gods as fallen and broken.  
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human hands.” What then did this signify for the gods that the idols represented? 
The radical conclusion has to be that the psalmists and prophets make no 
distinction between the images and the gods they represented—not because they 
did not know that such a distinction was there in the minds of pagan worshippers 
but because ultimately there was no such distinction in reality.
35
  
 
Even though, for example, Asklepios was “so-called a god” by the pagans, the only real 
existence that Asklepios had was in the imagination of the pagan and the physical 
representation in the idol. Thus Philo, Wisdom, Paul, and the Strong can argue that the 
god is only the idol, the idol is nothing, and therefore the god is nothing. This is why a 
common form of criticizing pagan gods is to label them to be the “work of human 
hands.”36 
There is, however, a difference in the way Paul and the Strong understand the 
non-existence of idol-gods. As we have seen in preceding chapters (especially chapter 2 
with the comparison between Joseph and Asenath and Artapanus Fragment 3), the 
agreement that gods do not exist can result in radically different theological and ethical 
interpretations of how to interact with idols. Subsequent correction and instruction by 
Paul will get to the heart of the matter concerning the implications of the non-existence of 
idols. The problem addressed in 1 Cor 8 is that the actions of the Strong have the 
                                                          
35
 Wright, The Mission of God, 151. 
36
 See especially my discussions of Philo and Wisdom in chapters 3 and 4. This interpretation is 
especially important to understand a text like 4 Kingdoms 19:17-18 (2 Kings 19:17-18; cf. Ps 113:12 LXX 
[115:4]): “Truly, Lord, the kings of the Assyrians have desolated the nations and they gave their gods into 
the fire because they were not gods but the work of human hands (ἔργα χειρῶν ἀνθρώπων), wood and 
stone, and they destroyed them.” One way to describe idols (and thus pagan gods) is to combine the terms 
for “hands” with another root meaning “make” or ‘form” (e.g., χειροποίητος: Wis 14:8; χειροκμήτος: 
Decal. 66), but it is even more common to describe the process of making idols (e.g., Psalm 135:15-18; Isa 
44:9-20; Jer 10:3-14; Hos 8:4-6; 13:2; Hab 2:18-19; Wis 13:10-19; 14:8-31; Decal. 66-76; C. Ap. 2.252-3). 
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potential to “destroy” the Weak (1 Cor 8:11). Paul will later argue that despite the non-
existence of the idol, there is still a demonic reality behind it (1 Cor 10:20). The Strong 
admit that many people continue to recognize other deities, and thus the Strong state that 
“even if there are those called gods, either in heaven or on earth.” A parallel to the idea of 
pagan deities being “so-called gods” (οὐδὲν εἴδωλον … εἴπερ εἰσὶν λεγόμενοι θεοὶ; 1 Cor 
8:4…5) is found in Wisdom 15:15, where the idols of the nations are called gods (πάντα 
τὰ εἴδωλα τῶν ἐθνῶν ἐλογίσαντο θεούς). According to Wisdom, associations with idols 
are to be avoided, even though Wisdom makes no mention of a demonic presence. The 
danger of idolatry in Wisdom (even without claiming their association with demons) is 
that God will punish both the idols and the idolater. With the corrective phrase “as there 
are many so-called gods and many lords,” Paul reinforces that there are indeed things 
claimed by worshippers to be gods (which he will later explain are connected to 
demons).
37
 By labelling them as “so-called gods” he acknowledges both their non-deity 
(people only call them gods) and their existence in the world (which he will claim is 
related to demonic activity).  
                                                          
37
 Fitzmyer (First Corinthians, 341; cf. 342), for example, argues that Paul makes a concession for 
the sake of argument: “Although idols are nonentities, many people subjectively consider them to be really 
existent…” See the argument for “gods” and “lords” being synonymous by Bruce W. Winter, “Theological 
and Ethical Responses to Religious Pluralism—1 Corinthians 8-10,” TynBul 41(1990): 2147-5. 
Witherington (Conflict and Community in Corinth, 188-9) thinks that “gods” references traditional pagan 
deities and “lords” probably refers to those imported from the eastern part of the Empire such as Isis and 
Serapis. Some think that this is the position only of the Strong as they look at the surrounding pagan 
practices. See Fotopoulos, Food Offered, 212; Thiselton, First Corinthians, 632. Witherington summarizes 
this section well: “His view is that though the ‘gods’ are not gods, there are demons present, using pagan 
feasts in temples to prey upon unsuspecting people. In fact, the sacrifices are offered unwittingly to demons 
(10:20f.). Thus in a limited sense Paul allows that there are “many gods and lords” (8:5). Supernatural evil 
powers use pagan religion to lead people away from the true God. The idols themselves are dumb and 
nothing, but they are used by the powers of darkness to enslave human minds and hearts” (Conflict and 
Community in Corinth, 188). 
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v. 6  
The origins of 1 Cor 8:6 are strongly debated. The formulaic elements and 
structure similar to the Shema seem to indicate that it is an early confessional formula.
38
 
While the Shema certainly provides a theological basis for this confession, the confession 
also contains more developed elements that likely rely on pre-existing Jewish interactions 
with Stoic and Platonic thought (analogous to the way that Philo was applying Stoic and 
Platonic philosophy to his conception of God).
39
 The fact that verse 6 is conversant with 
Hellenistic Judaism at a sophisticated level makes it likely that Paul brought this 
                                                          
38
 Most scholars think 1 Cor 8:6 is a confessional formula (e.g., Schrage, Der erste Brief, 2.241; 
Fotopoulos, Food Offered, 213; Phua, Idolatry and Authority, 132).  Some also think it is pre-Pauline, (e.g., 
Conzelmann, First Corinthians, 144; Fitzmyer, First Corinthians, 336). Some specify this pre-Pauline 
formula to be a baptismal formula (e.g., Rainer Kerst, “1 Kor 8,6: ein vorpaulinisches Taufbekenntnis?” 
ZNW 66 [1975]: 130-9; Jerome Murphy-O’Connor, “1 Cor., VIII, 6: Cosmology or Soteriology?” RB 85 
[1978]: 254-9. James Dunn (Christology in the Making: A New Testament Inquiry into the Origins of the 
Doctrine of the Incarnation [2
nd
 ed.; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1989], 179-81) thinks there are pre-Pauline 
elements that Paul compiled and arranged specifically to address the situation at Corinth. Scholars have 
also proposed several backgrounds for the confessional formula: Stoicism (e.g., Conzelmann, First 
Corinthians, 144-5), Hellenistic Judaism (e.g., Richard A. Horsley, “The Background of the Confessional 
Formula in 1 Kor 8:6” ZNW 69 [1978]: 130-35; “Consciousness and Freedom,” 574-89; Helmut Merklein, 
Der erste Brief an die Korinther: Kapitel 5,1-11,1 [ÖTK 7.2; Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus, 2000], 
2.188), Gnosticism (Walter Schmithals, Gnosticism in Corinth: an Investigation of the Letters to the 
Corinthians [Nashville: Abingdon, 1971]). In more recent scholarship, the possibility of a Gnostic 
background is not taken as a serious possibility. This is due in a large part to the dating of First Corinthians 
compared to gnostic texts. 
39
 The clearest explanation of Jewish interaction with Stoic and Platonic conceptions of God is 
Gregory Sterling “Prepositional Metaphysics in Jewish Wisdom Speculation and Early Christian Liturgical 
Texts.” Studia Philonica 9 (1997): 219-238. Sterling suspects that “Stoic and Platonic formulations of 
prepositional metaphysics found their way into Jewish synagogue liturgies in association with both 
attempts to present God in philosophical categories and in Wisdom speculations” (237). Sterling 
demonstrates how Greco-Roman authors were making arguments about the nature of God through the 
careful use of prepositions, and that Christians seem to have interacted with these arguments in order to 
describe the nature of God and Christ. With regard to 1 Cor 8:6, Sterling understands the cosmological 
description of God to be reliant on Stoic formulations while the soteriological description of Christ to be 
reliant on Platonic formulations: “Perhaps an early Christian—whether it was Paul or the author of a 
confession he was citing—used the Stoic formula for God and then balanced it with the Platonic formula 
for Christ” (236). I am not entirely convinced that Paul understood Christ in a way similar to Platonic 
understandings of the Logos, but Sterling does point to the careful formulation of Christian theology that 
relied on a Jewish tradition shaped by years of interactions with Greco-Roman thought.  
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confessional formula to Corinth, and it was part of his instruction. Whether or not it is a 
baptismal confession is hard to say. The Strong have likely appealed to this foundational, 
shared teaching to support their claims, especially those claims articulated in 1 Cor 8:4. 
The Strong seem to argue from the Oneness of God that idols are non-existent, and 
therefore associations with them are harmless.  
The confessional formula begins: “But for us there is one God the Father, from 
whom all things exist and we exist for him” (1 Cor 8:6a). Central to Jewish and early 
Christian theology was the oneness, and thus singularity, of God (see my “Theological 
Synthesis” in chapters 3, 4, and 5). Divine oneness is the belief that makes the plurality of 
gods an absurd categorical mistake because only One Being is within the category of 
God. Wisdom, Philo, Josephus, and Paul share the belief in God’s oneness.40  
The One God is then described as Father, who is the Creator of all things.
41
 This 
representation of God describes both God’s relationship with the whole world (ἐξ οὗ τὰ 
πάντα) and God’s relationship with this particular people (ἡμεῖς εἰς αὐτόν). While the 
Scriptures can use Fatherhood language in reference to both of these relationships, Philo, 
especially, used the representation of God as Father to describe God’s creative role (in 
                                                          
40
 See especially, Wis 13:1; Decal. 58-9; C. Ap. 2.167; 2.239. In addition to the Shema, Isaiah 40-
44 is an important text in the Septuagint on which these authors drew. In Isaiah, God’s oneness is 
demonstrated by him being the only Creator and the only Savior of Israel (e.g., Isa 43:10-11; 44:6). 
41
 In Pauline texts, the idea of God’s Fatherhood is not elaborated or explained. It appears most 
often in epistolary openings and describes the Father’s unique relationship to Christ (e.g., Rom 1:7; 1 Cor 
1:3; 2 Cor 1:2, 3; Gal 1:1, 3, 4; Eph 1:2, 3; Phil 1:2; Col 1:2, 3; 1 Thess 1:3; 2 Thess 1:1, 2; 1 Tim 1:2; 2 
Tim 1:2; Tit 1:4; Phlm 3). 
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contrast to inactive idols).
42
 Hellenistic Jewish authors, especially represented in Philo, 
repeat the anthropomorphic images for God, such as Father, but reappropriate them to 
speak of God’s universal Fatherhood as the Creator who generated all things. 43 While the 
confession is 1 Cor 8:6a emphasizes creation in reference to God as Father, it is not as 
narrow as in Philo. 
Also in contrast to these Jewish authors, Paul can talk of the active presence of 
Christ through whom Christians have come to new life and in whom they continue to live 
out that life: “And there is one Lord Jesus Christ, through whom all things exist and we 
exist through him” (1 Cor 8:6b). Paul does not think that the inclusion of Christ in this 
confession compromises his commitment to the oneness of God.
44
 He can still confess 
and teach that “there is one God, the Father.” Throughout First Corinthians, Paul speaks 
about God as if there is only one God, often using the noun with the definite article that 
admits of no other gods. All the occurrences of θεός in First Corinthians occur as ὁ θεός  
                                                          
42
 For Philo and Wisdom’s representation of God as Father, see chapters 3 and 4, especially Ch. 3 
n. 74. When the Scriptures speak of God as the Father to a particular people, the context relates God’s 
begetting of the people to his acts of salvation, most notably the exodus. In some texts, God is specifically 
described as Father of his people: Deut 32:6; Isa 63:16; 64:7 (64:8) Jer 3:4, 19; 38:9 (31:9) Mal 2:10. In 
other texts, God’s Fatherhood is implied by the description of God’s people as God’s son: Exod 4:22-23; 
Isa 32:6; 44:1-2; 63:8; Hos 11:1. In addition to God’s relationship as Father to the nation, 2 Sam 7:14 
promises that God will be a forgiving Father to David and his descendants. In Paul’s prohibition of idolatry 
in 2 Cor 6:14-7:1, he represents God as Father of God’s people by alluding to 2 Sam 7:14. Paul modifies 
his allusion to include all believers in Christ as “sons and daughters” whereas 2 Sam 7:14 more narrowly 
addressed David and his descendants. Paul’s argument frames  God’s Fatherhood in relationship with a 
particular people, but then Paul adds that the Father is the Lord Almighty, a description of God’s power 
over all things. 
43
 See ch. 4; cf. Ciampa and Rosner, First Letter, 383; Schrage, Der Erste Brief, 2.222-5.  
44
 Philo, while remaining wholly committed to the oneness of God, can also admit that there are 
other divine beings that are not to be identified as God: the logos, powers of God, and angels.  
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with the exception of 1 Cor 8:4 and 8:6 where God’s oneness is already emphasized in 
the context.
45
 The radical impact of Paul’s experience of Christ is evident especially in 1 
Cor 8:6b. The most striking difference between Paul’s and other Hellenistic Jewish 
authors’ beliefs in the oneness of God is that Paul thinks the Lord Jesus Christ is a divine 
being who performs deeds that only God can do.
46
 These two theological strands (the 
oneness of God and the divine attributes of Christ) converge in the confession that seems 
to be shared by Paul, the Strong, and the Weak.  
                                                          
45
 I interpret θεός in 1 Cor 8:4 to be a reference to another god, and thus it is not a reference to 
God: “there is no god except the One (God)” (οὐδεὶς θεὸς εἰ μὴ εἷς). This interpretation is supported by the 
scribal insertion of ἑτερος following θεός.  In 1 Cor 8:6, the article is replaced by the adjective εἷς: “there is 
One God, the Father” (εἷς θεὸς ὁ πατήρ). Paul’s overriding preference is to use θεός with the article. There 
are three places where in the confessional formula, dependent on the Shema, Paul simply writes εἷς θεός (1 
Cor 8:6; Eph 4:6; 1 Tim 2:5; cf. the prayer with the debated article in 2 Thess 2:16). The other nominative 
construction that sometimes omits the article is θεός + (ἐστιν) +  ὁ nominative noun (Rom 8:33; Phil 2:13; 
1 Thess 2:5). The two other instances of the nominative θεός without the article are 2 Cor 5:19 and Gal 6:7. 
In other cases, most prominently the genitive, θεός appears with or without the article, and there is no 
apparent distinction between the two. 
46
 In First Corinthians, the most common descriptions of Jesus are Christ and the Lord. “Jesus” is 
used, but it always occurs with another title except in the example of non-spiritual response in 1 Cor 12:3. 
At the outset in 1 Cor 1:1-4 Paul describes an close connection between Jesus and God with the dense 
sequence of names: Christ Jesus, God, God Christ Jesus, Lord Jesus Christ, God, Lord Jesus Christ. Jesus 
and God cooperated in the calling of Paul (1:1), forming the church in Corinth (1:2), and sending grace and 
peace to the Corinthians. There still appears to be some hierarchical relationship between God and Christ 
(e.g., 3:23; 11:3). The prominent Old Testament theme of the Day of the Lord has now been transferred to 
the near return of Christ (1:7-8; 4:5; cf. 16:22). When Paul appeals to an authority, he appeals to the Lord 
Jesus Christ, not to God (1:10), and Jesus (described as “Christ” or “Lord”) is understood to be an active 
presence among the community (5:3-5; 10:16, 21; 11:27-32). And it is the Lord who sovereignly directs 
Paul’s travels. Below are some of the descriptions of the Lord Jesus Christ in 1 Corinthians: 
Christ: 1:1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13, 17, 23, 24, 30; 2:2, 16; 3:1, 11, 23; 4:1, 4, 5, 10, 15, 17; 
5:7, 15; 7:22; 8:6, 11, 12; 9:12, 21; 10:4, 9, 16; 11:1, 3, 29; 12:12, 27; 15:3, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 
20, 22, 23, 27, 31, 57; 16:24.  
Lord: 1:2, 3, 7, 8, 9, 10, 31; 2:8, 16, 19, 5:3, 4, 5; 6:2, 11, 13, 14, 17; 7:25, 32, 34, 35; 8:6; 9:1, 5; 
10:21; 22, 26; 11:1, 20, 23, 27, 32; 12:3, 5; 15:31, 57, 58; 16:1, 7, 10, 15, 22, 23. 
Son: 1:9; 15:28. 
Wisdom of God: 1:24, 30 
Power of God: 1:24. 
Passover Lamb: 5:7. 
Righteousness, holiness, redemption: 1:30. 
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In 1 Cor 8:11-12; 10:9, and 10:11-22, Paul will prohibit certain actions because 
they are affronts to Christ who saved them. In chapters 8-10, the role of Christ is 
primarily stressed as soteriological. Likewise, the confession in 1 Cor 8:6 emphasizes 
Christ’s soteriological role (esp. the title Χριστὸς and the phrase ἡμεῖς διʼ αὐτοῦ), but it 
also ascribes a creative role to Christ (διʼ οὗ τὰ πάντα).47 Paul connects the ideas of 
creation and redemption both in the connection between the Father (Creator) and Christ 
(Savior) and also in the two roles of Christ (in creation and redemption). God’s role as 
the Creator was fundamental to Jewish thought and served especially in idol polemics to 
deny the existence of other gods because God is the unique Creator. In texts like Isaiah 
40-44, the fact that God is the only Creator is used to argue that God is the only Savior in 
which Israel should trust. But Paul does not focus on defining the category of God and 
then describing how other so-called gods do not qualify. Rather, he focuses on uniquely 
divine actions and their impact that has already been realized in the community. 
While Paul and the Corinthians could agree to the confession in 1 Cor 8:6, they 
came to markedly different conclusions concerning the practical entailments. The fact 
that this confession may well have originated with Paul and captures some of the most 
                                                          
47
 Jerome Murphy-O’Connor (“1 Cor., VIII, 6: Cosmology or Soteriology?,” 253-67) argues for an 
exclusively soteriological role for Christ. Similarly Dunn (Christology in the Making, 180) argues that Paul 
places emphasis on Christ’s soteriological role, but his point is to connect the Corinthians’ experience of 
spiritual salvation to their responsibility to God as Creator. In contrast, Gordon Fee (Pauline Christology: 
An Exegetical-Theological Study [Peabody, Mass.: Hendrickson, 2007], 92) thinks that Paul views “Christ 
as the ‘one Lord’ through whom both creation and redemption were effected.” So also Larry Hurtado (Lord 
Jesus Christ: Devotion to Jesus in Earliest Christianity [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2005], 123): “In another 
tantalizingly brief passage, 1 Corinthians 8:6, Jesus is explicitly identified as the one ‘through whom (are) 
all things and we through him.’ That is, Jesus here is linked with God, and the repetition of the 
prepositional phrases ‘through’ (dia) makes emphatic his role as agent in creation as well as redemption.” 
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basic and shared theology of the community makes it a particularly persuasive basis for 
an argument. Although the Strong think that this basic confession validates their actions, 
Paul also will base his argument on the theology of this confession. By quoting the 
confession, the Strong appeal to the oneness of God and God’s uniqueness in not being 
threatened by false gods, whereas Paul will emphasize the dynamic soteriological role of 
Christ (in chapter 8 with respect to other saved Corinthians and in chapter 10 with respect 
to provoking the Savior to jealousy). Paul will explain that (1) believers exist through 
Christ in a salvific relationship, (2) that salvific relationship places them in a community, 
and (3) there are certain demands on their actions on account of both (1) and (2).  
It seems that Paul quotes this confession for two primary reasons. First, the 
confession forms the primary argumentative basis for the Strong, and Paul intends to 
refute their argument. Second and related to the first, Paul wants to show how this 
confession is to be understood properly and how they should live in light of it. Paul is 
trying to put Corinthian actions in a wider context; namely, Paul wants them to 
understand the importance of Jesus’ lordship as a filter for their actions. In effect what 
Paul has done is to state that he too has this γνῶσις and that he too affirms the central 
monotheistic confession. In turning to verse 7, he begins to refute the ethical conclusions 
that they have drawn from their claimed γνῶσις. 
v. 7  
Paul and the Strong agree concerning the truthfulness of the confessional material 
in 1 Cor 8:6. Despite the Strong’s claim that everyone has the knowledge of God’s 
Oneness and therefore the non-existence of other so-called gods, Paul rebuts (indicated 
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by the use of the adversative ἀλλά) that not everyone has this knowledge.48 The Strong’s 
actions have harmed the συνείδησις (probably best translated as moral conscience) of the 
Weak.
49
 Their conscience is harmed both by committing an act that goes against their 
understanding of faithfulness to God and by committing a morally reprehensible act (1 
Cor 8:10). Here Paul focuses on the first manner that the Strong have harmed the 
conscience of the Weak. Paul argues that (recently converted?) Weak’s history of 
worshipping pagan gods and eating food sacrificed to the gods make them prone to 
misunderstanding the implications of the Strong’s actions. In their conversion to belief in 
Christ, they probably envisioned a break with pagan worship, and now the Weak viewed 
participation in pagan worship as a violation of their faithfulness to Christ. The Weak’s 
past association with idols meant that any association with idols at all (even if they 
acknowledged God alone as God) polluted their moral conscience.  
Richard Phua correctly summarizes the Strong’s position: “It appears that the 
‘strong’ possess the knowledge that all things come from the one God, which obviously 
includes food, even idol-meat. And since idols are nothing and insignificant, and since 
                                                          
48
 David Horrell (“Theological Principle or Christological Praxis? Pauline Ethics in 1 Corinthians 
8:1-11:1,” JSNT 67 [1997], 89) appropriately summarizes what Paul means by “knowledge”: “What he 
does perhaps mean is that not all possess this knowledge in a way that convinces them of the non-reality of 
idols and of the consequent acceptability of idol-food—in this sense they do not have the gnosis of the 
strong.” It is not simply that they do not have the theological knowledge that God is one. It is that they do 
not draw the appropriate conclusions from that. See also David G. Horrell, “Idol-Food, Idolatry and Ethics 
in Paul” in Idolatry: False Worship in the Bible, Early Judaism and Christianity (ed. Stephen C. Barton; 
New York: T & T Clark, 2007), 120-140.  
49
 For a detailed study of συνείδησις in Hellenistic Jewish literature, especially Philo, see Richard 
A. Horsley, “Consciousness and Freedom among the Corinthians: 1 Cor 8-10,” CBQ 40 (1978): 574-89; cf. 
Jerome Murphy-O’Connor, “Freedom of the Ghetto (1 Corinthians 8:1-13; 10:23-11:1)” in Keys to First 
Corinthians (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 127-8; Gregory W. Dawes “The Danger of Idolatry: 
First Corinthians 8:7-13,” CBQ 58 [1996]: 98). 
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God is the one who has created all things, it is perfectly right for the ‘strong’ to eat idol 
meat.”50 What is intriguing about the Strong’s position is that it bears strong similarity to 
Paul’s own position in 1 Cor 10:26. As we will see in the analysis of 1 Cor 10, the 
differences between these positions are that Paul refuses to participate in worship at the 
idol temple (because it could provoke the Lord to jealousy) and Paul is more concerned 
about the effect of his actions on other believers than his freedom. In chapter 8, Paul 
argues primarily along the grounds of communal love; whereas, in chapter 10, he will 
correct these actions of the Strong that he labels as acts of idolatry. 
v. 8  
First Corinthians 8:8 argues for the moral and theological neutrality of food: 
“food will not make us stand before God” (cf. 1 Cor 10:25-26).51 The questions are 
twofold: is this a quotation of the Strong and does Paul agree with it. Even if it is not a 
quotation by the Strong, it is certainly a position with which they would agree. The 
change from third person to first person probably indicates a shift of speaker in which 
Paul is quoting the Corinthians.
52
 Moreover, the content of 1 Cor 8:8 has some parallels 
                                                          
50
 Phua, Idolatry and Authority, 133. 
51
 Most commentators interpret παρίστημι to have a negative connotation that is to be avoided and 
thus interpret the phrase as standing before God in judgment. Another interpretation is to think of this in a 
cultic context as standing before the altar of God with the effect that food does not achieve a positive thing 
(ability to stand before God in cultic worship). See Charles H. Giblin, “Three Monotheisitc Texts in Paul,” 
CBQ 37 (1975), 536-7. Whichever interpretation one takes, the point of the statement is that food has no 
bearing on it (regardless of the “it” representing a positive cultic standing or a negative summons to 
judgment). Jerome Murphy-O’Connor (“Food and Spiritual Gifts in 1 Corinthians 8:8,” CBQ 41 [1979]: 
292-8) argues that 1 Cor 8:8 is a quotation of the Strong, and he prefers the minority text: “we are no better 
off if we do not eat, and no worse off if we do.” His position is to read the Corinthians as arguing for the 
absolute moral neutrality of food. 
52
 See Fitzmyer, First Corinthians, 345. 
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with what is most likely a quotation from the Corinthians in 1 Cor 6:13.
53
 So it is most 
likely a quotation of the Strong. But does Paul agree with it?  
If one takes the stance that Paul agrees with this assertion, the claim would be that 
because God alone is God, God is not in any way threatened by food that has been 
associated with non-gods. Thus, the danger of food associated with idols would not be 
that it is an affront to God; rather, one’s interaction with this food has implications for 
how other believers understand these non-gods. The major problem with this 
interpretation is that in 1 Cor 10:1-22 Paul seems to argue that food can indeed have a 
bearing on one’s standing before God. If one takes the stance that this is a position of the 
Strong with which Paul disagrees, then verse 9 becomes the beginning of Paul’s 
refutation of the Strong’s position in verse 8. Paul then continues to refute the Strong’s 
position (i.e. that food has no bearing on one’s standing before God) in chapter 10. The 
Strong assert that food is a matter of indifference before God and thus Christians are not 
better off for eating or abstaining as far as God is concerned. This position of the Strong 
seems to be consistent with their theological reasoning: God is unassailable and One and 
thus idols are non-existent and harmless (cf. 1 Cor 8:4). This position, however, does not 
seem consistent with Paul’s theological reasoning: God is unassailable and One, but 
demons are behind idols and Christ is offended by Christians participating with demons. 
Fotopoulos summarizes,  
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 “Food is for the stomach and stomach is for food, and God will destroy both the one and the 
other” (1 Cor 6:13). 
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“The apostle vividly demonstrates from Israel’s history and from the meaning of 
pagan cultic meals that the consumption of sacrificial food connotes partnership 
with the pagan gods who are demons. Food then, in this case idol-food, does have 
great significance for someone’s relationship with God. Hence, from Paul’s 
perspective consuming idol-food is not an adiaphoron.”54  
 
Due to Paul’s argument in 1 Cor 10:1-22 in which the eating of this food is described as a 
matter of faithfulness to Christ, I agree with Fotopoulos that Paul thinks food has 
consequences for one’s standing before God.   
There is also the question concerning whether 1 Cor 8:8b-c (“Neither are we 
worse off if we do not eat, nor are we better off if we do eat.”) is Paul’s correction of the 
Strong’s position or if it is a continuation of the Strong’s position. Fotopoulos thinks that 
the Strong were advocating for Christians to consume idol-food, and they would not 
agree that “neither are we worse off if we do not eat, nor are we better off if we do not 
eat.”55 I disagree with Fotopoulos. The Strong want to assert the indifference of food as it 
affects their relationship with God, and therefore they think that they are permitted to eat, 
even if their motivation is social expediency. As far as it relates to their standing before 
God, the Strong are eager to claim that food has no effect. But the Strong are also 
interested in defending their own practice of eating this food, which was socially and 
economically expedient for them. Recall that feasts in temples were not exclusively, or 
perhaps even primarily, religious functions; rather, they were often parties comprised of 
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 Fotopoulos, Food Offered, 217.  
55
 Fotopoulos, Food Offered, 217-8. Ciampa and Rosner (First Letter, 368, 389) interpret the 
verse: “We’ll be worse off if we do not eat and better if we do since we will offend our friends and 
neighbors (and hurt our chances of social advancement by building relationships with potential patrons) if 
we snub them by rejecting their invitations or their food.” 
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guilds, business associates, and families. The Strong were less concerned with advocating 
that other Christians should consume food sacrificed to idols. Their concern was to 
defend their own freedom.
56
 In verse 9, Paul will respond that food is not an issue of 
indifference. Paul thinks that Christians would not be worse off for abstaining—they 
would actually be far better off.  
v. 9  
Paul rebuts the Strong with a warning that their actions have serious effects on 
other Christians. Their knowledge “puffed them up” so that they were not acting in love 
toward their fellow believers. There is a contrast between the actions of the Strong (that 
cause a brother to stumble; 8:9) and Paul’s actions (that are careful not to cause a brother 
to stumble; 9:12).
57
 One question concerns the idea of the Strong’s ἐξουσία (right). Do 
they have a legitimate Christian “right” to eat food sacrificed to idols, or does Paul use 
this term as a concession to prove a point? Many scholars have argued that Paul agrees 
with the Strong’s legitimate claim to eat food sacrificed to idols.58 Arguing that the 
Strong have a legitimate ἐξουσία to eat food sacrificed to idols, however, is at odds with 
Paul’s discussion of idolatry in 1 Cor 10:1-22 where he argues that this activity offends 
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 Note the repeated references to freedom, but the idea of moral compulsion does not appear. The 
Strong do not seem to care if the Weak participate in feasts so long as their “freedom” to do so is not 
hindered. 
57
 Both Wisdom 14:11 and Psalm 105:36 (LXX) use the term σκάνδαλον in their polemics against 
idolatry. But in both these cases, it is the idol itself, not the actions of someone else, that become the 
stumbling block. In Wisdom, idols are a σκάνδαλον to pagans; whereas, in Psalm 105, idols are a 
σκάνδαλον to God’s people. 
58
 E.g., Witherington, Conflict and Community, 199. 
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Christ. Moreover, ἐξουσία seems to be a word emphasized by the Corinthians when they 
sought to justify a particular action. Their emphasis on ἐξουσία explains why Paul spends 
chapter 9 explaining what it means to exercise Christian rights and what things are 
genuinely rights of the Christian. It is better to interpret this as Paul not thinking that they 
have a legitimate right to eat food sacrificed to idols. Paul does not validate that the 
Strong have a legitimate right; rather, he only recognizes (somewhat tongue-in-cheek) 
that they claim to have this right. He entertains this pseudo-right to show that even if food 
were a matter of Christian indifference, it would still cause a brother to sin and thus 
offend Christ.  
1 Cor 8:10-13 
Paul is concerned that the Weak would witness the Strong’s nonchalant attitude 
toward εἰδωλόθυτα and be tempted to participate in idolatry in some way. The primary 
issue seems to be that the Strong are dining (or wanting to dine) in an idol’s temple (ἐν 
εἰδωλείῳ κατακείμενον; 1 Cor 8:10).59 The most likely temple in which to dine at Corinth 
was the Asklepieion.
60
 Knowing that Asklepios did not really exist, the Strong reasoned 
that attending meals hosted by pagans at the temple of Asklepios should not be an issue. 
In 1 Cor 10 Paul will show how attending this meal in the idol’s temple is a theological 
problem, but here he shows how it is a problem of not loving one’s brother because the 
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 Fee (First Corinthians, 359) is a staunch proponent of the view, with which I agree, that the 
problem throughout 1 Corinthians 8-10 is the desire of the Strong to eat sacrificial food at cultic meals with 
a secondary issue being food sold in a marketplace. 
60
 See Fotopoulos, Food Offered, 49-155. 
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brother will think that eating food sacrificed to idols is an acceptable practice. The action 
of the Weak brother eating food sacrificed to idols is understood by Paul to be 
destructive: “this ‘weak’ person—the brother for whom Christ died—is destroyed by 
your knowledge.” Paul reframes this affront to one’s brother as an affront to Christ 
himself: “you sin against Christ” (1 Cor 8:12). The force of Paul’s argument rests with 
the intimate association between Christ and the one who believes in Christ. When one 
believer acts in a way that harms another believer, the former has actually sinned against 
Christ.  
Paul’s conclusion in 1 Cor 8:13 provides his reasoning for all of chapter 9. He 
concludes by stating that “if food makes my brother stumble, I will never again eat meat, 
so that I will not make my brother stumble.” Paul does not use the term εἰδωλόθυτα (food 
sacrificed to idols) that he has used throughout his argument. Rather, he uses the more 
general terms βρῶμα (food) and κρέας (meat). Paul’s point is to make an argument from 
the greater to the lesser. If Paul is willing to give up even common meat, how much more 
should the Strong be willing to give up meat that is associated with idols (and as Paul will 
argue in chapter 10, is associated with demons)? That is, if Paul is willing to give up 
something that is both a right and a good thing, how much more should the Strong be 
willing to give up something that is neither a right nor a good thing. In chapter 9, Paul 
will argue from his own example that as he gives up even a legitimate right for the sake 
of others, the Strong should be willing to give a pseudo-right for the sake of others.  
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1 Cor 9:1-27 
The role of chapter 9 in the flow of chapters 8-10 has caused a great deal of 
debate with some arguing that it is misplaced in the reception of First Corinthians. The 
treatment here will be brief because this section does not contain representations of God 
or an understanding of false worship. Nevertheless, it does form an integral piece of 
Paul’s argument, and its function must be ascertained. Many who argue for the coherence 
of chapters 8-10 also argue that chapter 9 is an apology. The opening verses indicate that 
Paul intends to defend his apostleship, even if that is not his primary purpose:  
Am I not free? Am I not an apostle? Have I not seen Jesus our Lord? Are you not 
[the result of] my work in the Lord? Even if I am not an apostle to others, 
certainly I am for you. Indeed you are the seal of my apostleship in the Lord. This 
is my apology to those who would judge me (1 Cor 9:1-3).  
 
The verses that follow indicate that some of the questioning came about because of Paul’s 
refusal to accept material support. Paul asserts that it was his right to receive material 
support (9:3-14), but he has forgone this right for the greater good of preaching the 
gospel without being hindered (9:15-23). This has led some to explain chapter 9 as Paul 
arguing for the Corinthians to give up their legitimate right to eat idol food for a greater 
good.
61
 But this explanation would imply that Paul thinks food is indifferent and 
Christians have the right to interact with food sacrificed to idols, which Paul interprets as 
fellowship with demons. We have already seen that Paul does not believe εἰδωλόθυτα to 
be a matter of indifference. 
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 For a concise summary of positions on chapter 9, see Cheung, Idol Food in Corinth, 137-43.  
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Even though the Corinthian Christians do not have a legitimate right to eat food 
sacrificed to idols, Paul launches into an explanation of what Christian rights really are, 
and he uses himself as an example of foregoing even legitimate rights for others’ good. 
The contrast is between Paul and the Strong, and can be summarized: for the sake of 
others, Paul does not exercise his legitimate apostolic rights, and how much more then 
should the Strong be willing to sacrifice their pseudo-right. This approach allows Paul to 
get to the heart of the issue in that the Strong are pursuing what they think is best for 
themselves without concern for either the community or the Lord.  
1 Cor 10:1-13 
In chapter 10, Paul continues to argue that Corinthian Christians should not eat 
food sacrificed and served in pagan temples (i.e. εἰδωλόθυτα). While chapter 8 made this 
argument on the basis of love (ἀγάπη), Christian rights (ἐξουσία), and a desire not to 
harm another believer’s conscience (συνείδησις), chapter 10 argues more forcefully that 
eating εἰδωλόθυτα constitutes actual idolatry (εἰδωλολατρία) with the potential for 
arousing the jealous wrath of the Lord. In addition to the issue of εἰδωλόθυτα (food 
sacrificed and eaten in the temple precincts), 
 
Paul addresses several other issues 
involving sacrificial food, including buying food at a market to dining in a pagan’s home. 
Most scholars recognize 1 Cor 10:1-22 to be a rhetorical unit.
62
 Paul bases his argument 
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 It should be noted that some scholars argue that 1 Cor 10:1-10 or 10:1-13 are a pre-Pauline text 
or a previous composition by Paul. See especially, Wayne A. Meeks, “‘And Rose Up To Play’: Midrash 
and Paraenesis in 1 Corinthians 10.1-22,” JSNT 16 (1982): 64-78. Karl-Gustav Sandelin (“‘Do Not Be 
Idolaters!’ [1 Cor 10:7]” in Texts and Contexts: Biblical Texts in Their Textual and Situational Contexts: 
Essays in Honor of Lars Hartman [Oslo: Scandinavian University Press, 1995], 257-73) argues that in 1 
Cor 10:1-13 Paul draws on a pre-existing Jewish text. He concludes, “The injunction not to be idolaters, 
together with the citation of Exod 32:6 in 1 Cor 10:7, is the most important Pauline addition to the pre-
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on two main points: the history of Israel (10:1-13) and the community’s experience of the 
Lord’s Supper (10:14-22). The retelling of the history of Israel shows that enjoying God’s 
blessings is not a sure sign that God is pleased with and will not judge a group of 
people.
63
 The significance of the argument about the Lord’s Supper is based on the 
comparison between the believer’s participation with Christ in the Lord’s Supper 
paralleling a worshipper’s participation with demons in the pagan cultic meal. Both meals 
result in κοινωνία with an unseen spiritual being.64 Κοινωνία with both Christ and 
demons is an unthinkable division of loyalty for Paul, and it compromises the belief in 
God’s uniqueness and the exclusivity of Christ’s death on their behalf. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Pauline text. Therefore it can be seen as containing the central idea of the passage” (271). See his 
reconstruction of the Jewish text (265). Ultimately, there is insufficient evidence for this being a pre-
existing text. Moreover, the context of the argument against idolatry fits so well with the themes in 1 
Corinthians 8-10. Gary D. Collier (“‘That We Might Not Crave Evil’: The Structure and Argument of 1 
Corinthians 10.1-13,” JSNT 55 [1994]: 55-75), also admits that it is possible that this was an earlier 
composition. 
63
 Some argued that the Corinthians derived their confidence from a mystical view of the 
sacraments as protecting them. This view has been countered by several scholars; e.g., Karl-Gustav 
Sandelin, “Does Paul Argue Against Sacramentalism and Over-Confidence in 1 Cor 10.1-14?” in The New 
Testament in Hellenistic Judaism (ed. Peder Borgen and Søren Giversen; Peabody, Mass: Hendrickson, 
1995), 165-82; “‘Do Not Be Idolaters! (1 Cor 10:7),” 111-27; Fee, “Εἰδωλόθυτα Once Again,” 180-81. 
Sandelin is probably correct in arguing that Paul’s primary purpose is to urge the Corinthians to flee 
idolatry. Their actions are, however, rooted in a confidence of their standing before God verified by the 
blessings they have received which parallels the experience of the Israelites in the desert. Paul draws on the 
downfall of the Israelites to warn them that enjoying God’s blessings does not mean that one is irrevocably 
in God’s favor.  
64
 Joop Smit (“‘Do Not Be Idolaters’ Paul’s Rhetoric in First Corinthians 10:1-22,” NovT 39 
]1997]: 52) explains the problem: “Participation in the Lord’s Supper as communion (κοινωνία) with the 
blood and body of Christ is diametrically opposed to participation in sacrificial meals as communion 
(κοινωνοί) with demons (vv. 16-17, 18-20).” 
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vv. 1-5  
Paul closed chapter 9 with an explanation of his intention in pursuing the 
imperishable crown. His main point was that he is an example of self-restraint for the 
greater good (of preaching the gospel). Now he will provide negative examples of those 
who did not worship God properly. He appeals to the example of the Israelites, 
specifically the Wilderness Generation. He mentions blessings from God that everyone in 
the Wilderness Generation shared: the cloud, passage through the sea, baptism into 
Moses, spiritual food, and spiritual drink. Despite these blessings that they enjoyed, God 
was displeased with most of them and punished them. One characteristic sin of the 
wilderness wanderings was that of idolatry, epitomized in the Golden Calf episode. Paul 
draws on the context of idols in chapter 8 and assumes that the audience will immediately 
connect the idea of the wilderness wanderings with the dangers of idols.
65
 Paul’s point 
can be summarized as God having great displeasure with those who engage in idolatry, 
even after they have experienced blessing from God.  
 Paul begins 1 Cor 10 by stating his desire for the Corinthians not to be ignorant: 
Οὐ θέλω γὰρ ὑμᾶς ἀγνοεῖν (1 Cor 10:1). The content that he wants them to know 
explicitly involves the blessings shared by all the Israelites, but this statement also 
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 Schrage (Der Erste Brief, 2.381-2) explains the connection to chapter 8 although he understands 
chapter 10 to be a focused on participation in pagan cult meeting whereas chapter 8 discussed the more 
general topic of eating food sacrificed to idols. “He appropriately connects their own example with the 
exhortation to self-discipline and the warning of the danger of becoming-ἀδόκιμος from the previous 
section. But at the same time Paul goes back again to 8:10, where the presence of Christians in the idol 
temples has already been mentioned in passing, but now, as the close connection with verses 14-22 teaches, 
that [discussion] involves participation in pagan cult-meetings and not just eating food sacrificed to idols in 
temple dining halls.” 
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introduces the topic of committing idolatry. In De decalogo and Wisdom, false worship is 
described as ignorance, and it is especially characteristic of pagans (see the subsections 
entitled “Understandings of False Worship” in chapters 3 and 4). Both Philo and Wisdom 
introduce false worship by describing it as ignorance (Philo, Decal., 8; Wis 13:1; cf. 1 
Cor 10:1).
 66
 While Philo and Wisdom described idolatry resulting from the ignorance of 
pagans, Paul alleges that the Corinthian Christians might be guilty of idolatry on account 
of their ignorance. 
Paul analogizes the situation of the Corinthian believers to the Wilderness 
Generation, and he lists the events of the Exodus with this in mind. In the first four 
verses, Paul describes the five privileges that were shared by all Israelites in the 
Wilderness generation: the guiding cloud, rescue in the Red Sea, Moses’ leadership, 
spiritual food, and spiritual water. Paul refers to the Wilderness Generation as “our 
fathers” (10:1) by which he identifies the Corinthian Gentile-turned-Christ-believers as 
sharing in the heritage of God’s people because the Gentile Christians are a part of God’s 
new people.
67
 The “cloud” was a way to symbolize visually the active presence of God 
among the Israelites, and analogous to the way that God was active in the exodus 
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 Idolaters are ignorant of God, and “Such persons are happily compared in the sacred Scriptures 
to the children of a harlot; for as they in their ignorance of their one natural father ascribe their paternity to 
all their mother’s lovers…” (Philo, Decal. 8 [Colson, PLCL)]; cf. Spec. 1.331-332; Ebr. 108-110; Conf. 
144; Wis 15:11 
67
 Fitzmyer (First Corinthians, 380) comments on this identification: “In mentioning them as ‘our’ 
ancestors, Paul speaks as one of Jewish birth, but he is including the predominantly Gentile Christian 
community of Roman Corinth in ‘our,’ because Christians are for him in a new sense ‘the Israel of God’ 
(Gal 6:16).” 
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deliverance, Christ is active among the Corinthian believers.
68
 The phrase “They were all 
baptized into Moses…” has engendered a good deal of debate, but for our purposes, it is 
sufficient to state that Paul sees the deliverance of the Israelites through Moses’ 
leadership to be analogous to the baptismal experience of the Christian (cf. Rom 6:3; Gal 
3:27).
69
 It is based on the comparison of Moses to Christ, with both acting as agents of 
God’s deliverance. This comparison is not uncommon in early christological 
understandings, and the point is to demonstrate how Christ’s deliverance supersedes the 
deliverance in Moses.
70
  
Another source of great debate is the phrase “they were drinking from the 
spiritual rock that followed them and the rock was Christ” (1 Cor 10:4). The rock is 
spiritual because it represents God’s miraculous provision, and Judaism developed the 
idea of the rock following the Israelites.
71
 Some interpret this phrase as Paul literally 
believing that Christ was the rock while others understand Christ’s role for the 
Corinthians to be analogous to the role of the rock for the Israelites. Fitzmyer represents 
the literal interpretation: “Paul thinks that Christ was actually the accompanying rock, 
conceived of as the source of water that saved the Israelites in their desert wanderings. 
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 Ciampa and Rosner (First Letter, 446) think the references to the cloud and passing through the 
sea may allude to the Christian experience of baptism. 
69
 See Fitzmyer, First Corinthians, 381; Schrage, Der Erste Brief, 2.389-93. See also 1 Pet 3:20-
21 where baptism, as a salvific event involving water, is compared to the Flood, as a salvific event for 
Noah’s family. 
70
 For example, this theme is prominent in Matthew’s christological understanding. See Trent A. 
Rogers, “The Great Commission as the Climax of Matthew’s Mountain Scenes,” BBR 22.3 (2012): 383-98. 
71
 See esp. L A.B. 10.7. Fitzmyer (First Corinthians, 383) also references the targumic (Tg. 
Onqelos Num 21:16-20) and rabbinic (Tos. Sukkah 3.11) sources. 
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Paul thus applies to Christ an appellation often given to Yahweh as the helper or aide of 
Israel, called in Hebrew ṣûr, ‘Rock.’”72 The second interpretation views the rock’s 
provision of nourishment for the Israelites to be analogous to Christ’s provision for the 
Corinthians. The second interpretation has more trouble explaining why Paul describes 
this rock as “spiritual.” I slightly favor the literal interpretation, but either interpretation is 
in line with the main point that Paul wants to make. Even though all the Israelites 
received these blessings and provisions from God, “God was not pleased with the 
majority of them, for they were struck down in the wilderness” (1 Cor 10:5; cf. Num 
14:16, 29-32). The point is to remind the Corinthians, who believed themselves to be 
spiritual on account of the blessings of God (cf. 1 Cor 1-4), that they are not beyond the 
judgment of God.  
Paul’s argument is based in part upon the intimate care and provision of God for 
the Wilderness Generation. This care and provision is understood to be analogous to the 
care and provision that the Corinthian Christians experience from Christ. The phrase “the 
rock was Christ” (1 Cor 10:4) is of great importance for Paul’s representation of Christ. 
Whatever can be said about Paul’s hermeneutic of the Hebrew Scriptures, what he has 
done is to make Christ an active being in the community. From the identification of 
Christ with the rock, there are two important points for our study. First, this reinforces the 
connection between God and Christ including the thoughts of Christ’s divinity and 
preexistence (cf. 1 Cor 8:6). Second, this gives historical substance to Paul’s argument 
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 Fitzmyer, First Corinthians, 383. This interpretation may also reference Wis 11:4 as a possible 
link to wisdom Christology. 
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that Christ is actively and personally engaged among his people, with the emphasis in v. 
4 on provision and later the emphasis on judgment. Christ will be shown to be active in 
judgment both already among the Israelites (1 Cor 10:9) and now among the Corinthians 
(1 Cor 10:21-22), but this active role in judgment is founded upon Christ’s active role in 
salvation. They cannot claim that Christ saves them without also affirming that Christ 
judges them.  
vv. 6-10  
The correlations between Israel and the Corinthians (both enjoyed specific 
blessings from God, engaged in idolatry, and received or could receive God’s judgment) 
should serve as examples to warn the Corinthians from idolatrous behavior. The Israelites 
serve as examples of the judgment coming on those who desire evil. There are strong 
parallels between this section and Psalm 105 (LXX), which may even be a source on 
which Paul is drawing.
73
 Verse 14 describes the sins of the Wilderness Generation as 
impure desires: “They desired desires (lit.) in the wilderness and put God to the test in the 
waterless land” (καὶ ἐπεθύμησαν ἐπιθυμίαν ἐν τῇ ἐρήμῳ καὶ ἐπείρασαν τὸν θεὸν ἐν 
ἀνύδρῳ). Both 1 Cor 10 and Psalm 105 describe the idolatry of the Wilderness 
Generation in terms of desire (10:6; 105:14) and testing God (10:9; 105:14), which might 
suggest that Paul is alluding to a developed tradition about idolatry in the Wilderness. 
Whatever the reference, Paul views the desire for evil as rebellion against God. Paul 
might not have a specific incident in mind. Rather, he is referring to the repeated 
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 Contra Collier, “‘That We Might Not Crave Evil,’” esp. 63-74, who argues that 1 Cor 10:1-13 is 
a midrash of Numbers 11.  
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inclination of the Israelites toward the worship of idols because Paul clarifies the phrase 
“that we not desire evil” with “do not be idolaters.”74 Paul might also intend a parallel 
between the Israelites’ desire to eat the food they did in Egypt with the Gentile 
Christians’ desire to eat the food they did before their belief in Christ.75 Paul might be 
suggesting that their desire for food sacrificed to idols is a desire to abandon the devotion 
to Christ and return to their former lifestyles in the same way that the Israelites desired to 
abandon God’s provision in the Wilderness in order to eat the food they had in Egypt.  
 Until chapter 10, Paul has been making the argument that Christians should not 
eat εἰδωλόθυτα primarily by appealing to their obligations to love one another. First 
Corinthians 10:1-5 sets the stage for warning them that God’s people are not beyond 
God’s judgment. But the argument now takes a drastically sharper tone when Paul 
situates the actions which the Strong view as harmless within the context of idolatry. 
Doubtlessly, this description would have been shocking and offensive to the Strong. Paul 
commands the Corinthians not to become idolaters (μηδὲ εἰδωλολάτραι γίνεσθε). The 
term “idolater” (εἰδωλολάτρης) is never a self-description. Rather, a person is labelled as 
an “idolater” by someone who judges his actions to have gone too far. In Jewish and 
early Christian texts, labelling actions as idolatrous constructs a boundary that both 
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 Fee, First Corinthians, 454. 
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 This interpretation accords well the overarching thesis of Ciampa and Rosner that the major 
problem Paul is combatting in First Corinthians is the re-infiltration of pagan values into the Corinthian 
church. Phua (Idolatry and Authority, 161) summarizes: “the ‘craving’ of the Israelites suggests their desire 
for their former way of life in Egypt. When Paul uses this example of Israel as a way to warn the ‘strong’, it 
is highly probable that he is suggesting that by freely eating idol-meat and thus committing idolatry, the 
‘strong’ are expressing their desire for their former way of life.”  
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describes the acceptable actions within the community and delineates who is outside the 
community. The effect of this statement is that Paul is warning them that their actions 
could place them outside of the community of God’s blessing and in the realm of God’s 
judgment.  
In order to illustrate the severity of the Strong’s actions, Paul parallels the 
idolatrous actions of the Strong to examples of idolatry from Israel’s past that all the 
Corinthians would agree are idolatrous. He appeals primarily to four narratives drawn 
from the Wilderness Generation: the Golden Calf (Exodus 32), intermarriage with the 
Midianites (Numbers 25), judgment by serpents (Numbers 21), and grumbling (Numbers 
16).
76
 Central to Paul’s argument is that there is a direct comparison between the actions 
of the Israelites—which led to God’s wrath—and the actions of the Corinthians.  
First Corinthians 10:7 is a direct quotation of Exod 32:6. Paul compares the 
Corinthians’ association with idols to the paradigmatic sin of the Wilderness 
Generation—the worship of the Golden Calf. In Exodus 32, the sin is not simply 
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 Paul’s thought is also influenced by Psalm 77 (78) that describes the history of Israel in order to 
instruct God’s people to be faithful to God and keep God’s commandments (77:7). The psalm describes the 
cycle of Israel’s unfaithfulness, God’s wrath, and Israel’s repentance. Their sin is a combination of 
forgetting God’s works, disobeying God’s commands, and engaging in idolatry. Israel’s Wilderness years 
are summarized by the psalmist: “And they tested and embittered God the Most High. And his testimonies 
they did not observe and they turned away and were faithless as also their fathers; they were twisted into a 
crooked bow. They provoked him to anger with their hills, and with their carved imaged they moved him to 
jealousy. God heard and disdained, and he treated Israel with utter contempt” (Ps 77:56-59 NETS). Another 
significant psalm in Paul’s thinking is Psalm 105 (106) which describes God’s faithfulness despite Israel’s 
idolatry. Psalm 105 elaborates on the specific sin of idolatry (coupled with sexual immorality) that 
characterizes the wilderness generation. The people repeatedly sin, and God repeatedly expresses wrath, 
but God’s faithfulness to God’s people prevails. Exodus 32 and Numbers 25 are historical accounts of the 
idolatry of the Wilderness Generation, and Psalms 77 and 105 are poetic retellings of that unfaithfulness. 
The most important themes for Paul’s thought are the connection between idolatry and sexual immorality 
and the response of God to idolatry: God punishes even God’s own people when they worship idols. 
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association with idols via food; rather, God’s people have forsaken rightful worship and 
pursued idolatrous worship that also included sexual immorality (drawing on an 
interpretation of παίζω in Exod 32:7).77 This passage is appropriate for the Corinthian 
setting because the Corinthian Christians, due to their “orthodox” theological 
understanding of God, were unlikely to be tempted to attend meals at pagan temples due 
to a genuine belief in the gods’ reality and abilities; however, they probably were 
attracted to the activities surrounding the idol feasts, possibly including sexual activity 
that Paul would forbid. Paul’s point is that the Corinthians’ behavior is comparable to the 
idolatrous worship of the Wilderness Generation (even though the Corinthians’ behavior 
is motivated by other factors) that aroused God’s fierce wrath (Exod 32:12 uses an 
emphatic expression for Moses’ request “to stop your fierce wrath” παῦσαι τῆς ὀργῆς τοῦ 
θυμοῦ σου).   
Paul alludes to Num 25 in 1 Cor 10:8, and the point is to reinforce God’s 
displeasure with any association with idols. Paul may have in his mind the Hellenistic 
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 See Fee, First Corinthians, 454-5; Thiselton, First Corinthians, 734-7; Schrage, Der Erste 
Brief, 2.398-9. While the majority of uses of παίζω refer more generally to the act of merrymaking or 
amusement, there is at least one attestation in the LXX with strong sexual overtones: ἐγένετο δὲ 
πολυχρόνιος ἐκεῖ, παρακύψας δὲ Αβιμελεχ ὁ βασιλεὺς Γεραρων διὰ τῆς θυρίδος εἶδεν τὸν Ισαακ παίζοντα 
μετὰ Ρεβεκκας τῆς γυναικὸς αὐτοῦ (When Isaac had been there a long time it happened that Abimelech, 
king of the Philistines was looking out the window and saw Isaac enjoying his wife Rebekah; Exod 26:8). 
The ensuing dialogue indicates that παίζω referred to sexual acts between a husband and wife. While the 
context of παίζω in Exod 32 does not explicitly refer to sexual activity, it is within the semantic range of 
the verb to interpret it in such a way. Fotopoulos explains how this interpretation of παίζω fits with Paul’s 
critique of Greco-Roman practice: “In light of this study’s survey of Greco-Roman meals in Chapter 6, it 
seems likely that Paul is explicitly exhorting against sexual immorality in the context of dining rather than 
offering a general exhortation against sexual immorality” (Food Offered, 231). Witherington (Conflict and 
Community, 221-2) argues that in addition to the idolatrous associations at the temple it was also a problem 
for Christians to be engaging in sexual immorality: “This common association in the larger culture would 
explain why sexual immorality and idol food are also always linked in the NT (cf. Acts 15:29; Rev. 2:14, 
20). It is worth adding that the some rabbis interpreted ‘play’ in Exod 32:6 to be sexual play (cf. 
Babylonian Talmud Soṭa 6b).” 
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Jewish interpretation of this text. As recounted by Josephus (Ant. 4.126-30), Israel’s 
sexual immorality with Midian was really an attempt to seduce Israel into idolatrous 
worship and thus to have them forfeit God’s blessing.78 The connection between idolatry 
and sexual immorality, a very common theme in Hellenistic Jewish idol polemics, in this 
case is causal—sexual immorality leads to idolatry.79 Paul might be suggesting that the 
Corinthians desired to participate in the sexually immoral activities (which would also be 
prohibited by Paul) associated with idol worship, so that they are willing to associate in 
an unacceptable way with idols.
80
 
                                                          
78
 The Book of Revelation makes a strikingly similar interpretation of Numbers 22-24, the 
chapters directly preceding the reference that Paul makes. “But I have a few things against you: you have 
some there who hold to the teaching of Balaam, who instructed Balak to place a stumbling block before the 
Israelites so that they ate food sacrificed to idols and committed sexual immorality” (Rev 2:14). This 
narrative seems to have been significant for both Jews and Christians. In Hellenistic Jewish interpretation, 
Phinehas becomes an archetype of zeal and fidelity to God because he turned the Israelites away from this 
idolatry and sexual immorality (Ps106:28-31; Sir.45:23-24; 1 Macc.2:27, 54; Philo, Leg. All. 3.86.242; 
Post. 54.183; Conf. 13.57; Mut. 18.108; Ps-Philo, L.A.B., 24:4; 28:1-3; 46:1-47:10; 48:1-2; 50:3; 52:2; 
53:6). See especially, Louis H. Feldman, “The Portrayal of Phinehas by Philo, Pseudo-Philo, and 
Josephus,” JQR 92 (2002): 315-45.  
79
 Contra Wis 14:12 where idolatry is the origin and cause of sexual immorality. Especially in the 
Apostolic Decree, the New Testament vice lists, and Revelation, there is a strong connection between 
sexual immorality and idolatry. Stephen C. Barton, (“Food Rules, Sex Rules, and the Prohibition of 
Idolatry: What's the Connection?” in Idolatry: False Worship in the Bible, Early Judaism, and Christianity, 
141-162) gives an extended explanation for the connection. Barton comments, “Food and sex have to do 
with matters of utmost seriousness: the generation and sustenance of life. In other words, they have the 
potential to be creative, and therefore involve acts and imaginaries of human creativity. Conversely, they 
have the potential to be instruments of death and imaginaries of doom and judgment” (145). Because they 
involve life and death, they are moral issues; moreover, they are moral issues that involve both the private 
and public spheres and bring the private sphere into the public. Food and sex are visible and definable 
activities for which specific actions can be prohibited and permitted, and one’s compliance with these 
commands is observable. Therefore, food and sex become significant boundary markers that allow a 
community to define itself in distinction from others while also creating group solidarity through common 
practice. They communicate who is inside the community and who is outside the community. In early 
Christianity, food rules become fewer, but the rules that do exist gain more significance because for Gentile 
converts, they involve a significant change from their previous practice. 
80
 This interpretation is strengthened by the fact that in other contexts, the Corinthians engaged in 
sexual immorality (1 Cor 5:1-11; 6:9-20). Fee (First Corinthians, 454-5) gives four reasons supporting the 
idea that sexual immorality was associated with temple dining: (1) Numbers 25, alluded to here, links the 
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In his command not to put Christ to the test, Paul alludes probably to Num 21:4-
7.
81
 In Numbers 21, the Israelites speak against God and Moses because they do not have 
the abundance of food that they had in Egypt. God’s anger is aroused, and he sends 
serpents to punish the people. Paul interprets their questioning of God as putting Christ to 
the test.
82
 Analogously, the Strong are testing Christ by engaging in behavior that Paul 
considers to be idolatrous.  
Paul alludes to either Num 14:1-38 or Num 16:41 in 1 Cor 10:10. Numbers 14 
deals with the report of the ten spies, and Numbers 16 deals with the people’s reaction to 
the killing of Korah. Because Paul states that their grumbling results in supernatural 
execution by the Destroyer, he is probably alluding to Numbers 16, with Korah’s 
household being destroyed by the earth in Num 16:31-35 and the grumbling Israelites 
destroyed by the plague in Num 16:43-50. The narrative of Korah highlights the danger 
of attempting to circumvent the instruction of God’s leaders (Moses and Paul) and shows 
how grumbling and questioning result in God’s wrath. In these last two examples—
putting Christ to the test and grumbling—there is a theme of the people desiring the life 
                                                                                                                                                                             
two; (2) if one interprets παίζειν with sexual overtones, the two activities are linked in the quotation of 
Exod 32:6; (3) in 1 Cor 6:12-20, Paul links the word temple with sexual immorality; (4) every time idolatry 
is mentioned in the New Testament, it is associated with sexual immorality. Phua, however, interprets the 
association to be more general “The most satisfactory explanation of this Old Testament allusion is thus 
that Paul is telling the Corinthians not to be like the Israelites in their sexual immorality because sexual 
liaison with pagans can lead to idolatry, which was the case in Numbers 25” (Idolatry and Authority, 164). 
81
 For a discussion of the number 23,000, see Fitzmyer, First Corinthians, 386 
82
 It is somewhat peculiar that the Israelites’ actions are interpreted to be a test of Christ. There is 
good textual support for “Lord” and “God,” but the reading “Christ” is best supported, and it is certainly 
the lectio difficilior. Moreover, 1 Cor 10:4 understands Christ to be active among the Israelites in the 
Wilderness, so Paul probably thinks Christ to be a participant in this narrative also.  
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they had in Egypt (Num 16:12-14; 21:5). These examples coupled with the interpretation 
of desiring evil in 10:6 as a desire for the provisions of Egypt, suggest that Paul interprets 
the Strong’s behavior as a desire to have the “benefits” (including things such as social 
interaction, economic connections, entertainment, and sexual activity) of their former 
lives as pagan idol worshippers. 
Again Paul’s approach is to appeal to God’s very active judging presence among 
the Wilderness Generation in order to demonstrate Christ’s very active judging presence 
among the Corinthian Christians. The practical instruction, again, is based on a particular 
view of the deity. In this case, God and the Lord Jesus are understood to be judges and 
punishers of evil. This threat of judgment on idolatry forms a strong argument for the 
Corinthians to abandon the practices Paul is defining as idolatrous.  These examples serve 
as a warning of divine judgment for the sins associated with idols, but the person of 
divine judgment is now Christ (or the Lord in some manuscripts).  
vv. 11-13  
In chapter 10, Paul has been making the argument that the Corinthians should 
learn a lesson from God’s judgment on the idolatry of the Wilderness Generation, and 
now he restates the monitory role of these examples: “and these things happened to them 
as types, and they were written in order to warn us…” (1 Cor 10:11; cf. 10:6). Paul thinks 
that the Corinthians are living at the end of the ages, and this view adds urgency to the 
demands for holiness because the Day of the Lord is at hand. The main point of this 
argument comes in 1 Cor 10:12: “Therefore let the one who thinks he stands firm pay 
attention, lest he fall.” Paul uses “therefore” (ὥστε) as an exhortatory inference that 
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provides the summative instruction of 1 Cor 10:1-11.
83
 The warning is a direct attack on 
the Corinthian Strong who claim not to be sinning by their activity. Paul calls them to 
examine themselves. The very person who claims immunity from temptation (recall the 
over-confident trust of the Strong in their standing before God) is the person who is in 
danger of “falling.” Whereas in chapter 8 Paul warned the Strong that their actions could 
have the unintended consequence of harming the Weak, here Paul warns the Strong that 
their actions could have the unintended actions of harming themselves by causing 
themselves to fall. This indicates a shift in the argument from chapter 8 to 10: chapter 8 is 
given from the standpoint of concern for the standing of the Weak, and chapter 10 is 
concerned with the standing of the Strong. For Paul, the danger of idolatry is a danger for 
Strong and Weak alike. The Strong, taking confidence in their knowledge, would be 
shocked to be informed that they themselves were in real danger. Paul seems compelled 
to explain that they cannot blame their idolatry on God because God provides the way of 
escape.  
 Paul has now defined the issue of eating εἰδωλόθυτα to be an issue of 
εἰδωλολατρία. And he argues that the behavior of both the Strong and the Wilderness 
Generation involved idolatry (and sexual immorality). If the Strong think that their 
actions have no effect on their standing before God (cf. 1 Cor 8:8), they need only to look 
at the example of the Wilderness Generation. Just as God judged their idolatry, so too 
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 For this use of ὥστε see Trent Rogers, “The Functions of Ὥστε in the New Testament” Annali 
di Storia dell'Esegesi 30/2 (2014) 323-28. 
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Christ will judge the Corinthians’ idolatry.84 The explanation for the warning is based on 
God’s actions in the past, and the warning has weight insofar as Christ is viewed to be 
present and active among the Corinthians.  
1 Cor 10:14-22 
vv. 14-17  
Paul’s use of διόπερ beginning 1 Cor 10:14, marks the subsequent phrase as 
significant and of pronounced importance. While Paul previously warned them not to 
become idolaters, now he commands them to flee from idolatry (10:14).
85
 This may well 
be the central exhortation of Paul’s argument in 1 Cor 8-10.86 Having given the 
exhortation to flee idolatry (10:14), Paul lays the foundation for prohibiting certain kinds 
of associations with idols (10:16-22). The foundation for the prohibition is the personal 
participation that believers have with both Christ and other believes in the celebration of 
the Lord’s Supper.  
                                                          
84
 Dunn (Christology in the Making, 184) summarizes Paul’s argument: “In other words, Paul says 
to his readers: if you compare yourselves to the Israelites you will see what peril you are in. They 
experienced the equivalent of what we have experienced: they went through what we call a baptism; they 
enjoy what we call ‘spiritual food’—you only need to equate Moses with Christ (so ‘baptized into Moses’) 
and the rock with Christ to see how close the parallel is to your own situation—and yet look what happened 
to them (vv. 5, 9f.).”  
85
 Fee (“Εἰδωλόθυτα Once Again,” 193) explains the flow of Paul’s thought: “In vv. 1-13 Paul has 
warned that Israel’s εἰδωλολατρία and πορνεία caused their overthrow, despite their ‘sacraments’. Having 
warned Corinth of the same possibility, he concludes the argument, ‘therefore, flee εἰδωλολατρία’. And 
εἰδωλολατρία of course means eating at the temples.” 
86
 Willis, Idol Meat, 166-7; Fee, First Corinthians, 464; Witherington, Conflict and Community, 
224; Cheung, Idol Food, 147; Fotopoulos, Food Offered, 233. 
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 The interpretation of κοινωνία (participation) has generated considerable debate 
in secondary literature.
87
 The primary question is if κοινωνία refers primarily to a vertical 
or horizontal relationship. Paul does not elaborate on the nature of the relationship. He 
thinks that the nature of the κοινωνία in the Lord’s Supper is understood by the 
Corinthians, and it is an understanding on which he can base his argument in 1 Cor 
10:16: 
Is not the cup of blessing that we bless a participation in the blood of Christ? Is 
not the bread that we break a participation in the body of Christ? 
Τὸ ποτήριον τῆς εὐλογίας ὃ εὐλογοῦμεν, οὐχὶ κοινωνία ἐστὶν τοῦ αἵματος τοῦ 
Χριστοῦ; τὸν ἄρτον ὃν κλῶμεν, οὐχὶ κοινωνία τοῦ σώματος τοῦ Χριστοῦ ἐστιν; 
 
Lexical studies have shown that both a vertical and horizontal interpretation are within 
the semantic range of κοινωνία, and the context indicates that both vertical88 and 
horizontal
89
 relationships are involved, with perhaps an emphasis on the vertical. As 
much as the Lord’s Supper is a participation with Christ, it is also a participation with 
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 Ciampa and Rosner (First Letter, 473-5) provide a good summary. 
88
 The vertical component of κοινωνία (participating in/with Christ) is implied by the very context 
of worship which is focused on a deity. Analogous to εἰδωλολατρία which is worship focused on an idol-
god, the Lord’s Supper is focused on the Lord. The primary issue in both the worship of idols and the 
celebration of the Lord’s Supper is about how one relates to the deity. The Israelites’ focus at the altar of 
sacrifice (1 Cor 10:18) was on the restoration and maintenance of a relationship with God. Likewise, 
pagans sacrifice to demons. The acts by Christians (in the Lord’s Supper), Jews (at the altar of YHWH), 
and pagans (at the altar of gods) are analogous in the fact that they are all ways of relating to a deity. 
Moreover, the vertical element of κοινωνία is strengthened by the fact that the consequences of improper 
worship are realized in the offense to the deity (1 Cor 10:22). 
89
 Even while the vertical dimension of κοινωνία might the primary referent in the context of 
worship, ancient worship was communal. The proper and improper worship of the Wilderness Generation 
(1 Cor 10:1-11) and the celebration of the Lord’s Supper (1 Cor 10:14-22) are the experiences of groups of 
people. The Lord’s Supper was a communal meal, and it had implications for how the Corinthians related 
to one another (1 Cor 11:17-22). The unity of the plurality of Christians in the Lord’s Supper is emphasized 
in 1 Cor 10:17. Worship in the ancient world was the action of a community, so κοινωνία with a deity 
implies some level of κοινωνία with others participating in the worship. 
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other believers. Believers together share in the one loaf. The importance of this line of 
argumentation is that Paul is basing his command to flee idolatry on both theological 
(κοινωνία ἐστὶν τοῦ αἵματος τοῦ Χριστοῦ) and ethical (πάντες ἐκ τοῦ ἑνὸς ἄρτου 
μετέχομεν) grounds. One of the things that makes the appeal to the Lord’s Supper so 
fitting for Paul’s argument is that the Lord’s Supper, like idolatry, is a matter of relating 
to God (the thrust of chapter 10) and also a matter of relating to others (the thrust of 
chapter 8). In a way that other lines of argument cannot, the Lord’s Supper emphasizes 
both the vertical and horizontal obligations of claiming Christ as Savior. The vertical and 
horizontal relationships of the Lord’s Supper tie together Paul’s lines of argumentation, 
primarily horizontal in chapter 8 and primarily vertical in 10:1-13. 
vv. 18-22  
Having appealed to the Corinthians’ participation with Christ in the Lord’s 
Supper as proof of the seriousness of dining relationships with deities, Paul further proves 
his point by appealing to associations that three groups of worshippers have: Israelites at 
the altar (10:18), pagans with demons (10:19-20), and Christians with the Lord (10:21). 
Just as Israelites participated with God at the altar (and received a portion of the meat),
90
 
                                                          
90
 There is some debate concerning with whom the Israelites participated. It could be that they 
participate with God by taking part in the cultic celebrations. But this could also be a reference to the 
Israelites’ participation with pagan deities in idolatrous celebrations like the Golden Calf incident. For the 
latter interpretation, see Fotopoulos, Food Offered, 235.  
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so pagans participate with their gods at the altar (and receive a portion of the meat that is 
εἰδωλόθυτα).91  
Paul and the Strong agree that the idol-gods are not real, and from this theological 
understanding, the Strong argue that there is no danger in having κοινωνία with them. 
The Strong’s theological understanding of what an idol is, causes them to dismiss them as 
harmless. The understanding of idols are merely material wood, stone, or metal is 
basically the view of the Prophets and Hellenistic Jewish authors such as Wisdom, Philo, 
and Josephus (see my discussion in chapters 2, 3, 4, and 5). Paul agrees with their belief 
that the idol-gods are not real, but he argues that there is another, demonic reality behind 
the worship of idol-gods. And worshipping before idol-gods is κοινωνία with demons. 
The view of demons behind idol worship is not incompatible with monotheistic beliefs, 
and it has a strong history in Jewish thought.
92
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 Karl-Gustav Sandelin, “Does Paul Warn the Corinthians Not to Eat Demons?” in Attraction and 
Danger of Alien Religion (WUNT 290; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2012), 123-32, argues persuasively that 
Paul does not have any idea of theophagy, either concerning the cup of demons or the Lord’s Supper. 
92
 Richard Horsley (“Gnosis in Corinth: 1 Corinthians 8.1-6,” NTS 27 [1980]: 38) notes that there 
are two primary streams of interpretations in Jewish texts concerning idols. “The one line, expressed 
prominently in Deutero-Isaiah, derided the heathen gods as nothings and their worship as foolishness, since 
the idol-gods are merely the lifeless products of human craftsmanship — in contrast to the one, true, living 
God, usually described in terms of his creative activity.” He goes on to describe this as the approach taken 
especially by Wisdom and Philo in De decalogo. But there is another approach to idols in Judaism: “The 
other distinct traditional Jewish polemic against idol-gods appears prominently in apocalyptic literature 
such as Jubilees and 1 Enoch. This other tradition, although it agrees that idols are ‘nothings’ and lifeless 
human products, saw in idolatry the service or the influence of demons (Jub 11.4-6; 22.16-22; 1 Enoch 19; 
99.6-10; Test. Naph. 3.3-4). Most interesting for the conflict between Paul and the Corinthian dissidents is 
the connection of this other polemical tradition with the motif of divine judgment. Biblical texts on which 
this tradition draw connect the critique of idolatry as the service of demons with a recitation of Israel’s 
historical disobedience in, and punishment for, its sacrificing to idols (Deut 32.17-21; Ps 106 [105 LXX]. 
28-40). Paul himself draws on this tradition in formulating his argument against the implications of the 
Corinthians’ gnosis in 1 Cor 10.20-2 as well as in 10.1-13” (“Gnosis in Corinth,” 39). While I think 
Horsley too neatly divides Jewish interpretations into two definable categories (they are more akin to a 
fluctuating spectrum of belief), he does alert us to the type of interpretation in Hellenistic Jewish literature 
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The danger of too close an association with idols is twofold. First, the Christian 
may unknowingly participate with demons. Second and more severe, the Christian might 
arouse the jealous wrath of the Lord. The Lord might be personally offended by 
Christians participating both with demons (by means of food sacrificed to idols) and with 
the Lord (by means of the Lord’s Supper). It is Christ alone who is the Savior of the 
Corinthians, and Christ demands an exclusive relationship. Corinthians cannot have 
κοινωνία with Christ and other spiritual beings.  
In order to make his argument persuasively, Paul defines idolatry as κοινωνία 
with demons and represents Christ as a jealous deity. The greatest danger of idolatry is 
that the Corinthians could arouse the jealous anger of Christ. The whole argument is 
founded on a view of Christ as presently active in the community. Christ is the active 
Savior of the community and participates with them in the Lord’s Supper; as a result, 
Christ demands exclusive devotion. In the same way that the Corinthians know Christ to 
be active in these ways, Christ may also be aroused to jealousy.  
1 Cor 10:23-30 
Paul’s argument against Christians eating εἰδωλόθυτα (i.e. food sacrificed and 
eaten at the temple) concluded in 10:22. Now he will address issues that are related to 
εἰδωλόθυτα in that they involve meat that has or could have its origins in the temple but 
                                                                                                                                                                             
that (1) recognizes God as One, (2) believes idols to be nothing, but (3) rejects associations with idols 
because demons inhabit them. For more on these lines of interpretation, see Phua, Idolatry and Authority, 
126-69. 
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is eaten in different contexts. While in chapter 8 Paul instructs the Strong not to exercise 
their pseudo-right, in 1 Cor 10:25-30 Paul permits certain exercises of Christian freedom. 
vv. 23-24  
The transition from the Lord’s jealousy in 1 Cor 10:22 to the permissibility of 
actions in 1 Cor 10:23 is abrupt. After Paul has prohibited outright the consumption of 
εἰδωλόθυτα, Paul sets the stage to address two additional contexts in which Christians 
might encounter food sacrificed to idols. First Corinthians 10:23a and 10:23c are 
probably a quotations of the Corinthians that Paul seeks to qualify (cf. 1 Cor 6:12).
93
  
Πάντα ἔξεστιν ἀλλʼ οὐ πάντα συμφέρει· 
“Everything is permissible” but not everything is beneficial.  
πάντα ἔξεστιν ἀλλʼ οὐ πάντα οἰκοδομεῖ 
“Everything is permissible” but not everything builds up. 
 
Paul makes two main points concerning the exercise of Christian freedom. First, to say 
that an action is permissible does not mean that it is recommended. Second, even actions 
that are permissible on theological grounds might be prohibited on the basis of their 
effects on the community. This correction of the Strong’s assertion coincides with Paul’s 
own example of limiting the exercise of his liberty for the common good. Chapter 9 was 
an explanation of how Paul did not “seek (only) his own good, but also the good of 
another” (1 Cor 10:24). 
 
                                                          
93
 There is strong textual support for the addition of μοι before πάντα in both 10:23a and 10:23c. If 
this pronoun is accepted as the original reading, it represents a qualification by Paul of the Corinthians’ 
statement that “everything is permissible.” The scope of their slogan would be limited by Paul’s comment. 
The permissible scope is reduced from a general aphorism to an individual permission; thus, the focus is on 
ecclesiological upbuilding rather than on the exercise of Christian rights.  
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vv. 25-26  
Again the transition is abrupt from the correction of the Corinthians’ positions in 
1 Cor 10:24 to the discussion of meat obtained in the meat market. Given Paul’s hardline 
stance on εἰδωλόθυτα, one might anticipate that Paul would command great 
scrupulousness when shopping at a meat market, but Paul’s position is quite permissive: 
“Eat everything sold in the marketplace without judging with regard to (your) 
conscience.” (1 Cor 10:25). The justification of permitting the eating of food purchased 
in the meat market is that the Lord possesses everything, so nothing is inherently 
contaminated.  
What commentators rarely point out is that Paul, in order to substantiate his 
argument, has chosen, from his Jewish background, another representation of the Lord—
again the argument is made along theological lines. In 1 Cor 10:1-22, the prevailing 
representation of the Lord is that Christ is actively present among and jealous for the 
community of Corinthian Christians—the community is in very real danger of Christ’s 
judgment (in the same way that God judged the Israelites). But the representation is 
different in 1 Cor 10:26: “For the earth and its fullness are the Lord’s [probably a 
reference to Christ as the Lord]” (cf. Ps 23:1 LXX). In this representation, the Lord is the 
unthreatened Creator who possesses everything (cf. 1 Cor 8:6). It is not an affront to the 
Lord if Christians come into contact with meat sacrificed to idols because everything is 
God’s. It is not that the representation of the Lord as unthreatened Creator is in 
contradiction with the representation of Christ as jealous. They both come from biblical 
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representations of God, but they are also distinct and make different points about God 
and the permissible associations with idols and food associated with idols. 
vv. 27-30  
Again the transition from the meat market to the meal at an unbeliever’s house is 
abrupt, but it is another context in which a believer might encounter food sacrificed to 
idols. Along with the majority of commentators, I think it most probable that verses 27-
29 refer to food bought in the macellum and then eaten at home.
94
 In addition to the 
context indicating a different location from that of εἰδωλόθυτα, Paul uses a different noun 
to describe this food, ἱερόθυτον. Fitzmyer summarizes the context of this new situation,  
Many Corinthian Christians would have had nonbelieving friends who might 
tender an invitation to dine in their houses, and such dining would not have been a 
participation in ‘the table of demons’ for such Christians (v. 21), because the 
setting of the meal is different, a private home, and not an idol’s temple, as in 
8:10. 
 
One of the biggest questions is the identity of the informant. Who is the person who says 
“this is sacrificial food”? The options are as follows: pagan host, pagan guest, or the 
Weak Christian. While it is not central to our study, it is most likely that the informant is 
a Weak Christian.
95
 The Weak Christian might attend the meal thinking that the meat will 
not have been sacrificed to a god, or the Weak Christian might be a slave or servant for 
the meal. 
                                                          
94
 Fotopoulos (Food Offered, 242) mentions the various contexts proposed by scholars: (a) food 
sacrificed in a temple and eaten in the temple precinct, (b) sacrificial food purchased in a macellum and 
eaten in the temple precinct, (c) food sacrificed at a temple and then taken home and eaten, (d) sacrificial 
food purchased from the macellum and eaten in home, (e) food sacrificed in a home and eaten in a home. 
95
 For a defense of the informant as a Weak Christian, see Fitzmyer, Frist Corinthians, 400-402; 
Fotopoulos, Food Offered, 244-6. 
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Another question is for whose conscience should the Christian be concerned? 
Should the Christian house-guest be concerned with the conscience of the house owner 
(who is a pagan and has no scruples about food sacrificed to idols) or the conscience of a 
weaker Christian? It seems most likely that Paul is concerned that the house-guest not 
give the impression to the Weak Christian that idols are something to be tolerated (cf. 1 
Cor 10:32). Again, Paul urges those with knowledge to have concern for other believers, 
and not exercise their “rights” apart from their obligations to love other believers. 
1 Cor 10:31-11:1 
Paul concludes chapters 8-10 with the overarching principle of doing everything 
for the glory of God. Some have noted that Paul is proposing a more fitting slogan than 
the Strong’s. 
 Strong’s Slogan: πάντα ἔξεστιν (everything is permissible) 
 Paul’s Slogan: πάντα εἰς δόξαν θεοῦ ποιεῖτε (do everything for the glory of God) 
 
The filter for a Christian’s actions should not be simply whether it is permissible. The 
real question is if it brings glory to God. Following from this theological principle, Paul 
offers a second principle with reference to other humans: do not cause people (Jews, 
pagans, or Christians) to stumble. He reinforces the need to seek the communal good. 
They find the example of seeking the good of others in Christ and also in Paul. 
Excursus: Idolatry in the Pauline Material  
The perspective of this project is to read Paul as a participant in larger polemics 
concerning idolatry in early Christian and especially Hellenistic Jewish arguments. The 
following analysis will draw upon the analyses of Hellenistic Jewish arguments in the 
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preceding four chapters, but it is also important to read First Corinthians within the 
context of other Pauline material.
96
 Paul uses the term εἴδωλον and its derivatives (e.g., 
εἰδωλόθυτα) to describe the images that were used in Greco-Roman worship. This term 
originated as a Hellenistic Jewish designation with antagonistic overtones. Phua notes 
correctly that “The term for the cultic objects in pagan Greek is ἄγαλμα, while human 
statues are normally called ἀνδριάς or εἰκών; although it can be used for images of the 
gods, shapes or apparitions, the cultic object is never called an εἴδωλον.”97 While the 
concept of idolatry is mentioned in several Pauline vice lists (e.g., 1 Cor 5:10-11; 6:9-10 
[if it is to be considered a vice list]; Gal 5:19-21; Eph 5:3-5; Col 3:5; cf. Rev 21:8; 
22:18), little information can be gleaned from them other than that idolatry is a 
characteristic of pagans and believers in Christ are expected to have abandoned that 
practice. Paul’s Epistle to the Romans, Epistle to Galatians, and First Thessalonians are 
other texts in the Pauline corpus in which he develops the concept of idolatry. 
                                                          
96
 Even though the Pauline material references idolatry several times, there are other important 
texts in the New Testament that deal with idolatry. What is remarkable about the theme of idolatry in the 
New Testament is that it is absent from the Gospels. Karl-Gustav Sandelin (“The Jesus Tradition and 
Idolatry,” NTS 42 [1996]: 412-20), mentions a few Gospel texts in which there might be a reference to 
idolatry. The most important non-Pauline text is Revelation. The false teaching in Pergamum and Thyatira 
led the people to commit sexual immorality and to eat food sacrificed to idols (εἰδωλόθυτα; Rev 2:14, 20; 
cf. Rev 21:8; 22:15). In Revelation 9:20, the author connects idolatry with the sin of sexual immorality, and 
he offers a more extended explanation of idolatry: “And the rest of humanity who were not killed by these 
plagues neither repented of the works of their hands nor stopped worshipping demons and idols of gold, 
silver, bronze, stone, and wood—which cannot see, hear, or walk—And they did not repent of their 
murders, magic arts, sexual immorality, or thefts” (9:20-21). Like Paul, the author argues that even though 
idols are merely material, there is a demonic force behind them. The Christian is to remove himself from 
associations with these idols—including both the false teachings and food. See Rowland, “Living with 
Idols,” 163-76. 
97
 Phua, Idolatry and Authority, 130. 
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 In First Thessalonians, probably the earliest extant Christian document, Paul 
describes the conversion of Gentiles as an abandonment of idolatry in order to worship 
the true God: “…you turned to God from idols, in order to serve the living and true God 
and to wait for his Son from heaven, Jesus who rescues us from the coming wrath” (1 
Thess 1:9-10). The part of this statement that relates to God and idols bears strong 
resemblance to Hellenistic Jewish descriptions of pagans converting to Judaism (e.g. 
Asenath and Abraham). Idols are dead and false in contrast to God who is “living and 
true.” But Paul is also different in that living out this faith in God also means that the 
believer eagerly waits for the return of the Son, the one who rescues them from wrath. 
Paul contrasts the dead idols with the one true God and the saving Son, the Lord Jesus 
Christ. To serve God means that one has abandoned idols and waits for his Son. 
Similarly, in Galatians 4:8, a person’s conversion to Christ involves abandoning and not 
returning to false gods: “But when you did not know God, you were enslaved to those 
things which by nature are not gods.” What has changed their status of being enslaved is 
the redemption of the Son (Gal 4:4-7). These themes in Pauline texts help us to 
understand Paul’s point in 1 Corinthians 12:2: “You know that when you were pagans,98 
you were deceived and led away to mute idols.” In 1 Cor 12 and 1 Thess 1, Paul contrasts 
idols and the true God. In line with Jewish critiques, Paul describes idols as false, non-
living, and inactive. In contrast to idols that cannot act or speak, God empowers his 
                                                          
98
 I have chosen to use the term “pagan” because it better communicates Paul’s intent. He is not 
trying to describe their ethnicity; rather, ἔθνη communicates a belief system that was not exclusive to the 
one God and one Lord Jesus Christ. 
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people to speak and act (1 Cor 12:4-11). For Paul, belief in God means that a person has 
severed his devotion to false gods. 
 In Rom 1, Paul echoes a stream of interpretation in Hellenistic Judaism wherein 
idolatry is the root sin that leads to all pagan depravity (e.g., Wis 14:12; cf. Rev 2:14, 
20).
99
 Even though Romans as a whole is thoroughly christological, the Lord Jesus Christ 
does not appear in the idol polemic of Rom 1:18-32. God is represented to be the Creator, 
who is perceivable by his works (cf. Philo and Wisdom). Paul begins with the belief that 
God is perceivable through nature, but humans have rejected that knowledge about God: 
“Although they claimed to be wise, they became fools, and they exchanged the glory of 
the immortal God for images resembling mortal humans, birds, animals, and reptiles” 
(Rom 1:22-3). Another way of describing their aberrant worship is that “they exchanged 
the truth about God for a lie, and they worshipped and served the creature rather than the 
Creator, who is blessed forever, amen” (Rom 1:25). Paul’s belief in the singularity of 
God is clear, and there is a fundamental distinction between Creator God and all other 
things in creation. Pagans have thought wrongly about God—their error begins with an 
intellectual misstep—and their idolatrous thoughts have manifested themselves in 
idolatrous and immoral actions. 
 While most of the Pauline references to idolatry occur in vice lists that do not 
provide much detail about the vices, Paul does expound upon idolatry in a few texts. 
                                                          
99
 The idea that idolatry leads to every other sin is most prominent in the Wisdom of Solomon. 
Alec J. Lucas has thoroughly explained the connection and parallels between these texts: “Unearthing an 
Intra-Jewish Interpretive Debate? Romans 1,18-2,4; Wisdom of Solomon 11-19; and Psalms 105(104)-
107(106),” ASE 27 (2010):69-91; “Reorienting the Structural Paradigm and Social Significance of Romans 
1:18–32,” JBL 131 (2012): 121-41. 
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Idolatry is the worship of non-living, mute, and deceitful objects, and it characterizes 
non-believers, including Christians prior to their “turning” or conversion. Christians are 
those who have abandoned the deceitful folly of idols, turned to God, and await the return 
of the Son. Belief in and worship of the true God is incompatible with the worship of 
idols.   
Analysis of the Argument 
One of the major differences between Paul’s argument and those we have seen by other 
Hellenistic Jewish authors is that the audience (both implied and intended) of Paul’s work 
consists of those within his same theological camp. Whereas Philo and Wisdom 
especially exploited the cracks already existing in the varied explanations of the divine in 
Greco-Roman culture in order to disprove the reality of pagan religiosity, Paul works 
with the varied beliefs about God (drawing on both his Jewish background and his 
previous teaching about Christ) in order to bring cohesive theological understanding and 
practice from the Corinthians’ fragmented belief and practice. Many of the more 
polemical features of other Hellenistic Jewish arguments, such as satire and the mockery 
of idols’ inactivity, are not present in Paul’s argument. This difference is largely due to 
the fact that the Corinthian Strong probably were not tempted to believe in the reality of 
the idol-gods and thus Paul saw little need to disprove them.
100
 Rather the Corinthian 
                                                          
100
 Contra Nikolaus Walter (“Christusglaube und heidnische Religiosität in paulinischen 
Gemeinden,” NTS 25 [1979]: 422-42, esp. 425-36) who thinks that one of the primary things that Paul is 
combating is the Corinthian practice, born out of their polytheistic background, to offer worship to multiple 
deities. Walter contends that the Corinthians had not realized that salvation in Christ also implied the 
exclusive demands of worshipping him alone. From our study, it seems that the Strong were thoroughly 
convinced of the idol-gods’ non-reality, so actual belief in idol-gods was not a temptation. It is, however, 
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Strong were tempted to engage in associations with idols on account of things such as 
social pressure, desire for entertainment, and economic prospering, and Paul writes to 
convince them that consumption of εἰδωλόθυτα constitutes idolatry and is unacceptable. 
Maintenance of or Departure from Judaism 
One of the perennial discussions in Pauline studies concerns Paul’s Jewish 
identity, and there is considerable debate in 1 Cor 8-10 whether Paul essentially 
reinforces Jewish teaching concerning idolatry or if he shapes early Christian teaching in 
a direction radically different than Judaism. Jack Sanders, for example, interprets Paul as 
repeating the Jewish teaching on interaction with pagan culture: “In 1 Corinthians, Paul 
advised Christians that they should not be polytheists (idolaters) and that they must 
confine sex to marriage. He thus took a normal Jewish stance toward Graeco-Roman 
culture.”101 As we have seen, there are positions within the streams of Jewish 
interpretation that would basically agree with Paul’s prohibition of eating εἰδωλόθυτα, 
but the way that Paul reasons is shaped radically by his experience of Christ.  
 Paul reads his Jewish tradition through a christological lens in order to combat the 
Corinthians’ interactions with pagan gods. Paul’s teaching in 1 Cor 8:6 is an example of 
him appealing to the Jewish tradition in order to assert both the oneness of God and 
God’s distinction from creation. But Paul also modifies this tradition through a 
                                                                                                                                                                             
possible that the Weak were confused by the actions of the Strong which may have led to theological 
doubts.  
101
 Sanders, “Paul Between Jews and Gentiles,” 83. Sanders argues that Paul was forging 
Christianity into a middle ground between Judaism (which forbade idolatry and sexual immorality) and 
Greco-Roman culture (which forbade circumcision). Paul is setting up boundary markers for this sect, and 
on the issue of idolatry, the boundary is clearly drawn in agreement with Judaism. 
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christological lens in order to assert that the one through whom creation is accomplished 
is also the one who accomplishes their salvation. Paul urges them to live in light of their 
new calling in Christ and abandon the ways of their pagan past, and the foundation for 
this new life is the death of Christ for them. Thus, although some of Paul’s practical 
conclusions (excepting the permissive approach to food in 1 Cor 10:25-30) can be found 
in other Jewish authors, Paul’s argument is significantly shaped by the role of Christ in 
the community. 
Refutation and Qualification 
In at least one way, Paul’s argument is more akin to Josephus’ than to the 
arguments by Philo or Wisdom in that Paul and Josephus are both refuting specific 
positions which they quote. In Contra Apionem, the quotations are more clearly 
identified; whereas, in First Corinthians, Paul’s use of the partitio does not as clearly 
identify the quotations for the modern reader, and thus interpretation is more complex. 
One of the reasons that Paul does not indicate quotations as clearly as Josephus is 
because he is quoting positions with which the audience would be familiar and that they 
would readily recognize. The use of refutation is especially prominent in chapter 8. The 
Corinthian Strong’s assertion in 8:1 (οἴδαμεν ὅτι πάντες γνῶσιν ἔχομεν) is both qualified 
and then refuted. Paul immediately qualifies the value of knowledge by asserting the 
greater value of love (8:1). He returns to this slogan of the Strong in verse 7 where he 
directly refutes it: οὐκ ἐν πᾶσιν ἡ γνῶσις. A similar qualification occurs in 1 Cor 8:8, 9 
and 10:23. 
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In 1 Cor 10, the refutation comes primarily in the form of extended explanation 
rather than brief statements. While Paul does not quote the content of their boast, it seems 
that the Corinthians interpreted the blessings of God to be indicative of his favor and 
impunity from judgment. Paul refutes this belief by explaining that the Israelites were 
blessed in many ways but still came under the judgment of God. Similarly, the Corinthian 
Strong seem to have believed that food eaten before idols was harmless; whereas, Paul 
claims that there is a very real danger of associating with demons and thus provoking the 
Lord to jealousy. 
Moral Arguments 
Wisdom, Philo, and Josephus employed moral arguments in their refutation of 
false religion, but their moral arguments took a different form than Paul’s. They showed 
that the immoral practices of the pagans proved that their theological foundation was 
correspondingly flawed. In First Corinthians, Paul’s moral arguments are made on the 
basis of love, over against the Corinthians’ self-seeking, pride, claims of personal rights, 
and jealousy. Paul explains that their morality has to be redefined, not in terms of their 
pagan past, but rather in light of their experience of Christ. Specifically, this means that 
love (directed at others for whom Christ has died) trumps knowledge and any claim to 
individual rights. Paul puts forward a pseudo-right in order to demonstrate that even if it 
were a right, love would trump that right.  
 The Strong’s claims to have knowledge in 1 Cor 8:1 are immediately qualified to 
be secondary to the higher call of love. The knowledge claimed by the Strong has led 
them to claim that they have the right to certain actions. But these rights have detrimental 
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effects (8:9) on the Weak. And thus, the Weak brother falls into sin because of the 
Strong’s claimed knowledge (8:11). In chapter 9, Paul then puts himself forward as an 
example of one who sacrifices legitimate rights (in contrast with the Strong who are 
claiming illegitimate “rights”) for the sake of love. The crux of the moral argument is that 
Christ’s death on behalf of other Christians makes love for them more important than any 
right or knowledge that can be claimed. Paul concludes his instructions about proper 
interaction with idols with the demand for Christians to act like Christ in self-sacrificial 
love: “Be imitators of me, even as I am an imitator of Christ” (1 Cor 11:1; cf. 16:24). 
Paul will also develop the ethic of love at length in chapter 13. 
Use of Scripture 
Paul’s theological framework is dependent on the definition of God described in 
the Jewish Scriptures. Paul’s dependence on Jewish Scripture is most obvious in 1 Cor 
8:6 and 10:1-13. He interacts with the Scriptures both at the level of direct quotation and 
allusion to narratives. First Corinthians 8:6 is very likely something that Paul previously 
taught the Corinthians, and it represented a core tenet of their theological framework. But 
Paul has freely modified this Jewish statement in order to account for Christ. It should not 
be overlooked that Paul has taken what was one of the most significant statements in the 
Scriptures for Jews and he has made it central to his instruction of who God and Christ 
are. Paul’s beliefs, and thus also the Corinthians’ beliefs through his instruction, are 
founded upon Jewish Scriptures. 
Like Wisdom, Philo, and Josephus, Paul is interpreting the Scriptures in order to 
instruct contemporary people about how to live and believe. That is, they all look at the 
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Scriptures as relevant and providing normative instruction for their communities. But 
Paul’s reading of the Scriptures is again filtered through his christological lens.102 Thrice 
Paul affirms that the purpose of the Torah (each reference is to the narrative and not legal 
portions) is to instruct the Corinthian Christians: “Does it not speak to us? Surely on 
account of us…” (1 Cor 10:10); “Now these things happened as examples for us, so that 
we not desire evil as they desired” (1 Cor 10:6); and “These things were happening to 
them as examples and were written to warn us, on whom the ends of the ages have come” 
(1 Cor 10:11). But what is remarkable is that these examples of blessing and judgment by 
God are taken to be analogous to how Christ acts among the Corinthians: “Let us not put 
Christ to the test, as some of them tested (him) and were killed by serpents” (1 Cor 10:9). 
Appeal to Christian Practice and Experience 
The appeal to the Corinthians’ experience of Christ is probably the strongest 
argument of Paul in chapter 10, and it is also something at which Paul hints in chapter 8. 
The modification of the Shema in 1 Cor 8:6b to include the soteriological role of Christ is 
essentially an appeal to the salvific experience of Christ in the community. This is 
reinforced in verses 11 and 12. In verse 11, Paul reminds the Strong that the Weak have 
the same salvific experience of Christ, and that this shared experience should affect the 
                                                          
102
 For example, in the quotation of Deut 25:4 in 1 Cor 9:9, Jewish Scriptures are taken to be 
relevant for the Christians in Corinth, but the Scripture may be interpreted to apply to an entirely different 
context. It applies to the rights of Christian missionaries. The Jewish Scriptures provide direct commands to 
be followed, and some of them are also applied in new ways to the context of the Christian community. 
Paul can even speak of a new law being the law of Christ (1 Cor 10:21). In 1 Cor 10:4, Christ is read into 
the Wilderness narrative. 
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way that believers relate to one another. Moreover, in verse 12, their shared experience of 
Christ also means that a sin against another believer is a sin against Christ.  
Paul appeals to the Christian practice of participating with Christ in the Lord’s 
Supper which Paul interprets to be analogous to and in conflict with eating in the 
presence of an idol (with a demon existing behind the idol). The persuasiveness of Paul’s 
argument rests on their experience of Christ in the activities of the Christian community. 
In two other texts in this letter (5:1-13; 11:17-34), Paul appeals to their experience of the 
Lord in the Lord’s Supper in order to persuade them to particular action. Both times, he 
reminds them both of their participation with Christ as a community and that Christ is 
actively judging the community. The idea is that when they “come together” to celebrate 
the Lord’s Supper they should be united and holy in order to glorify Christ.103 When they 
come together “the power of our Lord Jesus Christ” (1 Cor 5:4) is present in their 
celebration. In 1 Cor 11:27-32 the warning of the Lord’s powerful judging presence is 
even more severe:  
Therefore, whoever eats the bread and drinks the cup of the Lord unworthily, will 
be guilty of the body and blood of the Lord…for whoever eats and drinks 
[unworthily], eats and drinks judgment on himself by not considering the body. 
For this reason, many among you are weak and ill and a number have died” (1 
Cor 11:27…29, 30).  
 
Paul assumes that the Corinthians have a real and dynamic experience of Christ in the 
Lord’s Supper, and he leverages this experience to urge them to proper action. 
                                                          
103
 In 1 Cor 5:4, Paul uses συνάγω (a hapax legomenon  in Paul) to describe the congregation 
coming together to celebrate the Lord’s Supper. Paralleling this verb, he uses the more common synonym 
συνέρχομαι in chapter 11 (17, 18, 20, 33, 34) to describe the same coming together for the Lord’s Supper 
and worship (cf. 1 Cor 14:23, 26). 
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In their practice of baptism and the Lord’s Supper, they have experienced Christ. 
Both of these practices should have informed them of the exclusive nature of their 
relationship with Christ. The initiation into (baptism) and maintenance of (Lord’s Supper) 
their relationship with Christ centered on the celebration of Christ, and both of these 
celebrations instruct the believers concerning the demanded exclusivity of the 
relationship. Paul thinks that there is an irreconcilable competition between devotion to 
Christ and association with idols (cf. 2 Cor 6:14).
104
 The Christian who has experienced 
Christ in baptism and continues to experience Christ in the Lord’s Supper must forsake 
associations with deceptive idols, which are really demons. 
Representations of God 
Both God and Lord 
First Corinthians 8 and 10, and especially 1 Cor 8:6, is a truly remarkable 
development of Jewish theology. On the one hand, it bears strong resemblance to Jewish 
streams of theology in which heaven was populated by more than just God (e.g., the 
logos for Philo or wisdom for Wisdom of Solomon), and on the other hand, it is 
revolutionary in attributing divine salvific activity to the Lord Jesus Christ.
105
 While 
many Jews described angelic figures with god-like attributes and in proximity to God, 
they almost unanimously maintained that these beings were not to be worshiped, and 
                                                          
104
 Although some consider this verse to be a later interpolation, the content certainly fits with 
Paul’s approach to the exclusive relationship with Christ. 
105
 Larry Hurtado (“First Century Jewish Monotheism,” 3-4) is especially helpful for 
understanding trends of Jewish thought about God. 
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“This is what makes the early readiness of monotheistic Christians to participate in the 
public cultic veneration of Jesus the most striking evidence that Christian devotion 
quickly constituted a significant innovation in Jewish Exclusivist monotheism.”106 Paul’s 
thought is so remarkably shaped by Christ that his theological instruction to the 
community puts God and the Lord in parallel relationship (1 Cor 8:6) and that God’s 
activity among the Israelites is analogous to Christ’s activity among the Corinthians (1 
Cor 10:1-22) 
Father/Creator 
For Paul, just like for Philo and Wisdom, God’s Fatherhood is connected to God’s 
role as Creator. In 1 Cor 8:6, it is the one Father God who is responsible for Creation, but 
the idea is not developed (as in Philo, that God is Father in the sense that he begets and 
guides all creation). Perhaps more significant than God’s Fatherhood being connected to 
creation is the connection between God’s Fatherhood and the Christ. Both First and 
Second Corinthians open: χάρις ὑμῖν καὶ εἰρήνη ἀπὸ θεοῦ πατρὸς ἡμῶν καὶ κυρίου Ἰησοῦ 
Χριστοῦ (1 Cor 1:3; 2 Cor 1:2).107 Grace and peace come from God the Father and the 
Lord Jesus Christ. More intriguing is that every mention of God’s Fatherhood in the 
Corinthian correspondence, with the exception of the quotation in 2 Cor 6:8, is connected 
to the Lord.  
                                                          
106
 Hurtado, “First-Century Jewish Monotheism,” 9. 
107
 Cf. Rom 1:7; 1 Cor 1:3; 2 Cor 1:2, 3; Gal 1:1, 3, 4; Eph 1:2, 3; Phil 1:2; Col 1:2, 3; 1 Thess 1:3; 
2 Thess 1:1, 2; 1 Tim 1:2; 2 Tim 1:2; Tit 1:4; Phlm 3. 
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In comparison to other Hellenistic Jewish idol polemics, 1 Cor 8-10 places less 
emphasis on the importance of God as Creator. Moreover, the Lord Jesus Christ is also 
active in creation (1 Cor 8:6; 10:26). Paul shifts the emphasis from God’s creative role to 
the salvific role of Christ. Drawing on the idol polemic in Isaiah 40-44, authors such as 
Philo and the author of Wisdom of Solomon explained the non-existence of idol-gods by 
appealing to God as the only Creator. Paul makes this same argument. In response to the 
reality of other gods being worshipped (1 Cor 8:4-5), Paul reminds the Christians that 
there is only One God who is the Creator (1 Cor 8:6a). That is, the category of Creator is 
only applicable to one being, the Father of our Lord. But the salvific role of the Lord 
Jesus Christ (1 Cor 8:6b) is the focus of Paul’s subsequent argument. Central to the 
argument in 1 Cor 8:7-13 is the common salvation that believers have in Christ and the 
resulting love for one another than should flow from that. 
Lord Jesus Christ 
It is safe to say that nothing influenced Paul’s theological framework more than 
his experience of the Lord Jesus Christ.
108
 The most significant thing that Paul can say 
about the Lord Jesus Christ is that he is the agent of their salvation. As mentioned above, 
the explanation of the Lord in 1 Cor 8:6 is primarily soteriological. While the confession 
                                                          
108
 In the Corinthian correspondence, it is difficult to perceive if there is any difference that Paul 
conveys with different titles: Lord, Jesus, or Christ. They all reference the one person. Hurtado (Lord Jesus 
Christ, 117.) notes, “There are thus three main types of Pauline contexts in which Jesus is characteristically 
referred to as Kyrios: (1) In hortatory statements and passages Jesus is the Lord/Master whose teaching and 
example are authoritative for believers. (2) In references to eschatological expectations, Jesus is designated 
the Lord who will comes again as agent of God. (3) In formulae and passages reflecting actions of the 
worship setting, Kyrios designates the unequaled status given to Jesus by God and is the characteristic title 
given to Jesus in the worship practices of early Christian circles.” 
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in 1 Cor 8:6 does not make explicit the nature of the soteriological relationship, in 8:11 
Paul makes the connection between the believer and Christ’s death on the believer’s 
behalf: ὁ ἀδελφὸς διʼ ὃν Χριστὸς ἀπέθανεν. The Corinthian Christian community, in all 
its diversity and disfunctionality, exists because Christ has died for them.  
 The significance of Christ’s activity does not end with his death on their behalf; 
rather, Paul understands Christ to have an ongoing presence and activity within the 
community. While chapter 8 mentions the salvific relationship between the believer and 
Christ, chapter 10 describes the present interaction between the believer and Christ. The 
Corinthians are warned in 1 Cor 10:9 not to test Christ. This draws on the narrative of the 
Wilderness Generation testing God’s patience and forbearance by engaging in sinful 
behavior. Concerning the Lord’s Supper, Hurtado comments,  
Clearly the Lord’s supper is here the Christian cult meal where the Lord Jesus 
plays a role that is explicitly likened to that of the deities of the pagan cults and, 
even more astonishingly, to the role of God! This is not merely a memorial feast 
for a dead hero. Jesus is perceived as the living and powerful Kyrios who owns 
the meal and presides at it, and with whom believers have fellowship as with a 
god.
109
 
 
The active role of Christ in the community of believers undergirds Paul’s argument about 
the Lord’s Supper in 1 Cor 10:14-22. The key word is κοινωνία. There is a close 
fellowship between the believer and the Lord in the celebration of the Lord’s Supper. 
Because both Christ and demons are active in their respective meals, the believer cannot 
participate in both and remain faithful to Christ. The greatest danger for the believer is to 
arouse the jealous anger of the Lord (1 Cor 10:22). The idea of Christ’s active presence in 
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 Hurtado, Lord Jesus Christ, 146. 
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judging and punishing abuses in the Lord’s Supper is elaborated in 1 Cor 11:27-34. 
While the theme of eschatological judge is present, the more highly emphasized role is 
the Lord as the really present judge in the community. The threat is not so much of a 
future judgment but rather that Christ might effect his judgment presently in the 
community (cf. 1 Cor 11:27-32). 
This active and jealous presence of the Lord seems to contrast the description of 
the Lord in 1 Cor 10:26. Here the Lord (originally referring to Yahweh but now probably 
interpreted by Paul to be a reference to Christ) is the one who possesses the whole earth. 
The Lord’s possession of all things is founded, as in other Jewish texts, on the fact that 
the Lord created all things. The representation of the Lord as Creator and Possessor of the 
earth is somewhat more distant than the representation of the Lord as the dynamically 
present Savior and Judge. And Paul uses this distinction to make different points. The 
active judging Lord warns the believer about unfaithfulness. And the unassailable 
Possessor of all things assures the believer of the Lord’s control in a pluralistic 
environment. 
Understandings of False Worship 
The fundamental differences that led to disagreement at Corinth were centered—not so 
much on who God is but rather—on the understanding of what an idol is in relationship 
to God. All parties—Paul, the Strong, and the Weak—could agree that there was one 
Creator God and there was one Lord and Savior. Their agreement about the identity of 
God means that Paul does not define false worship as thinking wrongly about God like 
Wisdom and Philo or even like Paul elsewhere (e.g., Rom 1; cf. 1 Cor 10:1). But they 
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disagreed concerning the practical implications of these beliefs with respect to other 
gods. The Strong seemed to have had a very narrow category for what constituted false 
worship. Presumably, the Strong thought false worship involved both the action of being 
in an idol’s presence and the personal belief in the reality of that idol. On the basis of 
God’s oneness, they argued that being in the idol’s presence alone would not constitute 
false worship. Coming out of a background (perhaps recently?) of worshipping idols, the 
Weak judged false worship to be either the action of being in the idol’s presence or 
personal belief in the reality of that idol. Paul understands that there are spiritual forces 
that oppose God’s reign, and these forces are focused especially on the worship of idols. 
False worship, for Paul, involves actions of devotion to something other than God, which 
constitute κοινωνία with demons. Idol gods are not real, but demons exist behind the 
worship of these false gods. Eating food in the presence of an idol is unfaithfulness to 
Christ depicted in the analogy of the fundamental incompatibility of the Lord’s Supper 
and a meal before an idol in the presence of demons. 
Conclusions 
After the time when Paul brought the gospel to these Corinthians and they began “to call 
on the name of our Lord Jesus Christ” (1 Cor 1:2) the church began to have serious issues 
as they reverted to practices characteristic of their pagan lifestyle. One such practice was 
the Strong faction’s desire to eat εἰδωλόθυτα (food sacrificed to an idol-god and eaten in 
the idol-god’s temple), and Paul viewed this as unacceptable practice on account of a 
believer’s obligations of love to other believers and of faithfulness to Christ. The 
approach of this analysis has been to look at how the representation of God functions in 
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Paul’s argument, especially in comparison to other Hellenistic Jewish idol polemics. 
While this is an argument made about the acceptability or non-acceptability of particular 
practices, it is an argument made on theological grounds, and these theological 
underpinnings have been largely unexplored. As Paul crafts his argument and attempts to 
make different points concerning the permissible interactions with idols and idol-food, he 
represents God in different, although compatible, ways. In 1 Cor 8, Paul affirms the 
Strong’s assertion that there is only one God, but Paul also begins to reframe their 
theological reasoning to focus on the dynamic soteriological role of the Lord Jesus Christ 
in the community. The fact that God is the sole Creator implies that he is the only God 
and is not threatened by so-called pagan gods, but the fact that Christ died for the 
Corinthian Christians means that they have obligations to other Christians. The 
significance of Christ’s soteriological role is even more pronounced in 1 Cor 10 where 
Christ’s active provision for and judgment of the Corinthians is analogous to God’s 
interactions with the Wilderness Generation. This comparison demonstrates to the Strong 
that God’s people can commit idolatry (contra Wisdom) and that God will judge even his 
own people. Moreover, the ongoing fellowship that the Corinthians have with Christ in 
the celebration of the Lord’s Supper demands that they not have fellowship with idol 
gods or demons. But then Paul assures the Corinthians that the Lord is Lord of 
everything, and idol-gods and demons do not threaten the Lord; thus, they can eat 
anything so long as it is sufficiently detached from the idol-god. By appealing on the one 
hand to God’s uniqueness as Creator and the other hand to the Lord’s dynamic 
soteriological relationship with the Christians, Paul is able both to preserve the idea of the 
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transcendent unassailability of God and give weight to the demands of a really present 
Savior.  
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CHAPTER 7 
 
SUMMARY, SYNTHESIS, AND SIGNIFICANCE 
 
Introduction 
Despite the prevalence of discussion concerning idolatry in Jewish texts—especially 
Hellenistic Jewish texts whose authors were living in a culture dominated by Greco-
Roman religion—the theme of idolatry is not dealt with extensively in early Christian 
texts. In the New Testament, Paul’s instructions in 1 Cor 8-10 stands alone as the only 
extended instruction concerning idolatry. The proper interpretation of these chapters has 
generated a great deal of debate because the flow of Paul’s argument is not immediately 
discernible to the modern reader. In agreement with some other recent analyses, I have 
made the case that 1 Cor 8-10 forms a unified and persuasive argument prohibiting the 
consumption of εἰδωλόθυτα (food sacrificed and eaten within the temple precincts). The 
Strong at Corinth should abstain from eating εἰδωλόθυτα on account of love for those for 
whom Christ died and on account of exclusive faithfulness to and fellowship with Christ. 
I have also suggested that a proper understanding of Paul’s argument must place 
him as a participant in larger conversations about idolatry occurring in Hellenistic 
Judaism. Much of this project was devoted to understanding how three particular 
Hellenistic Jewish texts (Wisdom, Philo’s De decalogo, and Josephus’ Contra Apionem) 
constructed their arguments about idols. Several things emerged from the analysis of 
these texts. Each of these authors made arguments about practice, and they made their 
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arguments on theological grounds. Their arguments involve a particular view of God that 
shapes how they view idols and interactions with idols. Understanding the strands of 
interpretation in the theological frameworks of Hellenistic Judaism allows us to 
understand more clearly Paul’s argument as he participates in these larger conversations 
about idolatry. Moreover, comparing these texts to First Corinthians enables us to 
appreciate more fully how Paul’s theological and practical thinking is shaped radically by 
his belief in the Lord Jesus Christ as Savior and Judge.  
This concluding chapter is organized into three parts: (1) summary of preceding 
chapters; (2) synthesis of the representations of God and definitions of false worship in 
Paul, Wisdom, Philo, and Josephus; and (3) explanation of the significance of this 
project.  
Summary of Preceding Chapters 
Chapter 1 
Chapter 1 noted the (apparent?) incoherence of Paul’s argument in First 
Corinthians 8-10 and reviewed some of the previous explanations of its coherence or 
incoherence. The approaches were broadly divided into those scholars who viewed 
chapters 8-10 as irreconcilably incoherent and those who sought to explain how they 
were coherent. The first group is comprised of source critics who partition these chapters 
into sections from many letters. Scholars in the second group made arguments for 
coherence on the basis of different dining locations and rhetorical structures. I sided with 
those seeking to explain Paul’s argument as a unified prohibition of eating food eaten in 
idols’ temples, which Paul argues is idolatry. Paul uses the rhetorical partitio in order to 
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quote and refute positions of the Strong. I suggested that an overlooked feature of Paul’s 
argument is the variation in the way that he represents God. While Paul gives instructions 
about particular practices (e.g., dining location, presence of idols, the conscience of 
others, etc.), he is making arguments on the basis of a particular view of the deity. This 
chapter showed that previous scholars have not examined closely the ways that Paul 
represents God and its implications on how idols are portrayed. Chapter 1 proposed that a 
helpful lens for understanding 1 Cor 8-10 would be to compare it with contemporary 
arguments made by Hellenistic Jews paying particular attention to the way that these 
authors represent God and its implications for their understanding of idols. 
Chapter 2 
While Chapter 1 showed that understanding how God is represented could 
provide a better understanding of what behavior is considered idolatrous, and thus 
prohibited, Chapter 2 demonstrated the complexity of the topic of idolatry in the 
Hellenistic Jewish world. Although scholars sometimes assume that Jews uniformly 
rejected any associations with idols, the reality is that all Hellenistic Jews interacted with 
idols to some degree. The discussions in Hellenistic communities were about the degree 
to which one could interact with idols and still be considered to be within the bounds of 
faithful Judaism. Hellenistic Jewish authors, just like Paul and the Corinthian Christians, 
were negotiating the boundaries of what it meant to be idolatrous, and thus inside or 
outside the community. Artapanus Fragment 3 and Joseph and Asenath were examined 
in order to demonstrate the poles in Hellenistic Judaism concerning the acceptable 
interactions with idols. On the one hand, Asenath is the example of piety because she 
304 
 
 
 
severs entirely any contact with idols, and on the other hand Artapanus describes pious 
Moses, the hero of Judaism, as the one who founded certain Egyptian idol cults and 
theriolatry. Even though these authors arose from a similar provenance, interpreted the 
same Scriptures, and considered themselves to be monotheistic, they came to radically 
different conclusions concerning the acceptable interactions that one could have with 
pagan gods. Both authors, like Paul, retold the past in order to instruct their communities 
about how to live in the present. This analysis showed that there was a variety of 
positions concerning what constituted idolatry and that these authors were defining the 
boundaries of acceptable and prohibited practices. 
The fact that the definition of idolatry was a matter of practice also meant that it 
involved a number of other issues. It determined the social interactions that the “pious” 
could have in the broader pagan culture. The definition of idolatry also defined the 
boundaries of the community. Those within the community do not practice behaviors that 
the community deemed to be idolatrous. But at the heart of these discussions were a 
series of theological issues as authors attempted to define what is God and non-god and 
also the danger or harmlessness of associating with non-gods. It was noted that one’s 
definition of God largely determines his/her category of non-god. Then I described some 
of the different ways that Paul represents God in 1 Cor 8-10. Paul was certainly not the 
first Hellenistic Jew to define idolatry and then prohibit it. Three other extended critiques 
of idolatry in Hellenistic Jewish texts provide a window into the way Hellenistic Jews 
were making arguments concerning pagan religion: the Wisdom of Solomon, Philo’s De 
decalogo, and Josephus’ Contra Apionem. With these texts serving as representatives of 
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arguments being made by Hellenistic Jews, we are in a position to examine where Paul 
reproduces, abandons, or modifies pre-existing traditions. At the outset we can note one 
thing that is unique about Paul’s approach: the risen Christ shapes how he understands 
the nature of the community and the activity of the divine among the community.  
Chapter 3 
Chapter 3 analyzed the critique against pagan religion in the Wisdom of Solomon. 
Drawing on Greco-Roman philosophy and rhetoric, Wisdom makes a sophisticated 
critique of Greco-Roman religious belief and practice in order to dissuade Jews from 
engaging in idolatry and bolster their pride in their ancestral beliefs. Throughout 
Wisdom, the author emphasizes that God provides for his people and punishes their 
enemies. Chapters 11-19 (describing wisdom’s role in the exodus) are cast in this 
polemical tone, and the critique of false religions in 13:1-15:19 is especially antagonistic.  
Wisdom organizes false religion into three categories: nature worship, idolatry, 
and theriolatry. Nature worshipers receive the least harsh rebuke because they genuinely 
sought God.  In the category of nature worshippers, Wisdom critiques Stoicism’s failure 
to distinguish God from nature by appealing to Platonism’s transcendent God, ὁ ὤν. But 
Platonism’s transcendent, unknowable God makes Himself known in self-revelation to a 
particular people in the Jewish Scriptures (Exod 3:14). While nature worshippers are 
guilty of incomplete inference, idol-craftsmen intentionally deceive the masses, and will 
receive the eschatological judgment of God. In their leisure and with base materials, 
woodcutters and potters craft gods in the forms of humans and animals. Idols are the 
works of human hands, and are twice removed from the divine. Wisdom heightens the 
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Prophets’ satire of idolatry, and makes two significant additions. Wisdom provides 
euhemeristic explanations for the origins of idolatry, emerging from the grief of a father 
or a desire to honor a distant ruler. And Wisdom asserts that the invention of idolatry is 
the source of all evil. Most foolish and miserable of all false worshippers are the 
Egyptians who engage in idolatry and also theriolatry. Even worse, the Egyptians 
worship the most hateful and useless kinds of animals. 
Wisdom 13-15, read in the context of the Book as a whole, argues that idolatry is 
a foolish pagan invention with disastrous effects including the sure punishment of God. 
On the one hand, Wisdom argues that God is utterly distinct from Creation. It is this 
distinction that makes nature worship flawed (because it does not perceive the 
distinction) and idolatry foolish (because God is different than that material world). But 
on the other hand, God is actively involved in the created world, especially with his elect 
people. God cares for his people, and punishes their wicked enemies. Analogous to the 
way God punished the Egyptians in the exodus, God’s eschatological judgment especially 
awaits idolaters and theriolaters who have thought wrongly about God, engaged in 
immoral action, and oppressed God’s people. 
Chapter 4 
The subject of Chapter 4 is Philo’s De decalogo, which fits into the broader 
corpus of Philo’s Exposition of the Law. In the Exposition, and especially in De 
decalogo, Philo explains the Jewish Law in order to assure Jews (and probably Gentile 
sympathizers) of its intellectual superiority and thereby to provide a convincing argument 
for its practice. Wisdom is more carefully structured than De decalogo, but De decalogo 
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evidences a deeper understanding of philosophy and more complex thought. Philo 
interprets the Law as the perfect expression of the law of nature, and he explains that the 
best philosophy finds its truest expression in the Law. Philo interprets Commandments 
One and Two to prohibit Greco-Roman religious belief and practice. He has the same 
three categories for pagan aberrations (nature worshippers, idolaters, and theriolaters) as 
Wisdom, and he arranges them in this order because that is the order in which the Law 
treats them. 
Philo interprets the First Commandment to be a prohibition of worshipping 
nature. Central to Philo’s theological thought is the fundamental ontological distinction 
between God and everything else. God exists within Himself and everything else is 
contingent upon the Creator. Philo can draw on the images for God in the LXX (e.g., 
Father, King, and Ruler), but he reinterprets these to refer to God’s creative role, not his 
interpersonal relationship with a particular people. For example, the worship of nature is 
honoring the subjects above the King. Those who worship nature rely only on their 
physical senses and deify the four elements, celestial bodies, the heavens, or the cosmos.  
But this is a category mistake of failing to recognize that the Craftsman is greater than his 
craft. 
The Second Commandment prohibits both idolatry and theriolatry. While nature 
worshippers deify those things that are the brothers of humans (i.e. they are direct 
creations of God), idolaters err more greatly by deifying soulless things. Philo identifies 
the cult image with the god, and argues that pagan gods are manmade in contrast to God 
who is the Self-Existent Creator. Philo does not repeat the scriptural descriptions of 
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idolatry as adultery and disloyalty (these images would define God anthropomorphically 
as Husband or King) or forsaking of ancestral customs (this would imply that the Law is 
not discernible through philosophical reflection on nature); rather, idolatry is an error of 
and harm to the soul. This definition of idolatry as harm to the soul corresponds to 
Philo’s presentation of the Law as the most wonderful support of the soul. The effect of 
being deceived by the craftsmen is that the idolater is miserable and leads a wretched life. 
Because piety can refer to thinking properly about God, impiety can be defined as 
thinking wrongly about God; thus, Philo expands the category of false worship from 
primarily external acts to include improper understandings of God (in contrast to the 
Scriptures on which he comments that define idolatry primarily as improper action). 
Philo dismisses theriolatry without making a logical argument against it; rather, he 
ridicules their foolishness and claims that everyone would agree with his assessment 
intuitively. The Egyptians pass over useful animals and worship the vilest of creatures, 
and visitors to Egypt even ridicule this folly. 
Chapter 5 
Chapter 5 analyzed the polemic against Greek religion in Josephus’ Contra 
Apionem. Perhaps no other historical person better demonstrates the challenges of 
Hellenistic Jews living under Roman rule than Josephus, who was formerly a leader of 
the Jewish resistance to Rome but then writes under the patronage of the Flavian 
emperors. The work is an apology for Jewish belief and practice. Although the implied 
audience is upper-class Romans, Josephus writes first and foremost to educated upper-
class Jews in order to encourage Jews about the respectability of Jewish belief and 
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practice and its superiority over other ways of life. Contra Apionem 2.236-286 explains 
Jewish religious difference from Greeks (especially as a defense of Jews being 
considered religiously intolerant and anti-social), and Josephus begins that explanation in 
C. Ap. 2.236-254 by leveling his critique of Greek gods. Josephus claims that he would 
prefer not to criticize other gods, but his opponents have forced him. Josephus’ main 
point is that Jews would be foolish to abandon their superior way of life (extolled in C. 
Ap. 2.145-235) for the foolishness of Greek belief and practice (critiqued in C. Ap. 2.236-
286). 
Josephus wants to align the best of philosophy with Judaism, and therefore he 
begins his critique of popular Greek religion by stating that Greek philosophers have 
repeatedly criticized popular Greek religious belief and practice. Rather than Judaism 
being an obscure sect, Greek philosophy actually proves it to me the truest way of life. 
Josephus, like most Jewish polemics against pagan religion, argues that the physicality of 
the cult statues demonstrates their non-reality, but Josephus is unique in focusing the bulk 
of his criticism on the myths about the gods, drawn primarily from Homer and Hesiod. 
He does not mount a logical argument as to why the myths about the Greek gods prove 
that they are not gods; rather, he describes the most outlandish myths and assumes his 
audience will agree that these gods are not really gods.  
The Greek gods are many, similar to humans, immoral, and subservient. The 
plurality of gods is unthinkable because that implies rankings and quarrels among the 
gods, and Josephus’ Jewish definition of God will not admit more than a singular God. 
Most foolish is that the Greeks have fashioned their gods into the forms of humans by 
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assigning them specific characteristics to embody, territories to rule, trades at which to 
work, and skills to have. In a reductio ad absurdum, Josephus questions why people 
would worship gods so immoral that their behavior would be most reprehensible if 
performed by humans. Moreover, the Greek gods are subservient to things internally 
(e.g., their passions) and externally (e.g., Fate). Josephus’ most extended critique is of the 
supreme god, Zeus, probably because Zeus could represent a temptation for Jews in a 
way that most gods would not. Most to be blamed for this folly are the legislators who 
did not reign in the poets and artisans. Greek legislators, generally praised in the ancient 
world for their wisdom, should have emulated Moses in making piety the foundation for 
humanity.  
Chapter 6 
In Chapter 6, this study turned to the examination of Paul’s instructions to the 
Corinthian Christians in 1 Cor 8-10. The form of First Corinthians is quite different than 
the preceding three texts in that it is a letter written to a specific community that has an 
ongoing relationship with the author. Paul founded the Christian community at Corinth 
and continues to have a significant role in shaping their belief and practice. Paul writes 
this letter of admonition in order to persuade them to live in light of their new calling and 
life in Christ and not be conformed to their former pagan ways of living.  While Paul 
draws on the Jewish Scriptures and Hellenistic Jewish interpretations of them, Paul’s 
belief is shaped radically by his understanding of who Christ is and his active presence in 
the Corinthian Christian community. The letter has an episodic character as Paul gives 
instruction on a number of practical issues, first about oral reports and then about written 
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questions. In chapters 8-10, Paul gives instructions to the community concerning food 
associated with idols, with the majority of the instruction focusing on εἰδωλόθυτα (food 
sacrificed and eaten within the temple precincts). Paul consistently prohibits Christians 
from eating εἰδωλόθυτα by appealing first to their obligation to love one another and then 
to their obligations of exclusive faithfulness to Christ.    
Paul employs a rhetorical device, the partitio, in order to quote the Corinthians 
and then refute their positions. While the original audience would have known well the 
lines of argumentation, the identification of the Strong’s positions is not as clear to 
modern readers. It seems that a certain “Strong” faction in the community—probably 
motivated by their desires for social advancement and pleasure—has claimed that 
associations with idols are permissible because idol-gods do not exist. That is, their 
monotheism has provided justification for their permissive attitudes toward εἰδωλόθυτα. 
They base their actions on the confession that Paul delivered to them (1 Cor 8:6) which 
affirms One God the Creator and One Lord, the agent of both creation and salvation. In 
chapter 10, Paul will explain that the Strong do not have the “right” to eat this food, but 
in chapter 8 he entertains this pseudo-right in order to explain that Christian action is 
based on love for those for whom Christ died. The Weak in Corinth have witnessed the 
confident actions of the Strong and as a result the consciences of the Weak are harmed so 
that they are unsure of what faithfulness to Christ entails. He makes two arguments from 
the lesser to the greater to explain that the “right” to do something should be sacrificed 
because of what Christ has done. If Paul is willing to give up all meat for the sake of 
other Christians (1 Cor 8:13), the Strong should be willing to give up this specific meat. 
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And if Paul is willing to sacrifice his legitimate rights for the sake of other Christians 
(chapter 9), the Strong should be willing to sacrifice their pseudo-right. 
In chapter 10, Paul’s prohibition of εἰδωλόθυτα is made on the basis of exclusive 
devotion to Christ who saves and judges the Corinthian Christian community. He 
explains that the blessings enjoyed by Corinthians are analogous to the blessings enjoyed 
by the Wilderness Generation. Nevertheless, Paul says that their enjoyment of blessing 
from God did not mean that God was pleased with them because God judged and 
punished them. The idolatrous actions of the Wilderness Generation and God’s judgment 
of them serve as examples and warnings for the Corinthians, so that they “not be idolaters 
as some of them were!” (1 Cor 10:7). Paul appeals primarily to four narratives drawn 
from the Wilderness Generation: the Golden Calf (Exodus 32), intermarriage with the 
Midianites (Numbers 25), judgment by serpents (Numbers 21), and grumbling in the 
wilderness (Numbers 16). These narratives warn the Corinthians that God does not 
tolerate idolatry among God’s people, and then Paul commands, “Therefore, my beloved, 
flee idolatry!” (1 Cor 10:17). The most forceful argument that Paul makes is that the 
Christian celebration of the Lord’s Supper constitutes a κοινωνία with Christ analogous 
to the pagans’ κοινωνία with demons in their worship of idol-gods. Christians are 
obligated to exclusive faithfulness to Christ, as indicated by the singularity of one cup 
and one loaf in the Lord’s Supper, and their eating of εἰδωλόθυτα compromises that 
devotion. Even more severe is that their eating of εἰδωλόθυτα arouses the jealousy of 
Christ which none of them could bear. While Paul is on the topic of food associated with 
idols, he discusses two other contexts in which a Christian might encounter this food: the 
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meat market and at a non-believer’s house. In these cases, the Christian has the freedom 
to eat the food (so long as no one indicates that the food has been sacrificed) because all 
the earth is God’s creation. 
Synthesis of Arguments by Paul, Wisdom, Philo, and Josephus 
One of the goals of this study has been to understand these authors on their own terms, 
but it is also helpful to synthesize some of the streams of interpretation in Hellenistic 
Judaism in order to compare these authors’ arguments. The challenge for Jews and 
Christians in talking about idolatry is the balance between representing God as personally 
present and thus affected by human actions or removed and thus non-threatened by 
human actions. If God is represented as the unassailable Creator (and thus slightly 
distanced from the community), the consequences of idolatry are not that God will judge 
the offender; rather, the consequences of idolatry are internalized to be harming one’s 
soul. Conversely, if God has a personal and active presence among the community, there 
is a danger of offending God and incurring God’s wrath. These authors are wrestling with 
the balance of representing God in a way that protects God’s uniqueness and also allows 
them to prohibit idolatrous actions. For these authors, theological arguments were 
eminently practical. They affected what were permissible and impermissible actions and 
thereby established the boundaries of the community. These four authors were all 
concerned to preserve monotheism while also making a persuasive argument about not 
engaging improperly with the religious beliefs of the Greco-Roman culture. 
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Representations of God 
One of the central things that this study has shown is that arguments concerning 
the permissibility or prohibition of certain actions involve a certain view of the deity, and 
the specific manner in which God is represented shapes the argument. When these 
authors vary the way that God is represented, they are making deliberate choices with 
implications on their arguments. It is difficult to say if their theological understanding of 
God drives their conclusions about the acceptability of certain actions or if their practice 
drives certain theological emphases—likely it is a combination of both factors. This 
interplay between theology and practice makes understanding the representation of God a 
crucial aspect of understanding these authors’ arguments and conclusions. 
Most Jews would have understood God’s role as Creator to be one of the primary 
representations of God (with God’s representation as Redeemer/Deliverer in the exodus 
also being of central significance). It was a common mode of argumentation to discredit 
other gods by claiming that the Jewish God alone was Creator. Wisdom and Philo, 
interpreting the LXX through the lens of Platonic philosophy, make the ontological 
distinction between God and everything else on the grounds that God is the self-existent 
Creator and everything else is dependent creation—only the Creator is worthy of 
worship. Paul implicitly agrees with this distinction, but Paul also affirms the significance 
of Christ by attributing creative (and more importantly salvific) agency to him. The role 
of Christ in creation represents a remarkable shift in this stream of interpretation because 
Philo and Wisdom reinforce God’s oneness by appealing to God’s role as Creator. 
Stemming especially from the centrality of the Shema in Jewish religious life, the oneness 
315 
 
 
 
of God was an engrained tenet of Jewish belief. Josephus attacks the ridiculousness of the 
gods especially because of the theological problems of polytheism; in fact, it was the 
Jewish practice of monotheism in worship that necessitated Josephus’ defense in the first 
place. The centrality of belief in God as the only Creator carries over into Pauline 
Christianity, so that no one in Corinth seems to be questioning this theological 
proposition. 
While Greek and Roman gods share many qualities with humans, Hellenistic Jews 
insisted on speaking of God in non-anthropomorphic terms, which meant that they had to 
interpret carefully the (apparent?) anthropomorphisms in the Septuagint. The likeness of 
Greek gods to humans and even animals was a source of great ridicule by Josephus. 
Similarly Wisdom and Philo eschewed the notion that God was like humans. The 
challenge for these authors was how to interpret the Jewish Scriptures in a way that did 
not denigrate them but also in a way that could explain the anthropomorphic 
representations as descriptions of deeper realities. Philo bluntly states, “God is not like a 
human” (Decal. 32). This rejection of anthropomorphic descriptions of God is central to 
the manner in which he interprets the imagery of God in the Jewish Scriptures. Philo 
maintains the anthropomorphic images, but the representation of God as King describes 
his sovereign control (Decal. 51, 52, 61, 155) and God as Father describes his creative 
acts (Decal. 32, 51, 53, 64, 105,107). Similarly, Wisdom avoids anthropomorphic 
descriptions of God and prefers categories such as Creator and True Existence. Although 
Wisdom avoids anthropomorphic descriptions of God, it does not follow that Wisdom’s 
God is impersonal. The idol polemic is situated within a section in which Wisdom 
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describes how God has acted on behalf of God’s people, and the apostrophes in the idol 
polemic are directed to a personal God. Wisdom describes this universal Creator as “our 
God” who has special care for a particular people. While Wisdom can use the Father 
imagery to describe God’s providential control of creation (e.g., 14:2-3), Wisdom can 
also use the Father imagery to describe God as the covenantal Father. In some instances, 
the Fatherhood of God is implied by the designation “your people” because God’s people 
are described as God’s children (e.g., Wis 9:7; 12:19; 18:13). God’s people are also 
identified more specifically as the righteous (Wis 2:13, 18; 5:5; 18:7), not idolaters (Wis 
15:14-15), and God’s people in every case are understood to be Israel (Wis 9:7, 12; 
12:19; 16:2, 3, 5, 20; 18:3, 13; 19:2, 5, 22). The demonstrations of God’s providential 
control are in God’s care for particular Jewish heroes: Moses (14:3) and Noah (14:5-7). 
The apostrophe to God in Wis 15:1-5 alludes to description of God in Exodus 34 when 
the covenant is renewed. God has entered into a covenantal relationship with a particular 
people, and God acts in history to care for them. Wisdom 10-19 (cf. 16:1-4) is a 
description of how God exercises sovereign control over the cosmos to care for God’s 
people and punish their enemies. Philo is deeply committed to his Jewish community, but 
his approach in De decalogo is different from Wisdom because Philo meticulously 
removes particularizing elements from the Sinai narrative.
1
 While Exodus 19 and 20 
make the covenantal context of the giving of the Law explicit, Philo omits this element 
along with particularizing ethnic descriptions of the people to whom the Law was given. 
                                                          
1
 See Trent A. Rogers, “Philo’s Universalization of Sinai in Decal. 32-49,” SPhilo 24 (2012): 89-
109. 
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Paul seems much less concerned to reinterpret the anthropomorphic descriptions of God; 
rather, Paul can attribute personal qualities to Christ in order to show the severity of the 
Corinthians’ offense. Moreover, the language of God as Father from the LXX is applied 
to the relationship between God and Christ.  Paul understands the divine Christ to have 
physical properties, not only in his death (1 Cor 8:11), but also as having continuing 
impact in the community (1 Cor 10:16-17). 
While Philo and Josephus do not hold out the threat of God’s direct judgment, 
Wisdom and Paul think that unfaithfulness to God has the potential to result in God’s 
judgment. God cares deeply for God’s people and will punish the oppressor’s of God’s 
people. In the first section of Wisdom, the author describes the hope of the righteous as 
God’s eschatological judgment of the wicked (e.g., Wis 3:10; 4:16-5:14), and in the idol 
polemic, Wisdom promises that God hates and will punish both the idol and the idolater, 
who are identified as the enemies of God’s people (Wis 14:9-14, 30-31). This description 
of God’s direct judgment in vindication of God’s people corresponds to the more 
personal description of God in Wisdom. The immanency of judgment is not as explicit in 
Wisdom, however, as it is in Paul’s 1 Corinthians in which Christ’s judgment manifests 
itself in the immediate punishment of offenders (e.g., 1 Cor 11:30). Wisdom describes 
how God punished the wicked in the past and holds out the hope of future judgment, but 
there is little thought of God’s active presence among the community in the present. For 
Paul, there is a very real danger that the actions of the Corinthians could arouse the 
jealous wrath of the Lord that could be realized both presently and in the future (1 Cor 
10:21-22). 
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Defining False Worship 
Corresponding to an author’s definition of God is his definition of what is false 
worship, and just as God is represented variously so also false worship is defined 
variously.
2
 As mentioned above, Wisdom and Philo make a fundamental ontological 
distinction between God and everything else. God is the self-existent Creator, and 
everything else belongs to the category of “non-God.” Drawing on the distinction 
between God’s essence and everything else, Philo argues that worshipping or ascribing 
divinity to anything other than God is false worship. Philo’s understanding of false 
worship is the deification of anything that is created (either by God or, worse, by 
humans). Nature and the celestial bodies are the “brothers” of humans, and it is absurd to 
worship as divine one’s brother because the two are of the same nature (Decal. 64). 
Failure to distinguish between Creator and creation is tantamount to not distinguishing 
between the subject and the ruler (Decal. 61, 64). Even worse than worshipping nature is 
worshipping idols that lack souls. The human, by possessing a soul, is superior to the 
soulless idol, so it is nonsensical for the human to worship the idol (Decal. 76). Wisdom 
appeals to the ontological distinction between God (who is self-existent) and humans 
                                                          
2
 A common understanding of false worship in the Jewish Scriptures is to forsake the Jewish 
ancestral religion, but these authors do not make arguments along those lines. Perhaps, they abandon this 
traditional line of argumentation because their audiences (whether or not it is the implied or intended 
audience) include those outside the ancestral tradition. Because pagans should be able to understand God 
and right action analogically by observing nature, Wisdom and Philo criticize pagans for their inability to 
think rightly about God and worship properly. Philo and Josephus note that the best Greek philosophers 
have been able to understand something about who God is. Thus, these authors do not argue for the 
audience to reject the alien cult; rather, they attempt to demonstrate the foolishness of Greco-Roman 
religious expressions. Even though Paul appeals to the Jewish Scriptures and describes the Israelites as “our 
fathers” (1 Cor 10:1), he is writing to Gentiles who have believed in Jesus as the Christ. So the appeal not 
to forsake ancestral religion would make little sense. 
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(who are contingent upon God) in order to explain that idols lack souls (Wis 15:8, 16-17). 
Humans have borrowed souls and are unable to impart souls to their creations, the idols. 
Josephus’ argument is slightly different because he discredits the gods as divine, not by 
criticizing their ontology, but rather by describing their behavior as unbefitting for God. 
The pagan gods are numerous (C. Ap. 2.239, 2.251), humanlike (C. Ap. 2.240, 2.242;), 
animal-like (C. Ap. 2.240), immoral (C. Ap. 2.241, 2.2446), and enslaved (C. Ap. 2.247). 
All of these qualities do not belong to the category of “God” and thus, they disprove the 
reality of the gods. The category mistake of worshipping something other than God is 
also what lies behind Philo and Wisdom’s critiques of animal worship, a practice 
especially characteristic of their Alexandrian context. While no animal belongs to the 
category of “God,” the Egyptians are even so foolish as to worship the worst of animals 
(e.g., Wis 15:18-19; Philo, Decal.79-80). 
Wisdom and Philo want to promote Judaism as the truest philosophy, and this 
emphasis has implications for how competing philosophies are treated. If Judaism is 
primarily a religion of personal and corporate devotion to God, then it makes sense to 
describe non-devotion as betrayal. But if Judaism is a philosophy, (even while 
recognizing that “philosophy” in the ancient world describes a way of life) then deviation 
from Jewish worship is a cognitive error expressed in improper practice. For Philo, the 
primary category of describing false worship is cognitive error; thus, he redefines idolatry 
from being an external act of worship to an internal error of the soul. More fundamental 
than the external acts of improper worship is the ignorance of idolaters about who God is 
(e.g., Philo, Decal. 8; cf. Spec. 1.331-332; Ebr. 108-110; Conf. 144). Philo also describes 
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nature worship as a delusion or wandering from the truth (Decal. 52, 66). For Wisdom, 
the nature worshipper is guilty of error and ignorance (13:1), but this person has made a 
genuine attempt to seek God (13:6). Wisdom’s broad category for false worship is 
incorrect thinking about God. This is evident both in explicit texts (e.g., Wis 13:2, 10; 
15:15) and the mockery with which Wisdom treats the process of making idols—it is a 
foolish endeavor. The idolaters will be punished (not just for their actions but also) 
because they have thought incorrectly about God (Wis 14:30; cf. 14:22). Having 
described the folly of Greek myths about the gods, Josephus labels these thoughts as 
“irregular and erroneous conceptions of the deity.”3 Josephus does not first and foremost 
critique Greek religious practice, but he focuses on their beliefs in the gods. These 
erroneous conceptions arise from the legislators’ ignorance about God (C. Ap. 2.251).  
  The masses are simply deceived, but the artists, poets, and painters intentionally 
deceive of the masses. Wisdom, Philo, and Josephus are in line with the majority of 
Jewish thought about God in the rejection of physical representations of God’s image 
(see esp. Josephus, C. Ap. 2.191). Thus, they reject the Greco-Roman images as impious 
and mock those who craft them and trust in them. Wisdom especially accredits ill-will to 
the artisans who intentionally deceive the masses, so that the error of idolatry seems to be 
intentional on the part of the craftsman and simply foolish on the part of most common 
worshippers (Wis 15:3). Philo argues that because the idol-gods do not exist and 
craftsmen know that they do not exist, the craftsmen use every deception at their disposal 
                                                          
3
 Josephus, C. Ap. 2.250 (Thackeray, LCL). 
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to convince people that the idol-gods are real. Sculptors and painters (Decal. 7-8, 66, 70, 
esp. Spec. 1.29), craftsmen (Decal. 71), and mythmakers (Decal. 55; Post. 165) conspire 
to deceive the masses into false belief about the idol’s reality. Josephus blames the 
legislators for not reigning in the painters and poets (C. Ap. 2.251-2). In contrast to 
Wisdom and Philo, Josephus does not accredit ill-will to the artisans. They simply 
introduce the gods that they choose. 
In both De decalogo and De specialibus legibus, Philo argues that the First 
Commandment prohibits polytheism because polytheism, like nature worship, is the 
deification of the created (Decal. 65; Spec. preface; 1.331-2, 344; cf. Migr. 179; Her. 
169; Virt. 212). For Philo, the First Commandment also instructs about God’s oneness 
with the implication that polytheism is altogether flawed. Wisdom and Josephus would 
agree with Philo, but they do not make the distinction as neatly. Josephus begins with the 
idea that God is one and goes on to criticize the pagan multiplication of gods. He 
describes how the idea of polytheism is erroneous by describing the inconsistencies and 
nonsensical categories into which the gods are forced. The ridiculousness of a plurality of 
deities evidences itself as the various gods are confined to specific realms (C. Ap. 2.240), 
fight each other (C. Ap. 2.243), and abuse one another (C. Ap. 2.245). While Philo attacks 
the categorization itself (polytheism is flawed because there can be only one being in the 
category of God), Josephus attacks the specific example of polytheistic belief (Greek 
polytheism contains numerous errors.). 
Philo wants to promote the communal practice of the Law in Alexandria, but to 
defend the Law as the best philosophy he describes the Law as being directed at an 
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individual’s soul (Decal. 50, 58). By internalizing the Law, the benefits and 
consequences of obedience are realized in the soul of an individual. Corresponding to his 
internalization of the Law, Philo also internalizes the sin of idolatry. Philo’s argument 
throughout the Exposition of the Law is that the piety prescribed in the Mosaic Law can 
be arrived at even by non-Jews by examining nature and philosophy. This consistent 
assertion implies that Gentiles are inexcusable for their false worship even though they 
did not receive the explicit prohibition of idolatry in the Mosaic Law. Even the origin of 
idolatry is not located external to humans (such as in the rebellion of angels); rather, 
idolatry originates in the pride of human hearts (Decal. 6) or in human desire to venerate 
another (Wis 14:12-21). 
 In regard to the definition of false worship, Paul is somewhat different than the 
other authors because he focuses on false worship as improper practice and association 
(κοινωνία). Paul clearly thinks that worship of pagan gods and idols constitutes false 
worship, and the Corinthians seem to agree. The Israelites engaged in false worship by 
representing God in the golden calf, and pagan sacrifices constitute false worship because 
they are really participating with demons. But do the Strong engage in false worship 
when they participate in meals in an idol’s temple? Paul argues that this constitutes false 
worship because they participate with demons and this action is incompatible with their 
celebration of the Lord’s Supper. Paul’s category of false worship includes anything that 
is incompatible with a believer’s undivided devotion to Christ. Paul is much less 
concerned with the activity of pagans—idolatry is a real danger for those inside the 
community (contra Wisdom). 
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Understandings of Idols 
Both Wisdom and Philo direct the majority of their polemic against false religion 
at ridiculing the idolatrous practices of pagans. This emphasis is due to several factors, 
one of which is the visibility and pervasiveness of idolatry. One cannot also help but 
wonder if idol worship presents an easy target as it is easily misrepresenting and 
criticized as foolish. Additionally, rejection of images (and thus foreign gods in the form 
of images) was a well-known Jewish distinction from pagans that often resulted in Jews 
being ridiculed as atheists. Wisdom contains extended mockeries of idol craftsman—the 
woodcutter (Wis 13:11-14:2) and the potter (Wis 15:7-13)—critiques that are 
elaborations on the mockeries that Isaiah 44 makes of idol manufacturers. The 
description of the idol-makers’ activities is nothing new, but Wisdom provides the 
philosophical underpinnings of these mockeries. Humans have borrowed souls, so they 
are not capable of imparting life. Wisdom criticizes the non-reality of pagan idols 
because they are crafted by one who does not have the ability to impart the spirit to them 
(Wis 13:10; 13:16-19; 14:29; 15:16-17). Only God, who is Self-Existent, has the ability 
to impart life. Like Deutero-Isaiah and Philo, Wisdom makes a complete identification 
between the idol and the god. As I have argued, this is not a naïve approach on the part of 
these Hellenistic Jewish authors. They knew that pagans understood cult images as 
physical representations of the god’s presence. Because these Jews denied the existence 
of the god, they reasoned that the only thing that is real about the god is its material cult 
statue. Then the non-reality of the gods is evidenced in the fact that their idols do not 
move, speak, or act. Similarly, Philo reduces Greco-Roman cultic worship to the worship 
324 
 
 
 
of physical images. It is fairly easy to prove that cult images are not divine on account of 
their composition (their substance is used for common and cultic uses), activity (they 
have no capacity for action and are not the causes of anything), and existence (they are 
recent creations by humans) (Decal.66). The images are dead and dumb. One of Philo’s 
recurring descriptions for pagan gods is that they are manmade because he believes them 
to have no existence beyond the physical image that was crafted. Philo even mocks idol 
worshippers because they would not want to become like their gods (Philo, Decal. 74; cf. 
Spec. 2.256; Ps. 115:5-8). Josephus is different in this regard because he does not identify 
the god entirely with the image. He focuses his critique on the activity attributed to the 
gods in Greek myths. He does mention the composition of images (C. Ap. 2.252) and that 
no material is sufficient to represent God (C. Ap. 2.191), but his critique is focused on the 
myths about the gods, not their physical representation.  
A major difference between the immaterial God and the gods made of wood and 
stone is that the pagan gods, being identified with the perishable materials of their cult 
images, are not eternal; they are subsequent to the creation of the material world. Unlike 
God, idols were not from the beginning. How then did idols come to exist? Wisdom 
offers an euhemeristic explanation of the idols’ existence in terms of a grieving father or 
an attempt to honor a distant monarch. Wisdom also makes the claim that idolatry is the 
source of all evil, and Wisdom describes pagan immorality in contrast to the 
righteousness of the Jews. Philo and Josephus do not give extended euhemeristic 
explanations for the origins of idolatry, and they place the blame for idolatry on artists. 
They argue that Moses legislated piety into the laws because he had a proper conception 
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of God. Those legislators who copied Moses did so inadequately because they removed 
proper theology from the laws. This oversight created space for artists and poets to 
degenerate into polytheistic myths. 
Paul’s understanding of idols is heavily indebted to streams of Jewish 
interpretations. On the one hand, he agrees with a stream of interpretation that identifies 
the god with the physical idol and thus reasons that the gods are dead and inactive (cf. the 
Prophets, Wisdom, Philo, and Josephus). This is the interpretation of the Strong with 
which Paul agrees (1 Cor 8:4; 10:19-21; cf. 1 Thess 1:9). But he also draws on a stream 
of interpretation in Judaism that thinks that demons are behind the worship of idol gods. 
Idols indeed are nothing, but demons are real and oppose the lordship of Christ among 
the Corinthians. 
Significance of this Study 
This study has sought to understand Paul’s argument in 1 Cor 8-10 in light of its contexts, 
especially the contexts of Hellenistic Judaism, First Corinthians, and Greco-Roman 
rhetoric. I have argued that Paul uniformly prohibits Christians from eating food 
sacrificed to idols and eaten in an idol’s temple. I am certainly not the first to make this 
argument; indeed, my proposal would be somewhat suspect if it was entirely novel. My 
contribution has been to show how Paul argues by employing various representations of 
God in order to make particular points about the essence of idols and the acceptable 
interactions with them. In choosing different representations of God to make different 
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points about idols, Paul is drawing on and shaping the streams of interpretation in 
Hellenistic Judaism as he reads them in light of Christ. 
 Although the primary goal of this study is to come to a better understanding of 
Paul’s argument in 1 Cor 8-10, Paul’s argument does not make sense apart from 
understanding it in the context of Hellenistic Jewish attempts to interact with the Greco-
Roman world. One contribution of this study is to come to a better understanding of the 
polemics made by Wisdom, Philo, and Josephus. Only after these authors were analyzed 
thoroughly in their own right, was the attempt made to compare and contrast them. Each 
of these authors was making an argument about permissible or impermissible practice, 
but they made their arguments on theological grounds. The manner in which they 
represented God affected the way that they understood idols and the potential dangers of 
associating with idols. Even though these texts were written by Hellenistic Jews who 
were interpreting the Septuagint, they show variation in the way that they represent God 
and idols. The similarities of these polemics highlight their interconnectedness as streams 
of thought in larger Hellenistic Jewish interpretation while their differences highlight the 
complexity of the issue and the range of interpretations. This extended analysis of 
Hellenistic Jewish texts seems at first to be the long way of gaining an understanding of 
Paul, but there is a thickness to Hellenistic Judaism that necessitates careful analysis to 
understand it properly. 
 Only after these authors have been understood thoroughly and correctly do they 
provide a helpful context for understanding Paul’s arguments. The majority of Paul’s 
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argument draws on streams of interpretation already existing in Judaism. But the role of 
Christ radically shapes Paul’s theological grid and takes the polemic against idolatry in 
new directions. Both in terms of its communal impact (ch. 8) and in terms of faithfulness 
to God (ch. 10), the controlling thought is the salvific role of Christ. Paul’s novelty can 
be appreciated when it is read in the context of these Hellenistic Jewish polemics. 
Comparing Paul to other Hellenistic Jewish authors—especially in the way in which they 
represent God in their idol polemics—provides a clearer understanding of the coherence 
of Paul’s argument. Paul draws on the breadth of representations of God in order to make 
a persuasive argument prohibiting the Corinthians from eating εἰδωλόθυτα. 
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Festschrift für Erich Grässer zum siebzigsten Geburtstag / herausgegeben von 
Martin Evang, Helmut Merklein und Michael Wolter. Edited by Martin Evang, 
Helmut Merklein, Michael Wolter. Beihefte zur Zeitschrift für die 
neutestamentliche Wissenschaft und die Kunde der älteren Kirche 89. Berlin: de 
Guyter, 1997. 
Horrel, David G. “Theological Principle or Christological Praxis? Pauline Ethics in 1 
Corinthians 8:1-11:1.” Journal for the Study of the New Testament 67 (1997): 83-
114. 
 
 
 
336 
 
——. “Idol-Food, Idolatry and Ethics in Paul.” Pages 120-140 in Idolatry: False Worship 
in the Bible, Early Judaism and Christianity. Edited by Stephen C. Barton. New 
York: T & T Clark, 2007. 
Horsley, Richard A. “The Background of the Confessional Formula in 1 Kor 8, 6.” 
Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft und die Kunde der älteren 
Kirche 69 (1978): 130-135. 
——. “Consciousness and Freedom among the Corinthians: 1 Cor 8-10,” Catholic 
Biblical Quarterly 40 (1978): 574-89. 
——. “Gnosis in Corinth: 1 Corinthians 8:1-6.” New Testament Studies 27 (1980): 32-51. 
Hurd, John Coolridge, Jr. The Origins of 1 Corinthians. New York: Seabury Press, 1965. 
Hurtado, Larry W. “First Century Jewish Monotheism.” Journal for the Study of the New 
Testament 71 (1998): 3-26 
——. Lord Jesus Christ: Devotion to Jesus in Earliest Christianity. Grand Rapids: 
Eeerdmans, 2003. 
Hyldahl, Niels.  “Paul and Hellenistic Judaism in Corinth.” Pages 204-16 in The New 
Testament and Hellenistic Judaism. Edited by Peder Borgen and Søren Giversen. 
Peabody, Mass.: Hendrickson, 1997. 
Jewett, Robert. “The Redaction of 1 Corinthians and the Trajectory of the Pauline 
School.” Journal of the American Academy of Religion Supplemental Series 46 
(1978): 398-444. 
Josephus. Translated by H. St. J. Thackeray et al. 10 vols. Loeb Classical Library. 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1926–1965. 
Kasher, Aryeh. “Polemic and Apologetic Methods of Writing in Contra Apionem.” Pages 
143-186 in Josephus’ Contra Apionem: Studies in its Character and Context with 
a Latin Concordance to the Portion Missing in Greek. Edited by Louis H. 
Feldman and John R. Levison. Leiden: Brill, 1996. 
Kee, H. C. “The Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs.” Pages 775-828 in Apocalyptic 
Literature and Testaments.  Edited by James H. Charlesworth. Vol. 1 of The Old 
Testament Pseudepigrapha. Edited by James H. Charlesworth. Peabody, MA: 
Hendrickson, 1983. 
Kim, Seyoon. “Imatatio Christi (1 Corinthians 11:1): How Paul Imitates Jesus Christ in 
Dealing with Idol Food (1 Corinthians 8-10).” Bulletin for Biblical Research 13 
(2003): 193-226. 
 
 
 
337 
 
Kolarcik, Michael. “The Book of Wisdom: Introduction, Commentary, and Reflections.” 
Pages 435-600 in Vol. 5 of The New Interpreter’s Bible. Edited by Leander E 
Keck. 12 vols. Nashville: Abingdon, 1997. 
——. “Solomon, Wisdom of.” Pages 330-34 in Volume 5 of The New Interpreter’s 
Dictionary of the Bible. Edited by Katherine Doob Sakenfeld. 5 vols. Nashville: 
Abingdon, 2006. 
Konradt, Matthias. “Die korinthische Weisheit und das Wort vom Kreuz: Erwägungen 
zur korinthischen Problemkonstellation und paulinischen Intention in 1 Kor 1-4.” 
Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft und die Kunde der älteren 
Kirche 94 (2003): 181-214. 
Kern, Philip H. Rhetoric and Galatians: Assessing an Approach to Paul’s Epistle. New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1998. 
Kerst, Rainer. “1 Kor 8,6: ein vorpaulinisches Taufbekenntnis?” Zeitschrift für die 
neutestamentliche Wissenschaft und die Kunde der älteren Kirche 66 (1975): 130-
139. 
Kraemer, Ross S. When Asenath met Joseph: A Late Antique Tale of the Biblical 
Patriarch and His Egyptian Wife, Reconsidered. New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1998. 
Laato, Timo. Paul and Judaism: An Anthropological Approach. Translated by T. 
McElwain. South Florida Studies in the History of Judaism 115. Atlanta: 
Scholar’s Press, 1995. 
Lambrecht, Jan. “Universalism in 1 Cor 8:1-11:1?” Gregorianum 77 (1996): 333-339. 
Lanhgkammer, Hugolinus. “Literarische und theologische Einzelstücke in 1 Kor. Viii. 6.” 
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